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Abstract
This thesis is a study of the factors that influence and shape Japan’s official development 
assistance to the Pacific island countries. It is a case study of Japan’s aid diplomacy and 
contributes to the broader debate about what drives Japan’s aid program and how to 
interpret Japan’s role as an aid donor. The thesis argues that the issue of access to the 
region’s fisheries resources has profoundly influenced and politicised Japan’s aid 
relations with the Pacific island countries. But other political and strategic agendas have 
also shaped Japan’s aid diplomacy with the region. These motivated the Kuranari 
Doctrine, Japan’s major statement of principles underlying its foreign policy with the 
Pacific islands.
Through analysis of Japan’s fisheries aid diplomacy, the Kuranari Doctrine and 
Japan’s approach to multilateral aid policy frameworks, the thesis shows how, over time, 
policies may be driven by competing interests and objectives. The study demonstrates 
how different aid policies may be formulated by different parts of the aid bureaucracy, 
often without close coordination. This analysis builds on perspectives of Japan’s aid 
administration, especially the bureaucratic politics approach and the ‘modified strong 
state paradigm’. While the former emphasises inter-ministry conflicts and rivalry, the 
latter stresses coordination between government and private sector interests in ODA 
policy. This study suggests that neither perspective, on its own, provides an adequate 
explanation of the economic, political and bureaucratic factors shaping Japan’s aid 
policies to the Pacific island countries, and the way these have changed over time. While 
there is close coordination between government and private sector actors in order to 
advance strategic economic interests, coordination within the aid administration is more 
problematic.
The thesis challenges assumptions, implicit in much of the literature on Japan’s 
ODA, that there is a coherent set of aid policies and that Japan’s ODA program has 
evolved in a rational way from a narrow economic focus to encompass broader 
diplomatic and political considerations. It suggests, instead, that there are tensions within 
the aid program, especially between economic and political objectives. The study 
highlights the way the Pacific island countries have challenged Japan’s economic 
dominance through a combination of collective diplomacy, alliance building and 
exploiting international regimes (the Law of the Sea Convention). The Pacific islands 
case is of interest in that it shows how extreme disparities between Japan and aid 
recipients may be balanced, to some extent, by both bureaucratic and diplomatic factors. 
The study shows how Japan’s aid diplomacy has reacted to challenges and threats in the 
regional context, but argues that external pressures and domestic political processes may 
pull Japan in different directions and give rise to a disjointed, ad hoc set of aid policies.
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1 Introduction
Japan has sought a post-war new deal. It realizes that it cannot be indifferent to 
the problems facing the Pacific Island Nations in the region it belongs to and 
therefore seeks ...to work with them in contributing to their development.1
When the Foreign Minister of Japan, Tadashi Kuranari, visited the Fijian capital, Suva, in 
January 1987, he announced a new beginning in the relationship between Japan and the 
Pacific island countries.2 In the decades following the end of the Second World War, 
Japan’s presence in the region had largely disappeared. This contrasted with the inter­
war period when Japan exercised control over the islands of Micronesia.3 The Kuranari 
visit signalled that Japan’s postwar quest to regain a place in the international arena and 
rebuild ties with neighbouring countries had finally reached the Pacific islands. The 
centrepiece of the Kuranari speech was a declaration that Japan would increase its 
official development assistance (ODA) to the region.4
By 1987 Japan was already a significant aid donor to the region. ODA ties 
between Japan and the Pacific islands were initiated in the 1970s. In the 1980s the 
amount of ODA to the region increased rapidly, from 10 billion yen in 1980 to 18 billion 
yen in 1986 and to 22 billion yen in 1990. By the beginning of the 1990s, Japan had 
displaced other major donors to become the largest or the second largest bilateral donor 
to the Pacific island countries. In 1992, it was the largest aid donor to Kiribati and 
Tuvalu and the second largest to Papua New Guinea, Fiji, Tonga, Nauru and the 
Solomon Islands.5 With one exception, Papua New Guinea, all countries receiving aid 
from Japan, were given only grant aid (including technical cooperation). In Japan’s 
overall ODA, this ranks as the most concessional form of aid.
1 Tadashi Kuranari, ‘Working Towards “the Pacific Future Community” ’ , Address presented in Suva 
on 14 January 1987, Press Release, Embassy of Japan, Canberra.
2 Countries included in this analysis are Kiribati, Nauru, the Marshall islands, the Federated States of 
Micronesia, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Vanuatu, Fiji, Tuvalu, Western Samoa, Niue 
and the Cook Islands.
3 The islands had formerly been ruled by Germany. Japan assumed control under a League of Nations 
Mandate. During the Pacific War, Japan’s military presence extended as far south as New Guinea and 
the Solomon Islands.
4 The plan was to double Japan’s aid flows to the region. This speech became known as the Kuranari 
Doctrine.
5 Japan has, at various times during the 1980s, been the largest donor to Western Samoa, Tonga and the 
Solomon Islands. Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), Japan’s Official Development Assistance, 1994 
Summary, Tokyo, September 1994, p.9. Details of Japan’s bilateral ODA to the island countries are 
given in Tables 1.1 and 1.2.
Table 1.1 Japan’s Bilateral ODA Allocated to the Pacific Island Countries, 1980-93 
(million yen)
Fiscal year Yen loan Grant Technical
cooperation
Japan’s total 
ODA to the 
region
% of Japan’s 
Bilateral ODA
1980 5,122 3,339 1,782 10,243 0.6
1985 4,691 5,046 1,320 11,057 0.9
1986 9,572 6,441 1,986 17,999 1.4
1987 5,325 2,197 7,522 1.3
1988 5,961 3,125 9,086 1.4
1989 9,281 3,366 12,647 1.4
1990 11,870 6,787 3,400 22,057 1.6
1991 6,635 7,551 3,941 18,127 1.3
1992 7,481 4,048 11,529 2.0
1993 7,416 5,011 12,427 1.4
Total 37,890 76,333 35,099 149,322
Source: Compiled from data in Gaimusho, Waga Icuni no seifu kaihatsu enjo, Vol. 2, 1985, 1991-94.
Table 1.2 Japan’s Bilateral ODA as a Share of Total Bilateral and Multilateral ODA 
Received by Pacific Island Countries, 1988-92 (per cent)
Country 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992
Cook Is - - - 4.3 4.4
Fiji 19.1 20.7 20.7 20.8 30.1
Kiribati 43.2 35.2 53.1 45.9 63.1
PNG 13.4 12.6 11.9 13.1 25.2
Solomon Is. 39.8 37.6 27.8 38.3 29.1
Tonga 26.0 27.2 41.7 23.8 29.7
Tuvalu - 51.8 21.5 10.4 46.9
Vanuatu 12.9 9.2 19.3 16.3 3.5
W. Samoa 35.1 29.1 33.3 38.6 23.2
Note: This table excludes aid to the former US Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (Marshall
Islands, Federated States of Micronesia and Palau). Details of Japan’s aid as a proportion of 
total aid received by these countries are not provided in Japan’s ODA reports. In general, 
however, these countries receive more than 90 per cent of their bilateral assistance from the US.
Source: Compiled from data in Gaimusho, Waga kuni no seifu kaihatsu enjo, Vol.2,1990-94.
Apart from the emphasis on grant aid, the single most consistent and striking 
feature of the ODA received by the region from Japan is the high proportion of fisheries
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grant aid,6 which accounted for more than 87 per cent of Japan’s grant aid to the region 
between 1975 and 1979.7 In the 1980s the fisheries sector continued to dominate; 
accounting for one-third of all Japan’s grant aid to the region in the period 1975 to 
1992.8 For some countries the share was as high as 99 per cent. Moreover, while the 
region received a small share of Japan’s overall bilateral aid (1.3 per cent in 1991), it 
received a comparatively large share of fisheries grant aid (10.4 per cent in 1991).9
Table 1.3 Fisheries Grant Aid as a Share of Japan’s Grant Aid to Pacific Island 
Countries, 1975-92 (million yen)
Country Grant aid total Fisheries grant aid Share of grant aid(%)
FSM 6,979 3,606 51.7
Fiji 7,698 2,599 43.1
Kiribati 7,196 3,737 51.9
Marshall Is. 5,515 3,537 65.9
Palau 3,877 1,500 38.7
PNG 13,822 853 6.2
Solomon Is. 6,637 4,505 67.9
Tonga 6,224 1,791 28.8
Tuvalu 1,210 1,207 99.8
Vanuatu 3,484 603 17.3
Western Samoa 10,640 115 10.8
Total 73,285 25,688 35.1
Note: FSM -  Federated States of Micronesia; PNG -  Papua New Guinea.
Source: Compiled from data in Gaimusho, Waga kuni no seifu kaihatsu enjo, Vol.2, 1985, 1991, 1993; 
JICA, Annual Reports, 1977-92.
In the two decades preceding the Kuranari visit, the region witnessed the gradual 
retreat of colonialism in the region and the transformation of the international Law of the 
Sea regime. Most of the colonies that had once made up the region attained statehood 
and sovereignty.10 In the same period, the United Nations drafted a new legal framework
6 Fisheries grant aid is a separate category of Japan’s grant aid budget, which is made up of general 
grant aid, grant aid for fisheries, grant aid for disaster relief, grant aid for cultural activities, food aid 
and grant aid for increased food production.
7 Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), Annual Reports, 1976-80, JICA, Tokyo.
8 Between 1975 and 1986, the share was 50 per cent.
9 In 1989, this share was 30 per cent. Details of fisheries grant aid to the Pacific island countries as a
share of Japan’s total fisheries grant aid are given in Tsusho sangyosho, Keizai kyoryoku no genjo to 
mondaiten, 1992, pp.974-80.
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governing maritime boundaries and national and international jurisdiction over marine 
resources.* 11 The single most dramatic change was the introduction of 200-nautical-mile 
exclusive economic zones in 1977. This gave the new political entitites in the Pacific 
jurisdiction over an area of about 7 million sq km.
As the world’s leading fishing nation, Japan was profoundly affected by the 
changes that were brought about by the new Law of the Sea regime. The implications of 
this new regime were particularly marked in the Pacific, where national maritime zones 
far exceeded the region’s land area.12 These enclosed some of the world’s (and Japan’s) 
most productive fishing grounds. In 1975 more than 85 per cent of Japan’s tuna catch 
was from the Pacific. By 1980 this had increased to 90 per cent and included waters 
within and adjacent to the economic zones of Pacific island countries.13 In the early 
1990s it was estimated that the Pacific island region accounted for 45 per cent of the 
world’s tuna catch and that stock levels could sustain increases in fishing effort.14
This thesis is first and foremost a study of factors that determine or influence 
decisions about Japan’s aid allocations to the Pacific island countries. What are the 
motivations and interests underlying Japan’s aid program to the region? This question is 
explored through an analysis of 1) Japan’s evolving fisheries aid policies; 2) the aid 
doubling plan incorporated in the Kuranari Doctrine; and 3) the emergence of a 
multilateral approach to aid to the region. These issues are examined for evidence of an 
inherent logic in both policy rationale and practice.
The motivations and objectives of Japan’s aid (ODA) to the Pacific islands are of 
intrinsic interest and importance. But they are also important in terms of what they might 
contribute to a broader question of the role of aid in Japan’s diplomacy and as an 
instrument of policy towards a group of small, developing countries. This study is 
important for what it may reveal about Japan’s ODA, and in particular about what drives 
Japan’s aid policies. How important are Japan’s economic interests? What is the role of 
political or diplomatic considerations? Do these parts fit together; that is, are they 
compatible? How do policy making procedures and bureaucratic structures impact on 
policy decisions? Is there a consensus among policy makers as to what goals Japan’s aid
10 In the 1960s, three Pacific island states attained self-government or independence; in the 1970s seven 
more states were bom; and in the 1980s there were four new states.
11 Negotiations (the Third UN Law of the Sea Conference) began in 1973 and ended in 1982.
12 For some individual island states, the ratio of sea area to land is about 7000 to 1.
13 Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF), Fisheries Statistics of Japan, various years, 
Statistics and Information Department, MAFF, Tokyo; Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), FAO 
Yearbook of Fisheries Statistics, various years, FAO, Rome.
14 South Pacific Commission, Status of Tuna Stocks in the SPC Area: A Summary Report for 1993, 
Tuna and Billfish Assessment Programme, Working Paper 3, June 1993. It is estimated that the region 
supplies 50 per cent of annual supply of canning grade tuna to the world market.
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should be promoting? These questions are at the heart of debates about Japan’s role as 
an aid donor, and the factors that have shaped Japan’s emergence as an ‘ODA power’.
As a case study of Japan’s ODA, the Pacific island region provides insights into 
‘who and what governs levels and terms of aid, as well as the relationship in specific 
cases between ODA and [economic], political, social and security matters’. 15 This 
contributes to broader debates about what drives Japan’s ODA and how to interpret 
Japan’s role as an aid donor.
THE AID DEBATES
In the literature on Japan’s ODA reference is often made to Japan’s ‘aid power’, ‘aid 
leadership’ and ‘aid challenge’. These terms reflect the emergence of Japan as the 
world’s largest aid donor. 16 While there is no disagreement about the significance of 
Japan’s ODA in terms of its scope and size, there remain differences about how to 
explain its aid policies. What is perhaps most controversial in studies of Japan’s ODA is 
the issue of whether or to what extent Japan’s ODA policies are driven by the principles 
and goals of ‘economic cooperation’ (keizai kyoryoku) which marked the origins of 
Japan’s aid program. According to the economic cooperation approach, aid is essentially 
aimed at promoting Japan’s own economic interests through developing markets, 
securing access to resources and promoting Japanese investment in recipient countries.
As Japan’s aid program has expanded, new diplomatic rationales have been 
invoked and a more political orientation developed. 17 This has led to debate about 
Japan’s interest in maintaining a stable international economic and political system. 18 
Opinion is divided on whether Japan’s ODA program reflects a trend towards joint 
leadership or partnership with the US or a more diffuse collective management of
15 This is from a preface to a collection of studies of Japan’s ODA to particular countries and regions in 
Bruce M. Koppel and Robert M. Orr Jr. (eds), Japan s Foreign Aid: Power and Policy in a New Era, 
Westview Press, Boulder, 1993, p.14.
16 Definitions of aid are given later. Since the late 1980s, Japan has vied with the US for the status of 
the world’s ‘Number 1’ donor.
17 Dennis Yasutomo, The Manner of Giving: Strategic Aid in Japan's Foreign Policy, Lexington Books, 
Lexington, 1986. This dimension of Japan’s ODA is manifested in a variety of ways, including the 
announcement of an ODA Charter in 1992. According to the principles of the Aid Charter, adopted by 
the Japanese Cabinet in June 1992, Japan’s aid decisions will ‘henceforth pay full attention’ to trends in 
recipient countries’ military expenditure, as well as the promotion of democracy, a market economy and 
basic human rights. Where ‘serious reversals’ in these areas occur, Japan will reconsider its aid to that 
country. MOFA, Japan’s Official Development Assistance Charter, (Unofficial Translation), 30 June 
1992.
18 Richard Rosecrance and Jennifer Taw, ‘Japan and the Theory of International Leadership’, World 
Politics, Vol.XLII, No.2, 1990, pp. 184-209.
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international economics and politics; 19 or whether it is a drive towards regional 
(especially East Asian) political and economic dominance.20 There are also questions 
about how far Japan’s ODA is essentially a response to external pressures;21 and how far 
it is a proactive and strategically targetted program .22 These questions, in turn, depend 
upon assessments of the aid administration in Japan.
Aid administration is in fact the key to an understanding of what drives Japan’s 
aid program. There are two competing perspectives of aid decision making structures 
and processes in Japan. The first perspective asserts that domestic political processes are 
essentially a constraint on policy actors and an impediment to policy innovation. Change 
is incremental and often in reaction to external pressure. This emphasises the problem of 
conflict in the aid bureaucracy.23 The second perspective suggests that the very nature of 
the ‘aid bureaucracy’ facilitates the continuing use of aid as a tool of Japan’s 
international economic strategies. The goals and principles of economic cooperation are 
built into the organisation and structures of Japan’s ‘ODA system’. This view emphasises 
bureaucratic and private sector coordination.24
A central task of this thesis is to assess these two perspectives in light of Japan’s 
changing aid policy priorities and goals. The argument that is developed is that neither 
perspective of the aid policy making processes, on its own, provides an adequate 
explanation of the economic, bureaucratic and political factors underpinning Japan’s 
ODA, and the way these have changed over time. The study highlights, in particular, 
close coordination between private sector and government actors in order to advance 
strategic economic interests. But there is an absence of coordination, if at times conflict, 
beween government actors in the aid administration. This latter point has important 
implications for the effectiveness and utility of ODA in Japan’s foreign policies.
19 See Shafiqul Islam, ‘Beyond Burden-sharing: Economics and Politics of Japan’s Foreign Aid’, in 
Shafiqul Islam (ed.), Yen for Development: Japanese Foreign Aid and the Politics of Burden-sharing, 
Council on Foreign Relations, New York, 1991; Takashi Inoguchi, ‘Four Japanese Scenarios for the 
Future’, in Kathleen Newland (ed.), The International Relations of Japan, Millenium Publishing 
Group/MacMillan, London, 1990.
20 David Arase, ‘US and ASEAN Perceptions of Japan’s Role in the Asian-Pacific’, in Harry H. Kendall 
and Clara Joewana (eds), The US, Japan and ASEAN, Institute o f East Asian Studies, Berkeley, 1991.
21 Alan Rix, Japan s Foreign Aid Challenge: Policy Reform and Aid Leadership, Routledge, London 
and New York, 1993; Robert M. Orr Jr., The Emergence of Japan’s Foreign Aid Power, Columbia 
University Press, New York, 1990.
22 David Arase, ‘Public-Private Sector Interest Coordination in Japan’s ODA’, Pacific Affairs, Vol.67, 
No.2, Summer 1994, pp.171-99.
23 The main proponent of this view is Alan Rix, Japan s Economic Aid: Policy-Making and Politics, 
Croom Helm, London, 1980; see also Robert M. Orr Jr., The Emergence of Japan’s Foreign Aid Power.
24 See David Arase, ‘Public-Private Sector Interest Coordination in Japan’s ODA’. The next chapter 
discusses these studies and their various perspectives in more detail.
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THE PACIFIC ISLANDS AS A CASE STUDY OF JAPAN’S AID DIPLOMACY
Japan’s ODA to the Pacific island region has generally been analysed as a function of 
‘foreign policy’ in the broad sense. The Kuranari Doctrine has been viewed as either the 
starting point and/or the high point of Japan’s aid policy and articulation of its aid 
interests. In documenting Japan’s ODA to the region, these studies have assumed that 
ODA is primarily directed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) and delivered by 
the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA). The motivations for ODA have 
been viewed as essentially political and diplomatic. ODA has been regarded as 
‘friendship aid’ (otsukiai enjo), which refers to ‘aid flows to smaller countries of little 
political or economic significance to Japan’.25 Economic interests have been assumed to 
be less important or, if a factor, the precise links between these interests and ODA have 
not been explored or demonstrated.26
What is missing in these studies is an analysis of Japan’s ODA to the region over 
time and the political, economic and bureaucratic foundations of its aid policies. Studies 
of the region have tended to explain the Kuranari Doctrine only as a ‘snapshot’ of Japan- 
Pacific island relations over the past 20 years. What is particularly striking, given the fact 
that the largest proportion of Japan’s grant aid to the region is from the fisheries grant 
aid budget, is the absence of any studies exploring the links between Japan’s ODA and 
its fisheries resource interests in the Pacific.27 This is a particularly significant issue given 
the importance to Japan of the region’s fisheries resource. No studies of Japan’s ODA to 
the region have considered possible contradictions between economic and diplomatic 
policy goals, or the impact of domestic politics and political structures.28 This includes
25 Robert M. Orr Jr., The Emergence of Japan s Foreign Aid Power, p.89. ‘Otsukiai’ has been defined 
as an ‘attitude or action taken for the sake of preserving Japan’s associations, friendships and alliances’. 
Sukehiro Hasegawa, Japanese Foreign Aid: Policy and Practice, Praeger, New York, 1975, p.5. In 
another reference to Japan’s ODA to the region, it has been suggested that Japan has aspired to a 
‘leadership role’ in this particular set of aid relations; that its aid program has reflected a recognition of 
Japan’s ‘responsibilities to its near neighbours’. Alan Rix, ‘Japan’s Aid Leadership’, Association for 
Asian Studies, 41st Annual Meeting, March 1989, Washington DC.
26 For general studies of Japan’s ODA to the region, see Junko Edo, Japanese Aid to the Pacific Island 
Region, Pacific Islands Development Program, Research Report Series No.4, East-West Center, Hawaii, 
1986; Hideaki Matsuo, The Emerging Economic Relations Between Japan and the South Pacific, 
Unpublished MA thesis, University of Sydney, 1991; John Herrman, Japan s Economic Relations with 
the South Pacific, Unpublished MA sub-thesis, Australian National University, 1990; and Isami Takeda, 
‘Japan’s Aid to the Pacific Island States’, in Bruce M. Koppel and Robert M. Orr Jr. (eds), Japan’s 
Foreign Aid: Power and Policy in a New Era, Westview Press, Boulder, 1993.
27 The issue of Japan’s ODA and its interests in the region’s forestry resources has been the subject of 
one critical study. See Yasuko Shimizu and Taisuke Miyauchi, ‘Kaihatsu kyoryoku to iu na no nettai 
urin bassai’, in Yoshinori Murai (ed.), Kensho Nippon no ODA, Gakuyo Shobo, Tokyo, 1992, pp.83- 
156.
28 One of the first studies of Japan’s contemporary (postwar) relations with the Pacific islands did 
suggest that ‘organisational constraints within Japan’s aid system’ would affect Japan’s aid policies to
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the problems of reconciling competing policy goals and priorities, and the problems of 
adapting political processes to (shifting) policy objectives.
What is suggested in this study is that the Pacific island countries are in fact more 
important to Japan and of more significance in Japan’s aid policy than has been assumed 
in other studies. They are not simply passive recipients of ‘friendship aid’. Several points 
need highlighting. The island countries as a group have actively engaged Japan in aid 
dialogues that have drawn Japan into the region. The region has also, through its 
collective diplomacy, challenged Japan in an area where the latter is highly dependent 
and vulnerable (fisheries resources). In this context, the Pacific islands have been an 
arena for Japan-US rivalry and this has given the island states more leverage than would 
otherwise be expected in relations with Japan. Finally, regional fora promoting donor 
dialogue as well as dialogue between the island states and Japan have provided the latter 
with opportunities for adopting new aid initiatives and new modalities for aid to the 
region.
The study also reveals how extreme disparities between Japan and recipient 
countries may be balanced by bureaucratic and diplomatic factors. In other words, small 
island states may significantly enhance their negotiating power through a combination of 
collective diplomacy, alliance building and exploiting opportunities provided by 
international regimes. They may even gain advantage from bureaucratic divisions and 
rivalry in Japan’s aid administration.
AID AND STATECRAFT
To analyse the objectives of aid policy, or the motivations of aid policy makers, is to 
conceive of aid policy not as an end in itself but as ‘purposive behaviour, directed 
towards some end goals’ —  that is, as a form of economic statecraft A number of 
questions follow, which help to narrow the focus of the analysis.29 The central question 
is what motivates the giving of aid rather than what are the (probable) effects of aid. In 
this study, the focus is on the objectives and determinants of aid policy, not on the 
outcomes.30
the region. See Alan Rix, ‘Japan’s Role in the South Pacific Region’, Australian Foreign Affairs Record, 
June 1981, pp.295-302.
29 This discussion has relied to a significant degree on the analysis of statecraft in David A. Baldwin, 
Economic Statecraft, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1985. Baldwin defined economic statecraft 
as ‘influence attempts relying primarily on resources that have a reasonable semblance of a market 
price’ (p.14).
30 Outcomes are relevant insofar as they point to the objectives and goals of aid policy. For example, the 
emphasis on fisheries grant aid suggests an interest in fisheries resources. That is a link which is 
explored in this study. What is also relevant in this context is an assessment o f the donor’s interest in 
and dependency on the aid relationship. According to Baldwin, Economic Statecraft, ‘the greater the 
donor’s gain from the relationship, the more dependent he is on maintaining the relationship and the
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It is also necessary to ask who or what is the main target of the aid-giving. There 
may in fact be multiple targets and goals. The immediate target (the aid recipient) may 
not be of primary importance to the donor, or the main target of attempts to exert 
influence. Aid policy may not be primarily aimed at influencing the recipient but at 
influencing a third party —  that is, another country (for example, the US). Moreover the 
goals of aid policy may be any dimension of the target’s behaviour — for example 
‘beliefs, attitudes, opinions, expectations, emotions and/or propensity to act’ —  and not 
limited to economic dimensions.31
Finally, there is the question of what are the dynamics of aid as an attempt to 
exert influence. This raises the issue of power in aid relations. It is not assumed that 
influence is exerted through economic power alone. In the process of giving or 
withholding of aid, for example, while the economic dimension may be most significant 
and overt, there may also be other, non-economic dimensions that are important, for 
example, what is implied about the diplomatic or even military intentions of the donor 
country.32
Thus the concept of economic statecraft suggests a more complex view of aid 
than is perhaps often assumed. It also suggests several levels for analysis of aid policy. 
Rather than simple patterns of relations linking donor and recipient, economic statecraft 
points to the possibility of multiple goals and targets influencing and motivating aid 
policies. As an analytical tool in the study of Japan’s aid to the Pacific island countries, 
economic statecraft treats aid as a foreign policy instrument that is directed at the 
realisation of donor goals and interests.33 At the same time, it does not rule out the 
possibility that there may be a number of competing policy objectives.
WHAT IS AID?
Aid is a slippery concept, often laden with assumptions, preconceptions and unrealistic 
expectations. The Tack of clarity about what exactly aid is’ is in part due to the fact that 
aid may cover a wide variety of methods to transfer resources from rich to poor 
countries.34 The focus of this study is official development assistance (ODA). The
less able he is to make credible threats to forgo it’ (p.306). Thus aid policy is shaped by what the donor 
anticipates as being the probable (and desirable) effects of their decisions and actions.
31 David A. Baldwin, Economic Statecraft, p.32.
32 David A. Baldwin, Economic Statecraft, p.24.
33 This raises a further question: how far are Japan’s policy goals and interests compatible with those of 
the recipient or of other donors? To what extent does Japan define its interests in terms of the interests of 
other states? The following study explores the extent to which there are tensions underlying the policy 
goals and objectives of Japan’s ODA program.
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definition of ODA is that used by the Japanese government and which in turn derives 
from the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD). ODA has three features: it is 1) provided by 
official agencies, 2) administered with the promotion of economic development and 
welfare of developing countries as its main objective, and 3) concessional in character 
(having a grant element of at least 25 per cent).35 This definition distinguishes ODA from 
other official flows (OOFs) —  that is flows from official sources which do not have a 
grant element of at least 25 percent, such as those of Japan’s Export Import Bank. ODA 
is also distinguished from non-government organisations (NGOs) and the private 
sector.36
The term ODA is not without ambiguity. On the one hand, the US has argued for 
the inclusion of its military debt forgiveness to developing countries in its aid figures. For 
two years (1991 and 1992), when the OECD named both Japan and the US as the 
‘world’s largest donors’, military debt forgiveness was included as a component of the 
US aid figures. On the other hand, Japan’s aid to Eastern Europe and former Soviet 
republics does not qualify as ODA, according to the OECD, because the GNP/per capita 
in those countries is too high.37
Apart from defining aid by what it may include or exclude, it is also useful to 
consider aid according to what broader ideas and assumptions are attached to the 
concept. One idea central to thinking about aid is that of reciprocity. Is aid a unilateral 
transfer of resources or a reciprocal exchange of benefits? Analysis of this question often 
combines a mixture of normative and positivist ideas and approaches.38 These distinguish 
between humanitarian and altruistic goals on the one hand, and calculations of national 
self interest on the other. To further clarify the concept of aid, Baldwin has argued that it 
is necessary to understand the role of gift-giving in social exchange: ‘gifts generate an 
obligation to reciprocate regardless of whether any specific quid pro quo is agreed 
upon’.39
34 Peter McCawley, ‘Development Assistance in Asia’, Asian-Pacific Economic Literature, Vol.7, No.2, 
November 1993, pp.1-13.
35 DAC, Development Cooperation, various years, OECD, Paris. In this study, the terms ODA and aid 
are used interchangeably, unless otherwise specified.
36 The exclusion of these flows from the definition of ODA used here does not imply that they are 
unimportant in the development context and may not constitute aid. OOFs and ODA are linked in policy 
terms, as are ODA and NGO aid flows.
37 B. Anne Craib, ‘Japan Named World’s Largest Donor’, Japan Economic Institute Report, No.26B, 
July 8, 1994, pp.8-11. Since 1993, the US has not been permitted to include military debt forgiveness in 
its aid figures.
38 See, for example, Sarah J. Tisch and Michael B. Wallace, Dilemmas of Development Assistance: The 
What, Why and Who of Foreign Aid, Westview Press, Boulder, 1994.
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In Japan’s case confusion is perhaps less apparent on semantic grounds. The term 
aid (enjo) is less frequently used than economic cooperation (keizai kyoryoku). This 
latter term, which was adopted in the early years of Japan’s aid program, is a much 
broader concept and does not have the connotations of enjo (a gift from strong to weak 
or from rich to poor). The term keizai kyoryoku, by contrast, implies a more equal 
partnership and mutual benefit. It thus encompasses profit oriented activites of Japan’s 
private sector and aid is explicitly linked to the promotion of those activities.40 More 
recently, MOFA has been inclined to speak of ‘aid’ (enjo) or ‘ODA’ rather than 
‘economic cooperation’, in order to highlight economic development objectives (and 
recipient oriented goals) of Japan’s ODA.41 But other ministries continue to use 
‘economic cooperation’.
STRUCTURE AND APPROACH
Chapter 2 surveys the background and development of Japan’s overall ODA program. It 
does not provide an exhaustive account of Japan’s ODA policies. This has been 
undertaken by other studies. The principal aim of this chapter is to focus on the main 
issues in Japan’s aid diplomacy and to highlight, in particular, the tensions inherent in 
Japan’s evolving policy goals and objectives. It traces the evolution of the ‘economic 
cooperation’ approach and how this has been modified or influenced by other ideas or 
imperatives, for example burden-sharing. The purpose of this survey is to show how 
Japan’s ODA program has responded to an increasingly complex range of problems, 
pressures and challenges. This has given rise to competing rather than complementary 
policy objectives and priorities. The chapter questions assumptions that there is 
coherence and consistency of purpose in Japan’s aid program. It considers existing 
paradigms of the Japanese aid policy making system and suggests that a more complete 
explanation of Japan’s aid program needs to emphasise both policy coordination at the 
level of private sector and government relations, and lack of coordination, if not conflict, 
within the aid bureaucracy. This leads to the analysis in Chapter 3 of policy making 
structures and processes.
39 David A. Baldwin, Economic Statecraft, pp.293-4.
40 For further details, see David Arase, ‘Public-Private Sector Interest Coordination in Japan’s ODA’; 
Barbara Stallings, ‘Development in the 1990s: US and Japanese Paradigms’ in Barbara Stallings et al., 
Common Vision, Different Paths: The United States and Japan in the Developing World, Overseas 
Development Council, Washington DC, 1993, pp.3-29.
41 Dennis Yasutomo, ‘Why Aid? Japan as an “Aid Great Power” ’, Pacific Affairs, Vol. 62, No. 4, 
Winter 1989/90, pp. 490-503. This reflects the preference of MOFA for an aid policy that, at the 
declaratory level at least, is not determined by ‘give and take’ principles. In MOFA’s rhetoric, aid is 
linked to the promotion of Japan’s ‘broadly defined national interests’ and these are the ‘end result that 
comes about as a corollary of satisfying the vital needs of developing countries’. MOFA, Japan’s 
Official Development Assistance, 1994 Summary, MOFA, Tokyo, September 1994, p.13.
11
The purpose of Chapter 3 is to explore the domestic context of Japan’s aid policy 
and to identify bureaucratic and procedural influences on Japan’s ODA to the Pacific 
island region. Who are the policy makers and what are their interests and priorities 
regarding aid policy? What are the procedures for decision making? This analysis points 
to the way sectional divisions within the aid bureaucracy have evolved, such that 
different parts of the ODA program are managed primarily by different ministries and 
agencies. These coordinate aid policies with private sector interests. But the picture is 
complicated by a lack of policy coordination within the aid administration. The analysis 
highlights the existence of competing political interests within the bureaucracy, the 
existence of procedural frameworks that constrain policy makers and the absence of a 
strong executive to resolve disputes and provide policy coherence.
Having discussed the ‘internal’ context of Japan’s aid policies, attention shifts to 
the ‘external’ context; that is, the international and regional developments marking 
Japan’s emergence as an aid donor to the Pacific island countries. Chapter 4 identifies the 
factors that defined Japan’s interests in the region. The purpose of this analysis is not 
simply to highlight the importance and salience of fisheries issues in Japan’s diplomacy 
with the region. It is also to identify the issues and interests that have motivated and 
influenced Japan’s fisheries aid policies. This reveals the changing nature of external 
pressures and challenges on Japan, which has given rise to a dynamic aid policy agenda. 
The chapter examines both global developments (the Law of the Sea) and regional 
developments (the strengthening of multilateralism among Pacific island states, the role 
of the US and the rising environmental agenda).
Chapter 5 outlines the dimensions and scope of Japan’s fisheries cooperation with 
the Pacific island countries and examines the processes by which aid policies have 
promoted Japan’s fisheries interests in the region. It shows how the Fisheries Agency 
adopted a deliberate policy of using ODA to support the operations of Japan’s distant 
water fishing fleets. The chapter also shows how, over time, different aid initiatives have 
been adopted in response to international and regional challenges to Japan’s interests as a 
fishing nation. But while fisheries aid diplomacy was closely coordinated with the 
interests of Japan’s fishing industry, it was also constrained by bureaucratic procedures, 
conflicting political interests of ministries and lack of a clear vision about Japan’s role 
and interests in this region.
Fisheries interests were not the only policy agenda driving Japan’s ODA to the 
region. In the 1980s Japan developed political interest in the region, for reasons other 
than fisheries. The declaration of the Kuranari Doctrine reflected this new-found political 
interest and heralded a new phase in Japan-Pacific island relations. Chapter 6 examines 
the motivations and interests underlying the Kuranari Doctrine and the impact of this 
policy initiative on Japan’s aid allocations to the region. The importance of this study is 
that it highlights the way policy makers reacted to perceived political and security 
challenges confronting Japan in respect to its Pacific diplomacy. But in reacting to this
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‘new’ policy agenda, there emerged tensions with Japan’s fisheries policies. This study 
underscores how different sections of the bureaucracy may promote separate aid policies 
that create conflicts within Japan’s aid diplomacy. This also reflects a lack of 
consultation and coordination between ministries and agencies. The study highlights the 
dilemmas involved in balancing competing policy objectives: promoting Japan’s 
economic interests while addressing criticisms from other donors and building favourable 
relations with recipients.
These dilemmas are explored further in Chapter 7 in the context of Japan’s 
approach to regional and multilateral policy frameworks. Here the tensions involve 
pressures on Japan from recipients and other donors to adapt aid policies by introducing 
new aid modalities and thus demonstrating ‘aid leadership’. Meanwhile, domestic politics 
and the competing interests of ministries and agencies lead to pressures to continue with 
established bilateral aid modalities. This study is of importance in the context of Japan’s 
role in the international donor community as well as in the Pacific island region. The 
chapter analyses Japan’s role in South Pacific regional fora as well as its participation in 
regional aid dialogues and joint programming. It considers the changing aid policy 
debates at the global level, including the new emphasis on policy conditionality, and 
assesses Japan’s position on these issues in the context of the Pacific island countries.
In Chapter 8 the various parts of the analysis are reviewed to create an overall 
picture of Japan’s ODA policies to the region. The discussion suggests that Japan’s ODA 
is driven primarily by the need to address threats, pressures and challenges in the 
international arena; in other words, that Japan’s ODA policies are essentially reactive 
and, more importantly, defensive in posture. This reaffirms findings in other studies of 
Japan’s ODA.42 The economic cooperation rationale has continued to be a driving force. 
But there are also competing political and strategic agendas. This points to a more 
complex set of influences on Japan’s ODA than simple economic or political 
explanations may indicate. The thesis suggests that external pressures may pull Japan in 
different directions, and give rise to a disjointed and ad hoc set of aid policies. Domestic 
structures and processes in Japan reinforce the reactive and disjointed nature of Japan’s 
aid policies. These structures have not always been successful in managing conflicts and 
tensions in Japan’s aid policies. In fact, the evidence suggests that domestic politics have 
hindered and constrained the use of ODA as a foreign policy tool (in the statecraft 
tradition) and weakened Japan’s ability to respond more decisively and effectively to 
foreign policy challenges.
42 For example, see Robert M. Orr Jr., The Emergence of Japan’s Foreign Aid Power, and Alan Rix, 
Japan s Foreign Aid Challenge: Policy Reform and Aid Leadership.
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THE PACIFIC ISLAND REGION
What is the Pacific island region? Definitions may include geographical, political, cultural 
or institutional factors. Geographically, the Pacific island region extends from longitude 
130 degrees west to 140 degrees east; and, in a north-south direction, from the Tropic of 
Cancer to the Tropic of Capricorn. This area encompasses 22 island countries and 
territories.43
At the broad level, three cultural sub-regional groups can be identified. These are 
Melanesia in the western Pacific, Polynesia in the eastern Pacific and Micronesia in the 
central western Pacific, north of the equator. Melanesia is made up of Papua New 
Guinea, the Solomon Islands, New Caledonia and Vanuatu. Polynesia includes Tuvalu, 
Western Samoa, American Samoa, Tonga, Cook Islands, Niue, Tokelau, Wallis and 
Futuna, and French Polynesia. Fiji straddles the boundary between Polynesia and 
Melanesia. Micronesia covers Kiribati, Nauru, the Marshall Islands, Palau, the Federated 
States of Micronesia, the Northern Marianas and Guam.
In political terms, the region may be defined either as all island states and 
territories (which comprises membership of the South Pacific Conference) or as 
independent and self-governing states.44 The latter group is represented in the South 
Pacific Forum, a political grouping of leaders of Pacific island states, Australia and New 
Zealand, created in 1971. It is this group of Pacific island countries that comprises the 
focus of this study; namely Kiribati, Nauru, the Marshall Islands, the Federated States of 
Micronesia, Palau, Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands, Vanuatu, Fiji, Tuvalu, 
Western Samoa, Niue and the Cook Islands.45
The colonial make-up of the region, since the end of the Second World War, was 
as follows. Australia administered the territories of Papua and New Guinea. Britain 
administered the Solomon Islands, Fiji, and Kiribati and Tuvalu (known collectively as 
the Gilbert and Ellice Islands), and was in charge of the foreign policy and defence of 
Tonga. It co-administered the New Hebrides (later known as Vanuatu) with France. 
Britain, Australia and New Zealand also administered Nauru as a UN Trust Territory. 
New Zealand administered Western Samoa, the Cook Islands, Niue and Tokelau. The
43 The term Pacific island region is used in this study rather than South Pacific region. However, they 
generally refer to the same area. The Japanese government uses the term Oceania to refer to the Pacific 
islands, Australia and New Zealand. The term South Pacific is used to refer more specifically to the 
island states.
44 For some countries -  the Cook Islands, Niue, the Marshall Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia 
and Palau -  the distinction between independence and self-government is blurred. Their status is that of 
‘self-government in free association’ with the former colonial powers. In the case of the first two, New 
Zealand has responsibility for defence and some foreign relations; in the case of the latter three, the US 
retains control over defence and security matters.
45 Japan does not recognise the Cook Islands and Niue as fully independent states, and thus has not 
developed bilateral relations with these countries.
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US had the territory of American Samoa and Guam, and administered as a UN Trust 
Territory the former Japanese-ruled islands of Micronesia. France had the territories of 
New Caledonia, Wallis and Futuna, and French Polynesia.
Only the French colonial presence remains intact. Western Samoa was the first 
country to attain independence in 1962, followed by the Cook Islands (1965), Nauru 
(1968), Tonga and Fiji (1970), Papua New Guinea (1975), Niue (1977) the Solomon 
Islands and Tuvalu (1978), Kiribati (1979), Vanuatu (1980), and the Trust Territory of 
the Pacific Islands (1986), which was divided into four political entities: the Federated 
States of Micronesia, the Marshall Islands and Palau, which opted for free-association 
with the US, and the Northern Marianas, which chose to become a Commonwealth in 
‘political union’ with the US.46
Different colonial experiences left their mark on present day political systems. 
While Tonga (which was never fully colonised) retains its autocratic monarchy, all other 
independent countries have evolved various forms of Western style parliamentary 
democracy. The former British, Australian and New Zealand colonies (PNG, the 
Solomon Islands, Tuvalu, Fiji, Niue and the Cook Islands) adopted versions of the 
Westminister system. Vanuatu, which was ruled as a British/French Condominium, 
became a republic, as did Kiribati and Nauru. Fiji became a republic following two 
military coups in 1987. The former US Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands adopted 
versions of the US presidential system of government Western Samoa has a political 
system based on rule by chiefs.
Pacific island countries conduct their foreign relations through a variety of 
bilateral, regional and international channels. At the regional level, these include the 
South Pacific Forum and the South Pacific Conference/Commission.47 In fact, a 
distinguishing feature of Pacific island diplomacy is the emphasis on regional 
organisations and collective diplomacy. At the international level, eight countries are 
members of the United Nations General Assembly. These are Papua New Guinea, Fiji, 
the Solomon Islands, Vanuatu, Western Samoa, the Federated States of Micronesia, the 
Marshall Islands and Palau (pending).48
All Pacific island countries except Papua New Guinea may be defined as micro­
states, with populations of less than one million. Papua New Guinea’s population and 
land area far exceed the rest of the region’s combined, accounting for 88 per cent of its
46 Palau’s transition to independence was delayed due to differences with the US over the Palauan 
Constitution. It formally entered a Compact of Free Association with the US in October 1994.
47 The South Pacific Conference is the annual meeting of members of the South Pacific Commission. 
The latter is based in Noumea, New Caledonia. The South Pacific Forum is the annual meeting of heads 
of government of independent and self-governing states in the region. It is serviced by the Forum 
Secretariat, which is based in Suva, Fiji.
48 Details are in Steve Hoadley, The South Pacific Foreign Affairs Handbook, Allen and Unwin, 
Sydney, 1992.
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land area and 64 per cent of its population.49 The Melanesian countries as a whole 
(including Fiji) account for 98 per cent of the region’s land area and 76.7 per cent of its 
population.
While there are common economic characteristics within the region, there are 
also wide disparities reflecting the different sizes of countries. Common features include 
agriculture and fisheries based economies, with relatively large subsistence sectors. 
Tourism is a major industry in a number of countries while light industry and 
manufacturing sectors are developing in a few countries.50 All countries (except Nauru) 
are highly dependent on aid (the region as a whole has the highest aid per capita in the 
world).51 Common development constraints within the region include high transportation 
and communication costs, limited domestic markets, small and/or unskilled workforces, 
limited economies of scale and vulnerability to fluctuating world markets for primary 
exports.52
Economic diversity within the region stems largely from different land-based 
resource endowments. Melanesian countries tend to have significant concentrations of 
mineral resources. These include copper, gold and oil deposits in Papua New Guinea, 
gold in the Solomon Islands, gold and copper in Fiji, and nickel in New Caledonia.53 
Nauru’s economy is based on phosphate, but supplies will be exhausted by the end of this 
decade. The other major land-based resource is forestry, which is heavily exploited in 
Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands and Fiji.
The smaller island countries, with limited land resources, have relied for foreign 
exchange on a combination of sale of fishing rights, exporting fish and local produce, 
out-migration and remittances, and aid. High population density is a major problem in 
small atoll states (particularly the Marshall Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, 
Kiribati and Tuvalu). High population growth in most island countries is expected to put 
increasing pressures on the resources of these countries. Most countries are also facing 
major environmental problems, including resource depletion and pollution, due to 
population pressures as well as pressures from deforestation, mining, fishing and 
agriculture.54
49 This refers to the entire region; that is, both independent states and territories.
50 Fiji has the most diverse economy in the region, based on tourism, gold, sugar, light industry and 
manufacturing.
51 Steve Hoadley, The South Pacific Foreign Affairs Handbook, p.29.
52 A broad survey of economic characteristics is in Forum Secretariat, Forum Island Countries Profiles, 
Suva, 1991; see also Te’o I.J. Fairbaim et al., The Pacific Islands: Politics, Economics and 
International Relations, East-West Center International Relations Program, Honolulu, 1991.
53 Japan has been and remains a major market for New Caledonian nickel. Japan is also the largest 
market for Papua New Guinea’s minerals exports (copper and gold).
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JAPAN IN THE REGION: COMMERCIAL AND POLITICAL ANTECEDENTS
Japan’s modern contact with the Pacific island region began in the 1880s when limited 
emigration to some islands was permitted by Japan for the first time. This coincided with 
a series of ‘study tours’ of the region by Japanese whose records of their journeys 
provided first-hand insights about the island countries. The term nanyo (south seas) was 
coined at this time and referred to the Pacific islands as well as present day Southeast 
Asia. In the 1880s and 1890s an intellectual movement also emerged in Japan known as 
nanshin ron (southward advance). Proponents argued that the appropriate region for 
Japanese expansion, especially to secure natural resources, was the south seas. This 
movement gradually came to distinguish between two routes of southward expansion: 
the inner and the outer. Although emphasis appeared at first to be on the outer route 
(islands of the Pacific), political and military interest mainly centred on the inner route 
(Taiwan, Hong Kong and Indo China). This was especially marked after the Sino- 
Japanese War of 1894 and subsequent colonisation of Taiwan.55
In the 1880s, the first Japanese commercial operations were established in the 
region, mainly in Micronesia, which was then still under Spanish rule. One of these was 
the trading firm Nanyo Boeki Kabushiki Kaisha, which would later play a prominent role 
in the islands. Germany acquired Spain’s possessions in 1898 and sought to impose much 
tighter control over Japanese commercial actvities. Despite this, Japanese firms managed 
to prosper, especially in Palau where trade during the German era was entirely controlled 
by Japan.56 Commercial activities in other areas also expanded in the period up until the 
FirstWorld War.
The First World War marked the start of Japan’s colonial presence in the region, 
when it seized Germany’s possessions north of the equator. These island groups were the 
Marshalls, Caroline and Marianas. In 1920 the League of Nations assigned these 
possessions to Japan under a Class C mandate. Japan had in fact sought to annex the 
islands, but was opposed by the US.57 In 1922, the administration of the islands was 
transferred from the Japanese Navy to the Prime Minister’s office and a civilian body
54 Savenaca Siwatibau, ‘Some Aspects of Development in the South Pacific: An Insiders’ View’, in 
Peter Bauer et al., Aid and Development in the South Pacific, Pacific Papers 2, Centre for Independent 
Studies, 1991.
55 For an excellent analysis of Japan’s ‘re-emergence’ in the Western Pacific at this time see Henry Frei, 
Japan’s Southward Advance and Australia: From the Sixteenth Century to World War II, Melbourne 
University Press, Melbourne. 1991. In Japanese see Yano Torn, Nihon no Nanyo Shikan, Chuokoronsha, 
Tokyo, 1979.
56 Grant Goodman and Felix Moos, The United States and Japan in the Western Pacific: Micronesia 
and Papua New Guinea, Westview Replica Edition, Boulder, 1981, p.36.
57 Goodman and Moos, The United States and Japan in the Western Pacific, p.37.
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called the Nanyo Cho (South Seas Bureau) was established. Its headquarters were 
located in Koror on Palau.
Commercial operations in Micronesia centred on sugar, phosphate, coconut 
plantations, fisheries, shipping and retail trading. Commerce was dominated by three 
main companies: Nanyo Kohatsu (a joint venture between government and the 
Kuribayashi Group), the Phosphate Mining Company and the Nanyo Boeki Company. 
The latter also opened branches in the Gilbert Islands and New Guinea. Longline tuna 
fisheries began in the late 1920s and shore bases were established throughout Micronesia 
to service fleets. There were an estimated 7,600 Japanese tuna fishermen operating in 
Micronesian waters by 1938.58
With expansion of business, the Japanese population in Micronesia grew rapidly, 
mainly because the indigenous labour supply was perceived to be inadequate, numerically 
and in terms of skills. Tours by Micronesians to Japan were inaugurated in 1923. In 
addition, an emphasis on Japanese language teaching meant that Japanese became the 
common language throughout Micronesia. By the mid-1930s the number of Japanese 
exceeded the number of Micronesians in the islands. The Japanese policy became one of 
‘thorough assimilation’.59
The other main area of Japanese activity in the region early this century was in 
New Caledonia. Between 1892 and 1919, more than five thousand indentured labourers 
from Japan were sent to work in New Caledonian nickel mines. Most returned to Japan 
in the 1920s. At the end of the First World War, Japan began to invest in mining 
operations there and to import nickel matte from New Caledonia. At first Japanese 
mining ventures in New Caledonia failed and were withdrawn. Then in the mid-1930s 
two Japanese companies were established to carry out iron ore and nickel mining for 
export to Japan. These were the Taiyo Mining Company, mainly financed by Nippon 
Mining and later Sumitomo, and the Nouvelle Caledonie Company. These investments 
increased the number of Japanese in New Caledonia. A Japanese consulate was 
established in 1940 in Noumea when exports to Japan were beginning to expand. But in 
early 1941 an embargo was put in place by the French authorities on further exports to 
Japan and the consulate was closed. With the bombing of Pearl Harbour in December 
1941, all Japanese residents in the South Pacific were put into detention camps in 
Australia, New Zealand and Tahiti. All Japanese property was also confiscated.60
58 David J. Doulman, Fishing for Tuna: The Operations of Distant-Water Fleets in the Pacific Islands 
Region, Research Report Series No.3, Pacific Islands Development Program, Hawaii, 1986, p.5.
59 See Goodman and Moos, The United States and Japan in the Western Pacific, p.40. A more detailed 
analysis of Japanese policy in Micronesia is in Mark Peattie, Nanyo: The Rise and Fall of the Japanese 
in Micronesia 1885 -1945, University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu, 1988.
60 Details of Japan’s activities in New Caledonia are from Terutaro Nishino, ‘Japan: the Risen Sun’, in 
Ron Crocombe and Ahmed Ali (eds), Foreign Forces in Pacific Politics, Institute of Pacific Studies, 
Suva, 1983.
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After the surrender of Japan in 1945, Japanese commercial activities in 
Micronesia came to an end. The Japanese war-time government in 1942 had 
amalgamated the two major companies in Micronesia -  Nanyo Boeki and Nanyo 
Kohatsu -  but this was dissolved by the American occupation forces.61 Under a United 
Nations Trusteeship agreement, the Micronesian islands became the US Strategic Trust 
Territory of the Pacific Islands in 1947. This arrangement prohibited non-American 
investment in Micronesia (a ruling which lasted until 1974).62
The end of the war brought to an end political contact between the region and 
Japan. It also led to a hiatus in commercial contact, which only began to be re­
established on a limited scale in the late 1950s and 1960s. The main area of interest for 
the Japanese private sector was in resource extraction and trade: especially minerals, 
timber and fisheries.
War veterans in Japan retained an interest in (and sentimental bond with) the 
region and many sought to make pilgrimage to war-sites, especially in Papua New 
Guinea, the Solomon Islands and Kiribati (Gilbert Islands). Various non-governmental 
associations were also formed in Japan to support such expeditions and continue ties 
with the countries where Japanese soldiers fought during the war (for example, the 
Japan-Papua New Guinea Goodwill Society). But the war also bred bad memories for 
both sides, and where anti-Japanese feeling lingered on the part of Pacific islanders, in 
Japan it was more a case of ‘amnesia’ about the island countries of the Pacific.63
JAPAN’S POSTWAR INTERESTS IN THE PACIFIC ISLANDS 
The political context
With the end of the Pacific War, Western powers reasserted their control over the islands 
that were previously under Japanese rule or occupation. The former Japanese controlled 
islands of Micronesia became a US Strategic Trust Territory. Britain resumed control 
over the Gilbert Islands while Britain, Australia and New Zealand jointly administered 
Nauru.
In 1947, the Western metropolitan powers (the US, Britain, France, Australia, 
New Zealand and the Netherlands)64 established the South Pacific Commission.
61 Nanyo Boeki Kaisha, History of the Company, NBK Corporation, Tokyo.
62 Goodman and Moos, The United States and Japan in the Western Pacific, p.234. Goodman and Moos 
argue that Japanese firms were able to make some inroads into Micronesia before this time, facilitated in 
part by the reparations agreement between the US and Japan. See below.
63 Akio Watanabe, ‘The Pacific Islands and Japan: Perspectives and Policies’, (draft version), 
Conference on Strategic Cooperation and Competition in the Pacific Islands, Washington DC, 1989, p.5.
64 The Netherlands were included because they administered the territory of West Papua. This ended in 
1965 and the Netherlands withdrew from the regional organisation.
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Ostensibly aimed at promoting the economic and social welfare of the indigenous Pacific 
islanders, the South Pacific Commission (SPC) also ensured that the colonial powers 
collaborated to exclude outside (non-Westem) influence.65
This political status quo continued until the 1960s. Decolonisation began with the 
independence of Western Samoa in 1962 (followed by the Cook Islands in 1965 and 
Nauru in 1968). In 1969, the US and Japan signed what was the only agreement on war 
reparations involving the Pacific island countries. Under this agreement, which was 
limited to the former Japanese controlled islands of Micronesia, Japan pledged to provide 
US$5 million in grants ‘for the purchase in Japan ...of the products of Japan and the 
services of the Japanese people to be used for the welfare of the inhabitants of the Trust 
Territory’66. This was intended to settle all Micronesian claims against Japan for loss of 
lives and property during the war. The exchange of notes was signed in 1973.67
The political climate was generally not conducive to Japanese political 
involvement in the region. This was largely due to the continuing colonial domination of 
the region by Western powers, which precluded diplomatic relations with the island 
countries. There was also an absence of official economic involvement due to the fact 
that no reparations agreements were concluded with countries of the region. The 
exception was the agreement between Japan and the US, concerning Micronesia. 
However, this was not negotiated until the late 1960s and coincided with the more 
general trend towards political decolonisation in the Pacific.
Economic interests
In the 1950s and 1960s, Japanese trading companies re-established operations in the 
Pacific islands, mainly targeting natural resources. The pattem was in fact similar to the 
prewar era, with an emphasis on fisheries, minerals and timber. Imports of New 
Caledonian nickel resumed. Japanese firms also developed an interest in gold and copper 
prospecting ventures, mainly in Papua New Guinea and Fiji. In the late 1960s, Mitsubishi 
and Mitsui helped finance the development of the Bougainville copper mine and in 1972
65 It has been suggested that the main concern was containment of communism (both Chinese and 
Russian). Uentabo Fakaofo Neemia, Cooperation and Conflict: Costs, Benefits and National Interests in 
Pacific Regional Cooperation, Institute of Pacific Studies, Suva, 1986.
66 Article 1 of Claim-Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands Agreement between the United States of 
America and Japan, 1969, cited in Goodman and Moos, The United States and Japan in the Western 
Pacific, p.245.
67 Most of this grant was used for the development of fisheries infrastructure in Micronesia (fishing 
vessels, landing craft, and a fishing centre). The company that succeeded in bids to provide this 
infrastructure was the Nanyo Boeki Kais ha (NBK) Corporation. NBK, History of the Company. This 
company, which had been a dominant presence in the prewar era, re-established its commercial links in 
Micronesia once trade with Japan was permitted in 1963.
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Japan began to import copper from Papua New Guinea. Japanese firms also established 
logging ventures in Papua New Guinea in the late 1960s and early 1970s.68
Japan’s fisheries interests in the region are described in detail in Chapter 4.
Suffice to point out here that the region’s marine resources (especially tuna) were 
abundant and highly valued. Japan emerged in the postwar era as a major fishing nation 
and was the leading fishing nation in the Pacific. Japan’s dependence on the region’s tuna 
was significant, and grew increasingly so in the 1970s. Unlike mineral and forestry 
resources, which were concentrated in only a few countries that had relatively significant 
land areas, fisheries were an abundant resource throughout the region. There were also 
few restrictions on the operations of Japanese fleets, although this situation began to 
change in the late 1970s.
Trade and investment ties between Japan and the Pacific island states
In the 1980s, Japan became the largest export market for Papua New Guinea and the 
Solomon Islands. The scale of these exports (especially trade with Papua New Guinea) 
has led to a disproportionate share of the Japan market in Pacific island exports. This is 
shown in Table 1.4. For most other countries Japan remains a small or insignificant 
export market, except for specific commodities such as wood chips. In turn, the Pacific 
island countries as a whole comprise a very small market for Japan’s exports. As a share 
of Japan’s total foreign trade, the region is miniscule. It accounted for 0.2 per cent of 
Japanese world trade in 1989. Papua New Guinea accounted for 70 per cent of this 
trade.69
Japanese foreign direct investment (FDI) in the region has also been on a limited 
scale. Table 1.5 gives the breakdown of Japanese FDI to countries in the region, as a 
share of Japan’s total FDI to Oceania (including Australia and New Zealand). The island 
countries attracted only 2.9 per cent of Japanese investment to Oceania in the period 
1951-89. This investment has concentrated mainly on tourism, fisheries, forestry and 
mining. The Oceania region, in turn, accounted for 5.5 per cent of Japanese FDI between 
1951 and 1989. By far the greatest share of this investment has been directed at Australia 
(89 per cent).
It is obvious from the above brief survey of Japanese trade and investment links 
with the region that the island countries occupy a very marginal place in Japan’s overall 
foreign economic relations. This point stands in sharp contrast to the very significant 
fisheries interests that Japan has in the region. Access to the region’s fisheries resources 
was, and remains, a ‘special’ and highly sensitive issue area. It is an issue that has
68 Hiromitsu Iwamoto, Japan-Papua New Guinea Economic Relations in the Postwar Period: Analysis 
from Dependency Perspective, Unpublished BA Honours Thesis, Flinders University, 1990.
69 Hideaki Matsuo, The Emerging Economic Relations Between Japan and the South Pacific Island 
Nations, p.30.
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profoundly influenced and politicised Japan’s aid relations with the Pacific island 
countries.
Table 1.4 Trade between Pacific Island Region and Rest of the World, 1987-90 
(A$millions)
Trading Partner 1987 1988 1989 1990
Exports to:
Australia 310 317 379 640
New Zealand 73 71 137 104
France 232 269 353 376
United Kingdom 260 258 133 293
Other Europe 664 653 602 433
United States 536 577 521 487
Japan 630 974 999 640
Other Asia 513 389 296 381
Other countries 116 120 462 389
Total 3,334 3,628 3,882 3,743
Imports from:
Australia 1,124 1,223 1,325 1,255
New Zealand 338 304 400 388
France 1,101 958 967 1,083
United Kingdom 127 110 93 187
Other Europe 386 321 376 90
United States 493 616 725 478
Japan 528 575 637 523
Other Asia 527 512 637 346
Other countries 1,622 1,082 718 763
Total 6,246 5,701 5,878 5,113
Source: South Pacific Commission, South Pacific Economies Statistical Summary, No. 13, Noumea,
1993, p.27.
Relations between Japan and the Pacific islands have a history that dates back to 
the end of the last century. The region, together with much of Southeast Asia, was 
important mainly for its reserves of natural resources. The early part of the twentieth 
century saw the establishment of a colonial presence by Japan in Micronesia, and in the 
interwar period, these islands increasingly assumed strategic importance to Japan’s 
military planners. Immediately after the war, Japan’s presence in the region all but 
disappeared. In the postwar period Japanese interest in the island countries gradually 
returned. This interest was once again centred on the region’s resources. Spearheading 
Japan’s re-entry to the Pacific islands were the distant water fishing fleets. Their 
activities and interests are explored in detail in Chapter 4.
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Table 1.5 Japanese FDI in Oceania (Pacific island countries, Australia and New 
Zealand), cumulative total for FY1951-1989.
Nation Cases US Smillion per cent
Fiji 71 62 0.4
Kiribati - - -
Nauru 2 0 0.0
PNG 209 218 1.6
Solomon Is 15 22 0.2
Tonga - - -
Tuvalu - - -
Vanuatu 57 104 0.7
W. Samoa 2 1 0.0
Sub-total 356 407 2.9
Australia 2,353 12,394 89.0
New Zealand 325 694 5.0
Total 3,385 13,933 100.0
Source: Ministry of Finance of Japan statistics, cited in Hideaki Matsuo, The Emerging Economic
Relations Between Japan and the South Pacific Island Nations, Unpublished Masters Thesis, 
University of Sydney, March 1991, p.166.
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2 Issues in Japan’s Aid Diplomacy
Japan s economic aid...symbolizes the movement of Japan from its passive one­
dimensional economic focus and avoidance of international political and 
strategic issues towards a more active and involved multi-dimensional 
diplomacy.1
Central to debates about Japan’s international role is the question of why Japan gives aid. 
The magnitude of Japan’s aid flows commands an interest in this question. Absolute 
amounts of ODA increased rapidly in the 1980s, from 5,781 billion yen ($2,638 million) 
in 1979 to 12,368 billion yen ($8,965 million) in 1989.2 Under the latest medium-term 
target, for the period 1993 to 1997, ODA will grow by a further 50 per cent over the 
previous five-year period. But more significant than absolute amounts (which in 
themselves may not be very revealing)3 is the fact that in the 1990s Japan has become the 
world’s largest donor of aid. Reaching the status of world number one donor has more 
than symbolic importance. It raises important questions about Japan’s role in 
international development and its capacity and/ or intention to exercise leadership within 
the international community.
This chapter describes Japan’s ODA program, its rationale and policies, and the 
main factors that have shaped and influenced Japan’s role as a donor. This reveals the 
gradual broadening of interests and objectives underlying Japan’s aid program, but also 
the tensions that have emerged between different policy priorities. The chapter explores 
some of the dilemmas confronting Japan’s aid program and the attempts to resolve these. 
This sets the broader context for the study of Japan’s ODA to the Pacific island 
countries.
The chapter then considers perspectives of the aid administration and policy 
making system in Japan. These perspectives provide different explanations of Japan’s aid 
program. In surveying the main ideas and assertions of these approaches, it is suggested 
that there is a need for a perspective that emphasises both policy coordination and 
conflict, and accounts for the presence of competing aid policies. This would build on 
existing interpretations of the aid policy making system in Japan.
1 Kazumi Goto, ‘Japan’s Growing Role in International Development’, Development and ODA, Japan- 
ASEAN Forum, United Nations University, Tokyo, 1990, p.75,
2 Dollars throughout this thesis refer to US dollars unless otherwise specified.
3 In describing the volume of aid, it is important to have some measure of comparison. Discussion of 
Japan’s aid should, for example, take into account the fact that, as a share o f GNP, Japan’s ODA is only 
0.26 per cent (1993 estimate). This is the fourth lowest among the Development Assistance Committee 
(DAC) countries. New Zealand, Ireland and the US are lower.
AN OVERVIEW OF DEVELOPMENTS IN JAPAN’S AID PROGRAM
Origins and early development
Japan became an aid donor in 1954 when it joined the Colombo Plan. Its aid budget at 
that time, essentially for technical assistance, was 18 million yen (about $50,000).4 In the 
same year, Japan concluded the first war reparations agreement with Burma. Other 
agreements followed with the Philippines, Indonesia and South Vietnam. Economic aid, 
not covered by formal reparations agreements, was also provided to eight other countries 
as compensation payments.5 In 1958 Japan’s yen loan program commenced with the first 
agreement to provide 18 billion yen ($50 million) to India. According to the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs (MOFA) in its ‘40th Anniversary of Japan’s ODA’ essay, this marked the 
‘starting point of Japan’s economic cooperation in earnest’.6
Japan’s aid program thus began as a way of ‘compensating’ for war time 
occupation of neighbouring countries. But it was also a tool for promoting its postwar 
economic recovery.7 In fact, from the late 1950s, Japan’s aid was essentially a 
component of the country’s foreign economic policy, albeit a somewhat obscure 
component.8 The term ‘economic cooperation’ was used to describe the overall pattem 
of private and government capital flows to neighbouring developing countries, including 
loans, export credits and private investment The basic orientation of economic 
cooperation was to assist the Japanese economy by creating foreign markets, promoting 
exports, as well as securing access to raw materials.9 This rationale and approach, which 
represented a consensus at this time, was reflected in official reports including the
4 Japan’s technical assistance program actually began in 1952 when it contributed $80,000 to the United 
Nations Expanded Program of Technical Assistance, a forerunner of the UNDP.
5 These included Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, Korea, Singapore, Malaysia, Micronesia and Mongolia.
6 MOFA, Japan’s Official Development Assistance, 1994 Summary, Tokyo, September 1994, p.2. The 
Export Import Bank, set up in 1952, was the main implementing agency for loans and export credits 
until the early 1960s. Yen loans were administered by the Southeast Asia Development Cooperation 
Fund, established within the Export Import Bank in 1958.
7 It has been noted that the US supported Japan’s membership of the Colombo Plan, as a way of 
promoting Japanese exports to the Asian region and thus the postwar recovery of the Japan economy. 
William S. Borden, The Pacific Alliance: The United States Foreign Economic Policy and Japanese 
Trade Recovery, 1947-1955, University of Wisconsin Press, 1984; cited in Shinji Takagi, From 
Recipient to Donor: Japan s Official Aid Flows, 1945 to 1990 and Beyond, Essays in International 
Finance, No. 196, Princeton University Press, 1995.
8 Dennis Yasutomo, ‘Why Aid? Japan as an “Aid Great Power” ’, Pacific Affairs, Vol.62, No.4, Winter 
1989/90, pp.440-503.
9 This aspect of the origins of Japan’s aid program was noted in the first studies of Japan’s economic 
cooperation. See, for example, John White, Japanese Aid, Overseas Development Institute, London, 
1964. A later study by Sukehiro Hasegawa, Japan’s Foreign Aid: Policy and Practice, Praeger, New 
York, 1975, sets aid policy within the context of Japan’s national interest (kokueki) and elaborates on 
the changing priorities of this national interest. It reaffirms the centrality of economic reconstruction 
and growth in the origins of Japan’s aid program.
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Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) White Paper on Economic 
Cooperation and MOFA’s annual Diplomatic Blue Book.10
MITI’s role in promoting Japan’s industrial and commercial recovery, and 
especially in developing foreign markets, gave it a special interest in ‘economic 
cooperation’. It was MITI that published the first White Paper on Economic 
Cooperation in 1958. The Japanese private sector also had a key role in promoting 
economic cooperation and was officially incorporated into the policy making sphere.* 11
The administrative structures governing aid policy took shape in the early 1960s. 
Aid policy was officially coordinated by the ‘four ministry and agency system’
(yonshocho), which included MITI, MOFA, the Ministry of Finance (MOF) and the 
Economic Planning Agency (EPA). The Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund, 
(OECF), was created in I960.12 It was given responsibility for implementing yen loans, 
and was under the authority of the EPA. In 1962, the Overseas Technical Cooperation 
Agency (OTCA) was set up and given responsibility for technical cooperation. The 
OTCA merged in 1974 with the Japan Emigration Service (and part of the Japan 
Overseas Development Corporation) to become the Japan International Cooperation 
Agency (JICA).
In the 1960s, Japan became more integrated into the international donor 
community. It joined the Development Assistance Group in 1960, the forerunner of 
DAC. It subsequently became a member of DAC, the International Development 
Association (IDA) of the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). 
Japan also played a prominent role in new multilateral fora, especially the Asian 
Development Bank established in 1966.13 These bodies provided Japan with a means of 
rebuilding its international role and forging relations with developed and developing 
countries.14
10 For a survey of MOFA and MITI White Papers in the 1950s and 1960s, see Juichi Inada, ‘Japan’s 
ODA to ASEAN Countries: Objectives and Policymaking Process’, Development and ODA, Japan- 
ASEAN Forum 1, United Nations University, Tokyo, 1990, pp.50-6.
11 This aspect has been explored by David Arase, ‘Public-Private Sector Interest Coordination in Japan’s 
ODA’, Pacific Affairs, Vol.67, No.2, Summer 1994, pp. 171-99.
12 The OECF was created in response to concern about securing stable supplies of raw materials from 
developing countries. Its ‘basic intention’ was the promotion of Japanese control over energy and raw 
material production in developing countries. The mechanism would be yen loans to Japanese firms 
carrying out projects in resource development. David Arase, ‘Public-Private Sector Interest Coordination 
in Japan’s ODA’, pp.175-6.
13 On Japan’s role in the Asian Development Bank, see Dennis Yasutomo, Japan and the Asian 
Development Bank, Praeger Special Series, New York, 1983.
14 Japan was especially concerned about becoming a member of the OECD and ‘joining the club of 
advanced countries’. Membership of DAC was instrumental in this respect. See Torn Yanagihara and 
Anne Emig, ‘An Overview of Japan’s Foreign Aid’, in Shafiqul Islam (ed.), Yen for Development: 
Japanese Foreign Aid and the Politics of Burdensharing, Council on Foreign Relations, New York, 
1991, p.40.
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Participation in international fora also led to some clarification of the terms 
‘economic cooperation’ and ‘aid’, although these continued to be used interchangeably. 
The distinction lay in the way ‘aid’ came to be associated with the DAC’s definition of 
‘development assistance’, which was defined by MITI as ‘economic cooperation in the 
narrow sense’.15
In line with its membership of international donor organisations, Japan began to 
extend increasing amounts of grant aid in the late 1960s that were unrelated to 
reparations payments. In 1968 food aid commenced. This was a form of grant aid which 
emerged out of the Kennedy Round of international trade negotiations. In 1969 the 
general grant aid program was introduced. This was officially under the jurisdiction of 
MOFA, with OTCA and later JICA responsible for implementation. Given its late arrival 
and the emphasis on yen loans, grant aid (excluding reparations) remained a relatively 
small part of Japan’s aid program.16
By the end of the 1960s, the term aid had come to be associated with official, or 
government, transfers.17 Japan’s ODA encompassed bilateral loans, grants, reparations 
(these continued until 1976) and technical assistance; and contributions to multilateral 
organisations. A number of distinguishing features of Japan’s bilateral ODA, which 
would prove enduring characteristics, had also emerged by this stage.
Some characteristics of Japan’s ‘economic cooperation’.
The most striking feature was the Asian focus of aid flows. This reflected the legacy of 
Japan’s reparations agreements. But it also reflected the importance of Asia (and 
increasingly Southeast Asia) in Japan’s postwar foreign policy.18 In 1969, 100 per cent of 
Japan’s ODA flowed to Asia; 48 per cent to Southeast Asia. In the 1970s this pattern 
began to change, and by the end of that decade the Japanese government established a 
guideline for the regional distribution of aid: 70 per cent to Asia, and 10 per cent each to 
the Middle East, Africa and Latin America.19
15 Essentially this excluded non-concessional flows, including ‘other official flows’ (OOFs). The term 
‘other official flows’ was introduced by DAC in 1968. Among DAC countries, Japan had the highest 
portion of OOFs within its overall financial flows to developing countries. In 1969 OOFs amounted to 
$375.8 million (ODA was $435.6 million). In 1970 OOFs had increased to $693.8 million, compared to 
ODA flows of $458 million. Discussion of these concepts and how they evolved is in Alan Rix, Japan’s 
Economic Aid: Policy-Making and Politics, Croom Helm, London, 1980, especially Chapter 1.
16 This includes capital grants and technical cooperation provided on a bilateral basis. It was not until 
the 1980s that efforts were made to encrease the share of grants in Japan’s ODA.
17 In 1969 the DAC introduced the concept of official development assistance.
18 It has been suggested that there were both economic and political dimensions of this Asian bias in 
Japan’s aid program, including by the late 1960s a role in strengthening what was termed the ‘unity of 
the anti-communist camp’ in Asia. See Fumio Kaneko, ‘Japanese ODA: Politics of Strategic 
Assistance’, AMPO: Japan-Asia Quarterly Review, Vol.20, Nos 1 and 2, 1988, pp.46-59.
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A second distinguishing feature was the emphasis on yen loans. In 1969, 63 per 
cent of Japan’s bilateral ODA was yen loans. This actually increased in the late 1970s 
when reparations payments ceased and yen loans doubled. In 1978 yen loans amounted 
to 75 per cent of Japan’s bilateral ODA. The share of grants was among the lowest of 
the DAC member countries. The emphasis on loans reflected the fact that ‘economic 
cooperation’ not ‘aid’ was the focus of Japan’s diplomacy with developing countries. 
This was tailored closely to Japan’s own development and economic interests. Moreover, 
it was argued that countries should be encouraged to be ‘self-reliant’. Loans, not grants, 
would instill the necessary discipline that would lead to self-reliance.20
A third distinguishing feature was the emphasis on infrastructure projects. 
Infrastructure development had been the focus of reparations and loans, and later capital 
grants.21 This was rationalised on the grounds of promoting ‘self-reliance’: that 
construction of infrastructure supported economic development. But it also promoted 
Japanese exports of plant and equipment, as well as assisted Japanese firms in overseas 
investment Yen loans and grants were project tied, and the actual contract for the aid 
project was carried out by Japanese firms.22 The project tied aid helped to ensure the 
involvement of the Japanese private sector in delivering ODA.
The Japanese government also required an official request from the recipient for 
each project. This was ostensibly in order to respect the sovereignty of developing 
countries and the principle of self-reliance. But it may have had much to do with 
sensitivities in relations with Asian countries following the Second World War.23 A 
related characteristic was the way decision making was largely conducted on a case by 
case basis. This reflected the project based approach to aid as well as the decentralised 
aid bureaucracy. Each loan project was subject to consultation and coordination within 
the yonshocho system.24 This reflects a more general administrative feature of Japan’s
19 Alan Rix, ‘Japan’s Role in the South Pacific Region’, Australian Foreign Affairs Record, June 1981, 
p.301. These categories obviously leave out the Pacific islands. This reflects a more general problem in 
Japan of defining where, in the broader regional settings, the Pacific islands belong.
20 This remains a central idea in Japan’s approach to ODA. See Toshio Watanabe, ‘Thoughts on Japan’s 
ODA: Uphold the Philosophy of Assisting Self Help’, Management Japan, Vol.25, No.2, Autumn 1992, 
pp.3-10.
21 Capital grants were for infrastructure development where loans were inappropriate (such as social 
infrastructure) and for the lesser developed countries. Alan Rix, Japan s Economic Aid, p .l 19.
22 Until 1965, yen loans were actually made to Japanese firms carrying out the projects in developing 
countries. This practice began to change in 1965, with the first direct loan to a foreign government.
23 Robert M. Orr Jr., The Emergence of Japan s Foreign Aid Power, p.144. This is also reflected in 
Japan’s position on applying conditionality to aid; that is, Japan was opposed to using aid to encourage 
reforms or otherwise influence the political and economic policies of developing countries.
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aid program. No single ministry or agency had sole discretion over all or even part of the 
aid program.
External and domestic circumstances thus combined to shape an aid program 
known as economic cooperation. Japan’s ODA policies were dominated by economic 
issues, being primarily concerned with Japan’s postwar recovery and economic relations 
with its Asian neighbours. Political issues were hardly visible, although MOFA attached 
importance to the diplomatic effects of ODA and its role in helping to normalise Japan’s 
foreign relations.
The 1970s represented a period of transition for Japan as its aid program grew to 
encompass a larger number of recipients and a wider set of foreign policy objectives and 
challenges.
Japan’s ODA in the 1970s
In its early stages, Japan’s aid program reacted mainly to opportunity: to provide 
compensation, rebuild economic ties and create markets and a stable supply of raw 
materials. In the 1970s, there was a tendency for the aid program to react to adversity — 
that is, threats and challenges to Japan’s security. Developments in the international 
arena which had a significant impact on Japan’s aid policy included the emergence of 
what came to be described as ‘resource nationalism’, and a general trend within 
international fora of Third World collective diplomacy. The 1973-74 oil crisis was 
perhaps the most extreme case of resource nationalism although other challenges 
emerged in the UN Conference on Trade and Development and the Third UN Law of the 
Sea Conference.25
In the wake of the Arab oil embargo in the early 1970s, ‘natural resource security 
played a critical role in defining Japanese interests in the (Middle East) region and thus 
motivating Tokyo to extend economic assistance’.26 Aid was used to end the oil embargo 
by showing Japan’s ‘concern’ towards the Arab countries. Because of the nature of the 
crisis, procedures were also circumvented in that a massive aid package ($3 billion) was 
offered before requests were received.
Japan’s reaction to the challenges of Third World resource nationalism was to 
direct aid to regions that previously had not featured in Japan’s aid program. These
24 Grant aid procedures are explored in detail in Chapter 3. It should be noted that projects provided as 
grant aid were also subject to complex decision making processes. These involved key ministries such as 
MOFA and MOF, as well as other ministries, depending on the nature of the project.
25 William Nester, ‘The Third World in Japanese Foreign Policy’, in Kathleen Newland (ed.), The 
International Relations of Japan, Millenium Publishing Group/MacMillan, London, 1990.
26 See Robert M. Orr Jr., ‘Japanese Foreign Aid: Over a Barrel in the Middle East’, in Bruce M. Koppel 
and Robert M. Orr Jr., (eds), Japan s Foreign Aid: Power and Policy in a New Era, Westview Press, 
Boulder, 1993, p.290. He notes that by 1973,77.6 per cent of Japan’s energy needs were supplied by 
crude oil, of which 77.4 per cent came from the Middle East (46.4 per cent from Arab OPEC members).
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included Africa, the Pacific islands and Latin America, as well as the Middle East. 
Resource security, always one factor underlying Japan’s ODA, became a more salient 
political and economic imperative of ODA. This was evident in MITI and MOFA reports 
in the 1970s which emphasised security of natural resources, along with Japan’s political 
and economic stability and Japan’s international role, as objectives underpinning ODA.27 
In general, reliance on natural resources led Japan to channel ODA (often in conjunction 
with private sector investment) into sectors where it had an interest in securing stable 
supplies.28
Another political challenge in the 1970s was more directly related to Japan’s 
policies of ‘economic cooperation’. Anti-Japanese riots in some Southeast Asian capitals 
greeted Prime Minister Tanaka on a visit to the region in 1974. These demonstrated the 
depth of animosity for Japan that still lingered in the region, but also the way Japan’s 
foreign economic policies had bred negative and hostile reactions. What was also at issue 
was the tension between using aid as a means of promoting Japan’s economic interests 
while at the same time building goodwill with recipient countries. The increasing 
importance of the diplomatic dimensions of economic cooperation was evident with new 
efforts by Japan to enhance aid to Southeast Asia. In 1977 Prime Minister Fukuda 
pledged new aid policies towards the member countries of ASEAN, including SI billion 
for five ASEAN regional projects.29
The international donor community (and key allies such as the US) also put 
increasing pressure on Japan to enhance the qualitative and quantitative aspects of its aid 
program. This in part reflected Japan’s persistent large current account surpluses, a 
feature of Japan’s economy since the late 1960s. The declaration by Prime Minister 
Fukuda in 1977 that Japan would double its ODA within three years was in response to 
this pressure and was the first in a series of medium-term ODA targets that the 
government of Japan committed itself to. This signalled the importance of strong political 
(prime ministerial) initiative in bringing change to Japan’s aid policy, especially to ensure 
steady growth in aid disbursements against the fiscally conservative MOF. It also
27 It was in this context, in the early 1970s, that the special category of grant aid for fisheries was 
introduced. This is described in detail in Chapter 5. Grant aid for fisheries aimed to secure access for 
Japanese fleets to developing country fishing zones, as well as to support the operations of Japanese 
firms in fisheries-related joint ventures with developing countries.
28 In the 1970s this included major aluminium refineries in Latin America. Fumio Kaneko, ‘Japanese 
ODA: Politics of Strategic Assistance’, p.50.
29 This was announced as part of the Fukuda Doctrine on Japan’s relations with Southeast Asia. Dennis 
Yasutomo, ‘Why Aid? Japan as an “Aid Great Power” ’, pp.492-93. The Fukuda Doctrine is instructive 
in terms of the conflict it demonstrated between diplomatic and economic interests in Japan’s Southeast 
Asian diplomacy. Because of resistance from ministries (MOF, MITI and the Ministry of Agriculture 
and Forestry) to significantly increase ODA, relax tariff barriers and promote agricultural imports, the 
actual substance of Japan’s pledges of economic assistance was weakened. This ‘disappointed’ ASEAN 
leaders. See Sueo Sudo, ‘The Road to Becoming a Regional Leader: Japanese Attempts in Southeast 
Asia, 1975-1980’, Pacific Affairs, Vol.61, N o.l (Spring 1988), pp.27-50.
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demonstrated a perceived need to improve Japan’s image as an aid donor, in line with the 
growing importance of relations with developing countries and the donor community.30
The changing US role in the international arena (epitomised by the defeat in 
Vietnam and subsequent military withdrawal from the Southeast Asian mainland) also led 
to increasing pressures on Japan to assume more responsibility for its own defence effort, 
as well as that of the West.31 ODA became a central component of this new ‘peace 
diplomacy’, as a non-military means for supporting national security. This was evident in 
the emergence of a new policy guideline in 1978: ‘aid to countries bordering areas of 
conflict’. This guideline formed the rationale for increased aid flows to, among others, 
Turkey, Pakistan and Thailand (Western allies which bordered, respectively, Iran, 
Afghanistan and Cambodia).32 The early 1980s saw the emergence of another policy 
guideline: ‘aid to those countries which are important to the maintenance of peace and 
stability of the world’33. This rationalised aid to the Caribbean and the Pacific islands, as 
well as to Southeast Asia.
The importance of supporting American strategic interests and using ODA in 
concert with US foreign policy was particularly marked in the heightened Cold War 
environment of the late 1970s and early 1980s. The role of ‘US pressure’ on Japan’s aid 
program was recognised as an important influence at this time, especially on MOFA.34 
The term ‘strategic aid’ was applied to policy that was conducted in concert with the 
strategic interests of the US. This, by definition, meant Japan’s contribution to the 
American-led anti-communist strategy of the Cold War.35 But Japan’s aid program was 
also based on the rationale that the nation’s security rested on the political stability of 
recipients, which in turn was a product of their economic development36
30 Alan Rix, Japan’s Economic Aid, pp.41-4.
31 In the postwar period the Japanese government relied on the US for its defence under the terms of the 
Treaty o f Mutual Cooperation and Security. Japan’s Constitution (Article 9) set forth a non-military 
posture that precluded the maintenance of military forces (although the Japan Self-Defence Force was 
nevertheless allowed on the grounds that it was ‘defensive’) and any overseas despatch of military force. 
In this context, Japan’s aid was also strictly for economic not military purposes. This was spelt out 
explicitly in 1979 and 1981 when the Japanese government resolved ‘not to carry out economic 
assistance that will be applied toward military use or promote international conflict’. Juichi Inada, 
‘Japan’s Aid Diplomacy: Economic, Political or Strategic?’, in Kathleen Newland (ed.), The 
International Relations of Japan, Millenium Publishing Group/MacMillan, London, 1990, pp. 100-20
32 Dennis Yasutomo, The Manner of Giving: Strategic Aid and Japan s Foreign Policy, Lexington 
Books, Lexington, MA, 1986. See also Juichi Inada, ‘Japan’s Aid Diplomacy’.
33 MOFA, Japan s Official Development Assistance, 1984 AnnualReport, 1984, p.2.
34 See Robert M. Orr Jr., The Emergence of Japan s Foreign Aid Power, also Robert M. Orr Jr., ‘The 
Aid Factor in US-Japan Relations’, Asian Survey, Vol.XXVIII, No.7, 1988, pp.740-756.
35 Juichi Inada, ‘Japan’s Aid Diplomacy: Economic, Political or Strategic?’; Dennis Yasutomo, The 
Manner of Giving. The term ‘strategic aid’ was not used officially but confined to media and academic 
analysis.
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By the early 1980s, ODA had acquired a more political orientation and set of 
rationales, especially in terms of promoting Japan’s security. For example, the role of 
ODA was defmed by a 1980 MOFA report as ‘the cost of building an international order 
to secure Japan’s overall national security’.37 But the link between ODA and security 
was ambiguous and ill-defined. In particular, the link between ODA and political/military 
security remained vague, as opposed to the link between ODA and economic security. 
While the latter fitted more easily into Japan’s established approach to ‘economic 
cooperation’, the former appeared to be a rationale mainly articulated for the benefit of 
foreign audiences and allies. In this context, MOFA’s role in defining the purpose of 
ODA assumed greater precedence. MOFA’s interest in acquiring kudos with other 
donors through ODA also became a more prominent factor in its support for Japan’s aid 
program.
An attempt to integrate the various factors of Japan’s overall security, at least 
conceptually, was made at the end of the 1970s. This took the form of an approach 
known as ‘comprehensive national security’, developed mainly under Prime Minister 
Ohira in 1979 and Prime Minister Suzuki in 1980. This was a broad-based policy 
response to changes in Japan’s international security environment It entailed a 
combination of diplomacy, economic measures and military preparedness (enhancing 
national defence capability). The relationship between comprehensive security and 
economic cooperation was, however, a confusing one. As one writer observed, it was 
not clear whether comprehensive security was the ‘overriding framework’ for aid policy, 
or one component within an ‘overall philosophy of economic cooperation’.38
In most cases, comprehensive security arguments complemented and 
strengthened rationales for aid to areas where Japan already had an aid program. But 
there was the potential for conflicts and occasionally these manifested themselves -  for 
example on the issue of suspending aid to Vietnam.39 The difficulties of using ODA as a 
diplomatic instrument that aimed to create a more positive image of Japan with 
developing countries (an implicit part of comprehensive security) had also become 
apparent.
36 William Brooks and Robert M. Orr Jr., ‘Japan’s Foreign Economic Assistance’, Asian Survey, 
Vol.XXV, N o .3 ,1985, pp.322-40.
37 The report, titled Keizai kyoryoku no rinen -  seifu kaihatsu enjo wa naze okonau ka, gave two broad 
reasons for Japan’s ODA program: ‘humanitarian and moral considerations’ and ‘the recognition of 
interdependence’. These would remain cornerstones of MOFA rationales for ODA.
38 This is discussed in more detail in Chapter 6. Dennis Yasutomo, The Manner of Giving, p.32.
39 Robert M. Orr Jr., The Emergence of Japan s Foreign Aid Power, p.142. MOFA was more concerned 
about relations with ASEAN and the US, and thus supported termination of Japan’s aid program to 
Vietnam. On the other hand, MITI, concerned about promoting economic relations with Vietnam, 
supported a more flexible policy. This case reflected how ministries may have different views of 
‘national interest’.
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‘Economic cooperation’ based primarily on Japan’s economic interests was 
clearly not always conducive to good political relations, as evident in the case of 
ASEAN. The problem was the strength of bureaucratic resistance in Japan, from 
ministries other than MOFA, to adopting policies of economic cooperation that 
addressed the concerns of developing countries, such as identified by the ASEAN 
states.40 In this context, the general offers of ODA made by Japan to ASEAN as a group 
were less than a diplomatic success, falling short of the more meaningful economic 
cooperation ASEAN states had expected.
More fundamental perhaps was the emerging conflict between established 
principles and economic objectives of Japan’s aid program and the expectations and 
interests of other leading donors (who also happened to include Japan’s key ally, the 
US). Managing Japan’s relations with other developed states became an increasingly 
important factor underlying ODA policies in the 1980s. MOFA’s role as an advocate for 
economic cooperation on the grounds of prestige, kudos and status vis-a-vis other 
Western powers, was increasingly at odds with the position of other ministries more 
interested in specific economic returns on ODA.
Japan’s ODA in the 1980s
In the 1980s overall emphasis in Japan’s aid program was on achieving continuing 
growth in Japan’s ODA budget; that is, meeting quantitative targets. The first aid 
doubling plan was completed in 1980. The Japanese government then proceeded with a 
second medium-term plan, which aimed to double ODA disbursement in the period 1981 
to 1985. A third aid doubling plan, for the period 1986 to 1992, was realised by 1988. 
This was mainly due to the rapid appreciation of the yen after 1985. The government 
then announced a fourth medium-term plan, for the period 1989 to 1992. See Table 
2 . 1.41
The growth in Japan’s aid flows coincided with deepening trade friction between 
Japan and the US. There was greater emphasis in official rhetoric on burden-sharing and 
on Japan’s ‘international obligations and responsibilities’. Increasingly in the 1980s, the 
idea of ‘burden-sharing’ acquired a less military or geo-political orientation, and more of 
an economic focus.42 The clearest example of this was Prime Minister Takeshita’s 
International Cooperation Initiative (ICI) of 1988. There were three pillars of the ICI: 
‘cooperation towards achievement of peace, expansion of ODA and promotion of
40 Sueo Sudo, ‘The Road to Becoming a Regional Leader’, pp.37-8.
41 These increases were mainly funded by government borrowing of private sector funds; that is from the 
Fiscal Investment and Loan Program, which is based on funds invested in the postal savings system.
42 There were some exceptions to this trend, such as the Kuranari Doctrine on relations with the Pacific 
islands. This is explored in Chapter 6.
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international cultural exchange’.43 One month after the announcement of the ICI, and just 
prior to the G7 Economic Summit, the Japanese government announced its fourth 
medium-term target. The practice of announcing ODA doubling plans at G-7 summits 
continued in the 1990s.
Table 2.1 Japan’s ODA Performance 1977-93 (net disbursements)
ODA
(Smillion)
Increase
%
ODA/ 
GNP %
DAC 
Average %
ODA (Yen 
billion)
Increase
%
1977 1,424 28.9 0.21 0.33 3,825 16.7
1978 2,215 55.5 0.23 0.35 4,663 21.9
1979 2,638 19.1 0.26 0.35 5,781 24.0
1980 3,304 25.3 0.31 0.37 7,491 29.6
1981 3,171 -4.0 0.27 0.35 6,993 -6.6
1982 3,023 -4.7 0.28 0.38 7,529 7.7
1983 3,761 24.4 0.32 0.36 8,933 18.6
1984 4,319 14.8 0.34 0.36 10,258 14.8
1985 3,797 -12.1 0.29 0.35 9,057 -11.7
1986 5,634 48.4 0.29 0.35 9,495 4.8
1987 7,454 32.3 0.31 0.35 10,782 13.5
1988 9,134 22.5 0.32 0.36 11,705 8.6
1989 8,965 -1.8 0.31 0.34 12,368 5.7
1990 9,069 1.2 0.31 0.35 13,131 6.2
1991 10,952 20.8 0.32 0.34 14,731 12.2
1992 11,151 1.8 0.30 0.33 14,125 4.1
1993 11,259 15.2 0.26 0.29 12,517 1.1
Note: The lines separate the five ODA plans or medium-term targets.
Source: Compiled from data in MOFA, Japan s Official Development Assistance Annual Reports, 
1989, 1993, 1994.
Japan’s aid polices were an increasingly important part of its management of 
relations with its trading partners. This imperative also influenced the announcements 
between 1987 and 1989 of additional commitments to fund debt relief measures and 
structural adjustment programs (the Japanese Recycling Plan). These initiatives (which 
overlapped to some extent with the fourth medium-term target) aimed to encourage 
recycling of Japan’s trade and current account surplus. They also served to augment 
Japan’s contributions to multilateral lending institutions.44
43 MOFA, Japan’s Official Development Assistance 1990 Annual Report, p.6.
44 Terutomo Ozawa, Recycling Japan s Surpluses for Developing Countries, Development Centre for 
the OECD, Paris, 1989. See also Torn Yanagihara and Anne Emig, ‘An Overview of Japan’s Foreign 
Aid’.
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As long as the emphasis was on quantitative improvement, burden-sharing did not 
necessarily conflict with or displace the primacy of economic interests in ODA that had 
underpinned ‘economic cooperation’. Foreign policy rationales (such as those articulated 
by Prime Minister Takeshita) accommodated longstanding economic goals. The recycling 
plan, for example, supported increased flows to Southeast Asia. This coincided with a 
MITI initiative in 1987, called the New Asian Industries Development (AID) plan. It was 
conceived in response to the rapid rise in the value of the yen after 1985 and aimed to 
assist Japan’s smaller export oriented industries relocate to developing countries in 
Southeast Asia and export back to Japan. This was both to facilitate restructuring of the 
Japanese economy and mitigate pressures on Japan to reduce its trade surplus. Aid (yen 
loans and technical cooperation) would help build the necessary infrastructure in these 
countries to support Japanese investments.45
Nevertheless, the political and economic rationale of burden-sharing did 
introduce an aid agenda that competed with the specific interests and issues inherent in 
Japan’s relations with recipients. This had the potential for creating tensions in Japan’s 
aid policies.46 The problem of reconciling political and economic objectives also became 
more acute in the 1980s in the context of promoting qualitative change. Trading partners 
(the US in particular) linked procurement policies and practices of Japan’s ODA to 
debates about the ‘closed’ nature of the Japanese market. Although de jure tying of yen 
loans had gradually been reduced since 1978 (in 1989, 78 per cent of bilateral aid was 
untied), critics argued that the low share of projects carried out by Western firms 
attested to de facto  tying.47 This led to pressure on Japan to untie the engineering 
services and consulting component of yen loans, a process that began on a case by case 
basis in 1988. By allowing foreign consultants access, it was anticipated that the bidding 
process for project implementation would be opened up, as Japanese firms would not
45 See Danny Unger, ‘Japan’s Capital Exports: Molding East Asia’, in Danny Unger and Paul 
Blackburn (eds), Japan s Emerging Global Role, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder and London, 1993; 
and David Arase, ‘US and ASEAN Perceptions o f Japan’s Role in the Asian-Pacific’, in Harry H. 
Kendall and Clara Joewana (eds), The US, Japan and ASEAN, Institute of East Asian Studies, Berkeley, 
CA, 1991.
46 This is an aspect that is explored in more detail in the following study of Japan’s ODA to the Pacific 
island countries. The recent case of suspending aid to Iran illustrates this conflict. The US, accusing Iran 
of supporting terrorism, had urged Japan to suspend aid to Iran. Japan was reluctant to impose an aid 
suspension ‘without proof of Iran’s involvement in terrorism. It was also claimed that to suspend aid 
would mean the waste of an earlier loan to Iran (the first stage of a hydro-electric project). Iran also 
supplied almost 10 per cent of Japan’s oil. Japan subsequently announced it would ‘delay’ the second 
installment of the loan to Iran. See Nikkei Telecom Service, 7 March, 1995; Far Eastern Economic 
Review, 11 May, 1995, p.13.
47 Margee Ensign, Doing Good or Doing Well? Japan’s Foreign Aid Program, Columbia University 
Press, New York, 1992. For a more favourable assessment of Japan’s performance as an aid donor in the 
context of US-Japan relations, see Shafiqul Islam, ‘Beyond Burden-sharing: Economics and Politics of 
Japan’s Foreign Aid’, in Shafiqul Islam (ed.), Yen for Development: Japanese Foreign Aid and the 
Politics of Burden-sharing, Council on Foreign Relations, New York, 1991.
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have the advantage of tailoring project specifications to areas where they were most 
competitive.48
Other issues that concerned the international donor community included the 
relatively low ODA/GNP ratio (by the end of the decade this was 0.31 per cent, with a 
DAC average of 0.35 per cent) the grant element of total ODA commitments (76.3 per 
cent as compared to the recommended norm of 86 per cent) and the share of grants in 
total ODA (which was seen as the main factor accounting for the above anomaly, 44 per 
cent compared to a DAC average of 76 per cent). There was also pressure to reduce the 
proportion of aid provided for infrastructure development, which was seen to facilitate 
opportunities for Japanese firms to profit from ODA.49 The share of aid for infrastructure 
was 63 per cent of Japan’s total bilateral ODA in 1987. This dropped to 50 per cent in 
1989 and to 41 per cent in 1991.50
The Japanese government’s response to these criticisms was to institute measured 
and incremental reform. Apart from increasing the untied portion of its yen loans, it 
increased the amount of grant aid (from $1.7 billion in 1986 to $3 billion in 1990). Policy 
innovations designed to make grant aid more responsive to the needs of recipients were 
also introduced (for example the Small-Scale Grant Assistance scheme in 1989).51 High 
level government and private sector bodies (the Administrative Reform Council and 
Keidanren) also devised and backed measures to streamline and centralise aid policy 
making, as well as to clarify aid principles and develop country and region specific aid 
policies.
But whole-scale change, involving redistribution of decision making power as 
well as reforming procedures and guidelines, was largely blocked by bureaucratic 
resistance and inertia. The dilemma confronting these reform-oriented initiatives is that 
they challenge the administrative and political foundations upon which Japan’s ODA has 
been built and managed.52 As Orr concludes, definition of ‘quality of assistance involves
48 Susan J. Pharr, ‘Japanese Aid in the New World Order’, in Craig C. Garby and Mary Brown Bullock, 
(eds), Japan, A New Kind of Superpower?, The Woodrow Wilson Center Press, Washington DC, 1994.
49 Development Assistance Committee, Aid Review 1990/91: Report by the Secretariat and Questions 
for the Review of Japan, OECD, Paris, 1991.
50 MOFA, Japan s Official Development Assistance, Annual Reports, 1988,1990, 1992.
51 The Small-Scale Grant Assistance scheme began in 1989. There were 95 projects in 1989 (294 
million yen) and by 1992, 227 projects (700 million yen). Another innovation was the provision of non 
project-tied grant aid to support structural adjustment. The first package of $500 million was extended to 
countries of sub-Saharan Africa between 1987 and 1989. This was channelled through third party 
agencies (the UNDP and British Crown Agents). In 1992,16 small-scale grant projects were provided to 
the Pacific island countries. MOFA, Japan s Official Development Assistance 1993 Annual Report,
p. 114.
52 These refer to the complex political balance within the aid bureaucracy between the various policy 
makers. They also refer to the integration of the private sector in Japan’s ‘economic cooperation’. See 
David Arase, ‘Public-Private Sector Interest Coordination in Japan’s ODA’. For details of aid reform,
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difficult policy choices inimical to the conflicting interests’ of the various ministries 
involved in aid decision making.53
Underlying the resistance to administrative reform was the absence of adequate 
measures to address institutional and staffing weaknesses in Japan’s aid bureaucracy. The 
increase in staff numbers did not keep pace with the growth in the aid disbursements.
This was largely a reflection of the Japanese government’s fiscal austerity policies in the 
1980s, which placed strict limits on the growth of ‘non-obligatory expenditures’.54
In the 1980s a principal challenge for Japan’s ODA program therefore was 
adapting administrative procedures and institutions governing ODA to the reality of 
Japan’s burgeoning aid budget and the expectations of donors and recipients. Policy 
change continued to be a result of external pressures, especially from the international 
donor community and key trading partners. This reflected an apparent paradox: the more 
Japan’s aid budget grew, the more pressure there was from international aid fora, other 
donors and recipients for Japan to reform its policies and to improve the quality of aid; in 
other words, the more visible Japan became as an aid donor, the more criticism it 
attracted.
This had domestic dimensions as well. As the aid budget grew, public scrutiny of 
aid policy also increased. On the one hand, critics sought to expose corrupt, wasteful and 
socially and environmentally destructive aid practices; on the other, they pressured 
against political use of aid.55 The Japanese government became increasingly sensitive to 
public perceptions of ODA, as evidenced in the new efforts, especially by MOFA, to 
‘promote understanding of ODA’ in Japan.56 This was due in part to the fact that MOF 
was resistant to increasing the aid budget, and any public criticism of ODA increased its 
reservations about ‘wasting tax payer’s money’.
There was an underlying dilemma for the government, moreover, in that while the 
international community expected Japan to play a more political role in world affairs 
(including the political use of ODA), economic ministries and the private sector 
continued to emphasise their respective trade, investment and resource interests as 
motivations and objectives for ODA. Thus, to encompass this ‘diversity’, official MOFA 
reports continued to refer to vague or general principles and ideas as Japan’s ‘basic
see Alan Rix, Japan’s Foreign Aid Challenge: Policy Reform and Aid Leadership, Routledge, London 
and New York, 1993.
53 Robert M. Orr Jr., The Emergence of Japan s Foreign Aid Power, p.138.
54 Shinji Takagi, From Recipient to Donor, p.31.
55 See, for example, Yoshinori Murai (ed.), Kensho Nippon no ODA, Gakuyo Shobo, Tokyo, 1992; also 
AMPO, Japan-Asia Quarterly Review, Vol.21, N o .4 ,1989 (Special Issue on Japan’s ODA).
56 In 1987 the Japanese government adopted the recommendation of a study group to designate one day 
each year (6 October) to ‘International Cooperation Day’ as a way of raising awareness of ODA in 
Japan.
37
philosophy’ of ODA. These included ‘humanitarian considerations, interdependence, 
environmental considerations and support for self help’.57 This vagueness only fed the 
confusion at the international level about what exactly Japan’s ODA program was aimed 
at.58
In the 1990s the Japanese government attempted to resolve some of these 
dilemmas and tensions in its ODA by introducing new initiatives. The effect of these 
measures, however, has been more cosmetic than substantive. In fact it may argued that 
the aim of these innovations has been to avoid major adjustment in Japan’s ODA, 
especially at the administrative level.
Aid policy in the 1990s
Traditionally, the Japanese government had resisted attaching political conditions to its 
aid disbursements. The rationale, according to MOFA, was that ‘setting political 
conditions on assistance might infringe on the concept of non-intervention in domestic 
affairs’.59 But by 1990, MOFA also indicated that it would support political conditions 
‘in harmony’ with other Western countries, by providing ‘aid to support democratisation’ 
in Eastern Europe. In April 1991, then Prime Minister Kaifu went further by announcing 
that Japan would consider the military (arms imports/exports and spending), economic 
(promotion of free market policies) and political (human rights, democratisation) policies 
of recipient states before extending ODA. This was largely in response to the Iraqi 
invasion of Kuwait. Also in response to the Gulf War, Japan increased aid disbursements 
to the Middle East and North Africa.
In 1992 the Kaifu principles were formalised in an ODA Charter. In part, the 
ODA Charter was a response to foreign criticism of Japan’s ODA policies; that Japan 
needed to play a more active role in promoting international security rather than 
attending solely to its own economic interests. In addition, the Charter was directed at 
domestic criticism about the lack of transparency in Japan’s aid decision making system. 
But there was a clear qualification as to how far Japan would apply these principles and 
guidelines. Japan, it was claimed by some policy makers, had a different view of human 
rights and political development than that of the West.60 This has been borne out in the 
cautious and limited application of the Charter.
57 MOFA, Japan's Official Development Assistance, 1994 Summary, p.3.
58 This point is made by David Arase, ‘Public-Private Sector Interest Coordination in Japan’s ODA’, 
p.190. Confusion was evident in DAC, Aid Review, 1990/91, p.7.
59 Gaimusho, Waga kuni no seifu kaihatsu enjo, Vol 1, 1990.
60 For a discussion of contrasting US and Japanese views on political conditionality, see Robert M. Orr 
Jr., ‘Political Agendas: A New World Order Through Foreign Aid?’, in Barbara Stallings et al., 
Common Vision, Different Paths: The United States and Japan in the Developing World, Overseas 
Development Council, Washington DC, 1993.
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The fact that the Charter is a set of guidelines that do not have any legal status, 
means that it may be applied flexibly.61 In practice, this has meant that aid has been 
suspended or reduced only where there are no major conflicts with Japan’s economic 
interests, or where US pressure have been applied (as in the case of Iran). The ODA 
Charter may be seen as a mechanism for demonstrating Japan’s commitment to 
international security issues in ODA, while at the same time avoiding the problems of 
having to constrain or adapt policy practices. But there is also an element of resentment 
against Western pressure within Japan, which has led to an assertion of Japan’s own 
development path. This ‘defiance’ has led to a more prominent stand in international 
development fora, as evident in the debates about economic conditionality and ODA.
On economic conditionality, two trends that emerged in the 1990s were an 
assertion by policy makers (especially in MOF) that Japan should have an influence in 
international economic institutions commensurate with its economic contributions, and 
an emphasis on promoting policies in the international funding agencies that more closely 
reflected Japan’s own economic experience.
In 1991, the OECF published a paper that both critiqued the World Bank 
approach to structural adjustment and emphasised Japan’s own development model, 
including the benefits of industrial policy. This paper cautioned against ‘too rapid 
marketisation and liberalisation’.62 Largely in response to pressure from the Japanese 
government, the World Bank undertook to produce a major study on the development 
strategies of East Asian countries that enjoyed high growth in the postwar era. This 
presented the ‘Japan model’ in a more favourable ligh t63
As with the approach to political conditionality, this position on economic 
conditionality was an attempt to respond to international pressures without challenging 
established principles and practices. For example, on the issue of using aid for 
infrastructure development (see above), Japan sought to justify this ‘traditional emphasis’ 
within its aid policy framework by ‘pointing out that Japan’s own growth was 
accelerated through World Bank loans for infrastructure’.64 The result, however, has 
been to exacerbate, rather than ameliorate, tensions with leading donors, especially the 
US.
Among the contentious issues in the development debate of the 1990s are the role 
of the private sector (for Japan, the private sector has a central role in economic
61 These points are elaborated in more detail in Chapter 7.
62 Details are in Barbara Stallings, ‘Development in the 1990s: US and Japanese Paradigms’, in Barbara 
Stallings et al., Common Vision, Different Paths. The World Bank/IMF approach was labelled the 
‘Washington Consensus’.
63 World Bank, The East Asian Miracle: Economic Growth and Public Policy, Oxford University Press, 
New York, 1993. See also Alan Rix, Japan s Foreign Aid Challenge.
64 Susan J. Pharr, ‘Japanese Aid in the New World Order’, p. 171.
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cooperation, including ODA), debt relief (Japan is opposed to debt write off as a way of 
controlling the debt problem) and addressing environmental problems. Japan is allocating 
significant sums of aid to this area, but prefers bilateral to multilateral or cooperative 
ventures. This is seen to reflect Japan’s preference for a case-by-case approach to ODA, 
rather than more general ‘frameworks’.65 An underlying tension has also emerged in 
relations between the US and Japan over the extent to which burden-sharing equated 
with power sharing. The US has been reluctant to cede voting power in the international 
lending agencies in favour of Japan. It has also been unwilling to allow Japan’s funding 
shares in the regional development agencies (the ADB, for example) to outweigh its 
own.66
The emphasis on what is termed ‘global issues’: population, AIDS, environmental 
conservation, refugees and drugs is a major feature of the development debates in the 
1990s. Initiatives taken by Japan in these areas include an expanded budget for 
environment related projects ($7 billion dollars in the period 1992-96) and a special 
allocation of $3 billion for population and AIDS related assistance (announced at the 
1994 UN Conference on Population and Development).67
But despite embracing these global agendas, the orientation of Japan’s ODA 
remains very much regional (that is, Asian) and bilateral. In 1993, 71.2 per cent of 
Japan’s ODA was bilateral. At the declaratory level, Japanese leaders have stated that 
Asia (and Southeast Asia in particular) will continue to be the ‘priority focus’ of Japan’s 
ODA.68 In terms of aid flows, Asia still accounts for the largest share (65 per cent of 
bilateral aid in 1992). This regional concentration represents another potentially divisive 
issue: that is, the implications of continued high growth in East Asia through intra- 
regional trade, investment and aid and whether or not this will exacerbate inter-regional 
conflict and rivalry. Moreover, it leads to a continuing bias in Japan’s aid program on 
countries which are not amongst the poorest and least developed aid recipients.
The question of whether or not Japan’s aid policies and performance amount to a 
leadership role in the international arena continues to be debated. While it has been 
suggested that Japan’s potential for leadership in ODA is ‘inextricably an element of
65 Taizo Yakushiji, ‘The Challenge o f Development with Environmental Protection’, in Barbara 
Stallings et al., Common Vision, Different Paths, pp.99-108.
66 See, for example Kazumasa Iwata, ‘Debt Relief: Toward Renewed Economic Growth’, in Barbara 
Stallings et al., Common Vision: Different Paths, pp.65-82.
67 MOFA, Japan s Official Development Assistance, 1994 Summary, p.16. The environment agenda has 
become a major part of Japan’s ODA program, embraced by most ministries with an interest in ODA. 
For example, in 1991 MITI announced a ‘Green Aid Plan’ that aimed to disburse $2.2 billion over ten 
years in grants and loans for environmental projects. But it is not clear whether this aid signals a new 
approach in policy or simply a new area in which ministries may compete for resources from the aid 
budget.
68 Toshiki Kaifu, ‘Japan and ASEAN: Seeking a Mature Partnership for the New Age’, ISIS Focus, 6/91 
(1991) pp.30-8. The ODA Charter also reaffirmed this emphasis on Asia.
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Japan’s rise as a world power’,69 there remains disagreement over the extent to which 
Japan strives for or is capable of leadership in this sphere. Nevertheless the sentiment 
that ‘Japan should set its sights on becoming the leader in providing assistance to the 
developing world’70 is articulated by a number of policy makers and political leaders in 
Japan.
PERSPECTIVES AND APPROACHES: THE AID DEBATES
The foregoing study of developments in Japan’s ODA policies suggested that there exists 
a complex mix of economic and political objectives underlying ODA, and that the 
relative weight of these has changed over time. It has also highlighted a number of 
tensions in Japan’s aid program, for example between the goals of ‘economic 
cooperation’ and burden-sharing. It pointed to the problems of policy innovation and 
indicated that there is a lack of consensus among policy makers about the priorities of 
Japan’s aid program.
The previous chapter suggested that the debate about why Japan gives aid and 
what are the main influences on aid policy has been structured around several main 
questions: To what extent are Japan’s ODA policies shaped by the ‘economic 
cooperation’ principles (that is, promotion of Japan’s own economic interests) that 
originally underpinned the ODA program? How far do broader political and diplomatic 
interests and objectives shape Japan’s ODA policies? What is the impact of domestic 
politics and policy making processes on Japan’s ODA; how far do domestic politics 
impede or constrain the economic/strategic use of Japan’s ODA?
These questions are inevitably interrelated. The last is in fact central to any 
discussion of the first two, which is a basic premise of this study. While much of the 
literature on Japan’s ODA has tended to overlook the domestic political context of aid, 
and ignore possible conflicts and tensions in Japan’s aid program, explanations of what 
drives Japan’s aid policies in fact depend upon assessments of the aid administration.
The most extensive and detailed study of the aid decision making process is by 
Rix.71 Other studies that built on this work, by focusing on the decision making context, 
are by Orr (who emphasised the role of the US) 72 and Arase (who emphasised the role of 
the private sector) .73
69 Alan Rix, Japan s Foreign Aid Challenge, p.163.
70 Saburo Okita, ‘Japan as Number Two’, Institute for Domestic and International Policy Studies, 
Tokyo, 1992. Dr Okita, a former foreign minister, was a prominent and influential advisor to the 
government, and one of the most ardent supporters of a growing aid role for Japan.
71 Alan Rix, Japan s Economic Aid. See also Alan Rix, Japan s Foreign Aid Challenge.
72 Robert M. Orr Jr., The Emergence o f Japan s Foreign Aid Power.
41
The theoretical underpinnings of Rix’s approach are linked to the bureaucratic 
politics model of decision making. In this model, the decision making process is the 
result of organisations and individuals reacting to their own perceptions of national, 
institutional and personal goals. The underlying premise of this model is that politics and 
policy making ‘consists of competing organised interests’.74 Moreover, power is 
disbursed within the bureaucracy in a way that parallels pluralist conceptions of the 
state.75 In Japan’s case, pluralism is modified by the important role of the bureaucracy 
and the ‘symbiotic relationship’ between bureaucratic agencies and specific interest 
groups.76
Closely related to bureaucratic politics (but often submerged within the same 
approach, especially in the context of Japan) is the organisational process model. The 
emphasis here is on the way organisational structure and functioning (that is, 
administrative routines) affect decision making. Procedural rigidity and ‘standard 
operating procedures’ limit and define the range of choice in recurring routine and even 
crisis situations.77 The main points and arguments of the bureaucratic politics approach, 
in terms of its impact on Japan’s ODA, are summarised by Rix as follows:
divided political and bureaucratic responsibility for foreign aid lead[s] to fragmented 
budget processes and lack of any overall aid planning. In particular there is no political 
centre for aid policy and therefore no unified or consistent domestic political lobby at 
Cabinet level. Ongoing inter-ministry competition within the aid system lead[s] to 
cross-cutting objectives and programs. Limited aid planning or prioritising coupled 
with an open and competitive decision-making system [means that] consistency in 
objectives is weak. [There is] emphasis on broadly acceptable policy goals rather than 
specific country-based goals [and] limited scope for longer-term aid planning. Lengthy 
processes for aid approvals within the Japanese Government and bureaucratic 
domination of most aid processes [are further problems].78
73 David Arase, ‘Public-Private Sector Interest Coordination in Japan’s ODA’.
74 Robert M. Orr Jr., The Emergence o f Japan’s Foreign Aid Power, p.7. In the case of Japan, less 
autonomy and power has been observed in individual policy makers; thus more attention has been on 
organisational politics. Alan Rix, Japan s Economic Aid, p.16.
75 This view of the state in Japan holds that interest groups have access to the policy process, and that 
there are legal, procedural and institutional mechanisms facilitating this process. See, for example, 
Aurelia George, ‘Japanese Interest Group Behaviour; An Institutional Approach’, in J. A. A. Stockwin 
et al. (eds). Dynamic and Immobilist Politics in Japan, University of Hawaii Press, Hawaii, 1988.
76 Michio Muramatsu, ‘Patterned Pluralism under Challenge: The Policies of the 1980s’, in Gary D. 
Allinson and Yasunori Sone (eds), Political Dynamics in Contemporary Japan, Cornell University 
Press, Ithaca and London, 1993; also, Michio Muramatsu and Ellis S. Krauss, ‘The Conservative Party 
Line and the Development of Patterned Pluralism’, in Kozo Yamamura and Yasukichi Yasuba (eds),
The Political Economy o f Japan, Vol. 1: The Domestic Transformation, Stanford University Press, 
Stanford, 1987.
77 Procedural rigidity has been widely observed in the context of Japan, but there may be both historical 
and cultural bases to this. See, for example, Lucian Pye, Asian Power and Politics: The Cultural 
Dimensions o f Authority, Harvard University Press, MA. 1985, especially Ch.ll.
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This perspective essentially mirrors a more general view that structural factors 
within Japan constrain the assumption by Japan of a more ‘proactive international role’. 
These include ‘the inadequacy of Japan’s bureaucratic structure’ due to overlapping 
spheres of jurisdiction, partisanship arising from lifetime employment commitments in the 
bureaucracy, and the absence of a strong central executive. Another structural constraint 
stems from the nature of party politics and Japan’s electoral system, which encourages 
parochialism and sectionalism among politicians. A further constraint is attributed to ‘the 
salience of complex personal networks’ as a basis for decision making, which stresses 
consensus and compliance, and often avoidance of difficult choices.79 These factors are 
seen to increase the importance of outside pressure and render Japanese policy making 
‘reactive’.
The role of foreign pressure on Japan’s ODA has been explored by Orr in an 
important study of the politicisation of Japanese ODA. Orr argues that MOFA had 
sought to use ODA in order to expand Japan’s international political role, and that it had 
enlisted external support (namely the US) to augment its position within the aid 
bureaucracy.80 US pressure had a key impact on Japan’s growing aid budgets. Orr argues 
that direct pressure was a less frequent form of external intervention than what he termed 
‘bureaucratic coalition building’ and ‘preemptive action’ (using ODA to defuse foreign 
criticism of trade surpluses). Thus the study incorporates ‘transgovemmental relations’ 
(the US government) as a factor in the decision making process. The underlying premise 
of this approach is that, since no single ministry or institution dominates the aid process, 
‘external forces can be brought to bear to augment [a] ministry’s clout in pushing a 
policy position through the system’. MOFA is especially inclined towards urging US 
pressure ‘in order to bolster [its] position relative to other ministries’.81
There is another interpretation of aid decision making, put forward by Arase, 
who argues that ODA best fits into a ‘modified strong state paradigm ’.82 According to 
this view, bureaucracy uses its relative autonomy to ‘selectively structure’ policy choices 
around its own interests, and to nurture collaborative relations with the private sector.
78 Alan Rix, ‘Japan’s Aid Leadership’, Association for Asian Studies, 41st Annual Meeting, March 
1989, Washington DC.
79 Kent E. Calder, ‘Japan’s Changing Political Economy’, in Danny Unger and Paul Blackburn (eds), 
Japan's Emerging Global Role.
80 Robert M. Orr Jr., The Emergence o f Japan s Foreign Aid Power. It was possible for the US to 
assume this role because of the extremely important place that it has occupied in postwar Japanese 
foreign policies.
81 Robert M. Orr Jr., The Emergence of Japan’s Foreign Aid Power, p.12.
82 David Arase, ‘Public-Private Sector Interest Coordination in Japan’s ODA’, p.192. The ‘modified 
strong state paradigm’ derives from Chalmers Johnson’s analysis of the bureaucracy, and especially 
MITI, whose policies of ‘administrative guidance’ led the postwar recovery of Japan. Chalmers Johnson, 
MITI and the Japanese Miracle, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1982.
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While the implication of the bureaucratic politics approach is that Japan’s ODA is unable 
to be more proactive and ‘responsible’, the implication of the latter is that it can be and is 
proactive. It argues that the absence of a strong executive or legislative oversight in fact 
frees up the bureaucracy to define and promote its policies.83
While the bureaucratic politics model emphasises inter-ministerial conflict and 
rivalry, which impacts negatively on Japan’s performance as an aid donor; the ‘modified 
strong state model’ emphasises careful political balance through informal coordination, 
consultation and mediation. The decentralised system has a clear purpose: to ‘allow a 
wide variety of public and private sector actors to determine the means and ends of 
economic cooperation’.84 It also allows ‘economic ministries’ to have some say over aid 
policy and to protect their interests and those of their private sector clients. ‘Inertia’ is 
due primarily to the bureaucracy’s resistance to any measures that threaten its 
‘bureaucratic prerogative’.
A central aspect of Arase’s thesis is that the private sector was originally 
included, and remains a central part of, the aid system. ‘Structural inclusion’ of the 
private sector in intermediary structures (such as the aid implementing agencies, JICA 
and OECF) ensured close collaboration between private and bureaucratic actors. The 
importance of focusing on the decision making process, therefore, was that it revealed 
the mutual interests of the private sector and bureaucracy in ODA; and the interlocking 
and institutionalised ties between ministries and their ‘clients’ —  the industries they 
represent. Principles of economic cooperation were (and remain) central to Japan’s ODA 
policy and its role as an instrument of Japan’s ‘strategic economic agendas’.85
The foregoing survey of Japan’s aid policies showed that while economic 
interests and rationales continue to be prominent influences on Japan’s aid policies, new 
political rationales have gained ground. There is growing pressure on Japan from other 
donors and recipients to reform aid policies, but there is also strong resistance to major 
institutional change. Traditional economic imperatives underpinning ODA have evolved 
in line with changes to Japan’s own economic and foreign policy interests. This suggests
83 The absence of a powerful central executive in Japan does have important implications for ODA 
policy. Particularly significant is the fact that policy is generally initiated and managed in the 
bureaucracy. There are exceptions, however, when ministerial and prime ministeral interest intervene 
and influence the general direction of policy (for example, announcing aid doubling plans). The roles of 
politicians and Cabinet are examined in more detail in Chapter 3.
84 David Arase, ‘Public-Private Sector Interest Coordination in Japan’s ODA’, p.197.
85 This view of the political economy of Japan does not perhaps account for conflict between ministries 
over their respective ‘economic agendas’, which may in turn lead to differences over economic policy. 
This is especially pertinent in the case of ministries which have international rather than domestic 
oriented agendas. The former (MITI, for example) may be more innovative ( ‘internationalist’) in its 
approach than the latter (for example, the Ministry for Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries). See Kozo 
Yamamura, ‘The Deliberate Emergence of a Free Trader: The Japanese Political Economy in 
Transition’, in Craig C. Garby and Mary Brown Bullock (eds), Japan: A New Kind of Superpower.
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a dynamic process but also one that has been constrained by bureaucratic and procedural 
factors.
The perspective that is developed in this thesis is one that aims to account for the 
presence of competing aid policies and problems of adapting the aid administration 
(processes and procedures) to shifting policy objectives. In this context, it may be argued 
that the above two approaches (bureaucratic politics and the modified strong state 
models) are not necessarily mutually exclusive in that both yield insights that are 
relevant. Conversely, it is possible that neither, on its own, fully explains the combination 
of economic, political and bureaucratic influences on Japan’s ODA policies.
A key to understanding the aid system in Japan is bureaucratic decentralisation. 
Power, as opposed to authority,86 is shared between ministries and agencies. Particularly 
important in carrying out basic tasks, such as developing candidate projects, are those 
sector oriented or economic ministries. These ministries are closely aligned to, and 
represent the interests of, respective industry and private sector groups in Japan. 
Bureaucratic decentralisation allows ministries to tailor aid policies to particular 
economic interests. Policy coordination takes place between the private and public 
sectors, based on both formal and informal procedures, with the bureaucracy playing the 
leading role.
But the other side of the coin is that the aid bureaucracy is essentially 
conservative since its constituent parts are characterised by strong institutional loyalties 
and territorial rivalries. Overlapping jurisdictional domains may become the arena for 
policy conflict, rather than coordination. Moreover, the need for decisions to be based on 
consultation between a number of diverse policy actors means that there is no simple 
translation of policy declarations into practice. Procedures complicate and constrain the 
use of ODA as a flexible and sensitive policy tool. Aid policies may not necessarily 
promote private sector interests; in fact, competing interests within the private sector 
(including intra-industry conflicts) may diminish the influence of the private sector vis-a- 
vis bureaucratic actors.
In 1980 Rix observed that procedures help ‘counteract the unpredictability of 
bilateral relationships’. They are ‘resilient and predictable’; the ‘system’s plodding 
strength’.87 What are the procedures and processes of aid policy? How is power 
distributed within the aid bureaucracy and what is the relationship between government, 
private sector and other policy groups? These questions are taken up in the next chapter.
86 The distinction that is drawn here is similar to that between ‘control’ and ‘jurisdiction’. As has been 
noted elsewhere, ‘ministries with specified authority do not automatically decide matters within their 
jurisdiction’. Michio Muramatsu, ‘Patterned Pluralism Under Challenge’, p.51.
87 Alan Rix, Japan s Economic Aid, p.246.
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3 The Domestic Political Context: Aid Policy 
Making Structures and Processes
In studies of aid policy making in Japan, much attention is focused on the ‘four ministry 
and agency’ system of yen loan policy1. This is not surprising given the traditional 
dominance of yen loans in Japan’s aid policy. By contrast, grant aid has not been the 
focus of attention in studies of Japan’s aid policy, and thus the political and 
bureaucratic procedures have been largely overlooked.2 Grant aid has generally been 
regarded as falling under the jurisdiction and control of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
(MOFA) and the roles of other ministries, with the exception of the Ministry of Finance 
(MOF), have been down-played. For example, Orr described MOFA as having ‘sole 
discretionary power’ over grant aid. He relegated other ministries and agencies to being 
‘junior participants’, with influence only at the margins of aid policy making.3
This chapter reveals how grant aid policy may be subject to a much more 
complex system of power relations. The aim of the study is to consider procedural and 
bureaucratic influences on aid policy. It looks in particular at the processes underlying 
fisheries grant aid. Although procedures and processes are dynamic and have evolved in 
line with the expansion of Japan’s ODA program, the perspective in this chapter is on 
policy making within a contemporary context The chapter analyses procedural 
frameworks for aid policy making, the role and interests of bureaucratic actors, their 
links with private sector groups, the influence of politicians and the role of study 
groups and think-tanks.
The emphasis here on grant aid and, to a lesser extent, on technical cooperation 
derives from the fact that grant aid and technical cooperation constitute the main forms 
of Japan’s aid to the Pacific island region. Fisheries grants have comprised a significant 
share of this grant aid (see Table 1.3, in Chapter 1). Only one country (Papua New 
Guinea) has received yen loans. The Japanese government’s rationale for the emphasis
* Under this system (known as yonshocho), responsibility for yen loan policy is shared between the 
Ministry of Finance (MOF), the Ministry o f International Trade and Industry (MITI), the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs (MOFA) and the Economic Planning Agency (EPA). For different perspectives on the 
aid decision making process, see Alan Rix, Japan s Economic Aid: Policy making and Politics, Croom 
Helm, London, 1980 (which is still the definitive study of Japan’s aid bureaucracy); Robert M. Orr Jr., 
The Emergence of Japan s Foreign Aid Power, Columbia University Press, New York, 1990 (which 
examines, in particular, the role of foreign pressure); and David Arase, ‘Public-Private Sector Interest 
Coordination in Japan’s O D A Pacific Affairs, Vol.67, No.2, Summer 1994, pp.171-99 (which 
explores the private sector role in aid policy making).
2 Alan Rix, Japan’s Economic Aid, did describe some of the important aspects of grant aid policy, but 
not a lot has been done on this subject since then.
3 Robert M. Orr., Jr., The Emergence of Japan s Foreign Aid Power, pp.20, 30.
on grant aid is that small island economies have limited demand for large-scale 
infrastructure projects and low capacity to service loans.4
COM POSITION OF ODA AND GRANT AID
Japan’s aid program comprises bilateral grant aid and technical cooperation, bilateral 
loans and contributions to international organisations. Grant aid, in turn, is broken 
down into six categories. These are general grant aid, fisheries grant aid, grant aid for 
increased food production, grant aid for disaster relief, food aid and grant aid for 
cultural activities (see Figure 3.1). With the exception of certain limited cases,5 all 
bilateral grant aid is provided on a project basis. Technical cooperation essentially 
covers the acceptance of trainees in Japan, dispatch of Japanese experts and volunteers 
to recipient countries, equipment supply, project-type technical cooperation (a 
combination of the above) and development surveys.
Figure 3.1 Japan’s Grant Aid Program
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Source: JICA, Japan’s Grant Aid Program Related to Technical Cooperation.
Table 3.1 gives the breakdown of Japan’s ODA by type for the period 1986 to 
1993. It shows that grant aid comprised about 44 per cent of Japan’s bilateral ODA in 
that period. As a share of grant aid, technical assistance has steadily increased, from 35 
per cent to 55 per cent. Within the grant aid budget (not including technical
4 Sadaaki Numata, ‘Japan’s Cooperation with the South Pacific Region’, Pacific Economic Bulletin, 
December 1990, pp.8-14. Fiji is the only other country in the region to qualify for yen loans, according 
to MOFA, although the Fiji government has not requested any such aid.
5 For example, the provision of grant aid to support structural adjustment programs, mainly in sub- 
Saharan Africa.
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cooperation) general grant aid is the largest component.6 In 1992 it accounted for 91 
per cent of the grant aid budget allocated to MOFA. The next largest component was 
the fisheries aid category (5.5 per cent), followed by grant aid for disaster relief (1.8 per 
cent) and cultural aid (1.3 per cent).7
Table 3.1 Japan’s ODA, 1986-93
(Net disbursements $ million)
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993
ODA 5,634 7,454 9,134 8,965 9,222 11,034 11,151 11,259
Bilateral
ODA
3,864 5,284 6,422 6,779 6,940 8,870 8,385 8,044
Grants 1,104 1,481 1,483 1,556 1,374 1,525 1,653 1,928
Technical
aid
599 740 1,425 1,481 1,645 1,870 2,110 2,571
Yen loans 2,143 3,027 3,514 3,741 3,920 5,475 4,622 3,545
Multilateral 1,788 2,207 2,712 2,186 2,282 2,163 2,766 3,215
Note: Figures for 1990 and 1991 include aid flows to Eastern Europe as totals have not been
disaggregated. Amounts have been rounded and so do not necessarily equal totals.
Source: Compiled from MOFA, Japan’s ODA Annual Reports, 1988,1990-93.
The general grant aid portion is multi-sectoral in scope. Its main areas are 
medical and health, education and research, agriculture, public welfare and 
environment, communication and transportation, and infrastructure for export 
promotion in least developed countries. Usually these are grouped into three sectors: 
social infrastructure and services, economic infrastructure and services, and production. 
General grant aid also includes special categories of grant aid for debt relief and grant 
aid for structural adjustment Fisheries grant aid encompasses fisheries equipment and 
infrastructure (fishing ports, markets, cold storage), equipment and materials for 
research (survey vessels and laboratories), and infrastructure for fisheries training 
(fishing vessels, classrooms).
6 Henceforth, in this study, grant aid and technical cooperation are treated as separate categories of 
aid.
7 Food aid and grant aid for increased food production are categories of grant aid whose budget is 
allocated to MOF, although administered by MOFA. A Guide to Japan’s Aid, Tokyo, March 1993, p.9.
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GRANT AID PROCEDURES AND GUIDELINES
Grant aid is subject to a number of basic procedures and guidelines. Some of these are 
integral to Japan’s aid system, and the ideas that have characterised Japan’s aid 
program since its inception. Others have evolved in a more ad hoc way and do not have 
formal status as policy. Procedures are the key to understanding who makes policy. Aid 
policy procedures ensure that many policy makers influence decisions and that there are 
many levels at which policy may be influenced. The core of the decision making process 
is the project cycle.
The Grant Aid Project Cycle
Figure 3.2 gives a description of the grant aid project cycle according to an official 
source. This section examines these stages in more detail and elaborates where 
necessary on the policy making process.
The project cycle officially begins with the receipt of project requests by 
Japanese embassies in recipient countries. MOFA usually requires countries to submit a 
list of requests each year and to arrange requested projects in order of priority. Because 
the aid system is a request-based system, no aid can be initiated without a request 
Recipients may initiate the request and this would require some informal consultations 
and sounding out with MOFA beforehand.8 In many cases, however, the request is 
influenced by the government and/or private sector in Japan.
On the government side, aid officials and consultants hired by the government9 
may carry out project identification studies in the recipient countries. This is justified on 
the grounds that recipients do not understand the Japanese aid procedures or how to 
formulate a request. Once these teams have completed their work, they recommend 
projects to the recipient as being worth requesting. The role of government-sponsored 
agencies in the project identification phase can be a decisive factor influencing the 
subsequent decisions about aid allocations. Such missions facilitate and encourage the 
flow of aid by identifying projects and drafting the request They may also ensure the 
coordination of aid with other policy agendas by targetting countries that are ‘eligible’ 
for such aid.10
8 In such cases, it is important for a recipient to have either a resident embassy in Tokyo or a resident 
Honorary Consul. This sounding-out process and laying of groundwork is known as ‘nemawashi' . In 
the case of fisheries aid, it is expected that recipients will consult with the Fisheries Agency before a 
formal request is made.
9 Various ministries have established consultant bodies which carry out the project identification work 
(and in turn lobby for aid projects). Two examples are the Engineering Consulting Firms Association 
(ECFA) under the auspices of MITI and the Overseas Fisheries Consultants Association (OFCA) 
under the auspices of the Fisheries Agency in the Ministry of Agriculture Forestry and Fisheries 
(MAFF). These are described in more detail below.
10 This was apparent, for example, in the case of the Pacific island countries visited by missions 
seeking to identify fisheries grant projects. Details are provided in Chapter 5.
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Figure 3.2 The Grant Aid Project Cycle
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Source: Association for the Promotion of International Cooperation (APIC), A Guide to Japan s Aid, 
Tokyo, 1993, p.13.
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The private sector’s role in project identification is often officially sanctioned, 
but it may take place independently of government. Project identification work is 
coordinated by private sector consultant organisations. Consultants, in turn, often 
follow up leads that have been suggested by trading companies operating in the field.11
Consultants (or sometimes the trading company) suggest possible projects to 
the host country and may prepare the request letter. They inform the host government 
about counterpart costs and other obligations. MOFA is quite aware of the role of the 
private sector in formulating projects and does not appear to object to its involvement. 
As one aid official declared: ‘our concern is that a genuine demand exists and when we 
receive a request we do not really care who has formulated it as long as the recipients 
support the request’.12
When the request is formulated, it is channelled through the Japanese mission 
accredited to the host country, to the Grant Aid Division in MOFA. It then goes 
directly to the official formally in charge of the relevant region. The Grant Aid Division 
has about 12 staff dealing with projects at the pre-Exchange of Notes stage. This 
official then liaises with other ministries and agencies, depending on which sector the 
project covers, and solicits information, guidance and advice. In the case of fisheries 
grant projects, consultation is with the Fisheries Agency. There may also be 
consultation with the relevant regional division in MOFA.
The purpose of this consultation is partly political: to base decisions on the 
broader policy guidelines that may prevail (for instance, in the fisheries sector) and to 
reflect the interests of these various ministries, agencies and departments. Consultation 
is also partly for practical reasons. MOFA (the Grant Aid Division in this case) does 
not have the expertise or the staff to administer aid policy and make informed decisions 
about projects. It thus relies on the input of others.
Once this background research and consultation has been completed, the 
project request is put to a screening committee meeting which takes place in the Grant 
Aid Division. On the basis of the available information, a decision is made about 
whether or not to proceed with a basic design study. When the decision is made to 
dispatch a survey or design team, this in effect means that the project request will be 
supported.13
11 Interview, Managing Director, Overseas Agro-Fisheries Consultants Company (OAFIC), Tokyo, 
July 1993. The information-gathering role of Japan’s trading companies in countries where they 
operate has been observed more widely. See Kiyoshi Kojima and Terutomo Ozawa, Japan s General 
Trading Companies: Merchants of Economic Development, OECD, Paris, 1984. See Appendix 1.
12 Interview, Grant Aid Division, MOFA, May 1993. This attitude was not shared by some sections of 
the bureaucracy. In the case of fisheries aid, the Fisheries Agency seeks to control all project 
identification work so as to maintain a close link between aid and its fisheries interests overseas.
13 Interview, Grant Aid Division, MOFA, December 1992. The official suggested that this was the key 
point at which decisions were made. But this decision itself may be a formality.
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Two possible steps follow this decision. If the recipient is a newcomer to 
Japanese ODA or if the proposed project is very difficult, a preliminary study team is 
dispatched. This is carried out by the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) 
which forwards the completed report to the Grant Aid Division. The other (more likely) 
step is the basic design study. Again, JICA is in charge. It chooses the consulting firm 
and members of the team. In some cases (where political interest in a recipient is high), 
staff from MOFA will also join, but usually the team is led by, and comprises, officials 
from the ministry which is most closely linked to that project (for example, health, 
construction or fisheries).14 One of the main tasks of this team is to estimate the costs 
of the project.
The basic design study report is prepared by JICA and distributed to various 
ministries, as well as the recipient. What follows is the negotiating process between 
MOFA and MOF, where issues such as the ability of the recipient to maintain the 
project, the importance of the project to the development of the recipient, and the 
potential number of people to benefit from the project are discussed. Once MOF 
approves individual projects (usually this follows the drafting of the General Account 
budget and appropriation of funds), a draft Exchange of Notes agreement is drawn up 
and presented to the recipient. Finally, the project, as part of a package of projects, is 
sent to the Cabinet for approval. Usually this is a formality and with Cabinet approval 
the Exchange of Notes may be signed. This then clears the way for execution of the 
project to start, beginning with tendering of the contract.
Payment on projects is deferred over the life of the project That means that 
usually about 30 per cent of the funds will be disbursed to the supplier when signing 
contracts, with further portions paid as the project proceeds. The time-lag between 
request, basic design study, signing Exchange of Notes, and execution of project can be 
several years (usually three but sometimes more). Thus costs may need to be reviewed 
upward, after the initial basic design study, as prices escalate.
The above process is protracted and cumbersome. It requires the approval and 
authorisation of numerous policy actors in Japan. These include the Grant Aid Division 
and the Economic Cooperation Bureau as a whole in MOFA, the Budget Bureau in 
MOF, other ministries which are closely related to the specific project, and the Cabinet. 
The private sector also plays a central role. There are numerous opportunities for 
delays. Countries that make a request for aid do so without any guarantees that their 
request will be favourably received, or without knowing what the time-frame will be. 
They may need to wait several years for a response to their request, especially if there 
are questions about a project or a recipient. Conversely, if there is strong interest in
14 Based on a survey of JICA Basic Design Study reports regarding projects to the Pacific islands, 
carried out by the author in 1992 and 1993.
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promoting aid relations with a recipient, political support in Japan may expedite a 
project through the aid pipeline.
This raises the question of the broader political and bureaucratic context in 
which policy is made. What is the scope for political intervention? On the other hand 
how fixed are procedures and how routine is decision making?
Aid policy is constrained by a number of guidelines and ‘rules’ that have been 
applied (often rigidly) on the grounds of Japan’s approach to ‘economic cooperation’, 
its development philosophy and bureaucratic processes. These include the following.
1) Project-tied aid: the requirement that aid be project-tied rather than an 
outright transfer of funds. This takes several forms: capital works projects, equipment 
and technology transfer, dispatch of experts and volunteers. In the case of yen loans, 
the degree of conditionality (that is, the use of Japanese contractors and procurement 
of Japanese goods and services) has in principle been relaxed. For grant aid, all 
contracts must be carried out by Japanese nationals. Procurement of goods and services 
provided under grant aid may be carried out locally, in the recipient country. One 
rationale for project-tied aid is that this ensures that the aid is put to proper use and not 
misappropriated by corrupt government leaders and officials. It is also the case that 
Japanese officials are most comfortable with this system. This reflects the origins of the 
Japanese aid program and its emphasis on economic cooperation as a mutually 
beneficial undertaking (with a high level of private sector involvement). Projects ensure 
the participation of Japanese firms and thus the recycling in Japan of aid monies.
Projects may also target specific development goals and priorities; in Japan’s case these 
have centred on infrastructure development
2) ‘Self-help’: recipients must be able to bear some of the costs of delivering 
and maintaining projects. For this reason, recurrent costs are not included as part of aid 
projects and recipients must undertake to assume that responsibility. This partly reflects 
the Japanese rationale of aid giving that countries eventually ‘graduate’ from aid and do 
not become permanently dependent on it. More importantly perhaps, budgetary limits 
dictate that there be a trade-off between commitment to new projects and support for 
recurrent costs of completed projects. It is argued that Japan cannot afford to fund both 
new projects and the maintenance and running costs of completed projects.15
3) Single year budget cycle: aid projects should be disbursed within one fiscal 
year. This limits projects to single year cycles and aid disbursements must also be made 
on a yearly basis rather than multiple year cycles. Large projects may carry over into a 
second or even third fiscal year. In such cases, the amounts are appropriated in 
subsequent budgets. It is also the case that some parts of the aid budget (for example
15 Interview, Director of Research and Programing Division, Economic Cooperation Bureau, October 
1992. For yen loans there is now provision for part of the local cost financing to be borne by the 
Japanese government in some cases. MOFA, Japan s Official Development Assistance, 1993 Annual 
Report, pp.141-2.
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subscriptions to international organisations) are fixed from year to year. Japan generally 
follows the practice of using the previous year's allocations to particular recipients to 
guide their subsequent allocations. Here, the disbursement rate is an important 
consideration. If monies have not been spent, this may limit future allocations.16
4) Government to government aid: aid must be government to government (the 
Exchange of Notes agreement should be signed by governments), and in the case of 
supporting multilateral and international organisations, Japan must also be a member of 
the relevant organisation. There are variations and exceptions to this rule — for 
example, if Japan is not eligible for membership of an international organisation, it may 
provide project aid to the organisation via a member country, on a bilateral basis. The 
consistent rationale for this policy of government to government aid has been to ensure 
accountability of aid monies, through oversight by Japanese nationals in those 
organisations. It is also a requirement that payment of grant money be deferred rather 
than disbursed as a lump sum. There are a few exceptions to this, as for example in the 
case of debt relief provided as general grant aid.
The above ‘rules’ tend to be fixed —  that is, rigidly enforced. This is the main 
reason why there is a lack of flexibility in Japan’s aid policy. However, there are other 
policy guidelines that are more ‘subjective’ and tend to be applied more flexibly. In this 
context, political considerations may be influential.
These guidelines include the number of beneficiaries; that is, the population of 
the recipient country to benefit from the proposed project. There is no fixed guideline 
in this respect, but there is a preference for projects that benefit a maximum possible 
number of people. This supports the emphasis in Japan’s ODA program for 
infrastructure development. Countries with small populations (the Pacific island states, 
for example) are usually allocated one major grant aid project a year. This is an 
informal policy and it may change from year to year. With the introduction of the 
Small-Scale Grant Assistance scheme, several small projects may be allocated to one 
country in addition to the larger projects.17
Grant aid is also meant to target countries in most need; that is, countries with 
relatively low per capita income. Countries eligible for grant aid are generally those 
classified as least developed. A recommended per capita income ceiling is given by 
MOFA. In 1993 this was set at $1,235; in 1992 it was $1,195 and in 1991 it was 
$1,135.18
16 See Juichi Inada, ‘Japan’s Official Development Assistance to ASEAN Countries: Its Objectives and 
Policy making Process’, Development and ODA, Japan-ASEAN Forum 1, United Nations University, 
Tokyo, 1990, pp.63-4.
17 The Small-Scale Grant Assistance scheme was introduced in 1989. It now has a budget of $10 
million. Projects that may be supported by this scheme range in cost from $50,000 to $80,000.
18 MOFA, Japan’s Official Development Assistance Annual Report, various years. This criterion has 
been applied flexibly in the case of the Pacific island states. The per capita income levels of grant aid
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According to one official report, grant aid may be extended to a country with a 
relatively high income when implementation is ‘deemed necessary’. Policy 
considerations are said to include such factors as the importance of the country, the 
significance of the project and the integration of grant aid and technical cooperation 
being implemented by Japan. 19 Countries that are recipients of grant aid even though 
they do not fall below the required per capita income level are a special case and 
political arguments or rationales are important in justifying aid disbursements. These 
may include diplomatic benefits to Japan (such as votes in international fora); and the 
value to Japan of resources such as fisheries (aid to acquire access). The absence of 
such rationales may make it difficult to secure MOF support for projects in the 
region.20
Significantly, the size of the project (measured in monetary terms) may also be a 
subjective factor: for example, an indicator of Japan’s political support for a recipient 
or its economic importance. In determining project size, discretion may lie not with the 
project design teams, but with the Grant Aid Division or the Fisheries Agency (in the 
case of fisheries grants) .21
From the above analysis, it is suggested that procedures and guidelines may 
complicate and constrain aid decision making. The emphasis on consultation, especially 
in the project cycle, slows down decision making. There are built-in mechanisms for 
supporting the interests of both bureaucratic actors and the private sector. There are 
also opportunities, given the protracted project cycle and decentralised decision making 
system, for politically motivated intervention (to delay or speed up a decision; to 
increase or decrease the size of the grant, to deny or justify a project). Policy making 
ultimately depends on the bureaucratic actors.
recipients in the region vary between $696 for Kiribati and $3,564 for Palau. In fact two countries (Fiji 
and Palau) are well above the 1993 ceiling, and several others (the Federated States of Micronesia and 
the Marshall Islands) come close. Details are from South Pacific Commission, South Pacific 
Economies: Statistical Summary, No. 13, Noumea, 1993.
19 APIC, A Guide to Japan’s Aid, Tokyo, March 1993, p.15.
20 It was suggested by Grant Aid Division officials interviewed by the author that MOF officials 
questioned projects to the Pacific island countries that were large, on the grounds that they were ‘too 
big’ and could not be maintained. They also questioned aid to countries with relatively high incomes 
on the grounds that they were ‘too rich’. Grant aid to Fiji has been justified by providing projects that 
are ‘regional’ in scope and thus benefit other island countries. In addition, Fiji is regarded as a 
regional ‘opinion leader’ and for this reason it is important to provide aid to Fiji.
21 The way political considerations may intervene in deciding the size of the project was demonstrated 
in the case of Tuvalu, which was dubbed by MOFA the ‘Tuvalu problem’. A planned school project 
was halved in size after a Japanese television program aired criticisms of Japanese aid by the Tuvaluan 
Prime Minister. See Asahi shimbun, 9 February 1995, p.5. According to Oceania Division sources, the 
decision to cut the size of the project, a punitive measure against Tuvalu, was made by the Economic 
Cooperation Bureau’s Director General.
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THE BUREAUCRATIC ACTORS
The project cycle described above requires the agreement, if not authorisation, of a 
wide range of bureauratic actors. This is known as the ringi system or ringi sei. Who 
these actors are, what interest they have in aid policy, what perspectives they bring to 
the policy process and the role they play in its formulation are described in this section. 
This highlights the diversity of opinion within the bureaucracy about the purposes of 
ODA, as well as competing jurisdictional claims, which may introduce tensions and 
cross-cutting pressures on aid policy making.
Ministry of Finance (MOF)
MOF, in particular the Budget Bureau, has ultimate authority and power over aid 
disbursements since it must appropriate the required funds. In general MOF aims to 
limit or restrict expenditure, including aid disbursements, and it is largely the aid 
doubling plans initiated by various prime ministers that have ensured the consistent 
growth in the aid budget.22 In the allocation of aid monies, MOF insists that strict 
procedures ensuring fiscal accountability are adhered to (such as the project basis for 
aid). The standard rationale for this is that MOF must ensure that taxpayers' money is 
being spent prudently. It is MOF that most often alludes to the importance of the 
Japanese public’s acceptance of ODA as the underlying source of its legitimacy. It has 
also most strongly advocated the emphasis on yen loans in Japan’s ODA, believing that 
loans are more ‘economically sound’. MOF tends to be most concerned about the 
‘efficiency’ of ODA and its impact on the economic development of the recipients.23 In 
response to a MOFA official’s claim that ‘Japan can impress the world with the 
seriousness of its international contributions only by increasing the ODA budget’, a 
Finance Ministry official reportedly said, ‘We have to, first of all, improve the 
effectiveness of ODA project implementation by preventing ODA money from being 
squandered’.24 This is the essential position of MOF.
With respect to grant aid, the role of MOF is two-fold. The most central role of 
the ministry, and the source of its power in the Japanese government, is controlling the 
annual budget cycle. Each year MOF’s Budget Bureau receives requests from MOFA 
for allocations towards the various parts of the ODA budget, including grant aid. This 
is an amount based on the previous year’s budget plus overall rate of growth. Based on 
disbursement figures for the previous two years and the evidence of demand —  that is,
22 As Robert Orr observes, Cabinet-level decisions on aid levels were viewed as necessary by MITI and 
MOFA ‘to maintain the momentum against the more frugal Finance Ministry’, See The Emergence of 
Japan’s Foreign Aid Power, p.24.
23 For an example of MOF perspectives on ODA, see Isao Kubota, ‘Japan expands foreign aid role’, 
The Japan Times, 8 February 1993. Kubota is a senior MOF official.
24 ‘Adherence to ODA criteria scrutinized’, The Japan Times, 18 December 1992, p.3.
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requests from recipients — MOF decides on allocations to the various ministries and 
agencies.25 Once the budget has been drafted and approved by the Diet (Parliament), 
funds may be disbursed. No actual commitment can be finalised until the budget 
allocation has been secured. Because of the annual cycle of the budget, aid projects that 
are approved must generally be carried out within the fiscal year.26
The impact of this budget process has been noted by a number of writers. It 
precludes, for example, multi-year allocations of aid, and it reinforces the project basis 
of bilateral aid. More generally, the effect is that aid policy often tends to be 
coordinated and decided at budgetary level, rather than at the level of policy 
ministries.27
The second role of MOF is to approve individual projects that have been 
formulated often by other ministries and agencies, and put to MOF by the Grant Aid 
Division of MOFA. With the introduction of grant aid on a limited scale in 1969, the 
practice of approving projects on a case by case basis was initiated. But, according to 
an official of the Grant Aid Division, this practice of putting each project forward for 
the scrutiny of MOF became mandatory after the Marcos scandals in the mid-1980s.28
The process of negotiating between MOFA and MOF on each project follows 
the adoption of the budget. At the final stages of project formulation, approval for 
allocation is required from MOF. Negotations between MOFA and MOF usually centre 
on the aid policy criteria and guidelines that were discussed earlier. The priority of 
MOF is to ensure that the proposed project conforms to these criteria. Once MOF 
support has been secured, Cabinet gives its approval and the Exchange of Notes 
agreement may be signed by the government of Japan and the government of the 
recipient country. This allows for implementation to proceed.
25 As Orr notes, MOF usually trims requests to ‘more acceptable budgetary levels’. In the final stages 
of negotiations, though, it will reveal the amount of residual funds available. In recent years, these 
have been allocated to defence and aid. See The Emergence of Japan s Foreign Aid Power, p.34. It is 
important to note that ODA is not a separate account in the budget It is defined as ‘the total budget 
allocated to activities in each category where expenditure can be classified as ODA’. The aid budget is 
thus susceptible to conflict among ministries and agencies, competing for a share of the government’s 
budget
26 Alan Rix, Japan’s Economic Aid, p.122.
27 See Alan Rix, Japan s Foreign Aid Challenge: Policy Reform and Aid Leadership, Routledge, 
London and New York, 1993, p.75. He notes that the pressure to complete projects within a single year 
can lead to rushed completion of tasks or carryover of funds from one year to the next. Ironically, 
given the MOF concern about effective use of aid funds and avoidance of ‘mismanagement’ and 
waste, the emphasis on budgetary level coordination leads to disbursement pressures that create 
problems such as the preference for large-scale projects and inflation of project costs.
28 Interview, Grant Aid Division, MOFA, May 1993. This official added that this practice, which 
stemmed from Diet calls for stricter oversight of aid spending, is preferred by MOFA since 
responsibility (and blame for possible mismanagement of aid) is shared between MOF and MOFA. On 
the Marcos scandals, see Masaki Yokoyama, ‘Marcos’ Yen for Corruption’, Kasarinlan, The 
Philippine Quarterly of Third World Studies, Vol.5, No.4, 1990, pp.7-28.
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The role of MOF in the grant aid policy process is to ensure that broad 
guidelines and procedures are observed. In other words, it may be viewed as the arbiter 
of the aid policy system. Other ministries ultimately defer to MOF. They may also 
attribute policy and procedural rigidities of the system to MOF’s role in the decision 
making process.
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA)
MOFA has de jure authority over grant aid and technical coperation, and over the 
‘declaratory’ aspect of aid policy. MOFA plays a crucial role in bargaining and 
consulting with MOF, as described in the previous section. It has advocated aid 
doubling plans, on the grounds that Japan had international responsibilities. Outside 
pressure on Japan (whether from recipients or other donors) also is filtered through 
MOFA (and may even be solicited by MOFA). It has influence over absolute aid levels 
and new aid initiatives. It may also determine the priority of particular recipients and 
thus projects. MOFA is concerned with how aid fits into Japan's overall foreign policy 
and conceives of aid in political/strategic terms and often as a diplomatic instrument or 
tool. It thus argues for aid disbursements on political grounds. But it also sees aid 
(especially grant aid and technical assistance) as aimed at alleviation of poverty rather 
than as subsidising or supporting a Japanese industry. In other words, the political value 
lies, to some extent, in the humanitarian and development goals of ODA. This can put it 
at odds with other ministries who see aid in terms of promoting their own sectional and 
industry-based interests.29
Not surprisingly, MOFA derives much of the power and status it has in the 
bureaucracy from the aid budget over which it has authority. For this reason, it is 
anxious that this authority not be taken away from it.30 Nor is it in favour of putting 
more power over aid decisions into the hands of the Diet (that is, through adoption of 
an aid law31). In general, however, MOFA concerns itself with broad policy initiatives 
(on diplomatic grounds) while aspects of project level formulation tend to be delegated 
to other ministries and agencies and the private sector. This includes project 
identification and design. Because much depends on how far projects match the
29 For example, in response to DAC pressure, MOFA favoured a greater emphasis on basic human 
needs in Japan’s ODA, which MITI and MOF opposed because it did not fit with their respective trade 
and investment, or fiscal priorities. Robert M. Orr Jr., The Emergence of Japan’s Foreign Aid Power, 
p.56.
30 In 1988, a report by the Administrative Management Bureau of the Management and Coordination 
Agency recommended the transfer of the grant aid budget to JICA; a proposal that has not been acted 
upon. Alan Rix, Japan s Foreign Aid Challenge, pp.80-4.
31 This refers to a move by some politicians to adopt a ‘basic law’, which would put aid policy directly 
under the jurisdiction of the Diet. For more details, see Alan Rix, Japan s Foreign Aid Challenge, 
ch.3. Also Hisane Masaki, ‘Foreign aid charter urged’, The Japan Times, 1 January 1992, p .l.
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procedural and policy guidelines noted earlier, these tasks may be instrumental in final 
decision making.
There are two main sets of policy actors in MOFA. On the one hand, there are 
those that belong to the Economic Cooperation Bureau who are concerned primarily 
with aid policy and managing the project cycle. This bureau is made up of the following 
divisions: Grant Aid, Technical Cooperation, Yen Loans, Aid Policy, Research and 
Programing, and Development Cooperation.
It is the Grant Aid Division that receives the initial project request and 
coordinates the subsequent investigation and project development. This includes 
bargaining with MOF to support specific projects.32 In this context the Division’s main 
priority is to secure MOF approval for projects and this in turn depends on whether 
there are ‘good’ projects. The Grant Aid Division is staffed by a number of 
secondments from outside MOFA. These include (as of mid-1993) staff from Kokusai 
Denshin Denwa Company (a public corporation under the Post and 
Telecommunications Ministry), MAFF, Ministry of Construction, Bank of Sapporo, 
Tokyo Gas, JICA and MOF. Some of these positions, though based in the Grant Aid 
Division, oversee economic cooperation in general.33
The practice of ‘cross-posting’, which is a widespread phenomenon within the 
aid bureaucracy, aims to alleviate staff shortages within MOFA and ensure that 
consultations and coordination may be effected.34 It is also a means of facilitating 
power sharing within the aid system. There is thus a dual function for these 
secondments: to undertake specific tasks but also to provide contact with other parts of 
the bureaucracy and the private sector.
The other set of actors belongs to the regional bureaux and divisions. These 
bureaux cover Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, Middle East and Africa, Europe 
and Oceania, and North America. The Oceania Division, in the Bureau for European 
and Oceanic Affairs, is in charge of political relations with the Pacific island states, 
Australia and New Zealand.
In most cases, the role of the regional division is to lobby on behalf of its region 
for continuing or increasing amounts of aid. In this way, regional divisions may act as 
allies of the recipient governments. The regional division sees aid as necessary for 
friendly relations with recipients and for promoting specific foreign policy interests. It
32 Although the Grant Aid Division leads negotiations with MOF on specific projects, the negotiations 
on overall budget allocations involve other sections of the Economic Cooperation Bureau and, as 
negotiations progress, increasingly more senior officials are involved. Interviews, MOFA.
33 Interview, Grant Aid Division, MOFA, May 1993.
34 David Arase, ‘Public-Private Sector Interest in Japan’s ODA’, p.185. He suggests that this system, 
known as shukko, is one reason why ‘the decentralized aid system keeps functioning’. This is assessed 
in more detail below. There is also movement of staff from the government agencies and ministries to 
the private sector.
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may thus argue in support of projects. One way this is done is if the Japanese 
Ambassador resident in a recipient country directly approaches the Economic 
Cooperation Bureau and recommends a project. Another channel is from the regional 
division direct to the Grant Aid Division. This will occur especially in the lead up to an 
event such as the visit to the region by a high ranking Japanese team (led by a minister, 
vice-minister or even prime minister). It is expected that the visit will be marked by an 
announcement of a new aid package or the signing of an Exchange of Notes. This is 
sometimes referred to as omiyage gaiko or souvenir diplomacy. Similarly if Tokyo is 
hosting a visit by a foreign head of government, an aid announcement will generally be 
made at the time to signify close relations and build good will.
In such cases, the impact of political overtures is to rearrange the order of 
priority of planned projects, by pushing up one country so that an Exchange of Notes 
can be timed with a visit (and thus pushing down another). If the aid initiative applies to 
an entire region, more project requests will be sought from those countries.35
Another way that the regional division may play a role in aid policy is when the 
Grant Aid Division seeks information and guidance in formulating the project and 
preparing documents for MOF; that is, explaining the merits of the project on the basis 
of Japan’s political and diplomatic interests, as well as the recipient’s development 
needs and economic strategy.36
Although MOFA as whole may be in favour of ODA and share a common view 
that aid flows should be maintained or increased, there are likely to be differences 
within the ministry about the specifics of this approach. These differences are evident 
especially on questions of diplomatic/political versus procedural issues. While regional 
divisions may favour increasing aid on diplomatic grounds, the divisions of the 
Economic Cooperation Bureau may be more concerned about fiscal or security 
considerations.37
35 These details were provided to the author in an interview with an official of the Grant Aid Division, 
MOFA, December 1992.
36 Interviews, Oceania Division, MOFA, November 1992 and June 1993. The extent to which MOF is 
influenced by political and diplomatic arguments is not clear. Most important to MOF is that proposed 
grants be for ‘good’ projects. Part of this requires that the project be a priority in the recipient’s 
development plan. Given that the aid budget has grown considerably since the late 1970s largely on 
the basis o f political arguments, it is apparent that MOF is sensitive to the political and diplomatic 
nuances of ODA.
37 For example, whether conditions in a particular country are safe enough for dispatching ofexperts or 
volunteers. One official noted that conflict occurred in policy towards Peru. When the regional division 
sought to increase numbers of volunteers and experts in order to demonstrate support for President 
Fujimori, the Technical Cooperation Division resisted because of the dangerous conditions in the 
country at that time. In this case they recommended increasing the number of trainees received by 
Japan, rather than dispatching more volunteers and experts. Interview, Technical Cooperation 
Division, MOFA, January 1993.
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MOFA has formal jurisdiction over grant aid policy, but it is important to note 
the limitations on MOFA’s decision making power. MOFA has been described 
elsewhere as the ‘window’ through which requests are made and aid disbursed,38 while 
in reality it shares power with a number of other ministries. Chief among these is MOF 
(as already described) but other economic ministries have considerable influence over 
areas that correspond to their domains. These include MITI and MAFF (see below).
MOFA’s role over aid policy is constrained by its lack of personnel to 
adequately administer the aid budget and the lack of expertise on aid and development 
matters.39 The senior policy makers in MOFA are usually ‘generalists’ who rotate their 
positions every two years. This means they must rely on others (technical bureaucrats, 
other ministries and private sector consultants) for information and to administer aid 
policy.40
The role of MOFA, beyond the declaratory level, is also weakened by the need 
to confer with a wide range of ministries and agencies, which is a legacy of the origins 
of the aid program and reflects the decentralisation of power within the aid 
bureaucracy. In terms of the political clout of the ministry in the overall bureacracy of 
Japan, MOFA is relatively weak. In part, this reflects the lack of a powerful domestic 
constituency or private sector ‘clients’.41 Moreover, compared with other ministries, 
there is little movement of senior diplomats from government to the private sector 
(iamakudari) as there is no obvious place for them to go .42
38 The idea of MOFA as a ‘window’ for aid flows was used by several scholars of Japanese ODA 
interviewed by the author. It is also a description used by Robert M. Orr Jr., The Emergence of Japan s 
Foreign Aid Power, p.39.
39 Details of ODA staff levels in the Japanese government are in DAC, Aid Review 1990/91, Report by 
the Secretariat and Questions for Review of Japan, OECD, Paris, 1991, p.34. In 1991, Japan’s aid staff 
was 36 per cent of the US level, despite the fact that the two countries disbursed roughly the same 
amount of ODA. There has been difficulty in increasing staff for managing the aid program due to the 
fiscal austerity measures of the government in the 1980s, which restricted growth in the bureaucracy.
In addition, other ministries are resistant to staff reductions in order to allow a faster increase in the 
aid related ministries. The implications of this staff shortage include reliance on private sector, 
protracted implementation, and preference for large-scale projects. Susan J. Pharr, ‘Japanese Aid in a 
New World Order’, in Craig C. Garby and Mary Brown Bullock (eds), Japan: A New Kind of 
Superpower?, The Woodrow Wilson Center Press, Washington DC, 1994.
40 There are two types of bureaucrat in MOFA: the higher elite, on track to becoming an ambassador; 
and the lower ranked technical bureaucrat. Ellis S.Krauss, ‘Politics and the Policy making Process’, in 
Takeshi Ishida and Ellis Krauss (eds), Democracy in Japan, University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh, 
1989, pp.39-64.
41 As Kent Calder observes, unlike other ministries, MOFA lacks any ‘domestic juridiction’ or any 
regulatory power over business and industry. Kent Calder, ‘Japan’s Changing Political Economy’, in 
Danny Unger and Paul Blackburn (eds), Japan s Emerging Global Role, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 
Boulder and London, 1993, p.127.
42 This refers to the process whereby senior bureaucrats seek jobs outside of government once they 
reach the pinnacle of their government career. Amakudari (descent from heaven) ensures that close ties 
between related government and private sector bodies are facilitated. See John Creighton Campbell,
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A principal source of power for MOFA is the authority it has over JICA, which 
is the key implementing agency for grant aid and technical cooperation. Close ties 
between the two organisations are facilitated by cross-posting of staff. But there are 
also tensions between the two on issues of jurisdiction and policy.
Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA)
JICA is a public corporation, or tokusho hojin, established by a special law to be an 
‘instrument’ of national government.43 It is primarily under the jurisdiction of MOFA, 
and partly of MITI and MAFF. Under a law passed in 1978, the responsibilities of JICA 
grew to encompass the implementation of capital grant aid.44
JICA is mostly involved with technical assistance, being the main implementing 
agency. It is charged with allocating the major portion of the technical cooperation 
budget. Other ministries and agencies also have a share of this budget. JICA works 
closely with the Technical Cooperation Division in MOFA. The role of the latter is to 
negotiate with MOF about the breakdown of the technical cooperation budget (such as 
numbers of trainees received and volunteers dispatched) and to set general policy 
guidelines for technical cooperation.
JICA is staffed by professional aid bureaucrats, rather than transient ones as in 
MOFA, and often these officials have served in the countries they are working with. 
MOFA officials, on the other hand, rotate positions about every two years, so they do 
not have the time to become 'expert'. This applies to grant aid as well as technical 
cooperation. JICA is also staffed by a number of secondments from other ministries.
The President of JICA is appointed from MOFA. Other senior positions are held by 
officials from the Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund (OECF) and the Export 
Import Bank. In addition, according to one estimate, staff from other ministries head 
two-thirds of the Agency’s departments.45
JICA’s role in grant aid essentially is two-fold: to carry out basic design surveys 
and to implement grant aid, especially when this is related to technical cooperation.
This includes liaising with private sector contractors, the recipient country and Japanese
‘Democracy and Bureaucracy in Japan’, in Takeshi Ishida and Ellis Krauss (eds) Democracy in Japan, 
University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh, 1989, p .l 19. According to Arase, one section of the private 
sector that has developed a close relationship with MOFA is the financial industry —  that is banks. 
David Arase, ‘Public-Private Sector Interest Coordination’, p.185.
43 Institute of Administrative Management, Organisation of the Government of Japan, Tokyo, 1992,
p.108.
44 JICA, Organisation and Functions, 1992, p.4.
45 It has also been noted that this practice may undermine morale of career staff members of the 
implementing agencies, as their own opportunities for advancement may be limited. Robert M. Orr,
Jr., The Emergence of Japan’s Foreign Aid Power, p.49. The Management and Coordination Agency 
report referred to earlier recommended against this practice of reserving departmental posts in JICA 
for ‘outsiders’. Alan Rix, Japan’s Foreign Aid Challenge, p.83.
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banks. It also screens contracts between the recipient and Japanese private sector firms. 
In general, JICA is less important in making overall aid policy (for instance, deciding 
who is to receive aid and who is not) as it is primarily involved in implementation work. 
Its raison d'etre is delivery of aid programs. In this context, JICA has more interest in 
the follow up of projects and ensuring that projects achieve their ‘development’ 
objectives. JICA officials are also interested in promoting close ties with recipients 
since their work revolves around ‘people to people’ contact.46
Recent policy innovations, such as Small-Scale Grant Assistance, have led to a 
more proactive role for JICA. For example, volunteers from the Japan Overseas 
Cooperation Volunteers (JOCV) program, administered by JICA, carry out project 
identification work for the Small-Scale Grant Assistance scheme. But proposals that 
JICA assume more authority over grant aid policy have not been adopted.47
Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI)
The role of MITI in Japan’s aid policy has been examined in detail in other studies. In 
terms of the overall direction of Japan’s ODA, MITI has played a crucial role. Its 
priorities tend to be the links between ODA and Japan’s commercial and trade interests. 
This may put it at odds with MOFA over the diplomatic goals of ODA. But MITI may 
also be an ally of MOFA against MOF in the push to increase overall ODA levels.
While MITI is especially involved in yen loans, its involvement in grant aid 
policy tends to be more sporadic and selective. It depends on the actual project and 
whether or not the project impinges on a policy area that falls under MITI’s 
jurisdiction.48 More generally, MITI’s interest in grant aid depends on the extent to 
which grants are made to countries that are economically important to Japan (in terms 
of trade and investment potential) and where grants are used in conjunction with yen 
loan policy.49
46 Based on observations made by JICA officials interviewed by the author, Tokyo December 1992; 
and Suva, August 1992. In Chapter 7 the differences between MOFA and JICA on aid policy to the 
Pacific island region are explored in more detail, in the context of a JICA review of aid to the region.
47 Alan Rix, Japan s Foreign Aid Challenge.
48 For example, in 1991 a Japanese company sought an ODA grant to fund a pilot project in the 
Marshall Islands to undertake seabed mining. It sought political backing from the government of the 
Marshall Islands (to make the necessary request to the Japan government as well as to seek co­
financing from the US government). Documents obtained by the author indicate that the company was 
particularly concerned that MITI would be hostile to the proposed scheme, given MITI’s support for an 
alternative mining technology. MITI was named as the ministry with the main interest in seabed 
mineral mining. It was therefore necessary to influence MITI (through the Minister of MITI) in order 
for the project to go ahead.
49 One such case is Cambodia. Japan will extend grant aid to Cambodia for the purpose of buying food 
and other essential items so that the Cambodian government’s revenue may be freed up to repay 
principal and interest arrears on outstanding yen loans. This is necessary in order for Cambodia to 
receive new yen loans from Japan. Nikkei Telecom Service, 23 February 1995.
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MITI is also linked to grant aid policy by its association with JICA. Several 
departments in JICA, dealing with mining and industrial development, are headed by 
MITI secondments. The activities of the Engineering Consulting Firms Association 
(ECFA), which plays a key role in identifying and formulating aid projects, also fall 
under MITI’s jurisdiction. Established in 1964 with funding from MITI and the 
Ministry of Construction, ECFA carries out and coordinates aid project identification 
work. It brings together 138 member organisations including Japanese consulting firms, 
banks, construction companies and trading firms. ECFA also has its own research 
institute — the Japan Development Institute.
The role of ECFA (like its counterpart in the fisheries sector, discussed below) 
is to subsidise the often risky process of identifying and formulating project proposals 
in recipient countries. Such projects may subsequently become candidates for either 
Japanese bilateral ODA (including grant aid) or multilateral development aid (ADB, 
World Bank and UNDP).50
Ministry of Agriculture Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF) and the Fisheries Agency
This section focuses on the Fisheries Agency because of the emphasis on fisheries grant 
aid to the Pacific island region. But the overall influence of MAFF also needs to be 
noted. Traditionally, it had a strong interest in economic cooperation and, like MITI, it 
had pushed for the creation of its own agricultural cooperation agency at the time that 
the Overseas Technical Cooperation Agency (OTCA) was being restructured into 
JICA. The outcome, however, was the creation of an agency under MOFA, with some 
posts being shared by MAFF, MITI and other ministries.51 This issue reflected the 
strong sectional divisions within the aid bureaucracy and the way different ministries 
sought to control various aspects of the aid budget.
The Fisheries Agency, which is an ‘outer bureau’ of MAFF, had also pushed for 
its own aid organisation.52 When this initiative failed, the Fisheries Agency moved to 
establish its own channel for cooperation, by establishing a non-profit, semi-official 
organisation (zaidan), in association with the fishing industry. This is the Overseas 
Fisheries Cooperation Foundation (OFCF), created in 1973. See below.
The Fisheries Agency coordinates all aspects of Japan’s fisheries policy 
including negotiating agreements with other states for the right to fish within their 
Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs). Responsibility for these negotiations lies with the 
International Affairs Divison of the Fisheries Agency. Located within this Division is an
50 ECFA (Engineering Consulting Firms Association), Annual Report, 1993-1994, Tokyo.
51 On the creation of JICA, see Alan Rix, Japan’s Economic Aid, ch.2.
52 Although the Fisheries Agency falls within the purview of MAFF, and under the MAFF Minister, it 
retains a high degree of autonomy and authority over fisheries related policy. The Ministry was known 
as the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry until 1978 when Fisheries was added.
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Office for Overseas Fishery Cooperation. The work of this office is mainly to oversee 
the formulation and implementation of fisheries aid policy, including fisheries grant aid 
and technical cooperation. This includes the operations of the OFCF.
The links between the Fisheries Agency and MOFA on aid matters are 
facilitated by the placement of a Fisheries Agency official within MOFA’s Grant Aid 
Division. This official is charged with handling fisheries grant aid requests, liaising with 
the Fisheries Agency about approval for the request, and coordinating the pre- 
Exchange of Notes process. According to a Fisheries Agency official, it is this 
secondment that is the ‘secret’ of the Fisheries Agency’s ‘control’ over grant aid 
policy.53 The Fisheries Agency also seconds several officials to JICA to oversee 
technical cooperation in the fisheries sector. For example, the Director of the Fisheries 
Cooperation Division in JICA, charged with carrying out project-type technical 
cooperation in the fisheries sector, is an official seconded from the Fisheries Agency. 
Other Fisheries Agency officials are posted to Japanese embassies in countries where 
there are important fisheries interests —  for example, Thailand.54
Among the policy priorities of the Fisheries Agency is securing the operations 
of Japan’s distant water fishing fleets in foreign EEZs. Fisheries grant aid, introduced 
for this purpose in 1973, has traditionally been used in concert with access negotiations. 
Policy making occurs in parallel or tandem in the International Affairs Division of the 
Fisheries Agency, (which is explored in detail in Chapter 5). Jurisdiction over the 
fisheries grant aid budget is a complex issue, however: the budget officially is under the 
authority of MOFA. But since the creation of this special category of aid in 1973, it has 
been treated as a special case, with the Fisheries Agency assuming the main decision 
making powers over allocation.55
53 Interview, International Affairs Division, Fisheries Agency, Tokyo, May 1993. A possible role of 
the Fisheries Agency was to veto requests. Officials suggested that if the Fisheries Agency opposed a 
request, the project would not go ahead. Conversely, while the Fisheries Agency could encourage 
fisheries grants to certain countries, it could not determine the recipient government’s decision to put 
priority on a fisheries project versus a project in another sector.
54 Details were provided in interviews with officials in the International Affairs Division, Fisheries 
Agency, JICA and the Grant Aid Division, MOFA. In the case of the Pacific island countries, a new 
Japanese diplomatic mission, established in the Federated States of Micronesia in 1995 and with 
accreditation also to Palau and the Marshall Islands, is expected to include a posting for a Fisheries 
Agency or OFCF official. Katsuo maguro-tsushin, No.6985, re-printed in FFA News Digest, No.3/94, 
May-June 1994, p.3.
55 Interviews with Fisheries Agency and MOFA officials revealed that a movement was underway 
within MOFA to bring about the merger of the fisheries grant aid and general grant aid categories. 
This is being resisted by the Fisheries Agency, although a former Director General of the Fisheries 
Agency observed that even if a merger was instigated, the decentralised decision making structure of 
the aid bureaucracy would ensure that the Fisheries Agency continued to control fisheries aid policy. 
Interview, Tokyo, June 1993. MOFA officials have argued that the special grant aid for fisheries is no 
longer justified on the grounds that it does not have the effect of promoting Japan’s diplomatic 
interests in this area. The Fisheries Agency view is that this aid is effective, and MOFA is simply
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There is overlap in the jurisdiction of MOFA and the Fisheries Agency with 
respect to fisheries aid policy and the conduct of fisheries diplomacy in general (that is, 
negotiations with other states on access agreements and international treaties). This 
area of diplomacy also happens to be a major part of the relationship between Japan 
and the Pacific island region, if not the most contentious. Policy is thus dependent upon 
the extent of inter-ministry coordination, in particular between the Oceania Division 
and the International Affairs Division of the Fisheries Agency.56
A unique feature of the structure of the Fisheries Agency is the office of the 
Special Advisor to the Minister on fisheries matters, a post created in 1977 to 
undertake negotiations with countries, mainly in the Pacific (Oceania), on access 
agreements. It is a position that enjoys considerable autonomy and influence. The role 
of this Special Advisor has also been to define policy on fisheries grant aid, in the 
context of Unking aid and access negotiations (as discussed in more detail in Chapter 
5).
The Fisheries Agency also has an equivalent to ECFA —  the Overseas Fisheries 
Consultants Association (OFCA). EstabUshed in 1989, OFCA subsidises project 
surveys in recipient countries by member companies and undertakes project design 
work. It has 65 ‘supporting companies’ including consultant groups, construction and 
engineering firms (specialising in boat building, engines, ice makers and fishing gear) 
and trading companies. OFCA carries out project identification work in the Pacific 
island region, but only at the request of the OFCF.57
Overseas Fisheries Cooperation Foundation (OFCF)
The OFCF was created in 1973. Its status, unlike that of JICA, is a semi-government, 
non-profit organisation. However, funding is almost entirely from the Fisheries Agency 
budget.58 The relationship between the OFCF and the Fisheries Agency is similar to 
that between MOFA and JICA; that is, policy making power Ues with the Fisheries 
Agency and responsibility for implementation Ues with the OFCF. The processes of 
amakudari and cross-posting are also evident: the President of the OFCF is a senior
hostile to the concept of a grant aid category that supports a special interest group and is controlled by 
an agency other than MOFA. Interviews.
56 Negotiations on access agreements are usually led by Fisheries Agency officials. In other fisheries 
negotiations (such as policy relating to driftnetting) which are led by MOFA officials, the taisho 
hoshin or instructions for the delegations are drafted by the Fisheries Agency, in consultation with 
MOFA. In addition to the Oceania Division, the main policy maker in MOFA in the area of fisheries 
and Law of the Sea is the Ocean Division, in the Economic Affairs Bureau.
57 Interview, OFCA, Tokyo, June 1993; documents provided by OFCA. It was suggested in this 
interview that because of the ‘sensitivity’ of fisheries relations with the Pacific island countries, the 
Fisheries Agency wanted to ensure that fisheries grants would only be provided to countries in the 
region with access agreements with Japan; hence the coordination of OFCA‘s activities by OFCF.
58 OFCF, Japan’s Overseas Fisheries Cooperation, 1989.
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MAFF official, the Senior Executive Managing Director is from MOF and the 
Executive Managing Director is from the Fisheries Agency.59
The OFCF was established in 1973 as a joint initiative of the Fisheries Agency 
and industry groups. It aimed to subsidise cooperation between Japan’s distant water 
fishing fleets or trading companies and coastal states.For example, joint ventures were 
promoted through the provision of soft loans. JICA has a commensurate department, 
the Development Cooperation Program, that assists the private sector in carrying out 
development cooperation activities. This is the one area where a formal division of 
labour exists between the OFCF and JICA. The OFCF has increasingly assumed other 
functions similar to that of JICA: trainees to Japan, dispatch of instructors and experts, 
and equipment supply. Recipients either directly request OFCF assistance or channel 
requests through a Japanese private sector or industry group. Approval of such 
requests is given or decided by the Fisheries Agency (see Figure 3.3).
Figure 3.3 Flow Chart of OFCF Cooperation.
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Source: OFCF, Overseas Fisheries Cooperation Foundation, 1993, p.2.
In the case of the Pacific island countries, the OFCF is involved in grant aid 
project identification work. This work is sometimes contracted out to private 
consulting firms. Procedures subsequent to the receipt of a request are coordinated by 
JICA. The OFCF, which established a regional office in Fiji in 1990, also undertakes 
maintenance and repair of fisheries grant aid projects, delivered by JICA.60
59 Interview, Executive Managing Director, OFCF, Tokyo, June 1993.
60 This is the only regional office established by the OFCF outside Japan. It underscored the 
importance of the region to the Japanese fishing industry and the Fisheries Agency. In general, the 
Pacific island countries are the highest priority of the OFCF. This was the personal view of the 
President of the OFCF, in a meeting with the author, Tokyo, June 1995. Details and dimensions of this 
cooperation to the region are given in Chapter 5.
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COORDINATION AND CONFLICT W ITHIN THE AID BUREAUCRACY
The above survey of the role of key ministries and agencies in grant aid reveals the 
ways in which coordination is promoted within the bureaucracy. Policy making, 
especially at the project level, proceeds on the basis of consultation among a variety of 
ministries, agencies and departments. That is an essential feature of the project cycle. 
Authorisation for aid to be allocated is required from at least MOF and MOFA, but 
also, less formally, from other economic ministries such as MITI and MAFF.61
The need for additional staff to adminster grant aid has led MOFA to rely on 
secondments (cross-posting) both from within the bureaucracy and the private sector. 
This process (together with amakudari) also promotes consultation and coordination. 
The case of the Fisheries Agency placing an official in the Grant Aid Division of MOFA 
is illustrative of this process.
Most importantly, the delegation of authority, which is a direct result of this 
process, helps promote the decentralisation of power inherent in the aid system. It 
allows the Fisheries Agency, for example, to undertake crucial tasks in the formulation 
and implementation of fisheries aid policy. It thus follows that policy may be shaped 
around the priorities and objectives of the Fisheries Agency. This is reinforced by the 
existence of special aid agencies that direct and deliver technical cooperation and grant 
aid.
Paradoxically, though, these additional channels for aid delivery create conflict 
within the aid system and counteract the forces of integration. JICA and the OFCF are 
examples of essentially competing aid organisations. Both carry out the same type of 
cooperation, the only difference being that JICA’s scope of activities is not confined to 
the fisheries sector. But there is very little coordination or consultation between the 
two.62 Attempts to initiate dialogue between the two agencies in 1993 did not lead to 
any new commitment to coordinate activities.63 The fact that the Fisheries Agency has 
the OFCF under its complete discretion also means that, unlike JICA, there are no 
conflicts of interest as to the direction and use of aid. Policy may be tailored entirely to 
the interests of the fisheries industry. There is thus more incentive for the Fisheries 
Agency to concentrate resources and policy on the OFCF rather than deal with JICA.
61 Other ministries also play key roles. They can provide expertise in a special area in the formulation 
and design of aid projects. These ministries also fill key places on project design missions and have 
close ties with consultant groups. See JICA, Basic Design Studies,
62 This mirrors what has been observed in the case of JICA and the OECF, that there is ‘almost no 
cooperation between JICA and OECF in the field’. Robert M. Orr Jr., The Emergence o f Japan s 
Foreign Aid Power, p.50.
63 From interview, Director Fisheries Cooperation Division, JICA, Tokyo, May 1993. It appears that 
the problem lies in the way the Fisheries Agency prefers to use the OFCF as its own aid delivery 
organisation, and does not want to compromise its authority in this area (or its policy objectives) by 
merging, or coordinating the OFCF’s activities, with those of JICA.
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The creation of the special grant aid for the fisheries category also strengthened 
sectional division within the aid system. Although fisheries aid is still subject to the 
same consultation and ringi system as other grant aid, the fact that a special budget 
exists for fisheries grants (not to mention the purpose for which it was introduced in 
1973) has given the Fisheries Agency more discretion over this area of aid policy and 
made it less subject to budgetary politics in general.
Despite the discretionary power that the Fisheries Agency enjoys, there are 
nevertheless problems of reconciling its policy priorities with those of MOFA. For the 
latter, fisheries grant aid should not confined to questions of fisheries access, but be 
concerned with broader diplomatic and development goals. This is reflected in the 
declaratory statements on fisheries grant aid that are attributed to MOFA and JICA.64
There are also fundamental problems of duplication and ‘contested’ jurisdiction. 
This is a key issue in the study of Japan’s aid towards the Pacific island states, where 
Japan’s diplomacy has been dominated by fisheries issues. Fisheries Agency officials 
and the OFCF generally take the initiative on fisheries aid matters. But Pacific island 
states see MOFA as the arbiter of Japan’s foreign policies and, in the event of disputes 
over fisheries aid policy, usually channel their grievances to MOFA, who then must 
resolve differences and ‘smooth over’ relations. This leads to tension in relations 
between MOFA and the Fisheries Agency.65
Tensions also arise due to lack of consultation between MOFA and the Fisheries 
Agency on more general foreign policy initiatives. The Kuranari Doctrine, which is 
analysed in Chapter 6, was an initiative of MOFA that encompassed Japan’s overall 
relations with the Pacific island region. It had a direct bearing on regional expectations 
concerning Japan’s cooperation on fisheries policies. The Fisheries Agency was neither 
included in policy deliberations nor consulted about the initiative. It thus took a dim 
view of the policy and its impact on Japan’s relations with the region.
While procedures encourage both intra-ministry and inter-ministry coordination, 
the basis for conflict and rivalry also exists. In order to strengthen particular interests 
and promote policy agendas, ministries may focus on coordination of aid policy along 
economic lines with the private sector. The case of the Fisheries Agency and OFCF 
illustrates this coordination. But this has the effect of weakening policy coordination 
within the bureaucracy. Sectional divisions within the bureaucracy are both reflected in
64 This is examined in chapter 5. For an example of MOFA policy, see statement in Roman Grynberg, 
‘The Tuna Dilemma’, Pacific Islands Monthly, May 1993, pp.9-11.
65 In general, MOFA does not publicly acknowledge political or economic self-interest as factors 
motivating Japan’s aid program. In fact, any suggestion of self-interest or quid pro quo is taken as 
criticism and thus viewed as damaging to Japan’s image and reputation. MOFA is usually quick to 
respond to media reports that make such suggestions or allegations. It should be noted that privately 
MOFA officials are less apt to use rhetoric and generally support the more pragmatic bases of Japan’s 
ODA.
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and aggravated by ‘vertical integration’ between ministries and respective private sector 
firms and associations.
THE PRIVATE SECTOR AND MINISTERIAL LINKS
In general, aid policy is the preserve of the central bureaucracy in Tokyo. But in 
practice, policy relies on the input of actors outside the bureaucracy. The most 
important of these is the private sector. A key factor in the decision making process is 
the identification of suitable projects in developing countries that conform to the 
procedures and guidelines discussed earlier. This is the stage where the private sector 
plays a leading role. Through links with relevant private sector bodies (such as 
consulting firms), ministries may extend their influence over aid policy making at this 
level.
Most ministries have established special consulting organisations to liaise with 
private sector consulting firms and support and subsidise the task of undertaking 
project identification work in developing countries. These include ECFA under MITI, 
the OFCA under the Fisheries Agency, the Telecommunication Engineering and 
Consulting Services under the Ministry of Post and Telecommunication, and the 
International Engineering Consultants Association under the Ministries of Construction 
and Transport. These semi-government organisations are essentially channels for 
streamlining project development.
The bias in favour of infrastructure projects in Japan’s ODA (both grants and 
yen loans) may be explained in part by the fact that the emphasis of these organisations 
is on engineering work. These consulting bodies in turn represent and coordinate 
private sector consulting organisations and firms (sometimes subsidiaries of large 
corporations) active in the developing countries. The knowledge of these firms is 
invaluable in the identification and formulation of projects. Upon receipt of a request, 
the same firms may tender for the contract to implement the project66
MOFA does not have an equivalent consulting organisation and in general its 
links with the private sector are limited. It also lacks staff with expertise of the 
developing countries. This is the main reason it relies on other ministries and their 
related private sector organisations to facilitate the development of projects. Thus its 
influence over this aspect of the aid process may be minimal, with the groundwork 
being laid before MOFA becomes involved.67
66 It has been widely observed that the request-based aid process in fact promotes Japanese private 
sector involvement in the identification of projects since many developing countries are unable to come 
up with suitable projects on their own.
67 MOFA may influence policy in terms of the emphasis on different types of projects —  for example, 
basic human needs.
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In general, coordination between government and the private sector on aid 
policy is made possible by the close links between ministries and industry associations, 
consulting firms and trading companies in related areas. On fisheries grant aid policy, 
coordination of industry and government interests is generally facilitated by close 
consultation and government regulation. In this context, the line between the private 
sector and government is often obfuscated by the existence of intermediate 
organisations that link sections of the government and the private sector. These include 
the consulting firms noted above. They also include industry lobby groups and 
associations.
The key industry lobby group in the fisheries sector is the Japan Fisheries 
Association. Established in 1882, the Japan Fisheries Association (JFA) has represented 
the interests of the fishing industry at the national level. It undertakes research, 
promotes information exchange, petitions the Diet and government ministries and 
agencies, and develops policy recommendations. The JFA plays a mediating role by 
both harmonising the diverse interests of its members and fostering close cooperation 
between the government and the industry.68 Its membership comprises major trading 
companies, producer and labour organisations, and fisheries cooperatives. But its 
leadership is both government (former Fisheries Agency officials) and industry. The 
President is a former Director General of the Fisheries Agency and a Vice-President is a 
former Special Advisor to the Minister on fisheries matters.69
Development cooperation in the fisheries sector is undertaken by various 
cooperatives and firms affiliated to the Japan Fisheries Association, with the assistance 
of the OFCF. For example, Nikkatsuren (the Japan Federation of Japan Tuna Fisheries 
Cooperatives Association) includes in its prescribed outline of activities ‘taking 
measures to protect Japan’s historical fishing right within foreign fishing grounds’ and 
the dispatching of missions ‘to conduct feasibility studies of possible future cooperation 
for mutual benefit’ with those countries.70
Aid policy may be influenced by private sector interests through coordination 
between the private sector and ministries. But the relationship between the government 
and private sector is not always smooth or harmonious. Conflict may also occur in the 
event that government chooses not to support a particular industry or private sector
68 Industry is highly regulated and depends on the Fisheries Agency for a range of supportive 
measures (such as subsidies), as well as fishing licences and other controls.
69 This reflects the process of amakudari. Other Vice-Presidents (there are 7 altogether) include the 
Presidents of Japan’s main trading companies and fisheries cooperatives. Japan Fisheries Association, 
Fisheries of Japan, 1991.
70 Nikkatsuren, publicity material. Details are given in Chapters 4 and 5.
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interest.71 A key factor in shaping government-private sector policy coordination is the 
role of politicians. More precisely, government ministries count on political backing to 
push through a policy initiative. This backing in turn may depend on the political 
support that an industry is able to muster, through its electoral lobby, financial 
contributions and other political donations. The role of politicians in aid policy as a 
whole is not significant. But in respect to particular issue areas, it may be crucial.
THE ROLE OF POLITICIANS IN THE AID POLICY PROCESS
It has already been noted that aid policy is primarily the preserve of the bureaucracy. 
Neither the legislature nor executive provide leadership; and neither play a proactive 
role in defining Japan’s aid policies. This reflects the more long-standing relationship 
between politicians and bureaucrats, with the former playing a supportive role; their 
level of involvement in policy making often dictated by constituent interests.72
While individual politicians may be very influential, especially the faction leaders 
in the former ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), generally politicians act through 
parliamentary and party committees or policy groups known as zoku (tribe or caucus). 
Due to the long reign of the LDP as governing party, most LDP Dietmen developed 
expertise in a particular area of policy.73 They are thus known as zoku giins. Their 
interest and expertise has been extended to aid policy since this is a growing budget and 
is generally sector oriented (corresponding to the domestic economic domains of 
construction, telecommunications, health, agriculture and fisheries industries) .74
Bureaucrats who want to press for a new aid policy or aid package that requires 
Cabinet approval will often consult with the specific zoku and through that process of
71 This should not be surprising given the fact that within one industry, there may be intense 
competition and rivalry; and conflicting interests and policy priorities. The case of the fisheries sector 
in Japan reflects these problems, which are elaborated in more detail in Chapters 4 and 5.
72 While there continues to be debate about the power of the politicians versus the bureaucracy in 
Japan, the recent trend in academic studies has tended to argue that politicians, specifically the Liberal 
Democratic Party, were assuming more of an equal partnership with, if not leading, the bureaucracy. 
See collection of studies in Gary D. Allinson and Yasunori Sone (eds), Political Dynamics in 
Contemporary Japan. It is not clear how this stands in the light of the present shifting political 
alliances in Japan. For foreign policy in general, and aid policy in particular, there is agreement that 
policy making prerogative lies with the bureaucrats.
73 See Ellis Krauss, ‘Politics and the Policy making Process’, p.53.
74 It is important to note that politicians who are affiliated to a special policy area may try to influence 
aid policy decisions in line with their special interests. This can mean lobbying the potential recipient 
government to request projects that fall within their ‘jurisdiction’. Some bureaucrats are critical of this 
role because it may distort the aid relationship with the recipient. Interview, Former Director General 
of the Fisheries Agency, June 1993.
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consultation (or nemawashi) they may secure Cabinet support75 Often this serves to 
put pressure on MOF, which is resistant to increasing resource allocations.76 There is 
also an LDP aid committee, the Special Committee for External Economic Assistance 
and, since December 1988, a Ministerial Conference on ODA, also initiated by the LDP 
to ‘overcome bureaucratic tangles and expand the LDP’s influence over aid policy’.77
The aid bureaucrat prefers not to acknowledge contact with or pressure from 
politicians (or politicians’ aides). Officials generally maintain that political pressure was 
more frequent in the past and to the extent that it does occur now they will not bow to 
pressure. Rather, projects are chosen on the basis of their quality as 'good' projects.78 
This refers to the policy guidelines described earlier. But it overlooks the fact that 
diplomatic and special interest considerations are factored into the aid decision making 
process. These compete with budgetary and other bureaucratic considerations.
Decisions concerning aid disbursements are usually made prior to the formal 
involvement of the Diet or Cabinet. MOF presents its aid budget as a fait accomplis to 
the Diet, which simply approves it as part of the total General Account Budget.79 
Later, individual projects are sent to Cabinet for approval prior to the signing of the 
Exchange of Notes with the recipient government but little debate is generated at this 
point either. Executive and legislative powers do of course reside in the Cabinet and 
Diet respectively and they may assert themselves over particular policy issues. This 
occurs if constituent interests are at stake or if public opinion about an issue is 
particularly heated (for example, as a result of press exposes of corruption as occurred 
with the Marcos scandals). Executive and legislative intervention also occurs when 
international opinion (for example, the US or Group of Seven) is pressing for action. 
This may result in emergency aid packages, aid policy innovation and the sweeping 
five-year aid doubling plans that have pushed up Japan’s aid flows since the late 1970s.
In general, lobbying of the bureaucracy by politicians takes place when 
individual projects are being considered for approval. Bureaucrats, in turn, need to 
ensure the smooth adoption of policies decided upon and this depends on the process 
of consultation or nemawashi. Insofar as there exists a quid pro quo relationship
75 Nemawashi (paving the way for a policy decision) is a term derived from a Japanese gardening 
technique where a tree is prepared for transplanting by careful binding of the roots over a period of 
time. If carried out with patience and care, it results in a healthy transplanted tree.
76 This was the case with the introduction of fisheries grant aid. The policy system as described here 
operated under the ruling LDP (which lost power in July 1993 after 38 years in office). Under that 
system, a central role of ‘clearing house’ was played by the LDP Policy Affairs Research Council 
(PARC). For details of the policy making system in general, see Ellis Krauss, ‘Politics and the Policy 
making Process’, pp.51-2.
77 Robert M. Orr Jr., The Emergence of Japan s Foreign Aid Power, p.22.
78 Interviews, Grant Aid Division, MOFA, December 1992 and February 1993.
79 Grant aid is funded from the government’s General Account Budget.
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between politicians and bureaucrats, bureaucrats may facilitate policies important to 
politicians and in exchange politicians avoid causing problems for bureaucrats (for 
example, stalling or sabotaging the passage of specific policies).
The process of formulating and adopting the Aid Charter in 1992 required close 
collaboration between the bureaucracy, especially MOFA, and the Diet. This was also 
an example of the use of former bureaucrats in special policy groups to boost the 
position of MOFA. The Aid Charter remains a bone of contention as some politicians 
would prefer something more stringent (that is, an aid law) and some would also 
support a new ministry for ODA. This is strongly opposed by MOFA.
An aid law would require prior Diet approval for ODA disbursements, 
something which MOFA rejects as unworkable. A senior official in the Economic 
Cooperation Bureau argued that the idea of an aid law is not acceptable because it 
would be too rigid, saying: ‘We need to be able to respond flexibly to different 
situations’.80 MOFA also rejects the idea of a separate aid ministry or agency. 
According to an official in the Grant Aid Division, MOFA is best able to judge the 
political and diplomatic interests of Japan and how to promote these with ODA. It can 
thus provide a more coherent framework and rationale for ODA.81
Politicians may make representations on behalf of recipient governments with 
whom they have close ties. For example, some politicians belong to Dietmens Groups 
that promote relations with a particular country.82 Another forum where ties between 
Japanese politicians and other governments are cultivated is the Asia Pacific 
Parliamentarians Union (APPU).83 At the annual meetings of the APPU, it is not 
uncommon for parliamentarians from recipient countries to solicit aid informally from 
their Japanese counterparts.
Politicians may also lobby on behalf of individual contractors or firms who have 
identified and formulated a project and stand to benefit from its execution. In exchange, 
the politician would receive a gift, such as contributions towards election funds.84.
80 Interview, Director, Research and Programing Division, MOFA, October 1992.
81 Interview, Grant Aid Division, MOFA, May 1993. In other interviews, aid officials in MOFA 
supported this position.
82 In the case of the Pacific islands, such groups exist for Papua New Guinea, Palau and the Federated 
States of Micronesia.
83 This began as the Asian Parliamentary Union in 1965, essentially to forge close ties between non­
communist Asian countries. Japan was a leading member of the organisation. With the admission of 
Nauru in 1978, it became the Asian Pacific Parliamentary Union. Most Pacific island countries are 
now members and attend its regular meetings (two conferences and one general assembly each year). 
Charter and By-Laws of the APPU.
84 The importance of ODA as a source of political funds was noted by a number of Japanese observers 
and ex-government officials interviewed by the author. According to a former Director General of the 
Fisheries Agency, ‘aid is a tempting target of politicians (because) it is a source of many job
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Politicians are also likely to lobby on behalf of an industry within their constituency, 
which may benefit from aid contracts, exports derived from aid contracts, or licenses 
for logging, fishing or mining in a recipient country, which are awarded because of, or 
are otherwise related to, the disbursement of aid.85
Although there are mutually beneficial ties between politicians and their local 
constituents in dealing with day to day issues and problems, the status of politicians in 
Japan has often been tarnished by revelations of corruption and other scandals. In such 
cases, politicians are seen to be primarily concerned with promoting their re-election 
prospects and sheltering business and other special interests.86 This is reflected in the 
relative power balance between the Diet and bureaucracy. More generally, the role of 
politicians is shaped by the nature of the Japanese electoral system, which reinforces 
what Kent Calder described as the ‘factional, particularistic, distributive orientation’ of 
Japanese politics.87
In the context of aid policy making, politicians may be a key link between the 
bureaucracy and private sector and add weight to a particular decision. Their effect, 
however, is to strengthen coordination along sectional lines between the bureaucracy 
and the private sector, rather than within the bureaucracy. The Prime Minister and 
Cabinet may exercise more encompassing powers but as a rule strong political 
leadership on aid policy is not evident. This allows for bureaucractic prerogative and 
discretion to prevail.
ROLE OF ADVISORY COUNCILS AND STUDY GROUPS
One aim of the decentralised aid system is to ensure that individual decision makers do 
not act single handedly but instead work to build a collective position.88 While
opportunities and procurements. If politicians can exercise jurisdiction over aid programs, they can 
claim responsibility for benefits flowing from aid and earn a lot of gratitude’. Interview, June 1993.
85 The fishing industry in Japan has been supported by politicians who come from areas in Japan 
where the industry is most entrenched. Former Prime Minister Zenko Suzuki was a key advocate for 
fisheries grant aid largely because he came from Iwate Prefecture, a base for the distant water fishing 
industry in Japan.
86 Public confidence in politicians plummeted with the revelations of the Tokyo Sagawa Kyubin 
scandal in 1992 and 1993. That implicated a leading LDP politician (Shin Kanemaru) in bribery 
charges and revealed his links with organised crime. The scandal contributed to the defeat of the LDP 
in the July 1993 election. For an example of public opinion at this time see ‘TV Asahi Poll: All 
Politicians are Crooks’, Asahi Evening News, 18 March 1993, p.4
87 Kent E. Calder, ‘Japan’s Emerging Political Economy’, in Danny Unger and Paul Blackburn (eds), 
Japan’s Emerging Global Role, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder and London, 1993, p.126.
88 According to Pye, Japanese decision making contrasts with the ‘Western model of executive 
command and control’ because leadership is more subtle and nuanced rather than assertive. ‘The first 
and all-consuming obligation of leadership is to maintain group morale and above all not to impose an
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procedures do not preclude individual initiative and action (as the analysis of Japan’s 
policies in the Pacific island context demonstrates) they may hinder and constrain 
action, especially the translation of declarations into policy practice.
The process of consultation and consensus building is particularly crucial to 
MOFA since it lacks a significant domestic power base and, as one scholar observed, 
‘often must compensate for this weakness by other means’.89 A key aspect of the aid 
policy process, especially when new initiatives are being formulated, is to incorporate 
the recommendations of shingi kai (government advisory councils) and kenkyu kai 
(study groups). The role of the shingi kai and kenkyu kai is to lend legitimacy to 
government recommendations through gaining the ‘impartial’ and respected support of 
scholars who, together with former senior bureaucrats, generally make up these 
councils and groups.
It is important not to overstate the influence of these study groups and councils. 
Rather than set the direction of policy, they tend to support and give substance to 
policies and agendas already advocated by sections of the bureaucracy. Occasionally, 
they may not have any input at all but simply be a political exercise. This mirrors what 
Rix observed: ‘Most advisory councils were to some extent controlled by the officials 
of the ministry to which they were attached. This could emasculate a potentially active 
council or it could add legitimacy to policies which originated in the ministry itse lf.90
The case of the Aid Charter illustrates the process of consensus building and 
consultation in the context of planning and developing an aid policy initiative. Chapter 
7 discusses the impact of this Charter on the aid policy process. For now, attention will 
focus on the process of formulating and adopting the Charter.
On 30 June 1992, the Japanese Cabinet adopted the ODA Charter. This policy 
was an elaboration and formalisation of four principles originally laid out by Prime 
Minister Toshiki Kaifu in April 1991 in a speech to the Diet91. The principles that 
would henceforth guide Japan's ODA policy according to the Charter were promotion 
of environmental conservation along side development; avoidance of the use of ODA 
for military purposes or when international conflicts would be aggravated; 
consideration of recipients' levels of military expenditure and development of weapons 
of mass destruction; and consideration of recipient efforts to promote democratisation 
and basic human rights, as well as the promotion of market economies.The Charter also
independent will or even to determine policy directions’. Lucien Pye, Asian Power and Politics: The 
Cultural Dimensions of Authority, Harvard University Press, MA., 1985, p.171. It is important to note 
that consensus does not necessarily mean agreement; rather, it refers to acquiescence, often with the 
expectation that trade-offs are implicit.
89 Robert M. Orr Jr., The Emergence of Japan s Foreign Aid Power, p.138.
90 Alan Rix, Japan s Economic Aid, p.103.
91 MOFA, Japan s ODA, 1991 Report, p.44.
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set out its priority region and issues. It highlighted the East Asian countries, especially 
the members of ASEAN and, among issues, emphasis was given to global problems 
(environment and population), basic human needs, human resource development, 
infrastructure development and structural adjustment. The Charter also listed measures 
for effective implementation of ODA including policy dialogues with recipients and 
other donors, maintaining close ties with the private sector and the links between 
investment, trade and ODA.92
The ODA Charter is a core component of MOFA's efforts at reforming the aid 
policy process, essentially to enhance public support for ODA. It was also a (pre­
emptive) response to Diet pressure which threatened MOFA’s control over aid 
policy.93 While political pressure for aid policy reform can be traced back to the 
1970s,94 the immediate catalyst to the ODA Charter was Prime Minister Kaifu's Four 
Principles of April 1991. The context of this speech was the changing international 
political situation, in particular G-7 pressures to apply aid for the purpose of helping 
democratisation in Eastern Europe and peacekeeping (especially in the aftermath of the 
Gulf War). Beyond external influences, domestic pressures had been building. 
Corruption scandals had given momentum to calls for greater openness and reform.95
An LDP-based think-tank, the Forum for a Liberal Society, published a report 
in June 1989 titled An Aid Concept for Asian Stability and Development. According to 
one writer, this inspired Kaifu’s first reference to ODA principles, in a speech to the 
Diet in March 1990.96 The government's Administrative Reform Promotion Council 
(representing all government ministries) carried the aid initiative further when, in 
December 1991, it submitted a report to Cabinet in which it recommended, inter alia, 
an ODA ‘general outline’, including basic principles and regional policies.97 This was 
endorsed by Cabinet, which passed on further consideration of the recommendations to 
another government policy group, the Council of Foreign Economic Cooperation. This
92 MOFA, Japan’s ODA Charter (Unofficial translation), 30 June 1992.
93 It has been suggested that in order to rationalise more aid spending to MOF, it was necessary for 
MOFA to shore up public support for ODA. Bruce M. Koppel and Robert M. Orr Jr., ‘A Donor of 
Consequence: Japan as a Foreign Aid Power’, in Koppel and Orr (eds), Japan s Foreign Aid: Power 
and Policy in a New Era, Westview Press, Boulder, 1993, p.7.
94 See Alan Rix, Japan’s Foreign Aid Challenge, pp.92-3.
95 In 1989, a critical NGO movement in Japan (People’s Plan 21) formulated a People’s Charter on 
ODA as well as a Proposed Fundamental Law of International Development Cooperation, Documents 
1 and 2, in Kasarinlan, pp.93-100.
96 Robert M. Orr Jr., Political Agendas: Can the United States and Japan Cooperate in Forging a 
New World Order Through Foreign Aid?, Draft paper for Overseas Development Council, 1993, p.25.
97 Hisane Masaki, ‘Foreign aid charter urged’, The Japan Times, 1 January 1992. As Rix has noted, 
the idea of an Aid Charter is just one of the proposals made by the Administrative Reform Promotion 
Council. Alan Rix, Japan’s Foreign Aid Challenge, p.89.
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Council was chaired by former Foreign Minister and then government adviser, Dr 
Saburo Okita. The report of that Council, completed in May 1992, elaborated on the 
‘topics and philosophies’ to be incorporated in the ‘General Principle of Official 
Development Assistance’ to be established by government. It is this report which most 
closely resembles the final version of the ODA Charter.98 The Okita report was then 
deliberated by the Ministerial Conference for External Economic Cooperation before 
being adopted by Cabinet on 30 June 1992.
The above process reflects the importance of consultation and building 
consensus, especially through inter-ministerial discussion. But this was also a process 
that screened out more radical proposals.99 The ODA Charter was the product of input 
from various councils, ministries and Cabinet. Coordinating this process (and with most 
at stake, given calls from some sectors that a new Aid Ministry be created and/or that 
an ODA basic law be adopted) was MOFA and the Economic Cooperation Bureau in 
particular. One of the divisions closely involved in formulating the policies was the 
Research and Programing Division of the Economic Cooperation Bureau.
In developing the Kuranari Doctrine on aid to the Pacific island countries, 
MOFA (specifically the Oceania Division) sought to build consensus and support 
around its diplomatic initiative by incorporating the recommendations of study groups 
and think-tanks (as described in Chapter 6). MOFA policy on relations with the Pacific 
island region has generally been based on the ‘expert advice’ of scholars and ex­
bureaucrats.
There are several organisations and groups carrying out policy research on the 
Pacific islands (see Table 3.2). Their work is usually commissioned by the ministry or 
agency to which they are affiliated, and reports subsequently feed into the policy 
development being carried out by the ministry. The membership of these groups tends 
to overlap, especially in terms of the scholars that are included. This reflects the small 
pool of academics interested in the region, as well as the lack of widespread political or 
private sector interest in the region.
Bureaucratic sectionalism is also a factor in the work of these groups. As with 
the private sector linkages described earlier, links between ministries and think-tanks 
seem to be structured against coordination. This is despite overlap in their activities. 
The Fisheries Agency and the OFCF carry out their own research, although there are 
cases where the OFCF has commissioned the Japan Micronesia Association to 
undertake economic studies of the Pacific island countries. In general, reports
98 Outline of Promotion of Japanese Foreign Economic Cooperation, Opinions presented by the 
Council of Foreign Economic Cooperation (unofficial translation), 8 May 1992.
99 For a critique of the government’s approach in formulating the ODA Charter, see ‘An Interview 
with Murai Yoshinori about the Japanese Government’s New ODA Principles’, AMPO: Japan-Asia 
Quarterly Review, Vol.24, N o .l, 1992/93, pp.44-5.
78
commissioned by one ministry or agency will not be shared with other ministries or 
agencies.100
Table 3.2 Japanese Think-tanks and Policy Groups Working on Pacific Island Affairs
Organisation Affiliation Membership Role
Japan/Micronesia
Association
MOFA (est. 1974) Scholars Research; netwoiking
FAlR(a) Committee 
for Oceania
MOF (est. 1986) Scholars, bureaucrats, 
private sector
Research; netwoiking
Japan-South Pacific 
Economic Association
MITI ex-JETRO(b) Research; networking
Pacific Society Private sector (est.
1978)
Scholars Research; netwoiking
JICA regional study 
group
JICA (est. 1991) Scholars Ad hoc committee to 
review aid policies to 
Pacific island 
countries
Japan Committee for 
PECC(c) Pacific 
islands sub-committee
MOFA (est. 1989) Scholars, MOFA Facilitate Pacific 
island ties with 
PECC
Notes: (a) Foundation for Advanced Information and Research.
(b) Japan External Trade Organisation.
(c) Pacific Economic Cooperation Conference.
Source: Interviews, Tokyo.
CONCLUSION
This chapter has analysed bureaucratic and procedural foundations of Japan’s aid 
policies. As Arase argues, coordination between the bureaucracy and private sector is 
facilitated by private sector integration into the aid policy system and through 
bureaucratic decentralisation and power sharing.101 This paves the way for different 
policies to be developed by different ministries. But while there is coordination of 
government and private sector interests, coordination between ministries is more 
problematic. Power, or at least authority, over aid policy is an important basis for 
building ministerial influence, which tends to create the basis for political rivalry. There 
are also fundamental differences between ministries in their respective views of the 
purpose and use of ODA. Most marked are the differences between MOFA (concerned
100 Interview, Director, Japan Micronesia Association, Tokyo, March 1993. He also described an 
incident where MITI disputed the sub-contracting of a study of the economic situation in Fiji by the 
Japan South Pacific Economic Cooperation Association to the Japan Micronesia Association. MITI 
objected to its funds going to a MOFA organisation.
101 David Arase, ‘Private-Public Sector Interest in Japan’s ODA’.
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with political and diplomatic interests) and the more economic and sector oriented 
ministries (for example MITI and the Fisheries Agency).
Lack of policy coordination is a direct result of these differences and rivalries. 
But as Rix and Orr argue, coordination problems also result from an absence of a 
‘political centre’ for aid policy making and from overlapping jurisdictional spheres. 102 
Policy making structures (especially implementing agencies, consultant bodies and even 
think-tanks) reinforce the fragmentation and sectionalism within the bureaucracy. The 
decentralised decision making system and lack of a strong executive leadership to 
initiate policy change and innovation also contribute to the reactive nature of Japan’s 
aid policies.
Policy procedures have, in part, evolved to accommodate the competing claims 
to power over ODA. They allow for many policy actors to influence decisions 
(especially in the project cycle) and various levels at which policy may be influenced. 
Recipient governments may also lobby different parts of the aid bureaucracy in order to 
influence decisions about aid allocations. But to the extent that these procedures 
support political interests within the bureaucracy, they also complicate and constrain 
the development and implementation of aid policy; reinforcing rigidity and 
conservatism. This is a point that later analysis of Japan’s aid diplomacy demonstrates. 
While procedures have been described as contributing coherence and predictability to 
aid policy, it is important to note that procedures underlying grant aid policy, at least, 
are not always objective. Procedures reflect political interests and may be used as 
political tools by policy makers.
In the next chapter, attention turns to the issues and events that motivated or 
influenced Japan’s emergence as an aid donor to the Pacific island states. The 
discussion focuses on Japan’s fisheries interests and charts the problems and challenges 
confronting Japan in the region over time.
102 Alan Rix, Japan s Economic Aid’, Robert M. Orr Jr., The Emergence of Japan s Foreign Aid 
Power.
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4  Japan and the Pacific Islands: The Evolving 
Fisheries Agenda
The Pacific island region is a principal focus of Japanese interests as a distant water 
fishing nation.1 Since the 1960s, the operations of the Japanese fishing fleets have faced a 
series of external challenges. These have been both global (the Law of the Sea 
Convention) and regional. This chapter examines these challenges and the problems they 
posed for Japan. The aim of the chapter is to highlight the main interests and issues that 
have motivated and shaped Japan’s fisheries aid diplomacy.
Japan’s fisheries interests are analysed first in the context of the Law of the Sea 
negotiations, and then in the context of strengthening regional cooperation between the 
Pacific island states, US fisheries policy and the rise of the environmental lobby. 
Compounding the problems at the international and regional level are the internal 
difficulties facing the industry. These include declining economic competitiveness of 
Japanese fleets, scarcity of crew, and a shift away from fishing activities by Japanese 
trading firms to become mainly overseas based processors and exporters.
This study highlights the interface between US and Japanese interests in the 
regional context —  as competing fishing powers. Direct and indirect pressure on Japan 
by the US has boosted the collective diplomacy of the island states especially in conflicts 
with Japan. The study also shows how the Japanese government has, over time, 
promoted various measures to facilitate adjustment in the industry. But current problems 
have led to divisions in the Japanese fishing industry and forced increasingly difficult 
choices on the government.
JAPAN’S POSTWAR FISHERIES EXPANSION
In 1952 the last of the Mac Arthur lines, restricting the movement of Japanese fishing 
vessels in Southeast Asian and Pacific waters, was lifted. The MacArthur lines delineated 
the outer maritime boundaries for the operation of Japanese vessels.2 The Japanese 
government thereafter sought to encourage distant water fisheries, especially in tuna and 
skipjack production, in order to meet the nation’s food needs and diversify away from 
more fully exploited coastal fisheries.3 Government measures included financial support
1 A distant water fishing nation denotes a nation some of whose fishing fleets operate well beyond the 
nation’s own waters.
2 These were extended four times before being lifted entirely in April 1952. See Yoshiaki Matsuda,
‘Postwar Development and Expansion of Japan’s Tuna Fishery’, in David J. Doulman, (ed.), Tuna 
Issues and Perspectives in the Pacific Islands Region, East-West Center, Hawaii, 1987.
for construction of larger fishing vessels. In order to increase production further, the 
Japanese government also adopted a policy of switching licences away from other 
fisheries to tuna and skipjack vessels. The government’s policy of ‘from coast to off­
shore, from off-shore to distant waters’ saw fisheries production grow rapidly: in 1955 it 
reached its prewar peak of 4.33 million tonnes. By 1960 fisheries production was 6 
million tonnes and, by 1968, 8 million tonnes.3 4
Tuna production grew more quickly than overall fisheries production, reflecting 
strong growth in both domestic and foreign demand. Tuna production (not including 
skipjack) increased from 5,000 tonnes in 1950 to 20,000 tonnes in 1955 and peaked at 
50,000 tonnes in 1960. The number of tuna fishing vessels (over 20 GRT) grew from 
1,104 in 1958 to 2,975 in 1967.5 Government regulations defined fishing zones for tuna 
vessels of different size and class. These in effect restricted the operations of some 
vessels to waters of the western Pacific. For distant water operations (vessels over 100 
GRT), there were no restrictions and operations spread into the Pacific and beyond. 
While longline operations were continuous in the western central Pacific starting in the 
1950s, pole and line vessels expanded more gradually into this part of the Pacific and 
their numbers did not rise significantly until after 1970.
Distant water vessels mainly targetted the canned tuna market, since they were 
unable to preserve their catch due to lack of adequate refrigeration technology. This 
required bases in foreign ports, close to fishing grounds. Bases were established in order 
to service fleets and to provide points from where tuna could be sold to fish canneries.
By 1962 there were 38 such bases, including 9 in Okinawa, 4 in American Samoa and 2 
in the New Hebrides (later Vanuatu). The others were in Southeast Asia (Malaysia, 
Thailand, Philippines and Indonesia). By the early 1970s, 14 more bases had been 
established: including 3 in Papua New Guinea, 1 in the Solomon Islands and 3 in 
Micronesia, then the US administered Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. In addition, 
oil supply bases were established around the Pacific, including Papua New Guinea, Fiji, 
New Caledonia and Tahiti. The early 1970s saw joint ventures being established in Papua 
New Guinea and the Solomon Islands, which mainly involved pole and line fleets.6
3 The distinction here between tuna and skipjack (although the latter is a tuna) is based on the fact that 
Japanese have traditionally treated skipjack as separate from other tuna. In the Japanese market, 
skipjack, caught by pole and line vessels, is conventionally smoke dried and used as a food base. Other 
tuna (bluefm, yellowfin and albacore) caught mainly by longline vessels are kept fresh or frozen, and 
marketed as sashimi. Yoshiaki Matsuda, ‘Postwar Development and Expansion of Japan’s Tuna 
Fishery’, p.71.
4 Japan Fisheries Association, Fisheries of Japan, 1991, Tokyo, p .l.
5 Norio Fujinami, Policy Development of Japan’s Tuna Fishery, mimeo, Fisheries Agency, June 1987. 
Yoshiaki Matsuda, ‘Postwar Development and Expansion of Japan’s Tuna Fishery’, p.77.
6 Japanese joint ventures in fisheries were mainly established by large trading companies. These 
included Itoh-chu Shoji, which, in 1963, set up a freezing plant in Fiji for buying tuna for export to
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By the late 1960s, changes in freezing technology made it possible to transport 
fresh tuna to Japan. This coincided with growth in domestic demand for fresh tuna (for 
sashimi) which resulted from rising incomes in Japan. Longline vessels thus increasingly 
targetted the fresh rather than canned tuna market. This led to a declining demand by 
longline fleets for foreign bases. In contrast, distant water pole and line operations, which 
expanded in the 1970s, increased their foreign bases.
The distant water fishing industry was hit hard by the oil crisis of 1973-74. The 
tuna and skipjack fisheries, which consumed about 22 per cent of all oil used by the 
Japanese fishing industry in 1974, were compelled to make further adjustments.* 7 In 
general, the fishing grounds of the Pacific became more attractive due to their proximity 
to Japan. In addition, more economical fishing methods were developed, including purse 
seining (requiring less fuel, as well as less labour and no bait). Purse seine operations 
began on an exploratory basis in the early 1970s but did not expand until the 1980s.
Table 4.1 sets out the growth and contraction of Japan’s tuna fishing by type between 
1951 and 1985.
The major fishing grounds for Japanese tuna and skipjack fleets in the postwar 
period were in the western central Pacific. This included the waters of Papua New 
Guinea, Solomon Islands, Gilbert Islands (later Kiribati), Micronesia, Nauru and French 
Polynesia. The actual catch levels varied by gear type. The Pacific Ocean as a whole 
accounted for 470,000 tonnes or 86 per cent of Japan’s tuna production in 1975. Of that 
54,785 tonnes were caught by Japanese longliners operating within the Pacific island 
waters, while 107,052 tonnes were caught by Japanese pole and line vessels operating in 
the region.8 Japan was the dominant distant water fishing nation in the Pacific. Its nearest 
competitors were Taiwan and the Republic of Korea. In 1975, Taiwanese longliners 
caught 18,136 tonnes and Korean longliners caught 33,495 tonnes. There was no pole 
and line fishing by either country.9
Japan and the US. In 1967, it built a cannery in a joint venture with the Fiji government. Taiyo Gyogyo,
another trading company, started fishing surveys in the Solomon Islands in 1971 and in 1973 
established a joint venture-fishing base. In New Hebrides, the site of the first joint venture operation in 
1958, a fishing base comprising freezer, wharf and support facilities was built. The Japanese partners
were the Nanyo Boeki Kaisha (NBK) and Mitsui. In Papua New Guinea, the first Japanese fishing
enterprise was established in 1967 by Nihon Kinkai Hogei. Three joint ventures were established in the
early 1970s. Venture partners included Kaigai Gyogyo, Nihon Suisan and Kyokuyo. Dainihon Suisan
kai, Waga kuni kaigai gyogyo kyoryoku no jittai, Suisan Material No.70, 1976.
7 Yoshiaki Matsuda, ‘Postwar Development and Expansion of Japan’s Tuna Fishery’, p.87.
8 William L. Klare, Estimates of Catches of Tunas and Billfishes by Japanese, Korean and Taiwanese 
Longliners from Within 200 mile Economic Zones of the Member Countries of the South Pacific 
Commission, SPC Occasional Paper N o.10, Noumea, 1978; Tim Lawson, Status of Tuna Fisheries in the 
SPC Area During 1991 with Revised Annual Catches Since 1952, Tuna and Billfish Assessment 
Programme, Technical Report No.29, Noumea, 1992.
9 Tim Lawson, Status of Tuna Fisheries in the SPC Area During 1991 with Revised Annual Catches 
Since 1952.
83
Tuna and skipjack were of special importance to Japan as exports and 
increasingly as a highly valued domestic food source.10 As a share of Japan’s overall 
fisheries, tuna longline fleets accounted for one-third of the value of Japan’s total distant 
water fisheries by the beginning of the 1970s.* 11 Tuna fisheries were also highly 
dependent on distant water operations. In 1977, according to one estimate, 48 per cent 
of Japan’s tuna production (and 41 per cent of skipjack) came from areas which would 
be enclosed by the exclusive economic zones (EEZs) of 54 countries.12 In terms of 
overall fisheries, Japan was the world’s leading fishing nation. It also had the world’s 
highest per capita consumption of fish products.13
Table 4.1 Japanese Tuna and Skipjack Production by Type in Southeast Asian 
and Pacific waters, 1951-85 (tonnes)
Japan- 
based tuna 
longline
Japan-based
skipjack
pole/line
Tuna
longline/
motherships
Foreign- 
based fishing
Purse seine 
fishing
1951 90,402 123,349 9,933 0 664
1955 176,378 127,731 11,727 7,245 15,526
1960 322,774 102,621 21,716 14,909 14,772
1965 310,555 179,134 4,251 31,508 18,845
1970 304,152 221,828 0 8,771 15,663
1975 260,708 311,612 0 15,379 21,994
1980 301,986 360,777 0 46,531 82,958
1981 281,621 282,463 0 14,098 95,955
1982 287,246 266,743 0 8,661 127,546
1983 296,671 264,936 0 14,633 163,939
1984 286,096 343,546 0 15,523 190,438
1985 304,564 222,005 0 na 189,935
Source: Adapted from Yoshiaki Matsuda, ‘Postwar Development and Expansion of Japan’s Tuna 
Fishery’, p.83.
The above discussion has established the importance of the fishing industry to 
Japan and the dependence of Japan’s fishing fleets on access to distant water fishing
10 According to Japanese Fisheries Agency studies, Japanese fish consumption has been increasingly 
directed at products in the high price category. This includes various species of tuna: bluefin (which is 
categorised as super-high price), albacore, yellowfin, big eye and skipjack.
11 Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF), Annual Report on Japan’s Fisheries, Fiscal 
1991, Government of Japan, Tokyo; MAFF, Fisheries Statistics of Japan, 1991.
12 Yoshiaki Matsuda, ‘Postwar Development and Expansion of Japan’s Tuna Fishery’, p.87.
13 Annual per capita consumption of edible fish products was around 70 kg in the mid-1970s. The next 
highest country was the Republic of Korea, with 40 kg. MAFF, Annual Report on Japan s Fisheries, 
Fiscal 1991, p.19. Japan was overtaken as the world’s leading fisheries producer by China in 1989.
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grounds. These factors shaped Japan’s policies at the Third United Nations Law of the 
Sea Conference.
EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONES (EEZS) AND JAPAN’S POSITION 
History of the EEZ concept
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, adopted in 198214 established, 
for the first time in international law, the concept of EEZs. Under the relevant provisions 
(Articles 56, 58 and 59), coastal state15 sovereignty over the living and non-living marine 
resources is recognised within an area of 200 miles from the state’s coast-line. The 
economic zone is an area beyond and adjacent to the 12-mile territorial sea. These 
articles delineate the rights, jurisdiction and duties of the coastal state in the zone, as well 
as those of other states; and the basis for the resolution of conflicts. In recognising 
coastal state sovereignty over resources in the EEZ, the Law of the Sea Convention 
‘deviated fundamentally from the regime of freedom of fishing hitherto applicable in 
those waters’.16 Traditionally, sovereignty only extended to a territorial sea three miles 
wide. The development of the EEZ concept corresponded to changes in state practice 
that began soon after the Second World War.
In 1945 the US President issued two proclamations that would set the precedent 
for extended coastal state jurisdiction: one to claim for the US the resources of the 
continental shelf seabed, and the other to establish conservation zones in the high seas 
contiguous to the territorial sea, in which fishing activities would be subject to US 
regulation and control. This led to a number of Latin American countries in the late 
1940s and early 1950s declaring sovereignty over high seas, up to 200 miles of coastal 
base lines. These claims culminated in the Montevideo Declaration on the Law of the 
Sea, adopted in 1970 by Latin American countries, which, inter alia, pledged 
coordination among parties to promote the principles of coastal state jurisdiction over a 
200-mile area. Caribbean states followed a similar path in the early 1970s. Also in the 
early 1970s, African and Asian countries recognised the principle of extended coastal 
state jurisdiction, and in a number of fora, including the Organisation of African Unity, 
proclaimed the EEZ concept.17
14 With the ratification of the 60th state (Guyana), the Law of the Sea Convention came into force in 
November 1994.
15 A coastal state is one that has significant marine coast lines and is also engaged in fishing activity. A 
coastal state may also be a distant water fishing nation.
16 The Law of the Sea: The Regime for High-Seas Fisheries, Status and Prospects, Division for Ocean 
Affairs and the Law of the Sea, United Nations, New York, 1992.
17 The Law of the Sea: Exclusive Economic Zone, Legislative History of Articles 56,58 and 59 o f the 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, 
United Nations, New York, 1992.
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In addition to developments regarding EEZs, international practice was also 
extending the boundaries of the territorial sea. Law of the Sea conferences, held in 1958 
and 1960, failed to agree on the limits of the territorial sea. The developing countries 
generally supported a 12-mile limit, while many of the advanced maritime powers, Japan 
included, supported a 3 to 6-mile limit. With the failure of these conferences to resolve 
the question of territorial sea and contiguous economic zones, many countries, including 
maritime powers, unilaterally declared 12-mile fishing zones in the 1960s.
These developments merged, in the early 1970s, with the work of the UN Seabed 
Committee, which was concerned with regulating the use of the seabed and ocean floor 
in the high seas. The UN General Assembly resolved in 1970 to convene a conference on 
the law of the sea in 1973 which would aim to establish ‘an equitable international 
regime for the seabed area beyond the limits of national jurisdiction’ and resolve a range 
of other issues including delineating the territorial sea and contiguous zone.18 In 
preparation for this conference, a series of meetings were convened by the UN Seabed 
Committee at which proposals for subjects to be discussed were submitted. These 
sessions began in 1971 and lasted until 1973.
The Third UN Law of the Sea Conference (1973-1982)
The formal sessions of the Law of the Sea Conference lasted ten years but the EEZ issue 
was resolved in principle by 1977 (although a number of related issues such as highly 
migratory species remained outstanding.) At the beginning of the conference it was clear 
that while the establishment of an EEZ with coastal state sovereignty over marine 
resources was widely advocated, there was also strong opposition to this from some 
states, Japan in particular. In the preparatory sessions, Japan had proposed that the 
coastal state should enjoy ‘preferential rights’ rather than sovereign rights in an area 
adjacent to the territorial sea. It also distinguished between the rights of coastal 
developing and coastal developed states: the developing coastal state having the right to 
reserve for its vessels the portion of allowable catch that it could harvest. The developed 
coastal state would be entitled to reserve for its vessels that portion of the total allowable 
catch ‘which is necessary to maintain its locally conducted small scale coastal fisheries’.19 
Japan subsequently proposed that sovereign rights be granted to the coastal state solely 
on matters pertaining to the seabed in adjacent waters, and not to living resources.20
In the 1974 session of the conference in Caracas, Japan maintained that the 
crucial issue (for Japan) was the proposed rights of coastal states over living resources in
18 The Law of the Sea: Exclusive Economic Zone, p.14.
19 The Law of the Sea: Exclusive Economic Zone, pp.27-8. This contains summaries of the actual 
negotiations that took place in the Law of the Sea Conference, including interventions by delegations of 
different nations.
20 The Law of the Sea: Exclusive Economic Zone, p.42.
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the area adjacent to the territorial sea. It remained sceptical of the EEZ. In particular, the 
Japan delegation stated that its ‘main difficulty with the various proposals for an 
exclusive economic zone was the failure to take into account the need for adequate 
protection of the rights of other states, including traditional fishing states’.21 But, in this 
argument, Japan was largely isolated.
A number of negotiating texts emerged from the 1975, 1976 and 1977 sessions of 
the Law of the Sea Conference. These progressively elaborated on the rights, jurisdiction 
and duties of the coastal state within its EEZ in favour of the coastal state. The sovereign 
rights of the coastal state to the living and non-living resources of the ‘bed, subsoil and 
superadjacent waters’ were spelt out in the fourth and fifth sessions in 1976. A position 
also emerged on the definition of EEZ; as a distinct zone neither of the high seas nor 
territorial waters. By the sixth session of the conference in 1977, an informal composite 
negotiating text was prepared that formed the basis for the final versions of the relevant 
articles: 56, 58 and 59. A new article (55) laid down the sui generis nature of the EEZ. 
From this point, the rights and duties of coastal and other states in the EEZ were not 
considered ‘core issues’ to be resolved by the conference.22
The rights of coastal states were further strengthened by additional articles that 
concerned the conservation and utilisation of living resources within the EEZ. Article 61 
gives the coastal state final authority to determine the total allowable catch within the 
zone, and to promote the ‘maximum sustainable yield’ of harvested species. Article 62 
requires that if a coastal state has surplus living resources in its EEZ, it will give other 
states access to these resources through arrangements made according to conditions set 
out in the article. It specifically refers to the payment of access fees and joint venture 
cooperation. The fishing state is required, in turn, to comply with the conditions and 
conservation measures set by the coastal state.
These articles, together with those dealing with highly migratory species (Article 
64) and other species such as marine mammals, were not able to resolve conflicts 
between fishing states and coastal states. In part this was because they left room for wide 
interpretation of the respective rights and obligations. On the issue of highly migratory 
species (which includes tuna), Japan took the position, also shared by the US, that these 
would best be managed by international organisations who could adopt and enforce 
uniform regulations both within and beyond EEZs.23 Differences of interpretation
21 The Law of the Sea: Exclusive Economic Zone, p.71.
22 The Law of the Sea: Exclusive Economic Zone, p.98.
23 Developing coastal states such as the Pacific island countries took the position that such ‘international 
organisations’ would compromise their claim to sovereignty over tuna resources within their EEZs. This 
is an issue that is dealt with in further detail below. A highly migratory species is one that travels across 
great distances and may be targetted by many different countries.
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between coastal and distant water fishing nations would continue well into the era of 
EEZs, and be the cause of considerable tension and, at times, open confrontation.
In 1977 states began to declare their EEZs. By September 1977 about 40 
countries had done so. Japan had opposed the concept but it moved to declare its 
exclusive fishing zone on 1 July, 1977. This was largely a measure to protect Japan’s 
own fisheries resources (within its waters) and to ‘establish common ground’ in 
negotiating access to the EEZs of other coastal nations.24 Japan’s own 200-mile zone 
was the seventh largest in the world. Due to the position it adopted on highly migratory 
species, Japan’s legislation did not require foreign fleets to pay for access to the tuna and 
other such species within its zone.25
Japan’s position
Various policy options were available to Japan (and other distant water fishing nations) 
in responding to the introduction of EEZs. In theory, Japan could reduce its vulnerability 
by reducing its fish consumption. But reducing fish consumption was not a tenable 
option simply because, due to Japan’s limited land area, there was difficulty providing for 
non-fish protein in the national diet. There is a strong preference in Japanese food for fish 
products. Japan has the world’s highest per capita consumption of fish. This was, 
historically, due to scarcity of land in Japan and very productive coastal waters.
There were essentially two strategies that were both complementary and integral 
to Japan’s response: to make itself less vulnerable to policies of coastal states and to try 
to modify restrictive coastal state policies through negotiation.26 The first strategy — 
reducing vulnerability — required a combination of measures: 1) moving to high seas 
fishing grounds, beyond the EEZs; 2) developing domestic off-shore fisheries (that is, 
within its own 200-mile zone), 3) promoting fish farming and aquaculture, and 4) 
increasing imports of fish products.27 In practice, the Japanese distant water fleets were 
restricted to moving to high seas areas (since they were not licensed to fish in Japan’s 
off-shore waters)28 while undertaking, through negotiation, to modify restrictive coastal
24 Norio Fujinami, Policy Development of Japan’s Tuna Fishery, p.6.
25 Fukuzo Nagasaki, ‘The 200-Mile Regime and its Effects on Japan Fishing Industry’, Fishing and 
Industry in Asia and the Pacific, Asian Productivity Organisation, Tokyo, 1988, pp.117-21. Special 
arangements, granting reciprocal fishing rights, were concluded with neighbouring countries (Republic 
of Korea and the USSR) to accommodate territorial disputes and other differences.
26 Olav Schram Stokke, ‘Transnational Fishing: Japan’s Changing Strategy’, Marine Policy, July 1991, 
pp.231-43.
27 G. W. P. George, Linkage Diplomacy and Bilateral Economic Interdependence: The Approaches of 
New Zealand and Australia to Fisheries Negotiations with Japan, Unpublished PhD thesis, Australian 
National University, Canberra, 1981, pp.72-7.
88
state policies. Such policies included quotas, royalties and investment in joint ventures. It 
was in the context of this second strategy that the Japanese government introduced 
fisheries grant aid in 1973 and also established, with industry, the Overseas Fisheries 
Cooperation Foundation.
Government policy was influenced by a number of factors. Of key importance 
was the fact that coastal state EEZs enclosed some of the most productive fishing 
grounds in the world. Japan’s distant water fleets were highly dependent on access to 
foreign fishing grounds. By 1970 distant water fisheries accounted for approximately 
one-third of Japan’s fish catch in value and one-quarter in volume. By far the greatest 
proportion of distant water fishing was carried out in waters that in 1977 became the 
declared EEZs of the US and the USSR.29
The importance of the distant water fisheries industry was highlighted by the fact 
that it supplied a significant proportion of the domestic demand. Although fish imports 
were rising in the late 1960s and 1970s, domestic fishing fleets still accounted for the 
major share of Japan’s fish consumption.30 Phasing out the industry would mean an 
increased reliance on imports from other fishing nations, a politically untenable option at 
that time.31 After the Second World War fisheries production became integral to 
promoting Japan’s food supply as well as attaining self-sufficiency in food production. 
Self-sufficiency was closely linked to food security, which became a particularly sensitive 
issue in the 1970s (after the soya bean embargo by the US in 1973).
Maintaining the viability of distant water fleets was also an important political 
issue. Most of Japan’s catch was taken by small and medium -scale enterprises.32 These 
were organised into cooperatives and industry associations. In the tuna and skipjack 
industry, the most important associations were the Federation of Japan Tuna Fisheries 
Cooperative Association (Nikkatsuren) and the National Offshore Tuna Fisheries
28 Japan could, and did, put increasing emphasis on production within its own EEZ. Production in 
Japan’s own FFZ almost doubled between 1970 and 1980. MAFF, Annual Report on Japan s Fisheries, 
Fiscal 1991, p.3.
29 In 1974, 3.7 million tonnes were fished by Japanese distant water fleets. 1.4 million tonnes was 
caught from the US zone and 1.3 million tonnes from the USSR zone. Beginning in 1977, the annual 
catch quota allocated to Japan by these countries was gradually reduced. Fukuzo Nagasaki, ‘The 200- 
Mile Regime and its Effects on Japan’s Fishing Industry’. (Japan’s quota in the US EEZ was completely 
eliminated in 1988.) Environmental concerns (dealt with below) have stemmed directly from an over­
concentration of fishing activity on the high seas adjacent to EEZs.
30 Fish imports comprised mainly high value products such as shrimp. In 1971, the value of fish imports 
exceeded that of exports for the first time. Japan Fisheries Association, Fisheries of Japan 1991, p.7.
31 It was also not a realistic option given the fact that most coastal states did not have the capacity to 
harvest the fisheries within the EEZs for export. This point is referred to in the next section.
32 Large fishing companies (such as Taiyo Gyogyo) accounted for only 3.7 per cent of Japan’s total tuna 
and skipjack catch in 1977. Yoshiaki Matsuda, ‘Postwar Development and Expansion of Japan’s Tuna 
Fishery’, p. 87.
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Association of Japan (Kinkatsukyo) for the conventional longline and pole and line 
fishermen; the Japanese Overseas Purse Seine Fishing Association (Kaimaki) and the 
North Pacific Purse Seine Fisheries Cooperative Associations of Japan (Kitamaki) for the 
purse seine fisheries.33 For the most part they viewed the operations of their fleets in 
foreign waters as a ‘historic right’ and pressured the Japanese government to prevent 
‘excessive imports’ of tuna as well as to adopt ‘countermeasures against unreasonable 
phasing out’ of Japanese fleets in foreign EEZs.34
Both the fishing industry associations and the government, through the Fisheries 
Agency, initiated measures to counter or modify the effects of the EEZs.35 Industry 
established policies of vessel reduction and their replacement with more energy efficient 
vessels. It also negotiated fee paying arrangements, joint ventures and technical 
cooperation with coastal states in order to secure access to their EEZs. The Japanese 
government played a crucial role in supporting the distant water fishing industry. It 
introduced policy innovations that included fisheries grant aid, subsidies to promote joint 
ventures with coastal states, strengthening administrative arrangements to support 
negotiations for access arrangements,36 and measures to facilitate the replacement of 
fishing fleets with more efficient vessels and fishing gear. Government support was 
particularly important in the area of access negotiations, since small-scale fishing firms 
were less inclined to enter into joint venture arrangements with coastal states.37
A number of issues arise from the foregoing discussion. It has been argued above 
that the Japanese government and industry were strongly against the developments 
regarding EEZs in the Law of the Sea Conference. However, they were unsuccessful in 
opposing international moves towards formalising the principle of extended coastal state 
jurisdiction. The Japanese government played an important role in the postwar era of 
Japan’s fisheries expansion, especially regulating the distant water fishing industry in 
times of adjustment and change. It played a particularly important role assisting the 
industry in the face of challenges posed by the new international regime: providing
33 These cooperatives were in turn members of the Japan Fisheries Association.
34 See, for example, Nikkatsuren (Japan Tuna), ‘Outline of Activities’. Most fishing enterprises were 
small-scale and financially precarious. They relied on the cooperatives to support their operations by 
extending credit to purchase fuel and gear, and providing services such as processing, storage and 
marketing.
35 The onset of EEZs coincided with other adverse economic conditions. These included rising fuel 
prices in the early 1970s, falling catch rates (catch per unit effort, or CPUE) and growing competition 
from other DWFNs (Taiwan and the Republic of Korea in particular).
36 This included creating a position within the Fisheries Agency: the Special Advisor to the Minister on 
fisheries matters.
37 In general, fee paying arrangements were easier to deal with than joint ventures, as small-scale 
fishing enterprises often could not accumulate enough capital for joint ventures. Yoshiaki Matsuda, 
‘Postwar Development and Expansion of Japan’s Tuna Fishery’, p.87.
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measures, including grant aid, that supported industry’s strategy of negotiating access to 
coastal state EEZs.
Attention now turns to the situation in the Pacific island region. As already noted, 
this was a major fishing area for Japan’s distant water fleets and it was thus a focus of 
Japanese fisheries diplomacy. In the following analysis, it is argued that Japan’s fisheries 
access arrangements with the Pacific island states have been marked by instability from 
the outset, and this created an important basis for providing fisheries aid. Because Japan 
enjoyed a position of strength in its bilateral negotiations it succeeded in acquiring 
relatively cheap access. This situation changed profoundly in the late 1980s, especially in 
the wake of the conclusion of a multilateral access arrangement between the island states 
and the US. Japan’s position was also undermined by increased competition for access by 
other distant water fishing nations and increasing problems of adjustment in Japan’s 
fishing industry.
JAPAN’S ACCESS AGREEMENTS WITH PACIFIC ISLAND COUNTRIES
Pacific island countries declared their 200-mile zones between 1977 and 1984. Details of 
the dates declared and size of these zones are given in Table 4.2. The importance of the 
region’s fishing grounds to Japan was underscored by the fact that of the 15 access 
agreements that Japan had concluded by 1986, 10 were in the Pacific (island states and 
territories, Australia, New Zealand and the US).38
Table 4.2 demonstrates the extreme disparity between land and sea areas in the 
region. The overall geo-political boundaries of the region were dramatically transformed. 
This table does not include the dependent territories of France, the US and Britain in the 
Pacific island region. With the inclusion of the latter group of countries, the total area 
enclosed by maritime zones increases to 10.6 million sq km. Independent and self- 
governing countries account for 65.3 per cent of this total. Not all countries were of 
equal importance as fishing grounds. Due to currents and other climatic factors, the 
richest fishing grounds are in the waters of the western and central Pacific (which 
includes the zones of Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands, Nauru, Kiribati, Tuvalu, 
the Federated States of Micronesia, the Marshall Islands and Palau); hence, Japan’s 
interest was in access arrangements with these countries.
The first access agreements were concluded in 1978 with Papua New Guinea, 
Kiribati and the Solomon Islands. These were followed by the French Territories in 1979, 
and the Marshall Islands, Palau and the Federated States of Micronesia in 1981. All 
agreements, with the exception of Papua New Guinea, were for one year and subject to
38 Norio Fujinami, Policy Development of Japan’s Tuna Fishery.
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renegotiation. Papua New Guinea’s agreement was to continue in force (with the 
opportunity for adjustment) until either party gave three-months’ notice of termination.39
Table 4.2 EEZs of Pacific Island Nations
Country Status of zone Year declared Zone area (sq km) Land area (sq km)
Cook Is. economic 1977 1,830,000 237
Fiji economic 1981 1,290,000 18,272
FSM fishing 1979 2,978,000 701
Kiribati economic 1979 3,550,000 690
Marshall Is. fishing 1979 2,131,000 181
Naum fishing 1978 320,000 21
Niue economic 1978 390,000 259
Palau fishing 1979 629,000 488
PNG fishing/economic 1978 3,120,000 462,243
Solomon Is. fishing/economic 1978 1,340,000 27,556
Tonga economic 1979 700,000 747
Tuvalu economic 1984 900,000 24
Vanuatu economic 1978 680,000 12,190
W. Samoa economic 1977 120,000 2,935
Source: Adapted from David J. Doulman, Fishing for Tuna: The Operations of Distant-Water Fleets in 
the Pacific Islands Region, Research Report Series No.3, Pacific Islands Development Program, 
East-West Center, 1986; and South Pacific Commission, South Pacific Economies: Statistical 
Summary, No. 13, Noumea, 1993.
In some cases, the agreements were negotiated between the coastal state 
government and the various industry associations such as Nikkatsuren (see Table 4.3 
below), but normally the agreements were government to government and subsidiary 
agreements between the industry associations and coastal state were worked out 
separately. These subsidiary arrangements included the details of the actual terms and 
conditions of access; the government to government ‘umbrella’ arrangement dealt mainly 
with broad principles of cooperation. In both cases Japan’s negotiations were led by the 
Special Advisor to the Minister on fisheries matters.40
39 David J. Doulman, Fishing for Tuna: The Operations o f Distant-Water Fleets in the Pacific Islands 
Region., Research Report Series No.3, Pacific Islands Development Program, East-West Center, 
Hawaii, 1986.
40 The dynamics of access negotiations are explored more fully in the next chapter. For now it is 
sufficient to note that the Special Advisor wears ‘two hats’: as leader of the Japanese government side, 
and as leader of the fishing industry side. In this latter role, the Special Advisor speaks for the private 
sector in access negotiations. The industry representatives do not contribute formally and their positions 
are conveyed, and interpreted, by the Special Advisor.
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There were two ways of calculating access fees. One was a lump sum system, the 
other was a per vessel per trip system. The lump sum system was used initially and was 
preferred by the island states because of its simplicity and the guaranteed sum to be 
received. The per vessel system gradually took over as the dominant approach primarily 
because it was a more accurate system and fees could be based on actual operations and 
catch effort. The foreign vessel owners thus preferred this to the lump sum approach. 
The crucial element in calculating the access fee under the per vessel system was the rate 
of return. In the early 1980s this was between three and four per cent of the catch value 
although in reality (measured in terms of actual receipts) it was sometimes signficantly 
lower.
Table 4.3 Japanese Access Agreements with Pacific Island Countries41
Country Year com­
menced
Basis:
Lump
sum
Basis:
Per
vessel
Status Vessels
licensed
Duration Re­
strictions
FSM 1981 1981 1984 industry a,b,c 1 year yes
Kiribati 1978 1978 1984 govem’t a,b 1 year yes
Marshall Is 1981 1981 1984 govem’t a,b 1 year yes
Palau 1981 1981 - industry a,b,c 1 year yes
PNG 1978 1978 1979 industry a,b,c open no
Solomon Is 1978 1978 1979 govem ’t a,b 1 year yes
Tuvalu 1986 - 1986
Notes: a = longline; b = pole and line; c = purse seine.
Source: Adapted from David J. Doulman, Fishing for Tuna: The Operations of Distant- Water Fleets in 
the Pacific Islands Region.
The relatively low access fees (rate of return and actual receipts) were attributed 
to five factors. These were 1) the lack of any real scarcity value to the licences purchased 
(access agreements did not set quotas on catch effort); 2) the small number of buyers for 
licenses (who, for the most part, were well organised and skilled at negotiating); 3) the 
relatively large number of sellers of licences; 4) the relatively unprofitable nature of 
distant water fishing operations; and 5) the relative weakness of surveillance and 
enforcement efforts available to ensure compliance with agreements.42
41 This does not include the agreement with France for access to the French Territories in the Pacific 
(French Polynesia, Wallis and Futuna, and New Caledonia).
42 Les Clark, A Study on Fees and Other Economic Benefits from Foreign Fishing Access to the 
Fisheries or Exclusive Economic Zones of the States Participating in the South Pacific Forum Fisheries 
Agency, FFA Report 83/2,1983, pp.21-2. Because the system of fee payment was based on reported 
catch within the respective EEZs, much depended on the accuracy of the data provided by the fishing 
vessels. Absence of surveillance and enforcement mechanisms led to frequent non-reporting and under-
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The small number of buyers for licences in the 1970s and early 1980s was 
reflected in Japan’s dominant position as a distant water fishing nation in the Pacific. In 
1981, for example, 90 per cent of access fees received by Pacific island states were paid 
by Japanese vessel owners.43
In general countries in the region were dissatisfied with the low rate of return and 
this was underscored by the frequent break-off of access agreements. Between 1978 and 
1984 Japan’s access agreements with all the Pacific island countries (except the Marshall 
Islands and French Polynesia) were temporarily suspended for a total period of 54 
months.44 Break-offs were initiated by the Pacific island nations usually in an effort to 
secure higher returns and more favourable agreements. These efforts were largely 
unsuccessful, for reasons given above. In some cases (for example Papua New Guinea) 
short-term stability was secured through adapting access arrangements in line with 
mutual concerns.45
An underlying problem for the region stemmed from competition between island 
states for access revenue, as well as the inadequacy of national machinery for managing 
their resources. They were unable to harvest the fisheries resources themselves due to a 
lack of fishing fleets. Processing capacity was also limited. These problems were 
recognised from the outset by Pacific island leaders as fundamental obstacles to realising 
greater economic benefits from their EEZs. Regional machinery was thus established in 
the late 1970s and 1980s to overcome the self-defeating rivalry and economic weakness 
of the island countries. Although these mechanisms provided the basis for strengthening 
the region’s negotiating position, much also depended on the interests of the distant 
water fishing nations in addressing regional concerns.
reporting of catch (a problem that continues today despite regional mechanisms to enhance surveillance 
and compliance).
43 For some countries, dependence on this revenue was especially acute. For Kiribati, an average of 83 
per cent of access fees between 1978 and 1983 was paid by Japanese vessels. This income accounted for 
a major share of government revenue. Access fees accounted for 9.0 per cent of Kiribati government 
revenue in 1981. The share rose to 25 per cent in 1986, as a result of the agreement with the Soviet 
Union. Roniti Teiwaki, ‘Access Agreements in the South Pacific: Kiribati and the Distant-Water Fishing 
Nations, 1979-1986’, Marine Policy, October 1987, pp. 273-284.
44 Yoshiaki Matsu da, ‘Changes in Tuna Fishing Negotiations between Japan and the Pacific Island 
Nations’, in James Barney Marsh (ed.), Resources and Environment in Asia’s Marine Sector, Taylor and 
Francis, New York, 1992, p.53.
45 David J. Doulman, ‘Licensing Distant-Water Fleets in Papua New Guinea’, Marine Policy, January 
1987, pp. 16-28. This was largely due to Papua New Guinea’s stronger negotiating position: both as a 
major fishing ground as well as a larger economy that was not as dependent on access revenues as other 
governments. The estimated share of government revenue that came from access fees was 0.1 per cent in 
1980 and 0.6 per cent in 1984.
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REGIONAL FISHERIES FRAMEWORKS
A unique but very important feature of Pacific island fisheries diplomacy is the existence 
of regional institutional structures facilitating cooperation among members. These are 
mainly under the auspices of the South Pacific Forum.46 Fisheries policy is formulated by 
the Forum Fisheries Committee, which is the main decision making body of the regional 
fisheries organisation —  the South Pacific Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA), which was 
established in 1979 to help countries manage the living resources within their EEZs in 
accordance with the Law of the Sea Convention. Membership of the FFA was restricted, 
in the first instance, to members of the South Pacific Forum (that is, independent and 
self-governing Pacific island countries, Australia and New Zealand).
The issue of membership was the source of much controversy during the late 
1970s as there were some regional countries which sought a wider membership —  that 
is, a broad-based organisation open to distant water fishing nations (DWFNs) and coastal 
states. This was opposed by the majority, however, since it would permit membership to 
countries that did not recognise coastal state sovereignty over tuna.47 The headquarters 
of the FFA were located in Honiara, in the Solomon Islands.
Member states have not formally delegated any sovereign powers to the FFA, 
which is essentially an advisory and consultative body that is also mandated to carry out 
the policy decisions decided by the member states. But in practice it has assumed a 
proactive role, interpreting and articulating the region’s interests and approach to 
questions of resource management, and assisting countries in conducting access 
negotiations with DWFNs.
The FFA was also mandated to serve as secretariat for a sub-regional group of 
states known as the Parties to the Nauru Agreement (PNA). These countries controlled 
the most important EEZs in the region and, because of the stronger mutual interests they 
had in negotiations with DWFNs, it was decided to promote additional cooperation 
among themselves. A series of discussions, begun in 1980, culminated in the signing of 
the Nauru Agreement in February 1982. Founding PNA members were the Federated 
States of Micronesia, Kiribati, the Marshall Islands, Nauru, Palau, Papua New Guinea 
and the Solomon Islands. Tuvalu was admitted in 1991.
The Nauru Agreement gave rise to two major management initiatives. One was 
known as the harmonised minimum terms and conditions (MTCs) of access, to be
46 The South Pacific Forum is an annual meeting of heads of government of the independent and self- 
governing Pacific island states, plus Australia and New Zealand, which began in 1971. It is the pre­
eminent regional political organisation, fostering dialogue and cooperation between member countries.
47 This referred mainly to the US, as discussed below. It was not apparent that Japan was a source of 
concern at the time. However Japan would become a staunch advocate of a broad based fisheries 
organisation in the region, dubbed an Article 64 type organisation. For details of the establishment of 
the FFA, see Jon Van Dyke, Tuna Management in the Pacific: An Analysis of the South Pacific Forum 
Fisheries Agency, University of Hawaii, Hawaii, 1981.
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incorporated in agreements with foreign fleets and the second was the Regional Register. 
The MTCs prescribed minimum standards that vessel operators must comply with in 
order to be allowed access. These covered reporting catch and position, vessel markings, 
placement of observers on vessels, and conduct of transshipment operations. It also 
introduced standardised licensing procedures. These became legally binding on members 
when the First Implementing Arrangement of the Nauru Agreement came into force in 
September 1983.48
The Regional Register, which also became binding on members in September 
1983, was to serve as an ‘information database for licensing foreign vessels and an aid to 
surveillance and compliance’.49 The basic requirement of the Regional Register was that 
vessels must have ‘good standing’ on the Register before being issued with a licence to 
fish in the EEZ of any member country. Good standing is withdrawn if a vessel operator 
is found to have carried out unlicensed fishing, presented inaccurate or incomplete catch 
logs, fished in a closed area or within the territorial waters of a member country or 
committed any other offence against the fishing laws of the member country; and either 
not complied with any judgment handed down by a court (such as payment of 
compensation) or evaded trial. Approval to remove a vessel from the regional register 
requires a majority decision by PNA member countries (since all countries are potentially 
affected).
The main point of these measures was to reduce the leverage of the DWFNs 
when negotiating access agreements with regional states, by putting in place common 
licensing standards and enforcement mechanisms.50 While there was some improvement 
in the position of the island countries throughout the 1980s, implementation of the 
minimum terms and conditions and Regional Register rules remained weak.51 There was 
a tendency for island states to renege on some of the undertakings especially when 
DWTNs refused to comply with the requirements and threatened to fish elsewhere. This 
was a problem as long as access was relatively abundant and coastal states competed 
among themselves for access revenue.52
48 Michael W. Lodge, Minimum Terms and Conditions of Access, Discussion paper prepared for a 
Small Working Group Meeting on the Minimum Terms and Conditions of Access and their 
Implementation, February 1992, FFA Report, 92/15.
49 David J. Doulman and Peter Terawasi, ‘The South Pacific Regional Register of Foreign Fishing 
Vessels’, Marine Policy, July 1990, pp.324-32.
50 Pacific island states also agreed in principle that they should not accept less than a 4 per cent rate of 
return.
51 Japan refused to submit applications for registration directly to the FFA because it did not recognise 
the FFA as a ‘genuine Article 64 type organisation’. Because licensing was permitted through the 
coastal state, often licences were issued before good standing on the Register had been granted, which 
defeated the purpose of the Register.
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To counter this problem the idea of a regional licensing or access arrangement 
was developed. This would potentially reduce the leverage of DWFNs since they would 
be locked into a single licensing system (a break-off in one set of relations would affect 
the whole). The idea was first raised in connection with US fishing fleets, where the 
problem of compliance was made more acute by the US government’s refusal to 
recognise coastal state sovereignty over tuna. However, it was applied more generally to 
DWFNs and would come to be the source of considerable tension, especially with Japan.
US TUNA POLICY IN THE REGION AND THE EVOLUTION OF A 
MULTILATERAL ACCESS ARRANGEMENT
US purse seine fleets first entered the region in the late 1970s. All agreements negotiated 
with island countries were with the industry organisation, the American Tunaboat 
Association (ATA), not with government Apart from Papua New Guinea, all 
arrangements were concluded on a sub-regional basis; and were generally short term. 
These were with the Federated States of Micronesia, the Marshall Islands and Palau (July 
1980 to December 1982), the Federated States of Micronesia, Kiribati and Palau (March 
1983 to December 1984) and the Cook Islands, Niue, Tuvalu, Western Samoa and 
Tokelau (mid-1983 to December 1984). According to one study, fees paid by the US 
fleets were, on an annual basis, lower than Japanese fees.53 Papua New Guinea agreed to 
individual licensing of US vessels on the same terms as Japanese vessels for the 1984 
season. But this agreement did not extend beyond December 1984.
The agreements negotiated by the ATA with Pacific island countries represented 
an attempt to accommodate the discrepancy between US policy of not recognising 
coastal state rights to the tuna resource in their EEZ and the de facto international 
acceptance of these rights.54 But they were negotiated against the background of US 
legislation protecting the interests of the American vessel owners. This strengthened the 
bargaining position of the US tuna industry. The relevant laws were included in the 1976 
Fishery Conservation and Management Act (also known as the Magnusen Act) and the 
1954 Fishermen’s Protective Act. In the latter law, introduced in response to Latin
52 In order to counter some of the weaknesses in the MTCs and Regional Register rules, the PNA 
adopted a Second Implementing Arrangement, to take effect from 1 January 1991. This greatly 
enhanced reporting and other requirements and at first was strongly resisted by DWFNs, especially 
Japan. Other innovations included the Palau Arrangement for the Management of the Western Pacific 
Purse Seine Fishery, signed in 1992; and the Niue Treaty on Cooperation in Fisheries Surveillance and 
Law Enforcement in the South Pacific Region, which came into force in mid-1993. For a brief overview, 
see Gerry Geen, ‘Tuna Industry Development in the South Pacific: A Coordinated Approach’, 
Development Bulletin, July 1994, pp.39-41.
53 David J. Doulman, Fishing for Tuna, pp.25-8.
54 For details of US policy, see B. Martin Tsamenyi, ‘The South Pacific States, the USA and Sovereignty 
over Highly Migratory Species’, Marine Policy, January 1986, pp.29-41.
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American countries unilaterally declaring 200-mile EEZs, the US government undertook 
to provide compensation to American fishermen whose vessels were seized by coastal 
states for fishing without licences. Moreover, this compensation would be deducted from 
foreign assistance granted to any country concerned.55
Provisions included in the Magnusen Act increased the penalties against coastal 
states by compelling the US government to take retaliatory action against countries that 
‘interfere’ with US tuna operations in the EEZs. This included putting embargoes on 
tuna imports from the offending countries. As Copes argued, this was not an empty 
threat, as the US tuna market was the dominant market in the world tuna trade.56
The effect of these two laws was to encourage US fishermen to violate the EEZs 
of foreign nations. Two highly publicised cases involved American tuna vessels arrested 
in PNG waters in 1982 and in Solomon Islands waters in 1984. Other violations were 
recorded but not brought to trial.57
The political-strategic origins of the US multilateral access agreement will be 
examined in more detail in Chapter 6. The idea of such an agreement was first raised 
among US policy makers in response to potential Soviet advances in the region. Pacific 
island countries first debated the issue in late 1983. Negotiations towards formulating a 
multilateral access agreement between the US and the island states began in late 1984. 
(The Pacific island position was formulated by the FFA.) Agreement was reached in 
October 1986 and the Multilateral Treaty on Fisheries Between the Governments of 
Certain Pacific Island States and the Government of the USA was signed in March 1987. 
The agreement implicitly acknowledged that coastal states have sovereignty over tuna in 
their EEZs, but the US did not abandon its interpretation of the Law of the Sea. It took 
the position that the agreement demonstrated that provisions of Article 64 in respect of 
‘appropriate international organisation’ had been met so the retaliatory provisions of its 
domestic laws should no longer apply.58 Because of the importance of this agreement for 
Japanese policy in the region, it is necessary to examine more closely its terms and 
provisions.
The treaty covered five licensing periods of one year each. These would run from 
1988 to 1992. It allowed for a maximum number of 50 vessels to be licensed and 
included greatly enhanced reporting procedures (including catch data on the high seas 
and placement of observers on vessels). Of the total financial package agreed to of $60
55 Parzival Copes, ‘Access and Management in the Tuna Fisheries of the Pacific Islands Region’, in 
James Barney Marsh (ed.), Resources and Environment in Asia’s Marine Sector, Taylor and Francis, 
New York, 1992, p.67.
56 Parzival Copes, ‘Access and Management in the Tuna Fisheries of the Pacific Islands Region’, p.68.
57 For details, see B. Martin Tsamenyi, ‘The South Pacific States, the USA and Sovereignty over Highly 
Migratory Species’.
58 Parzival Copes, ‘Access and Management in the Tuna Fisheries of the Pacific Islands Region’, p.69.
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million over the five-year period (the total actually received including interest was 
$66,069 million), 85 per cent was allocated to countries according to catch volume 
within the various EEZs of the region. The remaining 15 per cent was apportioned 
equally among all parties irrespective of catch and was in the form of project aid and 
technical assistance. This 15 per cent component was divided into two parts: the 
Economic Development Fund (EDF) and Technical Assistance Fund (TAF). The former 
is for small-scale fisheries development projects; the latter for short-term consultancies, 
training courses and meetings. The FFA was mandated to serve as coordinator of these 
funds, although projects were subject to approval by the regional US Agency for 
International Development (USAID) office. Each country received an annual allocation 
of $66,666.67 for the EDF and $16,666.67 for the TAF.59
The following points need to be noted. First, the agreement was possible only 
because of US government support. Of the annual payment of $12 million, $9 million 
was a direct cash grant to the region provided by the US Agency for International 
Development in Washington. A further $1 million was channelled through the regional 
USAID office for development projects. The industry body, ATA, paid $1.75 million in 
licensing fees (minimum of 35 vessels at $50,000 per vessel) and $250,000 of in-kind 
technical assistance. Thus the US government paid for more than 80 per cent of the cost 
of access. There was some dispute at first over payment for access in the form of aid 
rather than commercial licence fees. But the ‘two-tier approach’ won favour in the end 
because, according to one report, ‘FFA countries have been far more interested in the 
bottom line dollar figure than who writes the checks’.60 Moreover, the majority of the 
US government share was given as a cash grant and was not project tied. The agreed 
amount was estimated to be around 10 per cent of the catch value. This was a vast 
improvement on the existing access fees paid to the region, where the rate of return 
varied between 1.5 and 4 per cent.
The US agreement marked a turning point in the region’s fisheries diplomacy.61 It 
was an unprecedented achievement in regional cooperation and in the benefits that were
59 Information provided to the author by FFA. All member states of the FFA were parties to the treaty 
and recipients of access payments. Neither Australia nor New Zealand were beneficiaries of the EDF and 
TAF, but New Zealand did receive payments on behalf of Tokelau, an island territory under its 
jurisdiction.
60 ‘Fish Pact Inked in Tonga; Soviets Exit Kiribati’, The Washington Pacific Report, Vol.5, N o .3 ,1 
November, 1986, p .l.
61 In 1992 agreement was reached on an extension of the Treaty for a further ten-year period. A 
maximum of 55 vessels are to be licensed, with an annual payment of $18 million. According to US 
State Department officials, there was some difficulty justifying to the Congress the renewal of the Treaty 
on improved terms, especially given the continuing low fees paid by other DWFNs as well as the 
absence of any strategic imperative for the US (such as existed in 1986). But the arguments that did 
prevail were that the treaty had greatly improved relations with the region and was important for the 
operations of American tuna fleets. In addition, it was necessary to continue the treaty since the related 
payments would comprise the only substantial American aid to the region, in view of the USAID
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secured for the island states from foreign access to their EEZs. It also benefited 
countries that were not generally targetted by distant water fishing nations and that did 
not receive revenue from access fees. The country most affected by the conclusion of this 
agreement, and the enhanced expectations of island countries that resulted, was Japan.
Another important feature of the multilateral treaty was the fact that US vessels 
agreed to all administrative requirements and management measures of FFA member 
countries, including the provision of comprehensive catch and effort data. Put bluntly, 
there was no incentive for US vessels owners to ‘cheat’ by under-reporting or not 
reporting fishing effort. Most importantly, the treaty provided the FFA with its first 
opportunity for assessing the reliability of data provided by operators from other distant 
water fishing nations. The information provided by US vessels thus strengthened efforts 
taken by the FFA and PNA to improve terms and conditions of access agreements and 
enhance surveillance mechanisms.
THE PROPOSED MULTILATERAL ACCESS AGREEMENT WITH JAPAN
At the signing of the US multilateral treaty in Port Moresby in April 1987, the idea of a 
similar arrangement with Japan was informally discussed by Pacific island leaders 
gathered there. Then President of Nauru, Hammer de Roburt, making an address on 
behalf of FFA member countries, asked rhetorically: ‘Where do we go from here?’ He 
continued: ‘One obvious avenue ... leads towards that other great economic power on 
the rim of our region —  Japan’.62 The South Pacific Forum, which met in Western 
Samoa in late May 1987, gave political backing to the idea of a multilateral arrangement 
with Japan, endorsing a regional approach to fisheries negotiations with Japan and 
requesting the Director of the FFA ‘to facilitate such negotiations promptly’.63
This was precisely what the Japanese Fisheries Agency (and industry) had feared 
would happen. Although the Pacific island countries mooted an approach that was quite 
different from the agreement with the US,64 Japanese officials interpreted the initiative as
cutbacks and closure of its regional office (effective from September 1994). Interview, US State 
Department, Washington DC, February 1994.
62 These comments were recalled by President Hammer de Roburt in his opening address to the first 
meeting of FFA members to consider a multilateral agreement with Japan, Nauru, 23-26 July 1987. 
Record of Proceedings, FFA Report, 87/29.
63 Communique, 18th South Pacific Forum, Apia, Western Samoa, 30 May 1987.
64 At the first regional meeting to discuss the issue, countries decided on a two-tiered approach. At the 
regional level there would be a ‘head agreement’ that incorporated basic principles and guidelines (with 
clauses covering, inter alia, compliance with the Regional Register, catch and position reporting, 
placement of observers, flag state enforcement, and dispute settlement). Countries would then be free to 
enter into subsidiary access agreements negotiated on a bilateral basis. These would contain details of 
the access fee, method of calculating fee, vessel numbers and issuance of licences. This approach 
reflected the concern on the part of some countries to not disrupt their existing agreements with Japan.
100
one seeking to replicate the American multilateral treaty. Their objections to the proposal 
centred on the way the US government contributed directly to the access fees paid under 
the multilateral agreement. It was argued that the Japanese government could not 
provide the same direct support. Nor could industry afford to pay the same level of 
access fees that were provided under the US agreement. These objections were valid to 
some extent,65 but they appeared to miss the point that the region was not seeking to 
conclude a US-style access agreement. These arguments continue to dominate Japan’s 
reasons for opposing the multilateral access agreement with the South Pacific.66
In order to explain Japan’s opposition to the proposed multilateral approach, it is 
necessary to consider more general concerns on the part of the Japanese Fisheries 
Agency. The response to the regional initiative was shaped largely by a sentiment that the 
Pacific island countries were going too far in asserting their authority over the fisheries 
resources of the region. Questions of principle as well as pragmatism were salient On 
the one hand, there was concern that Japan would be further weakened in its position as 
a DWFN if the Pacific island countries were able to present a common negotiating stand 
(a cartel-like scenario). This would lead inevitably to upward pressure on access fees and 
thus to a worsening economic performance by the fishing vessels. In such a situation 
there would not be the option of moving to other fishing grounds under more favourable 
access arrangements. But the approach being promoted by the region did leave some 
flexibility in negotiating bilateral arrangements and deciding access fees on a bilateral 
basis.67 Japan’s opposition to the proposed regional access agreement was thus linked to 
broader considerations of resource utilisation and concern at its lack of influence over 
regional fisheries policy.
The position Japan formally adopted on the multilateral access issue was that it 
was willing to enter dialogue towards a regional agreement on conservation and 
management issues. But access would remain confined to bilateral negotiations.68 When 
the Japanese government finally agreed to meet with the Pacific island countries to
65 The Japanese Fisheries Agency and tuna industry maintain that the ‘break-even’ point for their 
operations is a 4 per cent rate of return. The FFA estimated in 1993 that Japanese vessels could afford to 
pay between 6 and 8 per cent as a rate o f return (but no more). A multilateral agreement that provided a 
higher rate of return than this would thus depend on financial support from the Japanese government. 
This raised the issue of whether the Japanese government would provide a direct subsidy to the industry. 
For an analysis of the economic conditions of Japan’s tuna industry, see Anthony Bergin and Marcus 
Howard, ‘Japanese Tuna Fisheries: Future Trends’, Marine Policy, May 1992, pp. 147-66.
66 Interviews, International Affairs Division, Fisheries Agency, Tokyo, April-May 1993; Interview, 
Special Advisor Tatsuo Saito, Tokyo, May 1993.
67 The proposed regional arrangement did not contain a minimum rate of return, and thus no automatic 
increase in access fees was prescribed. But the point o f the initiative was to improve the returns for 
island countries, and thus increases were to be anticipated.
68 This position was conveyed formally by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) to the Papua New 
Guinea Embassy in Tokyo through a Note Verbale on 19 July 1988.
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discuss a regional fisheries arrangement in 1989, its aim essentially was to promote 
dialogue on management and conservation issues, the ultimate goal being to establish a 
regional fisheries organisation in the Pacific which would include both fishing states and 
coastal states, participating on an equal basis. This was an issue that dominated and 
ultimately doomed consultations, held during the same period, on the question of an 
albacore management regime in the region.
Japan’s opposition to the proposed multilateral access agreement was 
underscored to some extent by regional (Pacific island) differences on the issue. While 
there was a general desire to improve the returns from access agreements with Japan, 
there was also concern that a regional agreement would lead to a redistribution of fishing 
effort and access payments, thus benefitting some countries more than others. The 
experience of the US treaty had demonstrated this.69 Thus political will within the region, 
which appeared strong at the outset, gradually weakened by the time formal talks with 
Japan began in 1989.70
Following the second consultation with Japan in 1990, the Forum Fisheries 
Committee decided that, due to lack of progress, the issue should be given lower priority 
in future. The South Pacific Forum meeting in July 1990 adopted this position and efforts 
to hold negotiations with Japan were suspended.
In 1993 the FFA decided to once again revive the issue of a multilateral access 
agreement with Japan. One of the main reasons for this decision was the rather damning 
critique of access arrangements and the low level of fees received by island states, 
contained in a report reviewing the ten-year history of the Nauru Agreement.71 The 
report highlighted a number of failures on the part of the member states of the PNA in 
the implementation of minimum terms and conditions and the Regional Register rules. It 
called for a centralised licensing system to be set up and administered by the FFA; for the 
PNA to pursue multilateral agreements ‘as a matter of urgency’ and until they reach such 
agreements, to consider negotiating en bloc with DWFNs.
Adding impetus to a revival of the multilateral access issue were other 
developments: Taiwan announced in 1993 that it would enter into consultations with the 
FFA on a multilateral fisheries treaty; the US treaty was renewed for a further 10 years in
69 Japanese officials fed these fears by hinting that some countries would lose out on both access revenue 
and fisheries aid if an agreement was signed (see next chapter). This followed a general tendency in 
Japan’s fisheries diplomacy to exploit divisions and competition between states in order to maximise its 
bargaining position; hence Japan’s preference for bilateral access arrangements.
70 Based on records of meetings held to discuss the issue, July and November, 1987; April 1988; March 
1989 and June 1989. For a recent critical assessment of the multilateral approach to Japan, see ‘FSM 
Representative Warns Against Unrealistic Comparisons of Fisheries Regimes’, Pacific Report, Vol.7, 
No. 15, 15 August 1994, p.4.
71 Transform Aqorau and Pochon Lili, The Nauru Agreement —  The First Decade, 1982-1992: A 
Review of the Aims and Achievements of the Parties to the Nauru Agreement Concerning Cooperation 
in the Management of Fisheries of Common Interest, FFA Report 93/11, March 1993.
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1992; and increased dialogue took place between the FFA and Japan on regional 
management issues (helped in part by the appointment of a new Special Advisor, who 
was not as hostile to the FFA). While Japan’s policy remained the same in principle, in 
practice it agreed to meet a number of requirements regarding vessel licensing and 
monitoring, and provision of catch data. This included compliance with the Regional 
Register. The unofficial position was that by meeting at least some of the conditions of a 
multilateral agreement, the issue could be made redundant72
Regional challenges to Japan were spurred on by the conclusion of a multilateral 
access agreement with the US (prompted in turn by US political-security considerations). 
Although the negotiations with Japan on a multilateral arrangement ultimately proved 
inconclusive, in general relations between the region and Japan became more unstable. 
The US agreement led to greater confidence and higher expectations on the part of 
regional states in their negotiations with Japan. There was a greater willingness by some 
Pacific island countries to challenge Japan on the question of terms and conditions of 
access. This was reflected in the increased instability in access arrangements. Between 
1987 and 1990, the number of months of break-off totalled 50 (twice the rate of the 
previous four years).73 This included a long-standing break-off, beginning in 1987, 
between Japan and Papua New Guinea, which had previously been Japan’s most stable 
partner. An agreement between Japan and the French Territories was also suspended, 
while several other states (Tuvalu, the Marshall Islands and the Solomon Islands) gave 
notice that they would also suspend agreements with Japan unless increases in access 
fees were obtained. The FFA Director declared in late 1988 that ‘Japan’s differences 
with the region have never been worse’.74
POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC DILEMMAS OF JAPAN’S FISHING 
INDUSTRY
The issue of a multilateral access agreement was deliberated against a background of 
growing disaffection with Japan within the region. An important factor underlying this 
was the growing presence in the region of other DWFNs. In the 1980s the number of 
distant water fishing fleets (purse seine in particular) expanded significantly. Although
72 Interview, International Affairs Division, Fisheries Agency, Tokyo, July 1993. Despite forming a 
taskforce in late 1993 to consider the approach that the PNA and FFA should adopt in regard to a 
multilateral access agreement with Japan, the issue has subsequently been put on hold while the regional 
fora devote most attention to ways of promoting local industry development, through preferential access 
agreements and limited licensing arrangements. For a brief overview, see Gerry Geen, ‘Tuna Industry 
Development in the South Pacific’.
73 FFA estimate.
74 ‘Japan and Islands in Fisheries Dispute’, The South Sea Digest, No. 18, Vol.8, 25 November 1988, 
P-1.
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Japan remained the dominant DWFN (especially in longline and pole and line operations) 
other countries emerged as strong competitors for access. Apart from the US, these 
included traditional operators, Taiwan and Republic of Korea, and newly developing 
DWFNs: Philippines, Thailand and Indonesia (see Table 4.4).
Not only did these countries compete with Japan for access to the region’s fishing 
grounds, thus forcing up the price of access, but they were also prepared to pay a higher 
rate of return, due to lower cost structures, especially wage rates, in those countries.75 
The access fees for Taiwanese and Korean fleets were around 6 per cent of the catch 
value. The higher rate of return was to some extent offset by the poorer quality of 
compliance with terms and conditions (that is, there was a higher rate of under-reporting 
and non-reporting by Taiwanese and Korean vessels).76 Nevertheless, Japan was 
compelled to address the fact that it alone refused to pay higher fees.
Table 4.4: The Number of Purse Seine Vessels by Nationality Operating in the Pacific 
Island Region
Country 1983 1989 1990 1991
Japan 41 36 38 44
Korea 11 30 37 37
Taiwan 3 25 35 44
US 39 36 43 43
Philippines 0 14 13 12
Total 94 141 166 180
Source: FFA Regional Register, in Options for Tropical Tuna Management: Considerations for the 
South Pacific, FFA Report 92/88, 1992.
75 Japanese legislation, amongst other things, precluded the option of employing cheaper crew on 
Japanese vessels. Legislation restricted the foreign crew quota to 25 per cent of the vessel crew. The 
industry association, Nikkatsuren, has sought to expand the quota to 40 per cent. FFA News Digest, 
No.6, November-December 1992, p.l 1. Wage rates for Japanese crew on distant water fishing vessels 
were as high, if not higher, than other industry rates in Japan. The upward pressure on wages was due to 
the declining numbers of young Japanese willing to work on the fishing vessels, especially the distant 
water vessels. For details, see Fisheries Census reproduced in Japan Fisheries Association, Fisheries of 
Japan, 1991, p.6.
76 Estimated rates of under-reporting and non-reporting by purse seiners from Japan, Korea and Taiwan 
in 1990 were as follows: Japan — 15 per cent and 31 per cent; Korea — 28 per cent and 75 per cent; 
Taiwan — 79 per cent and 5 per cent. The rate of under-reporting is defined as the percentage of the 
catch not recorded on logsheets from fishing effort that is recorded. The rate of non-reporting is the 
percentage of the catch from fishing effort which is not recorded on logsheets (some of which may have 
been taken on international waters). FFA, Options for Tropical Tuna Management: Considerations for 
the South Pacific, p.10.
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Greater demand for access shifted the balance of power in favour of the sellers 
(that is, the coastal states).77 The effect was to increase the leverage of the island states, 
which was strengthened further by initiatives formulated by the FFA and PNA. These 
include the Palau Arrangement of 1992, which aimed to restrict the number of distant 
water licences issued to purse seine fleets operating in the region and to give preferential 
access to those fleets that engaged in joint ventures with Pacific island coastal states. The 
overall priority of the FFA shifted away from negotiating fee paying access agreements 
to promoting the harvesting and processing capacity of its members.78
Japan’s distant water fishing fleets were caught in an increasingly difficult 
situation. The waning of their political power vis-a-vis coastal states was matched by an 
economic decline that had begun in the 1970s and worsened in the 1980s. Economic 
problems stemmed from shortage of crew and high wages (see above), regulated 
inefficiency,79 and declining rates of return due to competition in the Japanese market 
from cheaper imports.80 All distant water fleets, with the exception of the large longline 
vessels (between 200 and 500 gross tonnes) experienced negative rates of return in the 
ten years to 1989. Skipjack pole and line vessels have consistently recorded the highest 
losses, although performance may fluctuate considerably within a short period.81 As
77 This reflected a more general trend, worldwide, of competition among DWFNs for steadily shrinking 
quotas in coastal state EEZs. Olav Schram Stokke, ‘Transnational Fishing: Japan’s Changing Strategy’, 
p.238. This competition has led to open conflict between fishing vessels operating in the Pacific island 
region. For example, Japan has alleged that Chinese vessels are cutting the fishing lines of Japanese 
vessels. See FFA News Digest, No. 1/94, January/February 1994, p.l.
78 Gerry Geen, ‘Tuna Industry Development in the South Pacific’. It has been observed that the growing 
pressure on Japanese distant water fleets, and phasing out of their operations in key zones such as the 
US, stemmed from the growing capacity of coastal states to harvest their own resources. This leads to 
less interest on the part of coastal states in attracting distant water nation participation in licensing 
arrangements. Olav Schram Stokke, ‘Transnational Fishing: Japan’s Changing Strategy’.
79 The Japanese fleets were bound by government regulations, aimed at controlling tuna supply, that had 
the effect of increasing their inefficiency. These included a prohibition on overseas basing of longline 
fleets and transshipment of catch. As a result, vessels had to make the time consuming and costly 
journey to Japan at the end of each fishing trip.
80 Trading companies have secured an increasing share of the domestic market in Japan (especially the 
sashimi trade) by purchasing products direct from other DWFNs. This has put downward pressure on 
prices, despite government measures to stabilise demand and supply. Japan Fisheries Association, 
Fisheries o f Japan, 1991, p.14.
81 Based on findings of a study cited in Anthony Bergin and Marcus Howard, ‘Japanese Tuna Fisheries: 
Future Trends’; also statistics of earnings provided by Japan industry associations. FFA News Digest, 
various issues.
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pressures on Japanese distant water vessels increased, the ability of industry to respond 
to them was being undermined.82
Japan’s tuna fleets remain highly dependent on access to the region’s EEZs (see 
Table 4.5). The proportion of Japan’s fishing operations which is carried out within and 
adjacent to the EEZs of Pacific island countries varies according to the vessel type and 
fishing gear used, as well as target species. In 1989, for example, 42 per cent of the total 
estimated catch of Japan’s pole and line fleet was from the region; for longliners the 
region accounted for about 16 per cent of total catch; and for purse seiners, 78 per cent 
of total catch.
The dependence of Japanese tuna fleets on access to the region is thus very high 
for purse seine and significant for pole and line operators. It is not so acute for the 
longline fleets as a whole, but for some operators the region is a crucial fishing ground. 
This is due to restrictions imposed by the Japanese government on some vessels which 
confine them to fishing in central western Pacific waters and areas close to Japan.
Table 4.5: Japan’s Tuna Production in the Pacific Island Region 
(‘000 tonnes)
Year Gear type World Total Western Pacific
1989 PL 238 100 (42%)
PS 177 138 (78)
LL 254 42 (16)
1990 PL 178 59 (33)
PS 191 157 (82)
LL 259 52 (20)
Notes: Figures have been rounded.
PL: pole and line; PS: purse seine; LL: longline.
Source: Options for Tropical Tuna Management: Considerations for the South Pacific, FFA Report
92/88, 1992; and Ministry of Agriculture Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF), Fisheries Statistics of 
Japan, 1990,1991.
This dependence underlies Japan’s concerns about existing regional management 
frameworks. Its position on the proposed multilateral access arrangement reflected, in 
part, the view that only with the involvement of DWFNs in a regional fisheries 
organisation could more accurate assessments of stock levels and ‘sustainable’ catch 
levels be carried out. In other words, it does not accept that the management measures 
adopted by the FFA are based on accurate (or at least adequate) stock assessments. Its
82 Although the Japanese government has taken some steps towards assisting the restructuring of the 
tuna industry, through vessel replacement and vessel reduction programs in the pole and line fishery, in 
general it has not pursued a ‘rigorous’ rationalisation program. David Doulman, ‘Japanese Distant- 
Water Fishing in the South Pacific’, Pacific Economic Bulletin, Vol.4, No.2, December 1989, pp. 22-8.
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fear is that the region’s resources may be subject to over-fishing unless an international 
fisheries organisation is set up.83
But Japan has also resisted the imposition of measures that restrict the operations 
of its vessels, especially on the high seas adjacent to EEZs. These measures, designed to 
enforce conservation of fish stocks within EEZs, have been criticised by Japan as both 
legally and scientifically flawed. In opposing the imposition of regulations and 
conservation measures Japan has been increasingly perceived as an irresponsible fishing 
nation and has become largely isolated internationally. This has introduced new conflicts 
between Japan and Pacific island states; as well as between Japan and the US. Once 
again, US pressure (this time direct) on Japan has helped increase the leverage of Pacific 
island countries.84
THE ENVIRONMENTAL DEBATE AND FREEDOM OF THE HIGH SEAS
The widespread declaration by coastal states of 200-mile EEZs meant that access for 
DWFNs to these fishing grounds became increasingly circumscribed. One strategy that 
fishing nations like Japan adopted in the face of this development was to move their 
distant water fishing operations to the high seas, beyond and adjacent to EEZs. Between 
1978 and 1989, Japan’s fishing catch on the high seas increased from 402,000 tonnes to 
1,330,000 tonnes.85
Corresponding to this rise in high seas fishing was growing concern among 
environmental groups and coastal states at the impact of this high seas fishing activity on 
fisheries resources both on the high seas and within EEZs.86 In the late 1980s and early 
1990s, this concern was heightened by evidence that entire stocks of some species had
83 It is estimated by scientists at the South Pacific Commission that the region’s tuna stocks, which 
account for 45 per cent of annual world tuna catch, could sustain further catch increases. South Pacific 
Commission, Status of Tuna Stocks in the SPC Area: A Summary Report for 1993, Tuna and Billfish 
Assessment Programme, Noumea, Working Paper 3, June 1993. This is disputed by Japanese officials. 
Japan also believes that only through membership of a comprehensive fisheries organisation will its 
access to the region’s resources be secured, through having influence over the allocation of quotas. At an 
international meeting in late 1994 between FFA member states and distant water fishing nations, Japan 
proposed that a working group be set up to study the ‘organisational and financial aspects’ of 
establishing a ‘framework’ for conservation and management of fish stocks, that includes coastal and 
fishing nations. Forum Fisheries Agency, Multilateral High-Level Conference on South Pacific Tuna 
Fisheries, Record of Proceedings, 5-9 December, 1994, Honiara.
84 It is argued here and in the next chapter that Japan has applied linkage tactics in its fisheries 
diplomacy between its policy of promoting the idea of an international fisheries regime in the Pacific 
island region and opposing the efforts of island states to control (some) high seas fisheries activities.
85 MAFF, Annual Report on Japan’s Fisheries, Fiscal 1991, p.5. The amount of catch taken from 
foreign EEZs in the same period declined from 2,457,000 tonnes to 952,000 tonnes.
86 The particular species of concern were straddling fish stocks (those that existed both within and 
outside the EEZs, such as the Atlantic cod off Newfoundland) and highly migratory fish stocks (those 
that moved through EEZs and the high seas, such as tuna).
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collapsed, largely because of over-fishing (for example, the Atlantic cod off 
Newfoundland and Alaska pollack in the Bering Sea) while other stocks of fish were 
under severe pressure (such as the North Atlantic bluefin tuna).
Environmental concerns and coastal state fears that their own resources would be 
adversely affected by high seas fishing have led to the adoption of measures aimed at 
curtailing, and in some cases imposing moratoria on, high seas fishing. Measures that 
have been of particular concern to Japan include the United Nations moratorium on the 
use of large-scale driftnets on the high seas; moves (led by the US) to impose a 
moratorium on tuna fishing where there is a high level of tuna and dolphin interaction; 
proposals to include some species of tuna on the Convention on International Trade in 
Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES); and moves to restrict the right of 
freedom of fishing on the high seas through strengthening international law in favour of 
the rights of coastal states. The latter point refers to the United Nations Conference on 
Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, convened in 1993. These are 
discussed in more detail below.
Japan has strongly opposed, and lobbied against, these measures. Differences 
between Japan and the US, which were evident with the multilateral access agreement in 
the Pacific, have widened. Essentially Japan has argued for continued fishing on the high 
seas, on the basis of the ‘sustainable use’ principle; and for a ‘fair balance’ between the 
rights of coastal states and those of fishing states. Japan’s position is that measures such 
as moratoria should be based on scientific evidence that prove that fish stocks are 
actually in danger of over-fishing. Japan has resisted signing the Convention on the 
Prohibition of Fishing with Long Driftnets in the South Pacific on the grounds that 
‘further information on the scientific basis for the convention’s provisions’ was 
required.87 The ban on driftnetting was based on what became known as the 
‘precautionary principle’. This states that ‘where there are threats of serious or 
irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for 
postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation’.88 In other 
words, the burden of proof lies with the fishing nation, not the coastal state. In arguing 
against this principle, Japan has declared that ‘It is necessary to enhance the credibility of 
the findings of scientific research. In this way citizens of each nation will have a greater 
awareness that fishing does not necessarily lead to destruction of the environment’.89
87 Comment by Koji Kakizawa, Parliamentary Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan, Japan-South 
Pacific Forum Dialogue, Honiara, 10 July 1992.
88 Also known as ‘Principle 15’ of the Rio Declaration, adopted at UNCED in 1992. See Moritaka 
Hayashi, ‘The United Nations Conference on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks: 
An Analysis of the 1993 Sessions’, Ocean YearbookXI, 1994.
89 Statement by Matsushiro Horiguchi, Head of the Delegation of Japan, UN Conference on Straddling 
Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, New York, 13 July 1993.
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Japan has also perceived measures aimed at protecting certain species (dolphins 
and whales in particular) to be based on emotional rather than scientific arguments. In 
the view of one official, such measures could lead to ‘overprotection of particular types 
of species’ which would ‘destroy the whole ecosystem. [Also] such argument will grow 
into the extreme position of denial of fishing sardines and krill which are the preys of 
whales and dolphins’.90
In the context of the Pacific island region, Japan and the island states have been at 
odds over issues regarding the regulation of high seas fishing operations of DWFNs, 
especially provision of high seas catch data for trips that involve both in-zone and high 
seas fishing. Japan’s position has been that such measures should not be adopted 
‘unilaterally’ by coastal states but be subject to discussion between coastal and fishing 
nations. The approach that Japan has advocated is for a comprehensive ‘regional fisheries 
organisation’, comprised of both coastal and fishing states. For Pacific island countries, 
this approach would amount to a derogation of their sovereign rights over the tuna 
resources within the EEZs. They are thus firmly opposed to such an organisation.
But common ground has also been identified in that Pacific island countries and 
Japan have an interest in promoting access to fisheries resources. In this, there is a 
mutual concern that environmental lobby groups may adversely affect fishing activity 
through advocating resource protection measures that curtail fishing operations on a 
more widespread basis.
Campaign against use of large-scale driftnets on the high seas
Driftnetting (also called gillnetting) describes a method of catching fish in large areas 
where fish are found in low density. Generally, nets are deployed at depths of about 10 
metres and may be up to 50 kilometres in length. Driftnets were used to target salmon 
and squid in the North Pacific and albacore tuna in the South Pacific. The main distant 
water driftnetting countries were Japan, the Republic of Korea and Taiwan. The 
controversy about the use of driftnets arose in 1988 and 1989. The immediate 
antecedents to the controversy were the sudden increase in driftnet vessels operating on 
the high seas east of New Zealand and in the Tasman Sea. In the North Pacific there was 
an upsurge of driftnetting on international waters of the Bering Sea.
In both cases, the increase in driftnetting was largely due to the closure of the 
American EEZ to foreign fleets (which was completed in 1988) and restrictions on 
access to the Soviet EEZ. This led the driftnet vessels fishing the area to move to the 
high seas. Other factors that appeared to prompt the increase in driftnetting were a rise in 
the price of albacore tuna in the Japanese market at this time and the fact that some
90 Kazuo Shima (Deputy Director General of the Fisheries Agency), ‘Fisheries and Environmental 
Issues’, Symposium on Central Western Pacific Tuna Fisheries, Tokyo, March 1993.
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longliners and pole and line vessels shifted to driftnetting because it used fewer crew and 
was more cost effective.91
Campaigns to ban the use of driftnets in both the North and South Pacific were 
driven by essentially the same concerns and arguments. Driftnetting was condemned for 
being indiscriminate and destructive; for the high incidence of juvenile and non-target 
species caught; for the danger to fish posed by lost and discarded nets; for being 
inefficient and wasteful because of the high dropout rate (loss of fish) and damage to 
fish; and for the navigational hazards it posed.92
In the North Pacific, concern was due mainly to the impact of driftnets on salmon 
stocks on the high seas, which affected American catches in their EEZ as salmon moved 
from the high seas to the EEZ. In the South Pacific, the main concern was the impact of 
driftnetting on the albacore fisheries of countries within the region. Both the US and 
New Zealand had established troll and longline albacore fisheries in the South Pacific. In 
addition, some Pacific island countries (notably Fiji, the Solomon Islands, Tonga,
Vanuatu and New Caledonia) had invested in albacore longline fleets. Acording to one 
study, the threat that the rapid expansion of driftnetting might over-fish the resource 
‘underscored the strong opposition by (these countries) to driftnet fishing in the 
region’.93
The first regional consultation to discuss the driftnet issue in the South Pacific 
was held in November 1988. A second consultation was held in March 1989 and a third 
in June 1989. These meetings developed a strategy to counter the growing trend in 
driftnetting, including embargoes on purchases of fish caught by driftnets and on 
transshipment of such fish within the region. The South Pacific Forum, South Pacific 
Conference and Commonwealth Heads of Government meetings in 1989 all gave 
political backing to this strategy. Initiatives to ban driftnetting within the region included 
the Tarawa Declaration, adopted at the South Pacific Forum meeting in July 1989, which 
called for a ban on driftnet fishing in the region and for the establishment of a 
management regime for albacore tuna. A conference was held in Wellington, New 
Zealand in November 1989 to draft a convention to this effect. The Convention for the 
Prohibition of Fishing with Long Driftnets in the South Pacific (Wellington Convention)
91 Government of Japan, The View of the Government of Japan on the Recent Media Reports on the 
Operation of Japanese Gill-Net Fishing Vessels in the South Pacific, mimeo, March 1989; see also 
Kazuo Sumi, ‘The International Legal Issues Concerning the Use of Driftnets with Special Emphasis on 
Japanese Practices and Responses’, International Workshop on Freedom of the Seas: Ocean Governance 
and Stewardship, Honolulu, 10-12 December 1990.
92 Kazuo Sumi, ‘The International Legal Issues Concerning the Use of Driftnets’, pp.1-2.
93 Andrew Wright and David J. Doulman, ‘Driftnet Fishing in the South Pacific: From Controversy to 
Management’, Marine Policy, September 1991, p.306. Albacore accounts for about 4.5 per cent of the 
region’s total tuna stock. Most of this is taken from the high seas, unlike the other major tuna species, 
which are mainly harvested within EEZs.
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came into force on 17 May 1991.94 The convention applies to EEZs of the South Pacific 
and adjacent high seas.
Also in November 1989, the US House of Representatives passed a resolution in 
support of the South Pacific Forum initiatives. It called for ‘Japan and Taiwan to 
immediately cease the use of driftnets in international waters of the South Pacific [and] 
to furnish immediately all available scientific data on driftnet fishing catch’ to regional 
organisations.95 According to one report, the strong US support stemmed from the fact 
that the US government was anxious to review policy for the South Pacific and act on 
issues of regional concern. Driftnetting presented such an opportunity.96 But the South 
Pacific campaign against driftnetting also gave added weight to American initiatives 
aimed at curtailing North Pacific driftnetting. The US Congress in 1987 had passed the 
Driftnet Impact Monitoring, Assessment and Control Act. This Act called for 
negotiations with driftnetting states regarding effective enforcement of laws and 
regulations governing high seas driftnetting. If these negotiations did not lead to 
agreements within 18 months of the enactment of this law, the US President could 
authorise (after receipt of certification from the Secretary of Commerce) the embargo of 
fish imports from the country in question. This led to an agreement between Japan and 
the US in June 1989 providing for cooperation in research and monitoring of driftnet 
vessels. Agreements with Taiwan and Korea followed.97
The various initiatives against driftnetting culminated at the UN General 
Assembly in November and December 1989. The US presented a draft resolution calling 
for an immediate ban on driftnet fishing. Japan tabled a counter resolution which called 
for more scientific research on the impact of driftnet fishing before considering a ban. A 
compromise resulted in resolution 44/225 on Large-scale Pelagic Driftnet Fishing 
(adopted on 22 December 1989). This called for a moratorium on all large-scale driftnets 
on the high seas by 30 June 1992 (unless scientific data proved the method was not 
harmful); immediate measures to reduce driftnet activities in the South Pacific and 
cessation by 1 July 1991; and immediate cessation to further expansion of North Pacific
94 Details of the initiatives of the South Pacific Forum are given in Andrew Wright and David Doulman, 
‘Driftnet Fishing in the South Pacific’. By the end of 1993, all but four South Pacific states had signed 
the Convention. Those that had not were Fiji, Papua New Guinea, Tonga and Western Samoa. It was not 
clear to the author why these countries had not signed, except for Papua New Guinea which continued to 
license Taiwanese shark driftnet vessels within its EEZ. The US had signed Protocol I (open to any state 
whose nationals operated in the convention area) and Canada and Chile Protocol II (open to Pacific Rim 
countries).
95 House Congressional Resolution 214, Appendix 3; Andrew Wright and David Doulman, ‘Driftnet 
Fishing in the South Pacific’, pp.330-1.
96 ‘Pressure Mounts for Asians to End Driftnetting’, The Washington Pacific Report, Vol.8, No.4, 15 
November 1989, p .l.
97 Kazuo Sumi, ‘The International Legal Issues Concerning the Use of Driftnets’, pp. 41-2.
111
high seas driftnets.98 This resolution was revised in December 1991 to enable driftnet 
fishing to be reduced by 50 per cent by 30 June 1992 and a full global moratorium to be 
effective by 31 December 1992.
In the face of this regional and international pressure, how did Japan respond? 
Japan was opposed to and at first resisted the moves to ban driftnetting without what it 
viewed as sound scientific evidence to prove the dangerous effects alleged by 
environmental groups in particular. At the first regional consultation on a possible 
albacore management regime, held immediately after the conference to draft the 
Wellington Convention, the Japan delegation declared that: ‘We do not think that 
substantial and direct conflict exists with other forms of fishing by the South Pacific 
nations’. "  Japan has continued to argue that scientific evidence should first be presented 
before measures such as moratoria are adopted.100
Japan was also opposed to coastal states unilaterally restricting fishing activity on 
the high seas. Japan correctly saw the driftnet issue as a harbinger of a wider move to 
control high seas fishing. For this reason, its position on the proposed regional (South 
Pacific) albacore management regime was to argue for a broad based approach, that 
included both DWFNs and coastal states, and covered all tuna harvested from the region, 
not just albacore.101
Finally there was a perception that the campaign against driftnets was not 
genuinely about resource conservation and environmental issues but was ‘anti-Japanese’ 
and motivated by other political and economic interests and agendas —  for example, 
trade disputes. It was also seen to be fuelled by ‘emotional’ rather than rational 
arguments.102
98 Details are provided by both Kazuo Sumi, ‘The International Legal Issues Concerning the Use of 
Driftnets’; and Andrew Wright and David Doulman, ‘Driftnet Fishing in the South Pacific’.
99 Statement by Japan, First Consultation on a Regime for South Pacific Albacore Fisheries 
Management, Wellington, 27-29 November 1989.
100 Japan’s position that scientific evidence was needed before taking steps to ban driftnetting was 
supported by the Japanese Fisheries Agency and MOFA (in other words, there existed a general 
consensus on this issue). On the one hand, this position was legitimate in that there was insufficient data 
available to estimate safe catch levels for albacore, and thus no concrete evidence to support the claims 
that the driftnetting was harmful. But in principle it was fundamentally at odds with the position held by 
the Pacific island countries and the FFA, who argued that the burden of proof that driftnetting was not 
adversely affecting the resources rested with the fishing nation. This became known as the 
‘precautionary principle’.
101 Talks between Japan and the region (together with other fishing nations) to establish an albacore 
management organisation in the South Pacific were held between 1989 and 1991. They foundered on 
Japan’s insistence that the talks be widened to include all tuna harvested in the region, not just albacore. 
This was rejected by the FFA members on the grounds that albacore was different in that it was mostly 
harvested on the high seas beyond states’ jurisdiction. On the other hand, tuna harvested mainly within 
EEZs could be adequately managed by existing regional machinery,
102 Interview, Former Special Advisor, Norio Fujinami, Tokyo, May 1993.
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Ultimately, the Japanese government was compelled to bow to pressure, as 
evident in the UN compromise resolution in November 1989. It subsequently scaled 
down activities in the South Pacific and in November 1991 Japan’s Cabinet announced 
that it would cease all driftnetting by 31 December 1992.103
Regarding policy towards driftnetting in the South Pacific, in October 1989 the 
Japanese government announced that the number of vessels allowed to fish in the South 
Pacific during the coming season would be reduced from 60 to 20. Japan would also 
carry out research in the Tasman Sea and inspection of Japanese driftnet vessels.104 
Then, at the South Pacific Forum meeting in August 1990, Japan announced that it 
would cease driftnet fishing in the South Pacific from the 1990-91 season. This was one 
year ahead of the deadline set by the UN resolution and was presented as a major 
concession to the South Pacific countries. The representative of the Japan government to 
the Forum Dialogue declared that ‘this decision has taken into consideration the strong 
aspiration of the island countries to develop their albacore fishing industry, a major 
concern of the island countries, as a means of economic expansion’.105 A proviso was 
added that this measure would prevail ‘until such time as appropriate conservation and 
management arrangements for South Pacific albacore tuna’ were entered into.
Japan has refused to sign the Wellington Convention. At the 1992 Forum 
Dialogue Japan’s representative stated that: ‘Japan accepted the UN Resolution of 
December 1991. But it has not accepted the protocols of the Wellington Convention 
because it believed that there was a need for further information on the scientific basis for 
the convention’s provisions’.106 This remains the official position. Unofficially, the view 
in the Fisheries Agency is that the moratorium has effectively ruled out any possibility of 
resuming driftnetting, given that the only effective method of collecting scientific data on 
its impact is by carrying out driftnet fishing, which is no longer permitted.107
103 ‘Japan to Cease Driftnet Fishing’, Media Release, 27 November 1991, Minister of External Relations 
and Trade, New Zealand. The Minister stated in the media release that he had discussed the issue with 
both the Japanese Foreign Minister and Fisheries Minister during a visit to Tokyo the week before. T 
know the Japanese Cabinet considered this question very carefully and I am delighted with the position 
they have adopted’. New Zealand was perhaps the strongest advocate within the South Pacific Forum for 
a ban on driftnetting.
104 ‘Japanese to Reduce Driftnets’, The Fiji Times, 11 October 1989, p.20. Despite this action, Japan, 
along with Taiwan, was the target of criticism during the Wellington Conference for its failure to 
completely phase out driftnetting. This led the Japan delegation to condemn what it termed ‘groundless 
criticism against us’ and complain that ‘our earnest efforts have not received any concrete recognition 
from the South Pacific nations’. Statement by Japan, First Consultation.
105 Address by Takehiro Togo, Ambassador of Japan, at the Japan-SPF Dialogue, Plenary Session, Port 
Vila, 3 August 1990.
106 Comment by Koji Kakizawa, Parliamentary Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan, Japan-SPF 
Dialogue, Honiara, 10 July 1992.
107 A Fisheries Agency official drew a parallel with the moratorium on whaling, claiming that ‘it is not 
easy to stop a moratorium once it is in place’. As a result of the UN resolution, the Fisheries Agency
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Both international and domestic factors were prominent influences on Japan’s 
decision to end driftnetting. Internationally, Japan was largely isolated on this issue. Its 
only allies were the other driftnetting nations of Taiwan and South Korea, neither of 
which carried much weight in international fora. The pressure from the US was a major 
concern, especially given the threat to invoke measures that would lead to trade 
sanctions on countries practising the method. It elevated the issue to one that concerned 
not just the Japan Fisheries Agency and MAFF, but the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
(MOFA), the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) and the Cabinet as a 
whole. The MAFF minister attributed the decision to end driftnetting to ‘other nations’ 
responses to driftnet fishing and Japan’s position in the international community’.108
The relatively weak position of the driftnetting industry within Japan’s distant 
water fishing industry, and in particular the animosity of the powerful longline and pole 
and line operators towards the driftnetters, also accounted for the policy shift. Although 
necessarily united in their opposition to the international push for a moratorium on 
driftnetting, the various industry groups representing other gear types were themselves 
rivals of the driftnetters. This stemmed largely from the incompatibility of the various 
gear types (those using lines were ‘enemies’ of those using nets and vice versa).109 More 
importantly the size of the driftnetting industry was relatively small and in the final 
analysis was expendable. The number of workers employed in driftnet fishing was 
estimated to be 10,000, out of a total workforce in coastal, off-shore and distant water 
fisheries of about 392,000 (1988 figures).110
Finally, the decision to end driftnetting was arguably calculated to promote 
dialogue with the South Pacific countries on regional management issues. According to 
one assessment (by two FFA officials), the decision had a positive effect on regional 
discussion on a proposed albacore management regime for the region. ‘The cessation of 
drift-net fishing by Japan in 1990 paved the way for progress to be made on discussions 
concerning a management regime for South Pacific albacore tuna. These circumstances 
permitted a more reasoned and rational approach to be taken because the drift-net issue 
had essentially been depoliticised’.111 Consultations between Japan and FFA member
instituted a program to scrap driftnet vessels and assist workers to move into other areas (such as squid 
jigging). A compensation package of 20 billion yen was allocated to compensate workers and facilitate 
the transfer to new technology. Interview, International Affairs Division, Fisheries Agency, April 1993.
108 ‘Japan Joins Call for Driftnet Fishing Moratorium’, Japan Economic Institute Report, No.45B, 6 
December, 1991, p.6. International pressure, and especially the media impact of the anti-driftnet 
campaign organised by environmental groups, was the key factor shaping Japan’s policy according to an 
official in the International Affairs Division, Fisheries Agency. Interview, April 1993.
109 Interview, Executive Director, Nikkatsuren, Tokyo, May 1993.
110 ‘Japan Joins Call for Driftnet Fishing Moratorium’, p.10; also Fisheries of Japan, 1991, p.5.
111 Andrew Wright and David J. Doulman, ‘Driftnet Fishing in the South Pacific’, p.328.
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States on albacore management were ultimately unsuccessful given the conflicting 
ojectives of the FFA and Japan.
The driftnet controversy was a major challenge to the Japanese government. It 
provoked unprecedented criticism of Japanese fishing practices (which was a concern not 
only to driftnetters but to the entire fishing industry). In particular, the issue 
demonstrated the strength of environmental lobby groups and the power of the Western 
media to mobilise opposition. The length of time that the Japanese government resisted a 
total ban on driftnetting, also had serious political and diplomatic implications. Japan was 
isolated in regional and international fora and its position appeared to provoke more 
general criticism of Japan. From the perspective of the FFA, this delay was symptomatic 
of the different interests and priorities of Japan and the regional states, that would make 
joint membership in a broad based tuna management body unworkable.
The most important influence on Japanese policy was most likely US pressure, in 
particular the trade weapon wielded by the US. This pressure gave weight to Pacific 
island regional policies. The US has also been behind measures to limit tuna fishing in 
other parts of the Pacific, which have created further conflicts with Japan.
The tuna-dolphin issue
Environmental concerns have led to restrictions on tuna fishing in the eastern tropical 
Pacific, where there exists a high interaction of tuna and dolphin. Environmental groups 
in the US in the late 1980s and early 1990s succeeded in influencing Congress and the 
Administration to enact a number of laws and amendments relating to ‘dolphin safe’ 
purse seine fishing. These include the US Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972, 
amended in 1988 to limit the dolphin mortality associated with tuna purse seining. It 
seeks to ban imports of yellowfin tuna and/or tuna products from countries that continue 
to catch yellowfin in association with dolphin, and from countries that are importing 
yellowfin tuna from such offending countries. Bans on the latter countries are currently 
in force against Costa Rica, Italy and Japan.112
In 1990, the US Dolphin Protection Consumer Act was passed by Congress, and 
required the US fishing industry to adopt measures to limit by-catch of dolphin and to 
label such tuna products as ‘dolphin safe’.113 Finally, in November 1992, the US 
President signed a bill that would place a moratorium on tuna fishing in association with
112 ‘US Lifts Ban on Yellowfin Tuna Imports from Spain’, FFA News Digest, No.2/94, March-April 
1994, p.5.
113 This Act is currently the subject of controversy between two environmental groups who were 
instrumental in its drafting: Greenpeace, who has claimed the law is being flouted and dolphin safe 
labelling is simply a public relations ploy; and Earth Island Institute, who has disputed these claims. See 
‘Tuna Industry Comes Under Fire’, FFA News Digest, No. 5/93, September/October 1993, pp.3-4; and 
‘New Row Over Dolphin-Safe Tuna’, FFA News Digest, No. 6/93, November-December 1993, p.4.
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dolphin in the eastern Pacific from March 1994, if one other major fishing nation 
(Mexico or Venezuela) agreed.
Japan’s concern is that these measures will, in the longer term, be adopted more 
widely and lead to reduced supplies of tuna. Of more immediate concern to Japan’s 
fishing fleets is that these measures will cause purse seine vessels currently operating in 
the eastern tropical Pacific to relocate into the central western Pacific. This would place 
increasing pressure on fish stocks in that region, through increased catch effort.114 The 
concern is that this would lead to increased competition for access and further 
deterioration in the economic performance of Japan’s fleets. Moreover, it has been 
argued that measures taken to protect dolphins in the eastern Pacific have distorted stock 
levels, causing tuna stock levels to increase out of proportion to stocks elsewhere
Japan’s officials have used this issue (in much the same way as the albacore tuna 
issue and the multilateral access agreement issue) to press their case for an international 
tuna management organisation for the region to which they would be a party. The FFA 
has responded that the Palau Arrangement, signed in 1992, precludes the need for such 
an organisation since it limits licences and hence fishing effort in the EEZs of the western 
Pacific.115
Revision of CITES
The pressure from environmental groups to curtail (if not cease) commercial fishing on 
the high seas has resulted in a move to list certain species of tuna as endangered, thus 
restricting their trade. The regime which is responsible for regulating trade in endangered 
species is CITES, also known as the Washington Convention. This was signed in 
Washington DC in March 1973. It introduced a system of permits and certificates to 
protect wild plants and animals while facilitating their trade. The convention defines three 
levels of protection for species and categorises these under three appendices. The highest 
level of protection is for Appendix One species. These are species threatened with 
extinction which may be affected by trade. Trade is strictly curtailed and ‘only authorised 
in exceptional circumstances’. Appendix Two species consists of ‘all species which 
although not necessarily now threatened with extinction may become so unless trade in 
specimens is subject to strict regulation’ (that is, through the issue of export permits or 
re-export permits to accompany shipments). Appendix Three species are those for which
114 These arguments were made by the Fisheries Agency officials interviewed by the author. See also 
comments by Kazuo Shima in ‘Fisheries and Environmental Issues’.
115 The Palau Arrangement for the Management of Western Pacific Purse Seine Fishery was signed in 
1992 by the Parties to the Nauru Agreement. It places a limit on the number of both foreign and 
domestic purse seiners licensed to fish in the region. In addition, licenses will be issued according to 
agreed criteria, including the history of compliance and cooperation with FFA member states.
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any Party has regulations ‘for the purpose of preventing or restricting exploitation’ and 
which requires the cooperation of other parties in controlling trade.116
At the eighth CITES meeting, held in Kyoto in 1992, the Swedish government (at 
the behest of environmental groups, mainly the World Wildlife Fund) proposed the 
inclusion of Atlantic bluefin tuna in Appendix Two (with one species, Western Atlantic 
bluefin, proposed for Appendix One).117 This was the first time a commercially harvested 
tuna was proposed for inclusion on CITES. The US government had been similarly 
pressured by environmental groups to support the proposal, but decided against the 
measure. The proposal was subsequently withdrawn after Canada, Japan and the US 
agreed to reduce their catch. Nevertheless, this development was viewed with alarm in 
Japan, where it was seen as an indication of the strength of the environmental lobby.118
In the lead-up to the tenth CITES meeting, in Florida in November 1994, a 
further attempt was made to include Atlantic bluefin tuna in Appendix II. The proposal 
came from Kenya, allegedly at the instigation of the World Wildlife Fund. According to 
an industry paper in Japan, Kenya agreed to withdraw its proposal in July 1994, after 
representations from the Japan Fisheries Agency ‘through diplomatic channels’. The 
arguments that were made by the Fisheries Agency were that: the proposal was not 
based on scientific information; the tuna resources are being managed by international 
organisations (such as the International Convention for the Conservation of Atlantic 
Tuna, ICCAT); and resource conservation measures had been intensified after the Kyoto 
meeting, making CITES management unnecessary.119
This issue and the possibility that other species of tuna will be listed as 
endangered, worries Japan Fisheries Agency officials and industry representatives 
perhaps more than any other.120 They believe that the consequences could lead to an end 
to commercial fisheries on the high seas. The issue has possible implications not just for 
the distant water fishing operators, but for the tuna trade as a whole. The conflict 
between environmentalist groups and coastal states on the one hand and fishing nations
116 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, US 
Department of the Interior, Washington DC.
117 The Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) estimated that while the status of some species is not 
known, some Northern Bluefin in the Atlantic is exploited beyond its maximum sustainable yield. 
Northern and Southern Bluefm tuna in the Atlantic are considered depleted. From FAO, World Review 
of High Seas and Highly Migratory Fish Species and Straddling Stocks, cited in Moritaka Hayashi, 
‘United Nations Conference on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks: An Analysis 
of the 1993 Sessions’.
118 ‘Tokyo Asks Stockholm Not to Back Tuna Ban’, The Japan Times, 22 February, 1992; ‘Atlantic 
Tuna are Thriving, Sweden is Told’, The Japan Times, 26 February 1992.
119 Katsuo-maguro tsushin, N o.7046, 6 July, 1994. Reprinted in FFA News Digest, No.5/94, 
September/October 1994, p.2. Japan is a strong supporter of regulatory measures adopted by ICCAT; for 
example, prohibiting imports of Atlantic bluefm tuna that do not have any certificate o f origin.
120 Interviews, Nikkatsuren, May 1993; Fisheries Agency, July 1993.
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such as Japan on the other, came to a head with the convening in 1993 of a UN 
conference to discuss international law governing high seas fishing, and, in particular, 
highly migratory species and straddling stocks.
United Nations Conference on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish 
Stocks
At the UN Conference on the Environment and Development (UNCED) held in Rio de 
Janeiro in 1992, it was decided that inter-governmental meetings be held to discuss ways 
to better manage high seas fisheries, within the framework of the Law of the Sea 
Convention. The impetus largely came from Canada, which, because of the collapse of its 
cod fishery off Newfoundland, sought stricter regulation of high seas fishing, adjacent to 
its EEZ.121 The UN General Assembly resolved, in December 1992, to formally convene 
a conference in 1993 and requested it to ‘identify and assess existing problems related to 
the conservation and management of such stocks, consider means of improving fisheries 
cooperation among states; and formulate appropriate recommendations’.122
At the first two sessions of the conference, held in April and July 1993, a clear 
divide emerged between coastal and fishing states, over ‘the principle of freedom to fish 
versus managed fishing’.123 While there was no unanimity within either camp, and 
priorities and preferred outcomes varied, the division reflected long-held differences in 
interpretation over relevant sections of the Law of the Sea Convention. On the one hand, 
the push from coastal states was for a legally binding convention that would effectively 
limit the freedom to fish on the high seas, and subject this freedom to the interests of 
coastal states in preserving and managing the resources within their EEZs. On the other 
hand, there was strong resistance from distant water fishing nations to extending coastal 
state jurisdiction beyond EEZs.
For Japan, the UN Conference came at a pivotal moment in its history as a 
DWFN, when its own fishing industry was under increasing economic pressure and 
international opinion appeared to be turning against high seas fishing. In practical terms, 
Japan aimed to minimise restrictions regulating high seas fishing, as these would impose 
a ‘heavy burden’ on its fishing fleets.124 It is also opposed to sweeping management 
principles that could lead to moratoria on high seas fishing. One of these is the 
‘precautionary principle’. The position that Japan advocated was for ‘regional fisheries
121 A preceding discussion of the issues was contained in a monograph prepared by the UN Division for 
Ocean Affairs and Law of the Sea titled The Law of the Sea: The Regime for High Seas Fisheries, Status 
and Prospects, 1992.
122 Moritaka Hayashi, ‘United Nations Conference on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish 
Stocks: An Analysis of the 1993 Sessions’, p.9.
123 ‘UN Fish Conference’, Ocean Policy News, N o\X , No.6, November 1993, pp.4-5.
124 Interview, International Affairs Division, Fisheries Agency, Tokyo, June 1993.
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organisations’ that would have ‘the fundamental right to determine which specific 
measures it will take, based on the actual situation in the region’.125 Such organisations 
would comprise both coastal and fishing states. On the question of tuna, there should be 
an allocation of quotas to both coastal and fishing states. Coastal states should not have 
sole rights over the fishery.126
This approach was an anathema to the Pacific island states and the FFA. From 
their perspective it was imperative that the UN conference give full recognition to, and 
support for, their claims to manage the tuna resources within their EEZs and to measures 
taken to ensure proper conservation of these stocks. Such measures included, by 
necessity, regulating some high seas fishing activities. These measures were in part 
reflected in the revised minimum terms and conditions which required providing high 
seas catch data as a condition of access (whenever fishing takes place both within an 
EEZ and on the high seas, during the course of a fishing trip), and strengthening 
monitoring and policing of fishing on the high seas. The Pacific island countries also 
wanted backing for their demands that fishing nations like Japan take greater 
responsibility for the activities of their fleets; that is, they sought a greater elaboration of 
‘flag state responsibility’. The position of the regional states was summed up in the 
following way: ‘FFA countries consider that they have a legitimate interest in the 
conservation and management of highly migratory species on the high seas in order to 
exercise more effectively their sovereign rights within EEZs. [They] need to ensure that 
no inroads are made to the principle of sovereignty over highly migratory species while 
within areas of national jurisdiction’.127
At the August 1994 session of the UN conference it was decided that a legally 
binding treaty would be adopted. This was an outcome that had been favoured by some 
coastal states but not by distant water fishing nations. In order to work out the finer 
details of the treaty, to the satisfaction of both groups, the conference was extended into 
1995.128
125 Statement by Matsushiro Horiguchi, First Session of UN Conference.
126 From discussion with Ambassador Satya Nandan, Chairman of the Conference, New York, February 
1994.
127 United Nations Conference on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Stocks, FFA Report 
93/33, p.6. One of the special concerns of the Pacific island countries was the question of how to treat 
the so-called high seas enclaves —  that is, those pockets of high seas surrounded by EEZs. These were 
not subject to any form of international management.
128 ‘US, Canada Call for Fishing Treaty’, The Canberra Times, 17 August 1994. Earlier it was thought 
that such an outcome would not be feasible due to opposition from major fishing nations, and that a 
declaration rather than a treaty would be adopted. According to the Chairman of the Conference, ‘this 
would allow for consensus and the introduction of “soft law” which we can build on and eventually 
create “hard law” ’. Ambassador Satya Nandan, Interview, New York, February 1994.
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CONCLUSION
Japan’s interests as a distant water fishing nation have grown increasingly complex over 
time. The strategy of promoting access to coastal state EEZs (a central concern in 
relations with the Pacific island states) has grown to encompass the question of fishing 
on the high seas, countering the effects of declining competitiveness, and promoting 
regional management frameworks that include Japan. The nature of problems facing the 
industry have also changed over time. These problems and challenges have defined the 
role and purpose of Japan’s fisheries aid.
Originally, the key issue was access to coastal state EEZs. As the distant water 
fishing industry came under increasing economic pressures, the need for securing more 
lenient access terms and conditions emerged as an important issue. Differences within the 
Japanese fishing industry have also widened, with trading companies increasingly more 
interested in securing cheaper imports than in engaging in fishing operations. Regional 
cooperation and collective diplomacy of Pacific island states have put political pressures 
on Japan and raised the problem of how to counter the strength and cohesion of regional 
initiatives. US policy on a multilateral fisheries agreement with the FFA member states 
strengthed regional initiatives and undermined Japan’s negotiating position. Finally, the 
environmental movement has highlighted the political, if not public relations, problem of 
convincing the international community of the safety of fishing methods and Japan’s 
commitment to conservation measures.
Japan’s response to this evolving fisheries agenda has essentially been to attempt 
to stem the effects of decline and to facilitate, through various measures, gradual 
adjustments in its distant water industry. But this requires a complex balance between 
competing political, economic and diplomatic interests. As the driftnet issue 
demonstrated, Japan’s ‘international role’ and the wider interests of the fishing industry 
were chosen over the interests of the driftnet industry; but Japan did not willingly make 
the choice.
It may be argued from the foregoing that the Pacific island region held 
importance for Japan not simply in terms of the fisheries resources which were located 
there, but also for the global implications of regional issues. Japan’s fisheries relations 
with the Pacific island states had direct relevance for Japan’s status as a global fishing 
power. The problems experienced with the region were problems felt more generally. In 
this context, it was highly significant how Japan responded in regional terms, for this may 
have established broader precedents or forestalled challenges elsewhere. Thus, in the 
Pacific island region, the stakes for Japan’s fishing industry and Fisheries Agency were 
much higher than might otherwise be assumed.
The following chapter analyses Japan’s fisheries aid policies towards the Pacific 
island countries. Fisheries aid has been an integral part of government and industry 
responses to international, regional and domestic economic problems facing the industry.
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The underlying purpose of fisheries aid has been to assist industry adjust to the new 
regime of EEZs. How precisely is fisheries aid utilised and integrated into Japan’s 
political and economic strategies? Has there been a coherent approach to fisheries aid 
policy? How have bureaucratic and procedural factors facilitated or constrained fisheries 
aid diplomacy? These questions are taken up in Chapter 5.
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5 Japan’s Fisheries Aid Diplomacy
The onset of EEZs created a number of problems for Japan. Most important was the 
anticipated restriction on Japanese access to foreign fishing grounds. The new Law of 
the Sea allowed for the possibility of a complete phasing out of distant water operations 
in coastal states’ EEZs, which occurred in the case of the US zone by 1988. In addition, 
there were anticipated costs involved in fishing operations due to the requirement that 
royalties and fees be paid in exchange for licences; and that joint venture investment be 
promoted with coastal states.
Thus economic and political challenges confronted Japan, as the world’s leading 
fishing nation, these being to secure access in order to continue fishing, and to ensure the 
viability of fishing operations by maintaining access costs that were lenient and affordable 
for the industry. These challenges were particularly acute in the context of Japan’s 
relations with the Pacific island countries, given the importance to Japan’s tuna fleets of 
fishing grounds in this region. Over time, new problems emerged, most notably 
opposition to high seas fishing based on environmental concerns.
This chapter focuses on Japan’s ‘fisheries cooperation’ policies, in particular 
fisheries grant aid and the role of the Overseas Fisheries Cooperation Foundation 
(OFCF). It analyses the dimensions of Japan’s fisheries aid to the region, the purposes of 
this aid and processes linking aid to Japan’s policies of promoting and securing its distant 
water fishing operations. The study shows how aid was a central component of 
government overseas fisheries policy and closely integrated within government and 
industry access negotiations with Pacific island coastal states.
The first part of this chapter examines the use of aid in access negotiations. This 
covers the bureaucratic and procedural factors influencing aid policy, the role of 
personality among individuals concerned, and questions of policy coordination and 
conflict. The chapter later looks at aid policy in the context of domestic economic 
problems in the fishing industry, multilateralism in the Pacific island region, and 
environmental debates. This approach essentially follows the development of problems 
and issues that were analysed in the previous chapter.
FISHERIES GRANT AID
By 1973 the widespread introduction of 200-mile EEZs looked increasingly imminent. 
The United Nations had declared that a third UN Law of the Sea Conference be 
convened and preparatory sessions began in 1971. A core issue to be resolved at the 
Conference was the legal status of extended coastal state jurisdiction. In 1973 the formal 
sessions of the Law of the Sea Conference commenced and it was in the same year that 
the Japanese government created a special grant aid allocation, within Japan’s ODA
budget, that would be specifically for fisheries aid projects —  known as fisheries grant 
aid. The grant aid component of Japan’s ODA was still at that time relatively small. 
Fisheries grant aid comprised about 6 per cent of this aid. By fiscal year 1975, 1 billion 
yen was disbursed as fisheries grants, out of a total grant aid budget that year of 16 
billion yen.
The grant aid for fisheries was initiated largely through the efforts of a leading 
politician in the governing Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), Zenko Suzuki. He became 
Minister of Agriculture and Forestry in 1977 and this also gave him jurisdiction over 
fisheries policy. Due to the strength of fishing industry groups within his constituency 
(Iwate Prefecture) Suzuki was a strong advocate of fishing interests and the leader of the 
fisheries group (suisan zoku) within the LDP.1
The grant aid initiative was motivated by an expectation that developing coastal 
states would request fisheries assistance from Japan as a condition of access. Thus 
special allowance for these requests needed to be made. As a senior fisheries advisor 
explained: Tn 1973 the fishing industry anticipated that the 200-mile regime would 
sooner or later start. At that time they thought that if fishing negotiations started with 
various countries, these negotiations would be undertaken on the principle of give and 
take. If we had nothing to give, we would face difficulty. So it was necessary to prepare 
this grant aid’.2 In this way, as a Fisheries Agency policy paper asserted, ‘The fisheries 
grant was bom not only as a program to assist fisheries promotion in developing 
countries but also as an important tool to enable our fishing industry to survive in the era 
ofEEZs’.3
This thinking strongly reflected the traditional approach to aid as economic 
cooperation, which was developed in Chapter 2 . It also supported a strategy adopted by 
the distant water industry and by government in response to the introduction of EEZs, 
aimed at modifying, through negotiation, restrictive coastal state policies. In order to 
protect the interests of the fishing industry, the role of aid would be to ‘smooth’ access 
negotiations —  that is, provide additional incentive for coastal states to conclude access 
agreements with Japan. For this reason it was important to establish a separate aid
1 Interviews, Norio Fujinami (former Special Advisor to the Minister on fisheries matters), Tokyo, May 
1993; Hiroya Sano, President, Japan Fisheries Association, Tokyo, June 1993; Tatsuo Saito, current 
Special Advisor, Fisheries Agency, Tokyo, May 1993.
2 Interview, Norio Fujinami, Tokyo, May 1993,
3 Tadashi Tsuchiya, Government Programs for Fishery Cooperation, Fisheries Agency, mimeo, n.d. It is 
important to note that prior to the introduction of fisheries grant aid in 1973, the Japanese government 
had promoted fisheries cooperation through various programs and institutions. These included the 
Southeast Asia Fishery Development Centre established in 1968. The underlying rationale for this 
cooperation, according to a government journal in 1972, was the development of fishery resources for 
Japanese utilisation, to promote capital investment by Japanese companies, and to facilitate favourable 
fisheries negotiations with developing countries. Kaigai gijutsu kyoryoku, July 1972.
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allocation, under the guidance of the Fisheries Agency, which would be closely tied to 
the access negotiations.
The fact that a special category of grant aid was created, for the specific purpose 
of meeting the requests of developing coastal states, reflected the strength of both the 
fisheries industry and its political and bureaucratic supporters (in particular the Fisheries 
Agency). But the question of who would control the allocation of the fisheries grant aid 
was not settled at the time and would continue to be contentious. On the one hand, it 
was clear that the grant aid would be part of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) aid 
allocation and be administered by the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), 
set up in 1974 to replace the Overseas Technical Cooperation Agency (OTCA). But the 
fact that the aid was only for fisheries grant projects and was essentially to secure the 
distant water fishing operations of Japan’s fleets gave the Fisheries Agency the principal 
role in determining policy. The perception of MOFA, according to a former Special 
Advisor, was that this amounted to a derogation of the power of MOFA and a loss of aid 
resources.4
The criteria for allocating the fisheries grant aid were not spelt out in detail, 
although being grant aid, it was necessary that recipients be developing countries with 
low per capita income. As a later policy paper declared, countries could receive fisheries 
grant aid if their per capita income was $2,000.5 This was more than double the ceiling 
for general grant aid recipients and indicated that the fisheries grants were a special case 
of grant aid. The paper also maintained that, as a general principle, first priority is given 
to countries with which Japan has fishing agreements ‘under reasonable conditions’. This 
suggested that the conditions of access were a factor in the allocation of fisheries grants. 
The criteria and policy practice would change over time. For example, although it was 
the intention to provide fisheries grant aid only to coastal developing countries and in 
order to facilitate access to their EEZs, policy priorities later shifted to building 
diplomatic support through fisheries grant aid and extending this aid to non-coastal 
states.
Pacific island countries were among the main beneficiaries of this grant aid 
category. As Table 5.1 demonstrates, their total share for the period 1973 to 1991 was 
20.4 per cent. Countries which received fisheries grants included those that had access 
agreements with Japan (the Federated States of Micronesia, Kiribati, the Marshall 
Islands, Palau, Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands and Tuvalu); those with fisheries
4 Interview, Norio Fujinami. The tension with MOFA was not entirely about loss of resources, according 
to Fujinami, but also about the principle of aid as a form of exchange. The MOFA bureaucrat does not 
approve of the ‘give and take’ principle. This has continued to influence attitudes and may be one reason 
why there is an attempt, at present, to merge the fisheries grant aid within the general grant aid budget. 
However, MOFA officials interviewed by the author accepted that fisheries grant aid was a ‘special’ case 
and linked to Japan’s fishing interests. This is discussed in more detail later.
5 Tadashi Tsuchiya, Government Programs for Fishery Cooperation.
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joint ventures with a Japanese firm (Fiji and Vanuatu); and two countries with neither 
(Tonga and Western Samoa).
Table 5.1 Fisheries Grant Aid to the Pacific Island Countries as a Share of Japan’s 
Total Fisheries Grant Aid (million yen)
Fiscal year Fisheries grant total Pacific island countries per cent
1973 155 (2) - -
1974 670 (2) - -
1975 1000 (2) 660(1) 66
1976 1,990(6) - -
1977 3,000 (7) 550 (2) 18.3
1978 5,000 (10) 900 (2) 18
1979 6,000 (12) 1000 (2) 16.6
1980 5,700(12) 1,950(4) 34.2
1981 5,730 (10) 1,100(2) 19.2
1982 8,154(14) 1,670 (6) 20.5
1983 6,996 (13) 1,110(4) 15.8
1984 8,650(13) 2,190 (4) 25.3
1985 8,886 (14) 1,873 (3) 21.0
1986 8,997 (12) 2,400 (4) 26.6
1987 2,903 (11) - -
1988 12,451 (26) 2,647 (10) 21.2
1989 11,400(23) 3,534(8) 31
1990 7,635 (13) 754 (3) 9.9
1991 7,415 (16) 775 (3) 10.4
Total 112,732 23,003 20.4
Notes: Figures in parentheses ( )  are the number of fisheries grants/ projects allocated in that year.
Source: Tsusho sangyosho, Keizai kyoryoku no genjo to mondai ten, 1992, pp.974-80.
OVERSEAS FISHERIES COOPERATION FOUNDATION
In the same year that the fisheries grant aid was established, a second initiative was taken 
by the fishing industry and government. This was the establishment of the Overseas 
Fisheries Cooperation Foundation (OFCF). The main purpose of this organisation was to 
support private sector fisheries cooperation with both developed and developing coastal 
states. The OFCF was essentially set up as a means of channelling government funds to 
the fishing industry in order to promote private sector fisheries cooperation. This would 
create commercial networks with coastal states and promote overall fisheries relations. 
Although described as a non-govemment agency, its close links with the government are
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evident in the role that the Fisheries Agency plays in both the decision making and 
funding of its operations.6
The OFCF’s initial activites centred on extending loans to Japanese fishing firms 
that were setting up joint ventures with coastal states or providing other assistance 
(loans, technical cooperation and infrastructure development) to coastal state 
governments. Such private sector cooperation was a central part of the strategy of 
securing access to foreign fishing grounds.7 The OFCF funded up to 70 per cent of the 
capital investment of joint ventures (see Table 5.2).8
Table 5.2 OFCF Loans to Japanese Fisheries Firms, 1973-90
Year Amount (million yen) Number of cases
1973 500 1
1974 1,960 7
1975 3,418 15
1976 2,705 11
1977 4,591 13
1978 3,244 20
1979 5,949 15
1980 2,801 12
1981 5,675 14
1982 8,742 15
1983 18,453 23
1984 22,189 23
1985 23,576 39
1986 16,552 30
1987 27,414 24
1988 22,606 33
1989 20,166 24
1990 14,082 12
Source: Kaigai gyogyo kyoryoku zaidan, Kaigai gyogyo kyoryoku zaidan yoran, 1993, p.5.
Other activities initiated by the OFCF included a program for inviting leading 
fisheries officials from coastal states to Japan. These visits (begun in 1974) were intended
6 Interview, Executive Managing Director, OFCF, Tokyo, June 1993.
7 The Law of the Sea Convention did recognise that joint ventures could form part of the terms and 
conditions for access established by coastal states. See Article 62 (4).
8 Two types of loans were provided to Japanese firms: no interest loans for the carrying out of technical 
and other cooperation with foreign governments, and low-interest loans for establishing and in some 
cases maintaining joint ventures. No actual breakdown by country/firm was available from OFCF. 
Beneficiaries included Japanese joint ventures in PNG and the Solomon Islands (Taiyo Gyogyo). See 
below.
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to promote dialogue between decision makers in Japan and coastal states. Also initiated 
in 1974 was a foreign trainee program. Participants in this program were usually from 
governments or a joint venture partner in the coastal state. The training program, which 
takes place in Japan, lasts for up to 5 months and involves technical training in specific 
areas of the fishing industry.
In 1976 a program for the dispatch of experts from Japan to coastal states was 
started. This may either be at the request of a Japanese firm planning a project in a 
coastal state and in need of assistance in carrying out the feasibility study; or a joint 
request of a foreign government and Japanese firm in order to assist in technology 
transfer. Two types of experts are dispatched: one to provide technical training, and the 
other to carry out project feasibility studies (the object of these is to identify and assess 
potential fisheries grant aid projects). Oceania (which includes Australia and New 
Zealand) has received the largest share of this cooperation: 295 trainees out of a total of 
1950; 68 technical experts out of 163, and 103 feasibilty study experts out of 272.9
In 1977 the OFCF inaugurated a program to support the provision of goods and 
services to coastal states as part of access fee payments. What is known as the goods and 
services program is provided as part of the cost of access. The goods and services 
component amounts to about 10 per cent of total access fee but may be higher (see Table 
5.3). The OFCF funds 75 per cent of the cost of goods and services; industry pays the 
balance. Usually the goods and services are fisheries related (such as outboard motors, 
vessels, fishing gear, nets) but they may be more general (office equipment used by the 
fisheries administration in coastal states). From 1977 to 1993 the largest share of this 
assistance was received by Oceania (94 cases out of 135).
Japan was the only distant water fishing nation (DWFN) to combine the goods 
and services as a component of access fee.10 Other DWFNs provided all the access fee in 
cash and this was preferred by the coastal states. Pacific island governments, in 
particular, wanted to treat goods and services as an extra benefit of access agreements, 
not as part of the cost of access. In contrast, the policy of the Japanese government was 
to treat goods and services as part of the access fee, thus using the aid as a subsidy for 
the industry.11
9 Kaigai gyogyo kyoryoku zaidan yoran, June 1993.
10 In the early 1990s, the Taiwanese fishing industry provided goods and services as part of access 
agreements with the Solomon Islands, (according to FFA data). The fact that Japan incorporated a goods 
and services component within its fee payments reflects several things: the Japanese tuna industry was 
less competitive than other DWFNs and unwilling to pay higher cash fees; the Japanese government was 
unwilling to contribute directly to fees (see below); and provision of goods and services was a lucrative 
business for Japanese manufacturers, although some Pacific island officials noted that at times they were
given equipment that was not in working order (that is, factory rejects). Interviews, FFA, Honiara, 
November 1993.
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Table 5.3 Goods and Services as a Share of the Total Access Fee in Agreements 
between Japan and Pacific Island Countries.
Country Agreement period % of G/S to total fee
FSM 1 Jan 1980-31 Dec 1980 14.24
FSM 1 Jan 1981-31 Dec 1981 13.08
FSM 1 May 1982-30 Apr 1983 6.56
FSM 1 Feb 1984-31 Aug 1984 6.56
FSM 1 Aug 1984-31 Aug 1985 9.16
FSM 1 Aug 1985-31 Aug 1986 11.35
FSM 1 Aug 1986-31 Aug 1987 14.23
FSM 1 Aug 1987-31 Aug 1988 7.87
FSM 1 Aug 1988-31 Aug 1989 7.00
FSM 1 Aug 1989-31 Aug 1990 5.63
FSM 1 Aug 1990-31 Aug 1991 4.61
Kiribati 1 Sep 1983-31 Aug 1984 10.64
Kiribati 1 Sep 1984-31 Aug 1985 9.97
Kiribati 1 Sep 1985-31 Aug 1986 23.13
Kiribati 1 Sep 1986-31 Aug 1987 20.96
Kiribati 1 Sep 1987-31 Aug 1988 11.78
Marshall Islands 1 Apr 1981-31 Mar 1982 13.04
Marshall Islands 1 Apr 1982-31 Mar 1983 13.79
Marshall Islands 1 Apr 1984-31 Mar 1985 14.79
Marshall Islands 1 May 1985-30 Apr 1986 15.28
Marshall Islands 1 May 1986-30 Apr 1987 15.05
Marshall Islands 1 May 1987-30 Apr 1988 14.16
Marshall Islands 1 May 1988-30 Apr 1989 7.28
Palau 1 Apr 1980-31 Mar 1981 24.78
Palau 1 Aug 1986-31 Jul 1987 12.50
Palau 1 Aug 1987-31 Jul 1988 12.50
Palau 1 Aug 1988-31 Jul 1989 12.50
Solomon Islands 1 Oct 1978-30 Sep 1979 14.29
Solomon Islands 1 Oct 1979-30 Sep 1980 31.35
Solomon Islands 1 Oct 1980-30 Sep 1981 30.96
Solomon Islands 1 Oct 1981-30 Sep 1982 24.19
Solomon Islands 1 Jan 1983-31 Dec 1983 27.66
Solomon Islands 1 Jan 1984-31 Dec 1984 40.84
Solomon Islands 1 Jan 1985-31 Dec 1985 14.83
Solomon Islands 1 Jan 1986-31 Dec 1986 34.28
Solomon Islands 1 Jan 1987-31 Dec 1987 42.59
Solomon Islands 1 Jan 1988-31 Dec 1988 11.25
Tuvalu 1 Jun 1986-30 Jun 1987 20.59
Tuvalu lJun  1987-30 Jun 1988 27.00
Source: FFA (compiled by the FFA at the author’s request).
11 Yoshiaki Matsuda, ‘Changes in Tuna Fisheries Negotiations between Japan and the Pacific Island 
Nations’, in James Barney Marsh (ed.), Resources and Environment in Asia's Marine Sector, Taylor and 
Francis, New York, 1992, p.51.
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Papua New Guinea is not included in Table 5.3 because it was firmly against 
inclusion of goods and services as part of the access fee. It was able to enforce this 
requirement, partly because of its importance to Japan as a fishing zone; and partly 
because it was less dependent on fisheries aid and fees as government revenue.12 It has 
also been observed that island governments were ambivalent about goods and services. 
The fisheries administrators in general were in favour of this component because they 
were the main beneficiaries. On the other hand, the political leaders and other sections of 
the national governments preferred cash fees because it supplemented government 
revenues.13
Table 5.3 is notable for the disparity between countries in terms of the proportion 
of goods and services they received compared to access fees. This in part reflects fishing 
effort. When fees are calculated on a per vessel system, the fee is proportional to the 
fishing and catch effort (the goods and services are a lump sum payment). However, 
there were countries that received relatively high absolute amounts of goods and service 
(for example, Kiribati).14 This may reflect both a greater willingness to accept goods and 
services as part of fee payment; but also an essentially weak bargaining position. Kiribati 
failed to achieve increases in access fees despite terminating its agreements with Japan in 
1981 and 1983. Goods and services were thus in lieu of higher access fees.15
Since the mid-1980s the OFCF has been closely involved in aid project finding 
and evaluation. This is crucial to ensuring that the fisheries grants are allocated to 
countries which have priority in access negotiations. As Chapter 3 argued, allocation of 
grant aid depends on projects being identified and requests made. Project finding and 
development is usually undertaken by consultant firms commissioned by the Japanese 
government (or sometimes operating independently of government). One of the key 
consultant organisations in the area of fisheries aid is the Overseas Agro-Fisheries 
Consultants Company (OAFIC). Details of its operations in the Pacific island region and 
the clients for whom it carried out the work are provided in Table 5.4.
12 Discussion of PNG-Japan fisheries relations features later in the chapter. David J. Doulman, 
‘Licensing Distant-Water Tuna Fleets in Papua New Guinea’, Marine Policy, January 1987, pp.16-28.
13 Interviews, fisheries officials, FFA.
14 Some details are provided in Yoshiaki Matsuda, ‘Changes in Tuna Fishing Negotiations’. For 
example, in November 1981 (before Kiribati adopted the per vessel system) an agreement for 12 months 
was reached, based on 210 million yen (access fee) and 25 million yen (goods and services). In general 
details, of access fees paid by Japan to countries in the region are not available.
15 Roniti Teiwaki, ‘Access Agreements in the South Pacific: Kiribati and the Distant Water Fishing 
Nations, 1979-1986’, Marine Policy, October 1987, pp.273-84.
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Table 5.4 Activities of OAFIC in the Pacific Island Region (to 1991)
Country & Client Amount Period of service Field of service
project (thousand yen)
Fiji
Rural Fisheries JICA (Grant) 18,711 Sep 1989 - Mar (I/P)
Development 1991 Refrigeration
Project Finding 
Study
K iribati
OFCF 2,400 Oct - Nov 1991 (P/F) Fisheries
Project Finding OFCF 1,500 Mar 1989 (P/F)
Study
M arshalls
Aquaculture
Repair Service OFCF 3,500 June - Aug 1989 ( O&M)
for Refrigeration Refrigeration
Complex
Palau
Engineering
Fishing JICA (Grant) 29,440 Nov 1987 - Mar (F/S & I/P)
Community 93,840 1991 Fishing Port Ice
Development
PNG
Plant
Basic Study on
Project
Formulation
JICA (T/A) 3,000 Feb - Mar 1988 (P/F) Fisheries
Solom ons 
Second Fisheries ADB (T/A) 46,000 Feb - June 1984 (F/S) Tuna &
Development Artisanal
Project Fisheries
Specified Area OFCF 3,937 Dec 1990 - Mar (D/D) Dockyard
Fishery Project
Tuvalu
1991 Equipment
Project Finding OFCF 1,560 July - Oct 1986 (P/F) Fishing
Study
Vanuatu
Community
Village Fisheries JICA (Grant) 16,403 Sep 1985 - Mar (F/S & I/P)
28,000 1987 Coastal Fishery
W hole Region
Fisheries UNIDO 5,000 Nov 1989 (P/F) Fish
Development Processing
Notes: I/P = Implementation; P/F = Project Formulation; O&M = Operation and Management; F/S =
Feasibility Study (Basic Design); D/D = Detailed Design.
Source; OAFIC (data provided to the author).
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Since the late 1980s, the OFCF has also provided specific programs of assistance 
for Pacific island countries, in addition to the established types of cooperation. These are 
the Fisheries Development Assistance for Pacific Island Nations (FDAPIN) program and 
the Technical Cooperation for Fisheries Development program.16
In general, OFCF links are only with countries that have fisheries agreements 
and/or joint ventures with Japan. Indeed, its raison d’etre is to promote fisheries 
cooperation with coastal states ‘with whom Japan has mutually beneficial fisheries 
relationships’.17 The status of the OFCF as a ‘semi-government’ body (unlike JICA) has 
made it relatively easy for government to use ‘overseas economic cooperation’ as direct 
subsidies to the fishing industry (for example, the goods and services program). The 
OFCF has proved increasingly important as a channel for economic assistance that 
bypasses the procedural and bureaucratic processes required of grant aid. The OFCF has 
thus been the basis for policy innovation in the area of fisheries aid. This is examined in 
more detail later.
JICA TECHNICAL COOPERATION IN THE FISHERIES SECTOR
Another source of fisheries aid is technical cooperation provided by JICA. This involves 
a similar range of activities as provided by the OFCF. These are dispatch of experts and 
volunteers, receiving trainees, supply of equipment, project type technical cooperation 
(which combines the foregoing components), and development surveys. Unlike grant aid, 
there is no separate category of technical cooperation in the fisheries sector. But it is 
possible to disaggregate most technical cooperation provided by JICA into the various 
sectors.
Although there is no explicit policy for fisheries-related technical cooperation that 
links aid and access, in practice the correlation between aid and access is high, especially 
in equipment supply (see Table 5.5). Other types of fisheries related technical 
cooperation (experts, trainees and volunteers) are often allocated to countries where 
there are fisheries grant projects, since these projects need skilled support staff.18
16 Details are provided in Kaigai gyogyo kyoryoku yoran, June 1993; also Masaru Okamoto, ‘Japan’s 
Fisheries Cooperation’, Symposium on Central Western Pacific Tuna Fisheries, OFCF, Tokyo, March 
1992. The FDAPIN carries out maintenance and repair of fisheries equipment and infrastructure 
provided as grant aid and OFCF aid. Details are included later in this chapter.
17 OFCF, ‘Details of Major Activities’, 1993, p.4.
18 All Pacific island countries have received JICA technical cooperation relating to fisheries in the form 
of experts, trainees and volunteers. The largest numbers have gone to Papua New Guinea, Fiji, Tonga, 
the Federated States of Micronesia, the Solomon Islands, Kiribati and the Marshall Islands.
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Table 5.5 JICA Fisheries Related Equipment Supply, 1986-91.
Year Recipient Access
agreement
Amount (million 
yen)
1986 Palau yes 17.4
1987 Kiribati yes 13.5
Solom on Is. yes 13.6
1988 Fiji (a) no 11.6
1989 Fiji no 18.3
Kiribati yes 12
1990 FSM yes 3.4
Kiribati yes 2.3
1991 Palau yes 9.6
Note: (a) Fiji was a recipient of fisheries grant aid (for reasons discussed more fully below). This
created a basis for receiving fisheries related technical cooperation which was often given in 
conjunction with capital grants.
Source: JICA, Annual Reports, 1987-92.
ADMINISTRATIVE CHANGE AND CONSOLIDATION
Fisheries policy has primarily been the responsibility of the Fisheries Agency. In 1948 the 
Fisheries Agency was established as an ‘outer bureau’ of the Ministry of Agriculture and 
Forestry. It was charged with regulating the fishing industry: coastal, off-shore and 
distant water. The introduction of the EEZ regime placed new administrative demands 
on the government These mainly stemmed from the need to negotiate access agreements 
with foreign governments and regulate overseas fishing operations. In response to these 
changes, the Fisheries Agency was restructured and the name of the Ministry was also 
changed in 1978, to the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries to reflect the 
enhanced role and importance of fisheries.
Within the Fisheries Agency, which still retained most authority over fisheries 
policy, the task of managing relations with coastal states and negotiating access 
agreements lay with the Oceanic Fisheries Department, and specifically the International 
Affairs Division. This Division collectively administered the fisheries agreements Japan 
negotiated with coastal states as well as international agreements to which Japan is a 
party.19 The Division also included the Office for Overseas Fishery Cooperation which 
was responsible for liaising with the OFCF, the Economic Cooperation Bureau of MOFA 
and JICA.
19 Japan is a signatory to 14 international fisheries agreements. Those administered by this Division 
include the Convention on Future Multilateral Cooperation in Northwest Atlantic Fisheries (NAFO), the 
Convention on the Establishment of an Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission (IATTC), and the 
International Convention for the Conservation o f Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT).
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Relations with the Pacific island countries were coordinated by the Nanpo 
(southern part) section of the International Affairs Division. This also had responsibility 
for relations with Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa. Other sections within the 
Division are responsible for East Asia (Republic of Korea and China), Russia, the US, 
the UN and Canada.20
The International Affairs Division is headed by a Director and two Councillors 
who lead negotiations with coastal states and at international fora. In the case of the 
Pacific island countries, the leading policy maker is the Special Advisor to the Minister of 
Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries. The creation of this post coincided with the period of 
transition, when 200-mile EEZs were being declared world-wide. The Special Advisor, 
appointed by the Minister, is a relatively autonomous actor. He works most closely with 
the Director General of the Fisheries Agency, although he is ultimately responsible to the 
Vice-Minister and Minister.
The first Special Advisor was appointed in 1977 to be in charge of access 
negotiations, essentially with countries with whom Japan did not already have fishing 
agreements. This tended to be southern hemisphere countries (since Japan had already 
become involved in negotiations with the US, Canada, the USSR, Korea and China). The 
first Special Advisor to be appointed was a long-serving official in the Food and 
Agriculture Organisation (FAO), Norio Fujinami. He was asked by the Japanese 
government to take up the new position in 1977. He subsequently stayed on until 1991. 
His main responsibility was negotiating agreements with the Pacific island countries. As 
such, he was the main influence on Japan’s fisheries policy towards, and hence relations 
with, the Pacific islands during this crucial period. His successor, Tatsuo Saito, a former 
Deputy Director General of the Fisheries Agency, has held the position since 1991.
It has already been noted in the previous chapter that the Special Advisor leads 
negotiations both for government to government ‘umbrella’ agreements and government 
to industry subsidiary agreements.21 Thus he represents both the government and the 
industry associations. In both roles, policy decisions are taken by the Special Advisor. 
This is most important at the level of deciding the terms and conditions of the agreement. 
Representatives of industry groups (Nikkatsuren, Kinkatsukyo, Kitamaki and Kaimaki) 
present at the negotiations generally do not contribute, but allow the Special Advisor to 
speak on their behalf. Although the industry groups are formally responsible for deciding 
what terms and conditions to accept, the Special Advisor may use his power as
20 From discussions with officials in the International Affairs Division, Fisheries Agency.
21 The Japanese government representation at these negotiations is usually made up of Fisheries Agency 
officials, rather than MOFA officials. This was explained in terms of budgetary considerations: that is, it 
is impossible on budgetary grounds for MOFA to also participate in negotiations (which usually take 
place outside Japan).
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spokesman to reject terms offered by coastal state governments, which industry would be 
willing to accept22
The power of the Special Advisor extends to influencing the direction of fisheries 
grant aid. The Special Advsior may decide what countries are a priority for fisheries 
grants and, once access negotiations have been concluded, the Special Advisor may 
facilitate project approval, liaising with the Overseas Fisheries Cooperation section and 
through this channel, with various sections of the aid bureaucracy. This is examined in 
the case of Papua New Guinea-Japan negotiations. But first, the more general pattern of 
linkage is described.
NEGOTIATING ACCESS AGREEMENTS WITH PACIFIC ISLAND 
COUNTRIES
Fisheries grant aid was linked in principle to Japan’s access agreements. This was evident 
both at the level of general policy and in actual flows of aid. However fisheries grant aid 
could be provided to countries in anticipation of access agreements being concluded 
sometime in the future. Thus there was not a strict correlation between Japan’s access 
partners and recipients of fisheries grants.23
From the mid-1970s, which coincided with the beginning of the era of EEZs as 
well as the start of Japan’s ODA program to the region, until the mid-1980s, the majority 
of grant aid from Japan to the Pacific island countries was fisheries grant aid (see Table 
5.6). In most cases the recipients of fisheries grant aid were countries which negotiated 
access agreements with Japan. But there were some countries which, in the 1970s and 
early 1980s, received significant amounts of fisheries grant aid but with which Japan did 
not negotiate access agreements or joint venture arrangements (Tonga and Western 
Samoa). These states did form part of the coastal state community in the South Pacific 
and were members of the South Pacific Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA). Both Tonga and 
Western Samoa had also advocated a broad-based regional fisheries organisation in the 
late 1970s, when the issue was being debated. These factors may have influenced 
Japanese aid policy.
While fisheries grant aid was provided at the request of the island governments, 
often the request would be initiated by Japanese fisheries industry representatives during
22 Norio Fujinami was often doing this, according to Pacific island officials present at negotiations. 
Interviews, FFA, Honiara. Fujinami justified his leading role in negotiations on the grounds that 
industry groups were often at odds with one another, and thus it was necessary for their position to be 
‘streamlined’. Interview, Tokyo, May 1993.
23 Interview, International Affairs Division, Fisheries Agency, Tokyo, April 1993; Norio Fujinami, 
Tokyo, May 1993.
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Table 5.6: Japan’s Grant Aid and Fisheries Grants to Pacific Island Countries, 1975- 
1993 (million yen)
Fiscal year Country Access agreem ent G ra n t total F isheries g ran t
1975 PNG Pending 660 660
1977 Tonga No 400 400
W. Samoa No 150 150
1978 Solomons Is. Yes 500 500
W. Samoa No 600 600
1979 Fiji No 500 500
Kiribati Yes 500 500
W. Samoa No 300 -
1980 Solomon Is. Yes 525 500
Tonga No 650 450
Tuvalu Pending 400 400
W. Samoa No 913.5 600
1981 Fiji No 430 400
Solomon Is. Yes 700 700
Tonga No 40 -
W. Samoa No 425 -
1982 FSM Yes 200 200
Fiji No 40 -
Kiribati Yes 567 500
Marshalls Yes 240 240
Palau Yes 320 320
Solomon Is. Yes 350 350
Tonga No 215 200
Vanuatu No 210 210
W. Samoa No 590 -
1983 Fiji No 300 300
Kiribati Yes 267 200
Marshall Is. Yes 470 470
Solomon Is. Yes 90 90
Tonga No 600 -
W. Samoa No 200 -
1984 FSM Yes 930 930
Fiji No 1,195 -
Kiribati Yes 580 580
Marshall Is. Yes 380 380
PNG Yes 60 -
Vanuatu No 270 -
W. Samoa No 390 -
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Table 5.6 contd.
Fiscal year Country Access agreement Grant total Fisheries grant
1985 Fiji No 813 -
Kiribati Yes 939 939
PNG Yes 44 -
Solomon Is. Yes 112 -
Tonga No 541 541
FSM Yes 275 275
Marshall Is. Yes 315 -
Palau Yes 486 -
Vanuatu No 393 393
W. Samoa No 1,131 -
1986 Fiji No 1,333 1,312
Kiribati Yes 229 189
PNG Yes 1,361 -
Solomon Is. Yes 880 -
Tonga No 516 -
FSM Yes 624 624
Marshall Is. Yes 403 -
Vanuatu No 427 -
W. Samoa No 667 -
1987 Kiribati Yes 253 253
PNG No 1,976 -
Tonga No 290 -
FSM Yes 400 -
Marshall Is. Yes 560 -
Palau Yes 450 260
Tuvalu Yes 158 158
Vanuatu No 564 -
W. Samoa No 673 -
1988 Fiji No 245 245
Kiribati Yes 130 130
PNG No 2,129 -
Solomon Is. Yes 897 439
Tonga No 270 -
FSM Yes 515 515
Marshall Is. Yes 648 648
Palau Yes 330 330
Tuvalu Yes 107 107
W. Samoa No 690 -
1989 Fiji No 352 342
Kiribati Yes 1,011 90
PNG No (a) 2,126 193
Solomon Is. Yes 1,018 1,018
Tonga No 824 -
FSM Yes 672 649
Marshall Is. Yes 599 599
Palau Yes 493 493
Tuvalu Yes 146 146
Vanuatu No 1,115 -
W. Samoa No 925 -
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Table 5.6 contd.
Fiscal year Country Access agreement Grant total Fisheries grant
1990 Fiji No 52 -
Kiribati Yes 630 145
PNG No 1,839 -
Solomon Is. Yes 909 327
Tonga No 613 -
FSM Yes 824 234
Marshalls Yes 337 337
Palau Yes 414 -
Vanuatu No 352 -
W. Samoa No 674 -
1991 Fiji No 1,146 -
Kiribati Yes 1,183 -
Marshall Is. Yes 375 375
FSM Yes 749 79
Palau Yes 404 -
PNG No 1,880 -
Solomon Is. Yes 4 -
Tonga No 548 -
Tuvalu Yes 396 396
Vanuatu No 4 -
W. Samoa No 854 -
1992 Fiji No 1,043 -
Kiribati Yes 407 211
Marshall Is. Yes 588 588
FSM Yes 1,130 100
Palau Yes 469 469
PNG No 1,739 -
Solomon Is. Yes 122 84
Tonga No 517 -
Tuvalu No (b) 3 -
Vanuatu No 6 -
W. Samoa No 1,457 -
1993 Fiji No 68 -
FSM Yes 1,193 139
Marshall Is. Yes 148 148
Palau Yes 691 110
PNG No 1,243 -
Solomon Is. Yes 1,041 248
Tonga No 671 -
Vanuatu No 979 -
W. Samoa No 1,342 -
Notes: (a) Negotiations between PNG and Japan to re-start the agreement were underway and aid was
incorporated as part of the rate of return. See next section.
(b) The agreement between Japan and Tuvalu broke down in 1992.
Source: Compiled from MOFA, Official Development Assistance Annual Reports, 1985-94; FFA.
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access negotiations.24 This was described by Fisheries Agency officials in Japan as 
follows.
When negotiating access agreements, requests for fisheries grants and goods and 
services were solicited by industry and in some cases received. Thereupon industry 
representatives would initiate an aid request by lobbying the Fisheries Agency (often 
through the Special Advisor) to allocate grant aid to the country concerned. The OFCF 
would be approached directly to provide goods and services. At the recommendation of 
the Special Advisor, the International Affairs Division would then direct the OFCF to 
carry out a project identification mission or, if a grant aid project was already identified 
and officially requested, it would facilitate the feasibility study process and allocation of 
funds through liaison with the Grant Aid Division of MOFA and with JICA (see Figure 
5.1).25 The key point in regard to this process is that private aid diplomacy would be 
conducted outside the regular channels of official aid diplomacy.
The link between fisheries aid and access was an issue that clearly troubled the 
Pacific island governments. The issue was first raised during discussion at the South 
Pacific Forum meeting in 1982. In the Communique issued at the end of the meeting, it 
was made clear that the Pacific island leaders ‘deplored the increasing tendency of distant 
water fishing nations to link the grant of aid with the receipt of fisheries access’ and 
called on distant water fishing nations to desist from this practice.26 The main concern of 
the leaders was that the linking of aid and access was denying countries a fair return for 
access to their EEZs. The threatened denial of fisheries grant aid on the basis of non­
agreement was also a concern to the region. But the weak position of the Pacific island 
states, most of which could afford neither a loss of aid nor access fees, meant that the 
practice of linking aid and access continued.
Fisheries aid had both economic and diplomatic purposes. It was an indirect 
subsidy to industry —  a contribution to the cost of access.27 It was also designed to be a 
goodwill gesture, thereby gaining preferential access to EEZs. These two aspects are
24 Various Pacific island officials acknowledged in interviews with the author that fisheries projects 
were offered to their governments by Japanese industry representatives, who suggested that facilities 
such as cold storage plants would be available as grant aid if a request was submitted. Pacific island 
officials also observed that while they sometimes sought aid to establish domestic fishing industries (and 
a harvesting capacity o f their own), the Japanese government was reluctant to provide aid that had the 
potential to create competition in the region for its own fishing fleets. Thus Japanese economic interests 
took precedence over the preferences of the recipients.
25 Interview, International Affairs Division, Fisheries Agency, Tokyo, April 1993.
26 Communique, 13th South Pacific Forum, Rotorua, New Zealand, 9-10 August 1982. While Japan was 
not mentioned, this statement was directed at Japan since it was the one DWFN that had a policy of 
using aid in this way.
27 Given regional dissatisfaction with the rate of return offered by Japanese industry (noted in the 
previous chapter), fisheries aid was a compromise between the demands for higher fees and what 
industry was prepared to pay. As demands for higher access fees intensified in the late 1980s, the 
economic function of fisheries grant aid became more pronounced.
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Figure 5.1 Linkage between Aid and Access
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Source: From interviews with Japan Fisheries Agency officials and the FFA.
closely linked; however precedence appeared to be given to the economic rather than the 
diplomatic objectives of aid policy. This is reflected in the fact that despite regional 
misgivings, Japan continued to link fisheries aid and access. In addition, in access 
negotiations, for example with the Papua New Guinea government, described below, 
fisheries grant aid policy was clearly formulated with a view to being a subsidy to the 
access fee.28 The emphasis on using aid as an indirect subsidy in turn reflected domestic 
economic problems in the fishing industry, which worsened in the 1980s.
In the late 1980s and 1990s, the correlation between fisheries grant aid and 
access agreements increased. Only countries with access agreements with Japan received 
fisheries grant aid. This is reflected in Table 5.6 above.29 Two exceptions in this period 
were Fiji and Papua New Guinea, which received fisheries grants without having an 
access agreement
Policy with respect to Fiji was influenced at the outset by a fisheries joint venture 
between the Fiji government and Itoh-chu Shoji. This ended with the withdrawal of the 
Japanese partner in 1987. Until the early 1990s, Fiji continued to receive fisheries grants.
28 This practice became evident in the early 1980s. In negotiations between Japan and Kiribati in 1981- 
82, the Japanese side refused to pay Kiribati 3 per cent rate of return as requested. In the final 
agreement, industry paid 75 per cent of the access fee, while government provided 25 per cent in aid. 
Pacific Magazine, April 1982, p. 15.
29 It is also the case that aid to the region diversified away from the previous emphasis on fisheries 
grants. This in part reflects the nature of requests from island countries, which preferred projects in 
other areas.
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This was rationalised by the Fisheries Agency on the grounds that Fiji was an important 
country within the region (a regional ‘opinion leader’) and that it should therefore be 
supported for diplomatic reasons. In the early 1990s policy towards Fiji changed, and it 
was no longer ‘eligible’ to receive fisheries grants. This is covered later in the chapter. 
Papua New Guinea received a fisheries grant in 1989 in anticipation of re-starting a 
fishing access agreement with Japan. When the anticipated agreement failed to be 
concluded, further fisheries grant aid was suspended.
PAPUA NEW GUINEA-JAP AN FISHERIES NEGOTIATIONS
Papua New Guinea (PNG) was the first Pacific island country to enter into an access 
agreement with Japan. The agreement with PNG was Japan’s most stable access 
arrangement in the region (in the period until 1987). It was also one of the most 
important. The PNG zone is the third largest in the region after French Polynesia and 
Kiribati. It also has one of the richest fishing grounds. This was reflected in the 
distribution of Japan’s fishing effort in the region. In the period 1984 to 1986, the 
average share of Japan’s longline effort in PNG waters was 25 per cent (the largest was 
the Federated States of Micronesia with 35 per cent); for purse seiners, the average share 
was 52 per cent (compared to 41 per cent for the Federated States of Micronesia). There 
was no recorded pole and line effort in PNG waters for that period.30
Consultations between PNG and the Japanese fishing associations to review the 
access agreement were first held in Tokyo in July 1985. At these talks the PNG 
delegation mooted a number of changes to the agreement. These included a shift to a 4 
per cent cif rate of return.31 At the next round of negotiations, held in December 1986, 
the PNG delegation made a new set of demands. Most notable was an increase in the 
access fee, from the previous negotiating position of 4 per cent to 10 per cent plus 
statutory fees.32
The main reason for demanding an increase in the rate of return was the high rate 
of return expected from the US multilateral treaty (estimated at between 10 and 12 per 
cent) and the belief that PNG was in a strong bargaining position because it had one of 
the largest and richest fishing grounds in the region. A further condition that PNG 
attached to its proposed rate of return was that no goods and services be included in the
30 FFA statistics. The other major DWFN in PNG was the US. In 1984,50 per cent of US purse seiners 
operating in the region were licensed to fish in PNG’s EEZ. Significantly, PNG was the major 
beneficiary of the US multilateral fishing agreement, receiving approximately one-third of all treaty 
payments between 1988 and 1992.
31 cif is an acronym for cost, insurance and freight.
32 This and the following information on PNG talks with Japan are from documents provided to the 
author by the PNG Embassy, Tokyo.
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access fee. As noted above, opposition to goods and services as part of the access fee 
was a long-standing position of the PNG government.
The December 1986 and subsequent February 1987 negotiations produced a 
deadlock. With the failure to conclude a new access arrangement the existing 
arrangement lapsed in March 1987.
According to the chief negotiator of the Japan delegation, Special Advisor Norio 
Fujinami, the reason for the break-off was the demand by the PNG side for a 10 per cent 
rate of return. This demand came as a shock as there was an expectation that the 
negotiations would proceed from the previously agreed basis of 4 per cent.33 Fujinami 
therefore asked the Japanese industry associations whether they were prepared to pay the 
higher rate of return, not just for PNG but for all other countries, since it was ‘logical’ 
that the PNG agreement would set a precedent for all others. If industry was not 
prepared to pay the same rate elsewhere then it was ‘logical’ that they abandon the PNG 
fishing zone. Thus Fujinami took indirect responsibility for initiating the break-off.34
Fujinami was quick to link PNG’s new demands to the US multilateral access 
agreement. In an effort to discredit the US agreement a paper was circulated by Fujinami 
among regional governments. It highlighted the ‘aid’ component of the US agreement 
and compared this to what Japan provided to the region. The levels of access fees 
(defined as that share paid by industry) in US and Japanese agreements were also 
compared. According to this analysis, it was argued that Japan was in fact paying more 
in access fees: 4 per cent compared to 1.5 to 1.7 per cent paid by US industry. When 
‘aid’ (defined as government contribution) was added, Fujinami calculated Japan’s 
fisheries grant aid to be equivalent to 4.1 per cent of catch value in 1986; and non­
fisheries grant to be 8.4 per cent. He concluded that, overall, Japan’s (bilateral) 
arrangements provided greater benefits to the region than the US multilateral treaty.35
This analysis was thus based on the assumption that Japan’s fisheries grant aid 
was a part of Japan’s contribution to the access fee. It was also suggested that general 
grant aid was a similar contribution. Most significantly it equated the US government’s 
cash contribution to the region (under the multilateral treaty) with that of Japan’s 
project-based grant aid. This was at odds with the way the regional governments
33 Norio Fujinami, Development of Fisheries Relations between Japan and PNG, mimeo, March 1988. 
Observers at the negotiations attributed the break-off to Fujinami’s outright dismissal of the PNG 
position, which did not allow for serious negotiation and compromise. This led the PNG officials to walk 
out of the talks in anger.
34 Interview, Norio Fujinami, Tokyo, May 1993. In access negotiations between Kiribati and Japan in 
late 1986, the Kiribati government had also requested an increase to a 10 per cent rate of return. In 
1988, a number of other countries demanded increased access fees and gave notice of intention to 
terminate their agreements with Japan. See ‘Japan and Islands in Fisheries Dispute’, The South Sea 
Digest, No.18, Vol.8, 25 November 1988, p .l.
35 Norio Fujinami, Development of Fisheries Relations between Japan and PNG, pp.8-10.
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perceived the respective contributions (and a reason why they were opposed to the 
linkage of aid and access).
A fundamental problem was that Japan’s grant aid was not conducive, in practice, 
to being used as a part of access fee payments. Fujinami did acknowledge this fact when 
he argued that ‘Japan cannot make a package agreement of access arrangement and aid 
program (because) the aid is provided project by project to specific countries’.36 His 
tactic was to emphasise Japan’s aid contributions as a way of influencing the PNG 
government to continue the existing bilateral access agreement. For example, Fujinami 
alluded to the change of PNG’s policy relating to acceptance of project tied grant aid37 
and said that such aid would be provided to PNG as soon as a fisheries agreement was 
concluded. But as long as PNG denied access to Japanese vessels, it would not be 
eligible to receive fisheries grant aid. ‘Fisheries aid can be provided to any country unless 
its 200-mile waters are closed against Japanese operations’.38
Despite acknowledging the difficulties of using grant aid a as part of access fees, 
an attempt to formalise the link between aid and access in a special fee formula was made 
in 1988. This reflected the anxiety of Japan’s fishing industry to reactivate its access 
agreement with PNG. Again the Special Advisor played a leading role.
The event that precipitated this was the arrest of a Japanese longliner, Take Maru 
No.32, for fishing illegally in PNG waters. A district court in the Milne Bay province 
fined the boat’s captain 500 kina ($580) and ordered confiscation of the vessel along 
with catch and gear.39 In an agreement signed on 2 December 1988 by the PNG Minister 
for Fisheries and Marine Resources and an agent for the Japan Fisheries Association 
(acting on behalf of Nikkatsuren), the PNG government undertook to release the vessel 
and in return the Japan Fisheries Association agreed to pay the sum of 100,000 kina.
Both sides also undertook to reach agreement, if possible within six months, on a new 
access arrangement40
The most crucial part of the agreement was the undertaking from the Japanese 
side to base the access arrangement on a 6 per cent rate of return. This was the PNG 
position at that time, having revised the original 10 per cent demand. Within days there 
was clarification from the industry association, Nikkatsuren, that this 6 per cent was to 
be composed of a 4 per cent fee from industry and 2 per cent as aid from the Japanese
36 Norio Fujinami, Development of Fisheries Relations between Japan and PNG, p.2.
37 PNG had a long-established policy of accepting only untied grants. This policy was relaxed in the 
mid-1980s.
38 Norio Fujinami, ‘Development of Fisheries Relations between Japan and PNG’, p.2.
39 ‘Japan and the Islands in Fisheries Dispute’, The South Sea Digest, No.18, Vol.8, 25 November,
1988, p .l.
40 Agreement Between the Independent State of Papua New Guinea and the Japanese Fisheries 
Association Concerning the Release of the Japanese Fishing Vessel, Take Maru No.32.
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government. The industry representative sought confirmation from the Minister that this 
was the PNG government’s understanding.41
Later that month, the Japanese industry associations sent a mission to PNG and 
informed the PNG Minister for Fisheries (as well as PNG’s Prime Minister) that a 
fisheries grant equivalent to 2 per cent of catch value would be made in 1989. They 
declared that the ‘Fisheries Agency would undertake best efforts to provide fisheries 
grant in 1989 considering the request, made by the (PNG) Minister of Fisheries and 
Marine Resources, which is equivalent to CIF 2 per cent of the value of the catch’.42
A position paper noted that it was not possible for the industry to make a firm 
commitment of aid amounting to 2 per cent ‘because of the budget system’. As a 
compromise it was suggested that if the PNG government wanted ‘verification of firm 
commitment of the fisheries grant of CIF 2 per cent’, the access agreement would only 
become effective once the fisheries grant had been confirmed. Thereafter, the Fisheries 
Agency ‘will continue its efforts to provide fisheries grants in the same manner as in 
1989’. The mission predicted that fisheries grants may eventually become ‘customary’.43
The key issue, as reflected in the above statements by the Japanese fishing 
industry, was how to commit, on an on-going basis, a grant that was equivalent to a 
proportion of the access fee. To make such a commitment under Japan’s grant aid 
system was recognised as highly problematic, given the project basis of Japan’s grant aid 
and the procedural requirements of the annual budget cycle.
In 1989 PNG received a fisheries grant of 193 million yen, the first stage in a 
coastal fisheries development project (and the first fisheries grant aid project since 1975). 
The grant was given on the basis that it was equivalent to 2 per cent of catch value, in 
anticipation of an access agreement being concluded. That year, two rounds of 
negotiations, held in Tokyo and Manila, failed to reach agreement on an access 
arrangement. A second phase of the coastal fisheries project, planned for implementation 
in 1990, was put on hold.
Three factors contributed to this outcome:
1) The Take Maru agreement (and subsequent fisheries grant allocation) was a
departure from standard PNG government procedures. It raised questions about 
who authorised the aid and whether there would be implications for non-fisheries 
aid requests.44
41 The PNG Minister did not confirm this understanding in writing. The ‘understanding’ appeared to 
have been conveyed verbally to the Japanese industry representative, and hence confusion was 
perpetuated.
42 Explanatory Note of Japanese Fisheries Mission, 20 December 1988.
43 Explanatory Note of Japanese Fisheries Mission; also Japanese Position On the Agreement 
Concerning Take Maru No.32, Dated 2 December 1988.
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2) The fisheries aid and access agreement had been reached largely through the 
efforts of PNG’s then Minister for Fisheries acting on behalf of provincial rather 
than national interests. His mandate was therefore questionable. This appeared to 
contravene another basic principle of PNG aid policy.45
3) The position of MOFA, which when approached by the PNG government for 
clarification about future fisheries aid commitments, contradicted the position of 
the fishing industry groups by stating that aid could not be committed in advance 
of projects being approved.46
By August 1990 the PNG government had returned to its original position that it 
would not accept a package of aid and access fee (that is the 2 per cent/  4 per cent 
formula) and insisted that the rate of return be 6 per cent. It also announced that it would 
begin licensing Japanese vessels on an individual basis by November 24 if no agreement 
was reached. In an effort by Japan to forestall this move and conclude an agreement, 
talks between the PNG government and Japanese negotiators were held in Port Moresby 
in November 1990.
When the negotiations took place, both sides appeared to have hardened their 
positions. While the PNG representative declared that ‘6 per cent CIF was an integral 
part of the fee formula’, the Japanese negotiator (Fujinami) reiterated the offer of a 4 per 
cent access fee plus 2 per cent aid. This 2 per cent was estimated to be about 1.3 million 
kina per year. He again alluded to ‘Japan’s fiscal situation’ in arguing that Japan could 
not provide an on-going commitment of grant aid, similar to the US government 
provision under the Multilateral Access Treaty. He also opposed the planned 
introduction of an individual licensing system arguing that this would make it difficult for 
Japan to monitor the operations of its vessels. In arguing against any increase in access 
fee, Fujinami maintained that:
1) 6 per cent would lead to fewer vessels purchasing licences and thus less revenue 
for PNG. It may also encourage under-reporting.
2) No new fisheries aid would be provided to PNG without an access agreement, 
and existing (fisheries aid) projects would be suspended.
3) Other Pacific island countries had complained to Japan that PNG had received a 
fisheries grant without any access agreement. This aid had been given in 
anticipation of an agreement being reached. Thus there was an implicit obligation 
on the part of PNG to reciprocate.
44 These procedures require a project identified by the Department of Fisheries and Marine Resources 
(DFMR), to be appraised by the Department of Finance and Planning before a donor is sought. DFMR, 
‘Summary of Fisheries Developments in Papua New Guinea’, PNG/OFCF Colloquium, November 1989.
45 This principle was that provincial governments may not negotiate aid assistance directly with foreign 
governments. DFMR, ‘Summary of Fisheries Developments’, p.16.
46 Interview, PNG Embassy, Tokyo, February 1993.
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4) The Take Maru settlement in 1988 had been based on a 4 per cent/2 per cent 
formula and the then PNG Minister for Fisheries had verbally agreed to this.
The PNG representative stood firm against these arguments. On the question of 
fisheries grants being denied or withheld until an access agreement was concluded, he 
simply stated that the PNG government would seek clarification of this from Japan’s 
MOFA.47
A number of issues stand out from the foregoing study. The above negotiations 
demonstrated the role of Japanese fishing industry groups in negotiating grant aid with a 
recipient government. The negotiations also revealed the way the size of a proposed 
project was determined as a proportion of the access fee. Aid was also promised, in 
advance of the project being formally approved. These practices were deviations from 
‘official’ aid procedures. Fisheries grant aid was also incorporated within a fee formula 
as an indirect subsidy to the payment of access. This attempt was ultimately 
unsuccessful. This raises the question of whether negotiating tactics were working at 
cross-purposes; or whether bureaucratic and procedural factors were at fault Both 
explanations are in fact pertinent
During the negotiations with PNG the Special Advisor used the promise of aid, 
and conversely the withholding of aid, as a lever to pressure the PNG side. The use of 
such tactics reflected both his negotiating power and the fact that his mandate also 
extended to issues of fisheries aid. The pressure applied on PNG by the negotiator may 
also have reflected the growing sense of crisis in Japan’s distant water fishing industry. In 
fact, the negotiator justified his rejection of PNG demands for a higher rate of return on 
the grounds that acceptance would set a precedent throughout the region. Policy 
emphasis was on containing the damage caused by the US multilateral treaty, by making 
an example of PNG, rather than saving the Japan-PNG access agreement
It has been suggested by observers that personality accounted for much of the 
style of the negotiations, not just between Japan and PNG, but between Japan and other 
Pacific island states. Fujinami was known to be a demanding and uncompromising 
negotiator. This could well account for the poor results in Japan’s negotiations with 
PNG; that is, his negotiating style antagonised the PNG negotiators and the opportunity 
for reaching a compromise was lost. The Special Advisor clearly underestimated PNG’s 
detemination not to give in to pressure. This was also a case where PNG officials sought 
to undermine the authority of the Special Advisor by challenging his interpretation of 
fisheries aid policy and soliciting the support of MOFA in this respect
Apart from negotiating tactics, bureaucratic and procedural factors were 
important Fisheries grant aid was clearly the special preserve of the Fisheries Agency.
47 From documents provided to the author by the PNG Embassy, Tokyo. PNG’s position was that the 6 
per cent rate of return was ‘non-negotiable’. Since this remained their position, the talks ended in 
deadlock and no further progress was made. Japan has not provided any more fisheries grant aid to
PNG.
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But there were obvious conflicts, if not contradictions, in policy between the Fisheries 
Agency and MOFA; namely, whether or not future commitments of fisheries grant aid 
could be guaranteed. This had the effect, in part, of undoing the fisheries aid diplomacy 
conducted by the Special Advisor and industry. MOFA tended to adhere to formal 
procedures, at least in official statements. It is also notable that the Special Advisor was 
inclined to use aid procedures as a justification for his refusal to accommodate regional 
demands for higher access fees (through a direct government subsidy). This argument 
was especially salient in negotiations for a multilateral access agreement.
How did procedures shape fisheries aid policy? Procedures were an obvious 
constraint on diplomacy. Fisheries grant aid required consultation and coordination 
among several ministries and agencies —  MOFA, Fisheries Agency, Ministry of Finance 
(MOF) and JICA. This increased the risk that conflicts over policy might arise and that 
official statements would be contradictory. The budget cycle was another constraint, 
since it required annual authorisation of projects. A further constraint (not spelt out in 
the above negotiations since it did pertain to Papua New Guinea as much as to other 
countries) was the limitation on the number of aid projects —  generally restricted to one 
grant aid project a year.
In an effort to strengthen its influence over fisheries aid, as well as to increase the 
number of fisheries grants available to the region, the Fisheries Agency introduced a new 
grant aid initiative in 1987 called the small-scale fisheries grant One objective of this aid 
was to overcome the existing restriction on providing more than one grant aid project a 
year to Pacific island countries.
SMALL-SCALE FISHERIES GRANT AID
A new form of fisheries grant aid was officially brought to the attention of the Pacific 
island countries at an OFCF-sponsored symposium in Tokyo on South Pacific Fisheries 
Development in late September 1987. The small-scale fisheries grant (SSFG) was to fund 
projects that were smaller than the usual grant aid projects; that is, less than 100 million 
yen ($700,000) and more than 10 million yen. The funds would be allocated from the 
fisheries grant aid budget. The Japanese government was prepared to receive one 
application from each eligible country.48
In announcing the new form of fisheries grant aid, an official from the Fisheries 
Agency’s Overseas Fisheries Cooperation Office explained its purpose and intentions. 
Ostensibly, the SSFG was designed to be more responsive to the special needs of the 
island states. Pacific island governments had become increasingly vocal in their criticism 
of the quality of Japan’s fisheries grant aid. This was reflected in the opening statement
48 Conference Report, Symposium on South Pacific Fisheries Development, OFCF, Tokyo, 28 
September to 3 October 1987. This is not to be confused with small-scale grant assistance, introduced by 
MOFA in 1989. The size of the latter grant was to be a maximum of 5 million yen.
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of the Pacific island countries’ representative to the OFCF symposium. The 
representative made the following criticisms: ‘Island governments have become 
increasingly disillusioned and impatient with Japan’s fisheries aid. There has been a lack 
of consultation with island governments, a refusal to supply commercial development 
assistance, and the supply of goods and services at inflated prices’. He added that ‘island 
governments want to see less restrictive aid policies and closer collaboration on all aid 
matters to ensure that their development goals and national priorities are furthered’.49
The SSFG was intended to provide the Japanese government with a mechanism 
for responding to the ‘smaller’ requests from the island governments, which were in line 
with the small scale of their economies. Aid would thus become ‘even more meaningful 
and useful’. It was also predicted that through the SSFG Japan could ‘respond more 
quickly and flexibly to requests’.50 But there were other, more important, considerations 
underlying the new aid program. These were alluded to in the discussion that took place 
at the symposium following the announcement of the SSFG.
The Fisheries Agency officials who introduced the SSFG scheme made clear that 
this aid would be available only to countries with fisheries agreements with Japan. The 
explanation was given as follows: ‘Since the SSFG is aimed primarily at solidifying and 
maintaining mutually beneficial relationships, the SSFGs are restricted to those countries 
holding fisheries agreements with Japan. The OFCF will dispatch project finding missions 
to identify and develop appropriate programs. Evaluations will be conducted with 
consideration given to the progress of fisheries negotiations taking place’.51
The SSFG can be understood, in this context, as providing Japan’s fisheries 
negotiators with an additional bargaining tool: an incentive for Pacific island countries to 
continue their bilateral access agreements with Japan. This was also the purpose of the 
regular fisheries grant aid. But the provision of that aid was constrained by Japan’s grant 
aid policy limiting the number of grant aid projects provided to regional countries to one 
a year. Thus in the years when non-fisheries grants were provided, there could not be any 
fisheries grant aid. As the Fisheries Agency official stated: ‘SSFGs are seen as a way to 
extend assistance during the interim years’.52
49 South Pacific Countries Representative Opening Remarks, Conference Report, Attachment 3. These 
criticisms were echoed by fisheries officials interviewed by the author at the FFA. They reflect the 
emphasis in Japanese aid policy on promoting Japan’s commercial and economic interests, which has 
the effect of reducing the diplomatic returns to Japan.
50 The key point that was suggested at the symposium was that the SSFG would be administered through 
the OFCF and not JICA. David J. Doulman, ‘Japanese Distant-Water Fishing in the South Pacific’, 
Pacific Economic Bulletin, Vol.4, No.2, December 1989, pp.22-8.
51 Conference Report, p.95.
52 Conference Report, p.100. This policy was described in another Fisheries Agency paper: ‘We can 
provide general grant for only one project in a fiscal year. If you request a grant for [a] non-fisheries 
project, we cannot... [provide] fisheries grants in the same fiscal year. The SSFG is the only exception 
to this rule’. Tadashi Tsuchiya, Government Programs for Fishery Cooperation. It is important to note
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In this way, the overall level of fisheries grant aid available to the region could be 
increased. According to a Fisheries Agency official: ‘The Fisheries Agency wanted to 
further increase aid to the South Pacific region, hence the creation of the small scale 
fisheries grant’.53 The desire to increase fisheries aid was perhaps to take advantage of 
anticipated increases in Japan’s overall aid to the region resulting from the Kuranari 
Doctrine (see next chapter). But it also reflected concern that island country demands for 
higher access fees would follow from the US multilateral treaty. There was thus a need 
to provide greater economic assistance as a way of meeting these demands.
The SSFG initiative was greeted with interest but also confusion by the Pacific 
island countries represented at the symposium. Much of this stemmed from the 
procedures for delivering the aid that were suggested by the Japanese officials. It was not 
clear how the SSFG differed from the normal fisheries grant aid. It was also not clear 
how Pacific countries should apply for the aid and whether governments in the region 
were to be officially notified of the SSFG by MOFA. To this latter question, the Fisheries 
Agency officials expressed some uncertainty and stated that this would need to be 
discussed with MOFA. This ‘hesitation’ was because it was not a new grant that was 
being introduced but a new method of using funds.
The question of whether or not MOFA was aware of the SSFG initiative before it 
was presented to island governments at the OFCF symposium was not clarified. What 
was clear was that the SSFG was a Fisheries Agency initiative and it would be used 
according to policy priorities of the Fisheries Agency and industry. In other words, it 
would be a new policy tool for the Fisheries Agency. Moreover the OFCF would carry 
out all the preliminary project work. The role of MOFA and J1CA was to be kept to a 
minimum.
How did this work in practice? One of the first test cases of the SSFG was PNG. 
It received a small-scale fisheries grant in 1989, which was provided in anticipation of an 
access agreement being concluded. The aid was calculated according to an agreed 
amount, equivalent to 2 per cent of the catch value (193 million yen), which was in fact 
greater than the prescribed ceiling for SSGA. Although the grant was made available 
relatively promptly, it did not succeed in overcoming bureaucratic constraints. Most 
notably, the grant was still subject to annual budgetary procedures of the Japanese 
government When the PNG government sought assurance from MOFA about future 
grant aid allocations, MOFA denied that aid could be committed in this way.
that the one project per year limit was not strictly applied for all countries, but for most countries it was 
the ‘rule’. From the late 1980s, there was a change in that most countries began to regularly receive at 
least two projects a year. In the two years following the introduction of the SSFG, the number and 
amount of fisheries grants to the region reached a record high (see Table 5.1).
53 Conference Report, p.104.
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The other issue that was of importance in respect to SSFG was the fact that 
regional states were increasingly requesting non-fisheries projects as grant aid from 
Japan. These included countries who were Japan’s fishing partners in the region. SSFG 
became the back-up form of aid; to be used when the Fisheries Agency wanted to 
provide fisheries grants, but when the bulk of aid allocations went towards another 
sector. In the 1990s, most of the fisheries grants to the region have been designated as 
SSFGs.
MOFA’S POLICY ON FISHERIES GRANT AID
At this point it is necessary to consider the position of MOFA in more detail. To what 
extent were there policy differences between MOFA and the Fisheries Agency and how 
did these impact on aid policy? Unlike the Fisheries Agency, MOFA does not officially 
recognise any linkage between fisheries aid and access agreements. Its policy merely 
states that fisheries aid is intended to address the world’s ‘food problem’ and to 
contribute to the economic and social development of developing countries.54 The most 
that has been admitted, in any official statement, is the ‘possibility (that) the situation of 
the fishing relationship between the country and Japan might be considered’.55
Unofficially, MOFA officials do recognise the special nature of the fisheries grant 
aid. Former head of the Oceania Division, Nobuaki Tanaka, expressed the view that 
fisheries aid was linked to access ‘in principle’. He also observed that the Fisheries 
Agency was able to mobilise aid resources, independently of MOFA, through its links 
with the Ministry of Finance and LDP politicians. Another Oceania Division official 
declared that fisheries aid ‘should be used to smooth fishing relations (with developing 
countries)’ but he qualified this position by stating that such aid ‘should not be 
completely tied to fishing agreements’.56
MOFA officials admitted that on occasion they were required to ‘censure’ the 
Fisheries Agency for its tactics, especially during fisheries negotiations when threats of 
withholding aid were made. Pacific island governments would, on such occasions, seek 
clarification from MOFA on such policy, as the PNG government did in its negotiations 
with Japan. These instances did not appear to result in any change of practice by the 
Fisheries Agency. The conclusion that may be drawn is that the role and influence of
54 See, for example, A Guide to Japan’s Aid, Association for the Promotion of International 
Cooperation, Tokyo, 1993, p.24.
55 See MOFA statement in Roman Grynberg, ‘The Tuna Dilemma’, Pacific Islands Monthly, May 1993, 
pp.9-11.
56 Interview, Oceania Division, Tokyo, June 1993. Nobuaki Tanaka was interviewed by the author in 
Bangkok (where he was then based) in April 1993. The Grant Aid Division in MOFA also defers to the 
Fisheries Agency: the official in the Division in charge of clearing requests for fisheries grants is 
seconded from the Fisheries Agency.
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MOFA was not significant (although by contradicting the Fisheries Agency, it did 
contribute to blocking the conclusion of an access agreement with PNG).
At the same time it was apparent that MOFA and the Fisheries Agency did on 
occasion work closely together. For example, ambassadors posted by Japan to the region 
were required to promote Japan’s interests, especially fisheries interests. One 
ambassador, posted to Fiji in February 1987 and accredited to Kiribati and Tuvalu, was 
chosen specifically for his expertise on fisheries matters. Fisheries industry officials also 
saw the ambassador as ‘one of them’.57
Problems between MOFA and the Fisheries Agency arose mainly from a lack of 
coordination between the two bureaucracies. While MOFA generally deferred to the 
Fisheries Agency on fisheries policy (for example, on the issue of a multilateral fisheries 
agreement), they also failed to communicate with the Fisheries Agency on policy 
initiatives of their own that would impact on the latter’s interests. Such was the case with 
the Kuranari Doctrine, delivered in early 1987. In planning this initiative, which was the 
first foreign policy statement by Japan relating to the Pacific island region, no input was 
provided by nor even solicited from the Fisheries Agency. Ironically, the political 
initiative appeared to influence regional expectations primarily in the area of Japan’s 
fisheries policy, particularly with regard to the conclusion of a multilateral access 
agreement58
As a result, the Fisheries Agency (and chief negotiators in particular) took a dim 
view of the Kuranari initiative. In interviews with the author, the Kuranari Doctrine was 
described as rhetoric or, at worse, ‘propaganda’; it was claimed that it raised ‘false 
expectations’ and the Pacific island countries did not receive anything concrete as a 
result.59 The general opinion of the Fisheries Agency was that MOFA did not understand 
the nature of Japan’s fisheries interests and policy in the region.
The above tensions result from an overlapping sphere of jurisdiction between the 
Fisheries Agency and MOFA and the fact that foreign policy and overseas fisheries 
policy are interrelated. In this context, there are also obvious tensions in terms of
57 The Ambassador in question was killed in a car accident in Fiji in mid-1990. Before being posted to 
Fiji he had held the position of Consul General in Seattle, where fisheries was the principal policy area.
58 See ‘Agency’s Next Problem: the Japanese’, Islands Business, June 1987, p.24. In subsequent 
bilateral negotiations Japan was asked to deliver on its political declarations of support to the region by 
developing appropriate fisheries arrangements. For example, in negotiations between PNG and Japan in 
1989, PNG’s Ambassador to Japan stated: ‘We believe Japan must now come to the party and meet its 
political declarations of support for the Pacific region’s development through practical arrangements 
such as in the fisheries area’. Opening Address by His Excellency Sir Joseph Nombri on the Occasion of 
the PNG/Japan Colloquium on Fisheries Cooperation, Tokyo, 20 November, 1989.
59 Interview, Norio Fujinami, Tokyo, May 1993. Both Fujinami and his successor were dismissive of any 
potential Soviet threat in the region, which had served as the principal catalyst of the Kuranari Doctrine. 
Their concerns focused instead on US fisheries policy in the region, which were seen to pose a direct 
threat to their interests.
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preserving respective ministerial powers and prerogatives. This leads to a perceived need 
to assert distinct priorities and policies.
Policy differences between MOFA and the Fisheries Agency have essentially been 
over the balance between economic and diplomatic goals. MOFA is more inclined to 
assess aid in diplomatic terms. A Fisheries Agency official, seconded to J1CA, observed 
that MOFA had argued against the continuation of fisheries grant aid as a special 
category of aid because ‘Japanese fishermen have been refused access to so many fishing 
zones, [and it appeared] the aid is not working’. This was affirmed by an official in the 
Grant Aid Division of MOFA.60 On the other hand, the Fisheries Agency has tended to 
stress the economic importance of aid (in the context of access negotiations). This 
approach is opposed by MOFA, however, which does not approve of using aid to 
subsidise the operations of a domestic industry.61
Fisheries aid was designed to be both a political and an economic instrument of the 
government and industry. The foregoing study has examined the use of aid as a tool in 
access negotiations. It has highlighted the close links between fisheries aid and Japanese 
access negotiations as well as some of the problems underlying attempts to link the 
access fee and receipt of grant aid under a formal arrangement It should be noted that, 
with the exception of Papua New Guinea, in all cases where disputes led to a temporary 
suspension of an access agreement new agreements were negotiated. This indicates that 
while there was dissatisfaction with (if not resentment of) the economic returns from 
access agreements with Japan, most countries were unwilling to forego the aid and 
access fees they received under these agreements. But the 1990s have seen some shifts in 
the position of Japanese industry and negotiators. In reponse to increased competition 
from other DWFNs and the stronger bargaining power of island states, the Japanese 
fishing industry has agreed to pay up to 5 per cent rate of return in recent agreements 
negotiated on a bilateral basis with some countries.62
The remainder of this chapter examines fisheries aid policy in the context of 
domestic economic problems in the distant water industry, the proposed multilateral 
access agreement and the rising environmental lobby. The next section examines the role 
of aid in supporting joint ventures, which was part of the strategy for promoting the 
operations of Japan’s distant water industry.
60 Interview, JICA, Tokyo, May 1993; Grant Aid Division, MOFA, May 1993.
61 This issue was raised in interviews with the President of the Japan Fisheries Association Hiroya Sano, 
the former Special Advisor, Norio Fujinami, and present Advisor, Tatsuo Saito, and officials in the 
Fisheries Agency, JICA and the Oceania Division, MOFA.
62 It appears that Japanese fishing interest is now mainly focused on the Federated States of Micronesia, 
the Marshall Islands, Palau, the Solomon Islands and Kiribati. A new agreement between Japan and 
Tuvalu was reached in March 1994 following protracted negotiations which centred mainly on the 
access fee. Prior to this new agreement, a Memorandum of Understanding was signed by the OFCF and 
Tuvalu on fisheries cooperation. FFA News Digest, No. 1/94, January-February 1994, p .l.
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AID AND JOINT VENTURES
Another basis for fisheries aid was to support joint ventures between coastal states and 
Japanese companies. Joint ventures were generally established by the large trading 
companies (shogo shosha) as part of the fishing expansion that occurred after the Second 
World War. Joint ventures were established in the New Hebrides (Vanuatu), PNG and 
Fiji. These included transshipment facilities and fish processing plants. The era of EEZs 
created additional incentives for establishing joint ventures. By establishing shore-based 
facilities, processing plants and fishing fleets in collaboration with coastal states, distant 
water fishing states aimed to acquire favourable and more secure access to resources, as 
well as to rationalise their operations. Joint venture cooperation was recognised in the 
Law of the Sea Convention as a legitimate condition of access to EEZs of coastal states. 
In recent years joint ventures have evolved as part of a strategy for addressing economic 
adjustment problems in the distant water fishing industry, especially the problems of crew 
shortages and competition from cheaper imports into the Japanese market. Fisheries 
grant aid and the OFCF have aimed to assist industry in setting up joint ventures. Aid 
policy has also been motivated by concern about ensuring the on-going viability of joint 
venture operations.
Solomon Taiyo
A joint venture between Taiyo Gyogyo and the Solomon Islands government, initiated by 
Taiyo Gyogyo in 1973, was a direct response to the changing international Law of the 
Sea. Under the terms of the original joint venture, Taiyo provided capital to build a 
cannery and shore facility and charter fishing vessels from Japan.63 In the 1980s, the 
company expanded its operational capability. The expansion of the joint venture centred 
on establishing a new cannery and commercial centre at the town of Noro in the Western 
Province. The expansion was in line with the Solomon Islands government plan for 
decentralisation of domestic industry. It was also an attempt to shore up the viability of 
the joint venture, which had been plagued by financial problems from the outset64
The development was undertaken in a five-year period from 1985 to 1990. It was 
dependent largely on the combined resources of several aid agencies and donors.
OFCF loans to Taiyo Gyogyo financed the new $12 million cannery; the Asian 
Development Bank funded a new power station with a loan of $7.2 million; the
63 Anthony V. Hughes, ‘High Speed on an Unmade Road: Solomon Islands’ Joint-Venture Route to a 
Tuna Fishery’, in David Doulman (ed.), Tuna Issues and Perspectives in the Pacific Islands Region, 
East-West Center, Hawaii, 1987, pp.203-24.
64 Interviews conducted by the author in Tokyo as well as with the Managing Director of Solomon 
Taiyo, Honiara. According to company officials the main source of the financial problems was the fact 
that the joint venture was not structured to be profitable. It was set up to allow for a high debt to equity 
ratio and for shareholders to extract income from cash flow rather than profits. Also see Anthony V. 
Hughes, ‘High Speed on an Unmade Road’.
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European Development Fund (EDF) provided a $10 million grant for associated 
infrastructure development including water supply, roads and wharf; and the Japanese 
government provided fisheries grant aid (1.8 billion yen/ $11.23 million) also for 
infrastructure development at the Noro township. This included an oil terminal (leased by 
the Solomon Islands government to Solomon Taiyo), cold storage facilities and a 
community centre.65
The contributions of aid to support this development reflected the importance of 
the Solomon Taiyo joint venture to the Solomon islands economy. The joint venture 
remains a crucial source of export earnings (estimated at 48 per cent in 1993) and 
employment (about 10 per cent). Thus a priority for the Solomon Islands is to keep the 
joint venture afloat. But such assistance also subsidises the operations of a Japanese firm, 
and provides an incentive for its continued participation in the joint venture.66
It has been suggested that Taiyo Gyogyo (re-named Maruha in 1993) has 
attempted to withdraw from the joint venture on a number of occasions due to financial 
losses and that there is a strong sentiment within the Taiyo company that it should 
withdraw.67 The fact that it remains is due, in no small measure, to the support of the 
Japanese government (through ODA and OFCF cooperation). The Japanese government 
interest in supporting the joint venture includes the issue of keeping its access to the 
Solomon Islands EEZ.
Instability inherent in the relationship, due in part to Solomon Islands government 
policy, points to an uncertain future for the Solomon Taiyo joint venture. This was 
evident during the negotiations for a new joint venture agreement in 1993. The Solomon 
Islands government had proposed selling its share of the company to the provincial
65 Details are from JICA, Basic Design Study for Noro Fisheries Infrastructure Development Project, 
March 1989; also Solomon Taiyo Ltd, company publicity material.
66 According to a senior Solomon Islands official, the infrastructure provided by Japan’s grant aid was 
not exclusively for use by the joint venture but there was no one else who could make use of it. The 
community centre was one part of the grant aid package that had been proposed by Taiyo Gyogyo and 
was initially intended to be a dormitory for fishermen. But under the requirements of grant aid (which 
stipulate that aid should not be for commercial use), the proposal was re-worded as a community centre. 
The official also said that Taiyo Gyogyo had helped ‘push through’ the grant request by lobbying key 
ministries in Tokyo. He added that when a European Community delegation had visited the Solomon 
Islands to inspect progress on the implementation of the EDF grant, there had been ‘surprise and 
consternation’ that it was primarily assisting the operations of a Japanese joint venture partner. 
Interview, Honiara, November 1993.
67 Interviews, Honiara; Tokyo. The trend in the 1980s has in fact seen Japanese joint venture partners 
withdraw from the region. These included Itoh-Chu Shoji, which withdrew from a fishing and canning 
joint venture in Fiji in 1987; Mitsui, which withdrew from Vanuatu in 1987; and a subsidiary of 
Mitsubishi and Nikkasturen (Kaigai Gyogyo Kabushiki Kaisha), which withdrew from PNG in 1982. 
The main reasons were commercial losses, and in the case of PNG, problems relating to transfer pricing. 
Companies also moved away from direct fishing activities to importing and distribution. In general, 
Japanese firms have faced strong competition from other fishing and processing nations, especially in 
Southeast Asia. For details see Geoffrey P. Ashendon and Graham W. Kitson, ‘Japanese Tuna Fishing 
and Processing Companies’, in David J. Doulman (ed.), The Development of the Tuna Industry in the 
Pacific Island Region: An Analysis of Options, East-West Center, Hawaii, 1987, pp.255-70.
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government. This proposal triggered a strong reaction from the Taiyo management, 
which reportedly argued that if the central government withdrew, then the joint venture 
would not receive any further bilateral aid ‘because the Japanese Government recognised 
central governments and not provincial governments’.68 The Solomon Islands 
government subsequently withdrew the proposal and a new joint venture agreement was 
concluded.
Kiribati Marine Training Centre
The Japanese tuna industry also sought to address, through fisheries aid, the problem of 
securing cheaper sources of labour on its fishing fleets. As was noted in the previous 
chapter, a key problem for distant water fishing fleets is the growing shortage of 
Japanese crew. This is a problem in terms of costs (high wages paid to Japanese crew 
contribute to lack of competitiveness). But it is also a problem that may determine the 
fate of Japan as a fishing nation; that is, without a new generation of Japanese fishermen, 
Japan cannot continue to be a fishing nation.
Domestic legislation allows for a foreign crew quota on Japanese vessels of 25 
per cent. Industry is seeking to raise this to 40 per cent. Distant water fleets have 
increasingly relied on foreign crew. By mid-1994, a total of 2,311 foreign crew were 
employed on 398 Japanese tuna vessels. Indonesians dominate, followed by Peruvians.69
One other major source of crew for the Japanese tuna industry is Kiribati. In 
1988 a project was initiated in Kiribati which aimed at training fishermen from Kiribati as 
crew for Japanese tuna vessels. The Marine Training Centre, as it was called, was a 
unique ‘joint venture’ between JICA, OFCF and Nikkatsuren, on the one hand, and the 
Kiribati government on the other.70
Details of the cooperation provided to the Marine Training Centre include a 
fisheries grant in 1988 of 130 million yen. This was used to construct a dormitory, 
classroom, laboratory and training vessel. JICA support included equipment supply, 
which between 1987 and 1990 amounted to 27 million yen; 12 JICA experts and 7 
trainees between 1989 and 1991. OFCF has provided equipment and experts; and 
Nikkatsuren has provided equipment71
68 This argument was used by representatives of the Taiyo company, not by Japanese government 
officials. It is another demonstration of the way the Japanese private sector presumes to speak for the 
government on aid policy. ‘Japan Opposes Shares Sale in Solomons’, The South Sea Digest, Vol.12, 
No.25, 12 March 1993, p .l.
69 Katsuo-maguro tsushin No.7034, 20/6/94; re-printed in FFA News Digest, No.5, September-October 
1994, p. 12.
70 The uniqueness stemmed in part from the cooperation between JICA and OFCF. It was noted in 
Chapter 3 that there was very little coordination between the two technical cooperation agencies.
71 Details of the grant aid and JICA technical assistance are provided in Gaimusho, Waga kuni no seifu 
kaihatsu enjo, Vol.2, 1992 and JICA, Annual Reports, various issues. OFCF cooperation is in Kaigai
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By the beginning of 1993, 180 students had graduated from the Marine Training 
Centre and, by mid-1994, 159 were employed on 20 Japanese pole and line vessels, 5 
longline vessels and 2 purse seiners. A tuna industry journal described these graduates as 
‘an indispensable source of manpower, especially for Japan’s skip-jack vessels’.72 The 
employment of graduates from the Marine Training Centre also provides a valuable 
source of foreign exchange for Kiribati (in the form of remittances). The third phase of 
the project commenced in 1994 and will run until 1996.
Federated States of Micronesia National Fisheries Corporation
In October 1994 agreement was reached between the Federated States of Micronesia 
(FSM) and Japanese tuna fisheries organisations on cooperation in the export of fresh 
tuna to Japan. Nikkatsuren agreed to invest in the FSM’s National Fisheries Corporation. 
Meanwhile a company was created by four fishing organisations to support the National 
Fisheries Corporation by providing guidance, funds and air freight connections to 
Japan.73 The joint venture aimed to promote the development in the FSM of a tuna 
export industry by providing ‘an air freight system’. Capitalisation for the new company, 
to be called Tuna Material Company, is estimated at 10 million yen, and will be financed 
by the OFCF. Tuna to be air freighted to Japan will be provided by Japanese fleets 
operating in FSM waters. The company wiill finance the operational costs of aircraft 
used in the joint venture.74
This joint venture grew out of concern on the part of Japanese fishing enterprises 
operating in the FSM about the rapid increase in Chinese and Taiwanese operators in the 
FSM which has contributed to the expansion of fresh tuna exports to Japan. This has put 
increased pressure on the fresh tuna market in Japan. The objective of the ‘cooperation’ 
is stated clearly in terms of gaining ‘influence’ with the FSM government on questions of 
limiting access of Taiwanese and Chinese vessels, while ‘stabilising’ Japan’s own access 
arrangements. As an industry journal explained, ‘as a partner in the cooperative venture, 
Japan may now gain a voice in asking the FSM to suppress such unrestrained expansion 
of fishing effort by third nations’.75 The joint venture was also rationalised on the 
grounds of securing Japan’s own access arrangements with the FSM.
gyogyo kyoryoku zaidan yoran, June 1993. This does not include yen amounts, only number of cases. 
Other details are from background documents provided by the OFCF.
72 From Kastuo-maguro tsushin, No.6943, 3/2/94. Reprinted in FFA News Digest, No.2/94, March- 
April 1994, p.14; see also Katsuo-maguro tsushin, N o .7093 ,16/9/94; re-printed in FFA News Digest, 
No.6, November-December 1994, p.22.
73 The four organisations are Kinkatsukyo, Kaimakikyo, Nikkatsuren and Hokubu Makiami.
74 ‘Japan-Micronesia Joint Venture’, FFA News Digest, No.6/94, November-December 1994, p.22.
75 Katsuo-maguro tsushin, No.7099, 27 September, 1994. Reprinted in FFA News Digest, No.6/94, 
November-December 1994, p.8.
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As with most fisheries grant projects, both the Maritime Training Centre and the 
Noro fisheries infrastructure project depend on the provision of technical cooperation 
from Japan in order to function properly. This includes ‘experts’ and equipment supply. 
There is a thus a need for support on an on-going basis. Failure to provide such support 
to projects in the past meant that infrastructure either was left idle or was poorly 
utilised.76 In part this was a problem of coordinating technical cooperation with grant aid 
and reflected procedural complexities in Japan’s aid system. But there was also a low 
priority put on maintenance of projects and whether or not they operated efficiently, if at 
ah.
In the late 1980s and 1990s, more attention began to be paid to the question of 
maintenance of projects and the coordinating of grant aid with technical cooperation.
This was evident in new initiatives adopted by the OFCF. As the following section 
suggests, these initiatives were part of an effort by Japan to make bilateral access 
agreements more attractive and beneficial to its fishing partners in the region. The 
underlying concern was to weaken regional support for, or interest in, a multilateral 
access agreement
BILATERAL VERSUS MULTILATERAL ACCESS AGREEMENTS
A fundamental consideration in regard to the issue of a regional access arrangement was 
the perception that Japan could negotiate more beneficial access arrangements at the 
bilateral level. This was because Japan had more leverage over countries under bilateral 
agreements. Pacific island countries were encouraged to continue with their bilateral 
arrangements rather than support a multilateral agreement Japan’s fisheries aid was an 
important part of its diplomacy in this policy area.
The possible impact of a multilateral fisheries agreement on Japan’s fisheries aid 
to the region was a central issue in the discussion and negotiations that took place. There 
was a genuine concern within the region that existing aid relations may be jeopardised by 
a multilateral agreement In arguing against the proposal, Japanese negotiators stressed 
the good relations that Japan and the region enjoyed under existing bilateral 
arrangements. In this context, it was also suggested that perhaps there was some basis 
for treating Japan as a ‘special case’, given its long history as a fishing nation in the 
region and its contributions to the development of fishing industries in some Pacific 
island countries. This referred in part to the grant aid projects that Japan had provided. It
76 Foundation for Advanced Information and Research, Japanese ODA to Pacific Island Countries: 
Current Problems and Future Perspective, Committee for Oceania and Pacific Island Countries, FAIR, 
Tokyo, 1993. Also, information provided by PNG officials on the state of the Kavieng National Fisheries 
College, established in 1977 with Japanese grant aid.
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also referred to the joint ventures that fisheries grants (and OFCF loans) had helped keep 
afloat77
Apart from the tactic of ‘reminding’ countries of the benefits they enjoyed from 
bilateral aid and access arrangements, there were attempts in some instances to use aid to 
pressure countries in a more overt way. This was the background to problems between 
Japan and Fiji, which came to a head in 1992. Fiji was a major beneficiary of fisheries 
grant aid, until it was informed by the Japanese government in 1992 that there would be 
no further provision of fisheries grant aid unless it agreed to an access agreement with 
Japan.78
Fijian officials believed that the pressure to conclude an access agreement (where 
none had existed before) was in part to undermine the regional support for a multilateral 
agreement with Japan. Fiji was regarded as an important country in the region and, in 
diplomatic terms, a regional ‘opinion leader’. Thus to conclude an access agreement with 
Fiji would encourage other countries to continue with their bilateral arrangements.79
Fisheries Agency officials and the Executive Director of Nikkatsuren confirmed, 
in interviews with the author, that Japan was seeking an access agreement with Fiji, and 
that this was to be mainly ‘symbolic’ of good relations between Fiji and Japan. Fijian 
officials described the proposed agreement as one ‘of convenience’ that aimed to have a 
‘demonstration effect’ on other countries. While the Fijian Cabinet has rejected the 
linkage between aid and access, and this remains one of the reasons why no access 
arrangement has been concluded, some Fiji government officials are inclined towards 
signing an agreement in order to ‘get the aid rolling’. At stake is a major port 
development near Suva which has been in the ‘pipeline’ for several years.80
In order to further encourage the Pacific island countries to continue with 
bilateral agreements, the Fisheries Agency introduced several initiatives to promote 
assistance to the region through the OFCF (in addition to the SSFG described above). 
These were the only programs that the OFCF developed for specific countries or regions. 
They included the Fisheries Development Assistance for Pacific Island Nations
77 The case in point is the Solomon Taiyo joint venture (cannery and fishing operations) in the Solomon 
Islands which was discussed earlier. Japanese government support has ensured the continuation of this 
joint venture.
78 At first, the reason given for not providing further fisheries grants to Fiji was that Fiji was too 
‘developed’ and rich to receive grant aid. The Fiji authorities were advised to redraft a project that they 
had requested from Japan (a fishing wharf complex near Suva) so that it could be seen to have regional 
benefits. After the request was re-submitted as a ‘regional’ project, the decision that was relayed by 
Japan to Fiji was that the project approval depended on an access agreement being concluded.
79 See reports in The Fiji Times, 28 and 29 December 1992; and Pacific Islands Monthly, May 1993, 
pp.9-11. Fiji was not regarded as a good fishing area by Japan, hence no access agreement had been 
concluded in the past.
80 Interviews, Director of Fisheries, Government of Fiji; and Permanent Secretary for Foreign Affairs 
and External Trade, Government of Fiji, Suva, January and July 1993.
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(FDAPIN), a five-year project which started in April 1990. It has a budget of 
approximately 500 million yen a year. Its aim is to carry out maintenance and repair of 
fisheries equipment and infrastructure provided under grant aid and OFCF aid. A 
regional office was established in Fiji (despite the fact that the actual work was centred in 
Micronesia) to coordinate the activities of the project.
The other initiative was a project titled Technical Cooperation for Fisheries 
Development. This was introduced in 1988-89 and tied closely to access agreements 
with Pacific island countries. According to a policy paper, the project aims ‘to contribute 
to the securement [sic] of fishing rights and interests of Japan’. It focused on promoting 
coastal fishing development. The estimated annual budget was between 100 and 150 
million yen per country.81
Recipients of both these projects are countries which have access agreements 
with Japan. The initiatives aimed to make bilateral access agreements with Japan appear 
more attractive and more beneficial to the Pacific island states. They reflected concerns 
about instability in access arrangements that became more acute in the late 1980s. Both 
initiatives were funded by a special subsidiary budget in OFCF, provided by the Fisheries 
Agency. Thus budgetary and other bureaucratic procedures, applicable to fisheries grant 
aid, could be circumvented.
From the foregoing study, it can be seen that the Japanese government responded 
to the initiative on a multilateral agreement by providing incentives to island states 
(grants and OFCF aid) to continue with their bilateral agreements. The evidence suggests 
that this tactic succeeded to some extent, at least in terms of encouraging countries with 
bilateral agreements to continue with these arrangements. For example, the Federated 
States of Micronesia, one of Japan’s most important fishing partners, has made quite 
plain its preference for keeping access arrangements bilateral. At the same time, it is 
aware of the need to maximise benefits from its resources. According to a government 
minister, ‘We always view fisheries negotiations with the greatest caution because it is 
our only resource. We cannot afford to [be] high-handed with the distant water fishing 
nations but we also cannot afford to be ripped off’.82
The approach preferred by the Federated States of Micronesia is to support a 
combination of bilateral and multilateral arrangements, including an ‘umbrella agreement’ 
with Japan that incorporates minimum terms and conditions. The evidence suggests that 
although the Pacific island states have not succeeded in persuading Japan to either 
support a multilateral access agreement or to significantly increase bilateral fee payments, 
they have gradually succeeded, through collective diplomacy, in enforcing a number of
81 Masaru Okamoto, ‘Japan’s Fisheries Cooperation’; also interview, OFCF Regional Office, Suva, July 
1993.
82 ‘FSM Representative Warns Against Unrealistic Comparisons of Fisheries Regimes’, Pacific Report, 
Vol.7, No. 15, August 1994, p.4.
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measures aimed at enhancing compliance with regional terms and conditions of access. 
This includes direct registration on the Regional Register and demonstrates the value and 
success of multilateralism in the region.
The position of Pacific island states was based on a pragmatic assessment of the 
benefits accruing from bilateral agreements and what Japan’s distant water fishing 
industry could afford. What was industry able to afford and why was there reluctance on 
the part of the Japanese government to provide a direct subsidy to industry in the same 
way the US government provided a subsidy under the terms of the US multilateral 
agreement? This question, which is taken up in the next section, is especially pertinent in 
considering government policies of support for the distant water fishing industry.
THE DOMESTIC POLITICS OF FISHERIES AID
It was noted in the previous chapter that the distant water fishing industry has been 
undergoing a process of economic decline, which has been exacerbated by international 
developments. The Japanese government, in response, has taken various measures to 
support the industry and to alleviate the effects of adjustment. But there are also limits to 
what it considers politically feasible; hence the importance of fisheries grants and OFCF 
aid as a less direct but also less politically contentious form of support The policy 
objectives of the Fisheries Agency, as set out by an official in the mid-1980s were:
1) To achieve stable operations in overseas fishing grounds. In this context, Japan has enhanced 
international fishery cooperation wth various coastal states enabling Japanese vessels to fish in 
overseas fishing grounds.
2) To maintain and cultivate fishery resources in coastal waters around Japan and to effectively 
utilise these resources.
3) To improve the economic conditions of fishermen suffering from sharply increased costs of 
production, stagnated prices and gradual decrease in fish consumption. [Therefore] the Agency 
encourages the fishing industry to reduce production costs through rationalisation of fishing 
operations and introduction of energy saving types of fishing vessels and gears through special 
financial loan program and favoured tax policy for fishing industry.83
The third point above reflects the changing economic conditions of Japan’s 
fishing industry. The economic problems of Japan’s tuna fleets have been the ostensible 
reason why Japan’s fishing industry and government have resisted paying higher access 
fees. The 4 per cent rate of return was described by one industry official as the ‘break­
even’ point for their operations. The fact that they paid higher rates of return to countries 
such as Australia was because of the higher market value of the catch (bluefin tuna).84
83 Takayoshi Horikoshi, ‘Japan’, Fishing and Industry in Asia and the Pacific, Asian Productivity 
Organisation, Tokyo, 1988, p.327.
84 Interview, Nikkatsuren, Tokyo, June 1993. This claim is treated with some scepticism by the FFA. 
The FFA has estimated that fishing fleets could afford between 6 and 8 per cent, depending on the vessel 
size. It has been estimated that the access fee as a proportion of total operating costs varies between 0.2 
per cent and 6 per cent, depending on vessel size and gear type. Fuel and labour account for the bulk of
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The availablility of fisheries grant aid and OFCF cooperation, and the willingness of the 
Japanese government to use this aid to support access negotiations with the Pacific island 
states, meant that industry had a way out of paying higher rates of return.
But the Fisheries Agency has not always supported policies favoured by the 
distant water industry. A key factor shaping government policy has been the domestic 
political climate in Japan. This was evident in policy on a multilateral agreement with the 
region and whether or not the government should directly contribute to access fees.
When the FFA members first proposed a multilateral access arrangement with 
Japan in 1987 it was the Fisheries Agency and Special Advisor who led the strong 
opposition against the initative. The Japanese tuna industry, on the other hand, was 
supportive in principle. Not only did they favour a regional access agreement in order to 
secure access for their fleets in the face of competition from other fleets, they also 
favoured a government contribution to access fees, similar to that provided by the US 
government. The problem was that they were unsuccessful in persuading government to 
‘change its policy ... and use direct linkage between fishing access and aid’.85
Why were they unsuccessful? This negative response by government is especially 
striking in view of the political rhetoric at the time that had declared Japan’s concern 
about Soviet intrusion and the intention to contribute to the region’s economic and 
political development and stability. It is obvious from this that fisheries issues were not 
considered to be part of Japan’s foreign policy initiative (the Kuranari Doctrine).
Apart from the different positions on questions of management of tuna,86 
domestic political factors were of importance. There was a view, reflected by senior 
fisheries officials that the proposal would not have sufficient political support, and 
therefore that MOF would not be pressured to allocate the necessary financial resources.
On the one hand, MOFA and the Oceania Division in particular, did not lobby for 
the proposed multilateral agreement This would be a logical source of political support. 
Wfrile MOFA appears to have taken its cue from the Fisheries Agency, who led decision 
making in this area, it was nevertheless apparent that MOFA officials did not support the 
use of government funds to subsidise the operations of Japan’s fishing fleets.87
the industry’s operating costs. David J. Doulman, ‘Japanese Distant-Water Fishing in the South Pacific’, 
p.25.
85 Interview, Tsutomu Watanabe, Executive Director, Nikkatsuren, Tokyo, May 1993. The industry 
representatives seemed resigned to the position taken by government on this issue.
86 It is apparent that Japan’s fisheries negotiators used the issue of a multilateral access arrangement to 
try and gain ground on a broad-based regional fisheries organisation in the region, that would have 
given Japan some say over questions of resource allocation and utilisation.
87 This was discussed earlier. Former Oceania Division Director, Nobuaki Tanaka, argued that the 
proposal for a multilateral access agreement was not taken seriously by his Division because it did not 
appear to have the full support of the region; nor was the regional position clearly stated.
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On the other hand, there was an assessment by the Fisheries Agency that political 
support for the multilateral agreement would not be forthcoming in the Diet. This was 
seen to reflect the following factors: 1) a decline in political influence of the fishing 
industry due to population decline in fishing areas, thus a smaller voting basis for the 
fishing industry; 2) financial difficulties of the large and medium-sized fishing enterprises, 
which meant they were not as significant political contributors as in the past; and 3) 
fragmentation of the fishing industry due to competition and rivalry between different 
groups, which also reduced their political influence.88
Strong political support was regarded as a prerequisite for persuading MOF to 
allocate resources as part of a fisheries agreement. It was the assessment of the Fisheries 
Agency and Japan Fisheries Association that a proposal for providing a direct subsidy to 
the fishing industry in the form of a contribution to a multilateral access agreement 
would be strongly opposed by MOF on the grounds of ‘keeping financial discipline’. It 
was argued that the ‘subsidisation of access fees would trigger increased demands from 
coastal nations’. Moreover, the Japanese negotiator would not seek ‘to ensure the lowest 
possible fee for Japanese industry’.89
A final factor that may have influenced policy on the multilateral access 
agreement was the changing priorities of the Fisheries Agency. Increasingly, Japan was 
facing the prospect of environmental concerns and campaigns threatening closure of 
fishing grounds not only in EEZs but also on the high seas. Thus there was a new 
imperative for fisheries aid: to build diplomatic support for Japan in international fora 
(where new policies and international laws were being developed) and to use aid in ways 
that demonstrated Japan’s concern about environmental consequences of fishing and 
conservation of stocks. Access to foreign EEZs for Japan’s fleets was not the sole (or 
principal) objective of fisheries grant aid. The priority was to keep the seas open to all 
fishing activity. This new aid agenda is discussed below.90
88 These assessments were given by a number of observers in Japan interviewed by the author. They 
included senior government officials, industry leaders and scholars. Population decline in the fisheries 
sector is evident in census figures. See MAFF, Fisheries Statistics of Japan 1991, Statistics and 
Information Department, Tokyo, 1993, pp.24-5
89 That is, the negotiator would not aim to keep fees low. Interview, former Director General of the 
Fisheries Agency, Tokyo, June 1993.
90 It was suggested by a former Director General of the Fisheries Agency that this new priority for 
fisheries grant aid would mean less emphasis on using aid in concert with access negotiations. 
Interview, Tokyo, June 1993.
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THE ENVIRONMENTAL DEBATE: A NEW DIRECTION FOR FISHERIES 
AID POLICY
Japan’s role as a fishing nation, and as an advocate of the principle of freedom to fish, 
had created a serious image problem by the time the UN Conference on straddling fish 
stocks and highly migratory species (discussed in the previous chapter) was convened. In 
part, this ‘image problem’ was the result of Japan’s policies, and its insistence that 
practices such as driftnetting were not harmful to the marine environment. But its 
problems were also due to the way public perceptions in Western countries had altered, 
largely through the successful campaigns of the environmental protection lobbies, which 
had redefined the fisheries agenda (especially when it came to such issues as marine 
mammals). This process of change was traced back by Japanese officials to the early 
1970s when protection of cetaceans (whales in particular) became an international 
issue.91
Japan’s fisheries aid has gradually assumed an important role in seeking to both 
counter this negative image and build support for Japan in international fora. More 
recently it has been directed towards playing a positive role in fisheries conservation and 
management. The evolution of this policy shift has not been without problems. On the 
one hand, the tendency among some policy makers and fisheries industry officials was to 
simply pressure countries to support Japan, using aid as a negative sanction. In 1987, at 
an OFCF symposium, a Fisheries Agency representative declared that there were at least 
two criteria for providing fisheries grants: ‘When the Japanese government selects the 
countries to which it provides fisheries grants, criteria include that the recipient country 
must have a fisheries agreement with Japan and it must take a supportive position to 
Japan in various international organisations’.92
This approach to aid proved counterproductive to some extent, as the policy has 
itself been the focus of criticism, and thus damaging to Japan. At the height of the 
driftnet controversy, allegations of aid pressure were prominent in media reports.93 
These allegations also surfaced during the International Whaling Commission Conference 
(IWC) in Japan in May 1993.94 Despite such criticism, it appears that the public relations
91 Kazuo Shima, ‘Fisheries and Environmental Issues’, Symposium on Central Western Pacific Tuna 
Fisheries, Tokyo, March 1993.
92 ‘Japanese Governmental Assistance’, Presentation made during Symposium on South Pacific 
Fisheries Development, Conference Report, p.93.
93 See, for example ‘Japan Denies Solomon Aid has Strings’, The Fiji Times, 31 July 1989, p . l l .  At the 
time of the 1989 South Pacific Forum meeting, there was some expectation, according to Japanese media 
reports, that Pacific island countries would not introduce ‘firm measures’ against driftnetting because of 
the importance of Japan’s aid to the region. This aid afforded certain ‘protection’ of Japan’s interests. 
Minato shimbun, 11 July 1989 and 17 July 1989, cited in Andrew Wright and David J. Doulman, 
‘Driftnet Fishing in the South Pacific; From Controversy to Management’, Marine Policy, September 
1991, pp.303-37.
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‘war’ remains an essential part of Japan’s response. As criticism of Japan has deepened, 
attitudes in Japan have hardened.95
A former Director General of the Fisheries Agency described the strategy of 
building diplomatic support for Japan as follows:
The current situation is one where Japan is targetted by environmentalists. My 
feelings are that we have to defend our interest and the general principle of 
sustainable utilisation of renewable resources. In order to achieve this objective we 
want to see as many nations as possible take the position ... that sustainable 
utilisation does not deplete resources ... Economic cooperation in the field of 
fisheries should be extended to many countries, so that they benefit from this 
position. [Part of this policy meant giving fisheries aid to countries] where there is 
no expectation of gaining access in return. Such a country is Nepal. There is no 
possibility of fishing there, but Nepal is interested in fish, they eat fish. So we 
should work for the same principle.96
Within MOFA there was also a perception that fisheries aid should serve the 
purpose of building diplomatic support for Japan. But the results to date, according to a 
Grant Aid Division official, have not been very encouraging. During the IWC Conference 
in Japan in 1993, it was observed that out of ten developing countries, only one (St 
Lucia) voted the same way as Japan.97
The strategy of giving aid in exchange for diplomatic support has been somewhat 
modified, in the face of the continuing criticisms of Japan and concerns about the 
environmental impact of its fishing practices. By 1992 there had emerged a new policy 
related to the environment At an OFCF Symposium, the Director of the Office of 
Overseas Fishery Cooperation in the Fisheries Agency declared that fisheries aid, in 
addition to its existing objectives, would henceforth be extended to:
promote fishery-related projects with the view o f contributing from a global 
standpoint to the appropriate management and effective utilisation o f fishery 
resources, including high seas resources, and conservation of the fisheries 
environment, recognising the vital role that fisheries should play in solving the food 
problem that is of concern to mankind as a whole, and to guarantee the transfer of 
our precious resources in a favourable condition to future generations.98
What does this entail? Essentially it means using fisheries aid to make a 
constructive contribution to conservation measures. This can be viewed as part of a
94 ‘IWC rejects interim relief request’, The Japan Times, 14 May, 1993, p.1,2.
95 This was evident in a range of editorials at the time of the IWC Conference in Japan. See Mainichi 
shimbun, 16 May, 1993; Sankei shimbun, 16 May, 1993 and Yomiuri shimbun, 16 May, 1993.
96 Interview, Tokyo, June 1993. Another non-coastal state to benefit from fisheries aid recently is 
Bolivia.
97 Interview, Grant Aid Division, MOFA, May 1993.
98 Italics added. Masaru Okamoto, ‘Japan’s Overseas Fisheries Cooperation’, Symposium on Central 
Western Pacific Tuna Fisheries, OFCF, Tokyo, March 1992.
163
process of building a leadership role in fisheries (and in particular tuna) conservation.
Such a role has been articulated by prominent industry figures, such as the President of 
Nikkatsuren. In August 1992 he stated that: ‘Japan must move to become a leader 
amongst tuna producers and must act in harmony with the environment’.99 Other reports 
called for Japan to set the pace for responsible fishing practices (limiting catch, using 
environmentally sound fishing techniques, and supporting conservation measures).
At the UN Conference on highly migratory fish stocks and straddling fish stocks, 
a key part of the agenda was about providing assistance to developing countries so that 
they might carry out conservation and management measures within their EEZs. The 
‘Special Requirements of Developing Countries’ were described at length by the 
Chairman of the Conference in his Negotiating Text, prepared after the second session of 
the Conference.100 Japan fully supported this approach. In his opening statement the 
head of the Japan delegation declared that: ‘It is essential for the appropriate 
management of high seas fisheries that developed countries transfer to developing 
countries the technology they need to conduct scientific research, handle data and pursue 
fishing operations in a responsible manner. Japan has enhanced its fishery cooperation in 
response to requests from developing countries, and intends to further expand such 
cooperation in the future’.101 According to the Fisheries Agency, Japan would be in 
favour of providing aid (a ‘special fund’) to support efforts of developing countries to 
conserve their resources, especially highly migratory species, within their EEZs.102
As with other ‘fisheries cooperation’ policy, it is the Fisheries Agency that has 
taken the lead in this area of environmental cooperation. The Fisheries Agency has also 
utilised the OFCF as a channel for promoting new forms of aid and technical 
cooperation. In 1993 a new program of assistance for the Pacific island countries was 
announced, titled ‘Coral Reef Natural Resource and Environment Policy Cooperation’. It 
will be administered by the OFCF and focus on those states that are Japan’s main fishing 
partners in the region. According to an industry publication:
The Fisheries Agency plans to first restore the resource inside the reefs into a 
healthy condition before utilising it as a tourist resource ... and a stable food 
supply for the residents; improve local management techniques, create a ‘marine 
pasture’ suited to local environmental conditions, and to provide technical
99 Suisan sekai, 5 August 1992. See also series of articles in Suisan keizai on ‘Reconciliation of the 
Fishing Industry and the Global Environmental Problem with a Particular Look at the Tuna Industry’, 
August, September and October 1992.
100 Negotiating Text, Prepared by the Chairman o f the Conference, UN Conference on Straddling Fish 
Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, New York, 12-30 July 1993.
101 Statement by Matsushiro Horiguchi, 13 July 1993.
102 Interview, International Affairs Division, Fisheries Agency, July 1993.
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assistance for the conservation and management of those marine mammals that
are likely to come under the regulations of CITES.103
The report suggested that the main rationale for this program was to promote a 
more positive image for Japan. ‘The Fisheries Agency feels that Japan has been viewed 
mainly as a country that goes around catching all the fish there are to catch. Japan would 
certainly like to wipe away such a negative image. [The Fisheries Agency] feels that 
some new direction in fishery cooperation may help do this’. Out of the OFCF’s total 
fisheries cooperation budget in 1994 of S50.6 million, $1.2 million would be allocated to 
the above project.104
Beyond image building, it is likely that this new emphasis on conservation has 
another side. It was observed earlier that the declared intent of Japan’s new approach to 
fisheries aid was in order to contribute to ‘the appropriate management and effective 
utilisation of fisheries resources’. This points to the integration of aid and management 
practices. The question arises: how will fisheries aid be used to promote Japan’s 
preferred management approach? It is clear that for Japan, an ‘appropriate’ management 
regime is one that includes both DWFNs and coastal states. The push for a 
comprehensive fisheries organisation is a fundamental part of Japan’s fisheries diplomacy 
in the Pacific island region. The provision of fisheries aid is certain to be conditional to 
some extent on Japan’s inclusion within regional policy making fora.
CONCLUSION
Japan’s fisheries aid was conceived and introduced in response to international changes 
in the Law of the Sea. It was clearly a defensive measure, one which sought to protect 
the operations of the distant water fishing industry. In the Pacific island region, the 
political rationale for aid was combined with economic considerations, as aid was used as 
an indirect ‘top-up’ to access fees. Direct subsidies were provided by the OFCF.
Over time, the function of fisheries aid evolved in response to new challenges and 
problems. For example, aid, used in conjunction with joint ventures, provided a basis for 
training foreign crew to help meet the shortfall in Japanese labour. It also helped keep a 
major cannery and fishing operation joint venture viable. The SSFG was a way of 
increasing (or at least maintaining) fisheries grants to the region, especially at a time 
when relations with the region were becoming more problematic. Fisheries aid initiatives 
were a way of addressing regional demands for more beneficial access arrangements, 
without taking more difficult adjustment measures or more politically contentious 
decisions, such as providing a direct subsidy to industry under a multilateral agreement.
103 From Katsuo-maguro tsushin, N o.6807,6 July 1993. Reprinted in FFA News Digest, No.5, 
September-October, 1993 p.24.
104 From Nilckan suisan keizai shimbun, 3 March 1994. Reprinted in FFA News Digest, No.4/94, July- 
August 1994, p. 13.
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Environmental aid was a response to the ‘image’ problems faced by Japan and the 
political challenge posed by the environmental lobby.
Policy was not always consistent. The use of aid in conjunction with access and 
the poor quality of some fisheries aid led to resentment of Japan and undermined the 
‘goodwill’ that aid was also designed to create. The emphasis on conservation measures 
detracted from the use of aid to support access negotiations. Attempts to pressure 
countries to support Japan in international fora conflicted with the goal of improving 
Japan’s international image as a fishing nation. This inconsistency has reflected the 
shifting priorities of Japan’s fishing industry. The study also suggests that aid may be 
utilised as a short term measure to compensate for political and economic weakness: to 
ease adjustment in a declining industry on the one hand and to undermine regional 
challenges (such as the multilateral access initiative) on the other. In this context aid is 
not necessarily a function of national strength.
The case of fisheries aid demonstrates the process of close coordination between 
a government agency and an industry or private sector group. Although government and 
industry relations were not always harmonious, fisheries aid was foremost a government 
tool to be used in the interests of industry. Administrative structures facilitated this 
approach. The OFCF was especially important as a channel for government aid to the 
private sector; it also coordinated fisheries grant aid policy.
But the foregoing study also shows the effects of aid procedures and bureaucratic 
politics, in particular the problems of formal linkage of aid and access. Procedures are 
not readily amenable to the political use of aid, as in negotiations with Papua New 
Guinea. Moreover, policy differences if not rivalry between ministries may complicate 
and undermine aid diplomacy, as the Papua New Guinea case revealed. This case also 
showed how recipients may play on bureaucratic differences in Japan’s aid administration 
in order to counter the negotiating position of Japanese officials.
A fundamental problem for fisheries aid diplomacy, however, was the existence 
of a competing aid policy agenda with respect to the Pacific islands. This was based on 
quite different ideas, objectives and policies. The Kuranari Doctrine, discussed in the 
next chapter, revealed how Japanese diplomacy was marked by an absence of a clear 
vision of Japan’s interests in the region or of an integrated and coherent set of policies.
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6 Competing Agendas: The Kuranari Doctrine 
and Japan’s Aid Diplomacy
In the 1980s Japan’s political relations with the Pacific island region expanded 
significantly. The region was gradually included within Japan’s foreign policy and broad 
political/strategic rationales for building ties with the island countries came to be 
articulated. These rationales supported an increasing aid presence and aid flows to the 
region. Policy towards the region was spelt out in a foreign policy doctrine delivered by 
the Foreign Minister while visiting Fiji in 1987 —  known as the Kuranari Doctrine. A 
central part of this policy was a plan to double Japan’s ODA to the region.
What were the motivations and objectives of this policy or doctrine? How was 
the aid doubling plan rationalised? What was the impact on Japan’s aid flows to the 
region? How did bureaucratic factors shape the policy decisions? Finally, how did the 
Kuranari Doctrine fit in with and relate to the ongoing fisheries aid agenda in the region?
This chapter examines the background to the development of this doctrine; the 
motivations and perceptions of the policy actors involved; and the implementation of the 
policy, especially relating to ODA. It explores the extent to which the Kuranari Doctrine 
was a case of ‘strategic aid’ and reassesses what is meant by the term ‘strategic aid’ as 
applied or used in the literature on Japan’s ODA.1
In analysing the origins of the Kuranari Doctrine, it is necessary to examine 
several strands in Japan’s foreign policy in the early 1980s, as well as developments in 
the Pacific island region. These include the emergence of the Pacific Basin cooperation 
concept, the idea of comprehensive security which integrated aid within a national 
security framework, and the outlook and posture of the Nakasone government. The 
analysis also considers American perceptions of security in the Pacific island region and 
the regional policy of the South Pacific Forum.
PACIFIC BASIN COOPERATION
The origins of the Pacific Basin cooperation movement date back at least to the late 
1960s. In 1967 then Japanese Foreign Minister Takeo Miki had sought an elaboration of
1 In general ‘strategic aid’ is a term that is confined to academic and media analysis of Japanese ODA 
and is not used officially. Most writers have used the term in reference to aid policy that is primarily 
aimed at countering Soviet influence and supporting Western (mainly US) security interests. For this 
reason strategic aid is largely a function of Cold War politics and its political objectives relate to shoring 
up global and regional security. The term does not describe the content of aid but the purpose of aid. See 
Dennis Yasutomo, The Manner of Giving: Strategic Aid and Japanese Foreign Policy, Lexington 
Books, Lexington, 1986; and Juichi Inada, ‘Japan’s Aid Diplomacy: Economic, Political or Strategic?’, 
in Kathleen Newland (ed), The International Relations of Japan, Millenium Publishing 
Group/MacMillan, London, 1990.
an ‘Asian Pacific policy’ based on increased cooperation and aid programs. A proposal 
for a Pacific free trade area was also mooted at this time and consultations to promote 
this idea led to the first Pacific Trade and Development Conference (PAFTAD) in 1968, 
an academic based forum.2 Official policy in Japan did not progress very much beyond 
this until 1978, when Prime Minister Masayoshi Ohira spoke of a ‘Pacific Rim 
Community’ during the election campaign of that year. Ohira subsequently established a 
Pacific Basin Cooperation Study Group as one of nine informal research groups. The 
chairman of the study group was Dr Saburo Okita.3
During a state visit to Australia and New Zealand in January 1980, Ohira and 
Okita discussed the ideas included in the interim report of the Study Group with the 
Australian and New Zealand Prime Ministers. This led to the convening of a seminar in 
September 1980 in Canberra made up of government officials, academics and 
representatives of the private sector from Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the 
United States, the five ASEAN countries, South Korea and the Pacific islands. This 
meeting was the first Pacific Economic Cooperation Conference (PECC).4
Prime Minister Ohira stopped over in Port Moresby on his way home from the 
state visit to Australia and New Zealand in January 1980. This three-hour visit was the 
first by a Japanese Prime Minister to a Pacific island country. Although considered a 
waste of time and an unnecessary burden on Ohira by some of the Prime Minister’s 
officials,5 this event marked a small turning point in the relationship between Japan and 
the region. PNG had been independent since 1975 and some other island countries 
attained independence as early as the 1960s. But until 1980, the official contact between
2 Since the early 1960s, Japanese scholars and business leaders have led debates about and proposals for 
a pan Pacific community. In addition to PAFTAD, the Pacific Basin Economic Council was set up in 
1968 to promote private sector cooperation and Japanese business leaders played a prominent role in this 
forum. Issues of development assistance were central to the Japanese proposals. The focus of Foreign 
Minister Miki’s initiative in 1967 was the fact that ‘the central issue for all Asian nations was the 
problem of poverty and any solution must be predicated upon a combined effort by both the developed 
Pacific nations and the developing countries in Asia’. Hadi Soesastro , ‘Pacific Economic Cooperation: 
The History of an Idea’, in Ross Gamaut and Peter Drysdale (eds), Asia Pacific Regionalism, Readings 
in International Economic Relations, Harper Educational Publishers and Australia-Japan Research 
Centre, 1994, p.80. See also Saburo Okita, Japan s Challenging Years: Reflections on my Lifetime.
Allen and Unwin/Australia - Japan Research Centre, 1983 and Kiyoshi Kojima, ‘Economic Cooperation 
in a Pacific Community’, in Paul F. Hooper (ed.), Building a Pacific Community: The Addresses and 
Papers of the Pacific Community Lecture Series, East-West Center, Hawaii, 1982.
3 In late 1979 Okita became Foreign Minister. He was succeeded, as Chairman of the Study Group, by 
two university professors, Tsuneo Iida and Seizaburo Sato, who produced an interim report in January 
1980 and a final report in July 1980. Saburo Okita, Japan’s Challenging Years, p.95.
4 Saburo Okita, Tightrope: Balancing Economics and Responsibility in Japanese Diplomacy, 1979- 
1980, Institute for Domestic and International Policy Studies, Tokyo, 1992, pp.45-50. In this text, Okita 
elaborated on Japan’s thinking and philosophy behind Pacific economic cooperation. In particular, he 
stressed the need for Japan to diversify its sources of supply and markets, and to integrate more fully its 
diplomacy towards the various parts of the Pacific Rim and Oceania.
5 Saburo Okita, Tightrope, p.50.
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Japan and region remained minimal. Moreover, Japan was then a very minor aid donor, 
although its potential had been noted.6
Although Okita later wrote that the countries of Oceania were ‘vital to the Pacific 
cooperation initiative’, it was apparent that this referred initially only to Australia and 
New Zealand. Japan’s Pacific diplomacy had not taken account of the island countries of 
the Pacific. Okita admitted that it was not until he and Ohira visited New Zealand in 
January 1980 that the question of what role the Pacific islands would play in the 
proposed regional ‘structure’ was discussed. Then New Zealand Prime Minister, Robert 
Muldoon, had made inclusion of the Pacific islands, and specifically Japan’s support for 
aid to the region, a condition of New Zealand’s support for the Pacific cooperation 
concept.7 The final report of the Pacific Basin Study Group subsequently made reference 
to existing regional organisations in the South Pacific and to the potential benefits to the 
island countries of Pacific-wide cooperation, especially in such areas as energy and 
transportation systems.8
The significance of Japan’s Pacific Basin diplomacy was that it created a foreign 
policy context in which to make policy towards the Pacific island region: in other words 
it provided a framework in which to integrate the region within Japan’s broader political 
and economic interests. In this way, the Pacific Basin movement served to reinforce the 
view in Japan of the Pacific island countries as a strategic entity, politically if not 
economically homogeneous. Although the focus of this diplomacy was ostensibly 
economic, especially as it evolved through PECC, the political aspects grew more 
prominent under Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone.
In January 1985, Prime Minister Nakasone underscored the growing importance 
of relations with the Pacific island countries when he visited Fiji and PNG. During the 
visit he pledged greater cooperation and in the style of omiyage (souvenir) diplomacy, 
donated $500,000 to the University of the South Pacific. Nakasone later explained the 
basis for this cooperation in an interview: ‘In light of the importance of these islands’ 
economic and political stability to the peace and stability of the Pacific region, Japan has 
been extending as much economic and technical cooperation as possible in fishing,
6 For an early assessment, see Alan Rix, ‘Japan’s Role in the South Pacific Region’, Australian Foreign 
Affairs Record, June 1981, pp.295-302.
7 Interview with Dr Saburo Okita, Tokyo, May 1992. Muldoon’s motives, in turn, are likely to have been 
shaped in part by the perceived security situation in the Pacific island region. Since the mid-1970s New 
Zealand had been concerned about possible Soviet influence and instability in the region. In addition, 
New Zealand had a more avowed sense of responsibility towards the Pacific island countries and thus 
wanted to include them.
8 ‘Report on the Pacific Basin Cooperation Concept’, Masayoshi Ohira’s Proposal: To Evolve the 
Global Society, Yuichiro Nagatomi (ed.), FAIR, Tokyo, 1988, pp.91-138.
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tourism and other areas’.9 In this interview, the Prime Minister alluded to Japan’s role in 
the region, not in terms of the intrinsic importance of relations with the island countries 
(such as in the fisheries sector) but of their importance in the wider Asia Pacific region 
and Japan’s need to fulfil its ‘responsibility as an industrial member of the regional 
community’. In keeping with the broad strategic concerns of the Nakasone government, 
the main thrust of his Oceania visit was securing Australian and New Zealand support for 
his ‘Four Principles’ of Pacific Basin cooperation: 1) respect for initiatives of ASEAN 
countries, 2) cooperation in all fields of economy, culture and technology, 3) cooperation 
open to countries outside the region, and 4) cooperation carried out with initiatives of 
the private sector rather than by the government’s direct guidance.10 Nakasone used the 
visit to Fiji and PNG to affirm Japan’s role as a Pacific nation that shared common 
interests with the Pacific island countries.
COMPREHENSIVE SECURITY
The idea that Japan’s security was broad-based (economic as well as military) and 
dependent upon a ‘comprehensive’ range of counter-measures (military, political and 
economic) had existed at least since the early 1970s when resource security became a 
major concern in the wake of the first oil crisis. The evolving international Law of the 
Sea regime at that time also challenged Japan’s traditional access to the distant water 
fisheries resources. The decision to establish a special category of fisheries grant aid in 
1973, as a way of securing Japan’s access to fisheries resources, attested to the approach 
to aid as a tool for promoting Japan’s economic security.
A study group established by Prime Minister Ohira in 1979 provided the first 
elaboration of the concept of ‘comprehensive security’. The report of the Comprehensive 
National Security Study Group, finalised in July 1980, advocated three levels of security 
effort: ‘self-reliant efforts; efforts to turn the international environment into a favourable 
one —  creation of a more peaceful international order; and intermediary measures — 
cooperation with countries important to Japan and sharing common interests’.* 11 Integral 
to all three levels was economic cooperation and assistance. The report argued for an 
‘increased and improved ODA program’ on the basis that Japan could not expect to play 
a significantly greater military security role (defence outlays would be lower than other 
Western powers); on the grounds of Japan’s dependence on developing countries for 
resources and the need to promote relations with these countries; and because of Japan’s 
comparatively high growth rate and capacity for allocating resources to ODA. It also
9 ‘Japan’s Nakasone States Isle Policies’, Pacific Magazine, September/October 1986, pp.62-4. See also 
‘Japan Wants Closer Links’, The Fiji Times, 15 January 1985, p .l.
10 ‘For Cooperation in the Pacific Region’, Nihon Iceizai shimbun, 22 January 1985, p.l; ‘Nakasone’s 
Oceanian Trip’, Editorial, The Japan Times, 22 January 1985, p.14.
11 ‘Report on Comprehensive National Security’, Masayoshi Ohira s Proposal, pp.228-30.
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argued that ‘many countries are hopeful of assistance from Japan because it is a reliable 
economic power ... free of political ambitions’.12
The report included diplomatic efforts within this framework of national security. 
In this context it advocated a greater political role by Japan, especially to promote 
stability in the Asia Pacific region. The Pacific Basin Cooperation Concept was seen as 
one initiative that would contribute to the goal of regional stability.
Implicit in the recommendations of the report was the idea that Japan’s national 
security was linked inextricably to the international system, (the idea of interdependence) 
and that Japan’s own economic well-being rested on the stability of developing countries 
and the maintenance of ‘friendly relationships’ with those countries. In this context, the 
role of aid was perceived as central to Japan’s national security efforts.
These ideas were spelt out more explicitly in another policy document, prepared 
by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) in November 1980.13 This was an attempt by 
MOFA to clarify the rationale of its aid policy, in particular to shift the emphasis away 
from commercial and economic considerations. ODA was defined as the ‘cost of building 
an international order to secure Japan’s overall national interest’. The policy document 
essentially reiterated the arguments for increased ODA that the Ohira study group had 
made. These included the argument that Japan should make greater efforts, by economic 
means, to establish a peaceful and stable international environment (since it could not 
make direct military contributions). It also included the argument that in light of Japan’s 
dependence on developing countries, especially for natural resources, aid could play a 
role in alleviating Japan’s economic vulnerabilities, by contributing to the economic 
stability of those countries.
Policy recommendations on Japan’s relations with the Pacific island countries, 
prepared for MOFA in 1980 and 1981, reflected these arguments of ‘comprehensive 
security’ as a rationale for ODA.14 Written by academics and former diplomats, these 
reports extensively surveyed political and economic conditions in the region, and 
elaborated on the approach Japan should adopt in its relations with the island countries. 
To some extent the more important relations with Australia and New Zealand 
overshadowed analysis of relations with the Pacific islands. At the same time, Australia’s 
and New Zealand’s own ties with, and interests in, the region (as the dominant Western 
powers and aid donors to the region) helped define the content of Japan’s approach to 
the Pacific island countries ,15
12 ‘Report on Comprehensive National Security’, Masayoshi Ohira s Proposal, pp.238-39.
13 Gaimusho, Keizai-kyoryoku no rinen —  seifu kaihatsu enjo wa naze okonau no ka, Kokusai Kyoryoku 
Suishin Kyokai, Tokyo, 1981.
14 Gaimusho (ed.), Hachiju nendai no nichigo kankei, Tokyo, 1980; and Gaimusho (ed), Hachiju nendai 
no waga kuni taiyoshu gaiko, Tokyo, 1981.
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The reports attempted to articulate a set of policies towards the region and in 
particular a clearer rationale for aid to the region. As the 1981 report argued:
It seems that ODA is the most effective means of economic cooperation in many 
of the Pacific island nations because of their levels of economic development and 
their given natural resources. ODA is generally divided into four categories: 1) 
food and emergency assistance from humanitarian viewpoint; 2) assistance for the 
development of energy and resources for Japanese economic development; 3) 
assistance for development of economic and social infrastructure to promote 
economic development and fulfilment of basic human needs in recipient 
countries; and 4) strategic assistance to promote peace and stability in certain 
areas indispensable to Japan. The basic attitudes of Japan’s ODA towards the 
Pacific island countries are in the third and fourth categories. The first and second 
categories are not important but may become so in the future.16
This elaboration of ODA policy is notable for its emphasis on the geopolitical 
component of security, rather than the economic component (resources). While it was 
recognised that Japan’s foreign policy interests in the region were based on economic 
factors (the presence of natural resources —  fisheries, forests and minerals —  and its 
tourism potential as well as geopolitical factors (regional security and possible 
superpower rivalry)17 the approach to aid policy in these reports appeared to concentrate 
on political stability rather than promoting resource security. This was the emphasis in 
subsequent foreign policy initiatives, as the later analysis demonstrates.
In general, ‘comprehensive security’ was a concept that described the approach 
to ODA in Japan, especially in the 1970s and early 1980s. It was also an attempt to 
integrate the various goals of ODA. Its prominence faded from official reports in the 
1980s.18 But its legacy was evident in policy towards the Pacific island countries. It 
established, as a principal goal, the use of ODA to promote ‘peace and stability’. This 
was generally defined in terms of supporting Western security interests. The promotion 
of political stability, as a rationale for ODA, was strongly evident in the foreign policy 
posture of Prime Minister Nakasone.
15 The importance to Japan of Australia and New Zealand, and especially the possible implications of 
Japan’s policies for these two countries’ own relations with the island states, is noted by Alan Rix, 
‘Japan’s Role in the South Pacific Region’, p.298.
16 Gaimusho (ed.), Hachiju nendai no waga kuni taiyoshu gaiko, pp.93-4.
17 For a further elaboration of Japan’s perceived interests in the region at this time, see Shizuo Saito, 
Taiheiyo jidai, Shinyusha, Tokyo, 1983. Saito was one of the authors of the 1981 MOFA report on 
relations with the Pacific island region. He was also a former Ambassador to Australia. Japanese media 
reports in the early 1980s saw the need for Japan to ‘contain the spread of Soviet power and influence’ 
in the Pacific and described Japan’s aid as motivated by geopolitical concerns. See The New Pacific, 
April 1981, p.9.
18 Dennis Yasutomo, ‘Why Aid? Japan as an “Aid Great Power” ’, Pacific Affairs, Vol.62, No.4 (Winter 
1989/90), pp.490-503. See Chapter 2 for further details about Japan’s policy of using aid as an 
instrument of national security.
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NAKASONE’S FOREIGN POLICY POSTURE AND STRATEGIC AID
Under Nakasone (Prime Minister from 1982 to 1987) the comprehensive security 
concept became integrated more closely with the US-Japan security alliance. Nakasone’s 
diplomatic style and emphasis was a marked departure from that of his predecessors.The 
slogan adopted and promoted by Nakasone was ‘Japan the international state’ (kokusai 
kokka). His policies (domestic and foreign) were based upon the promotion of a strong 
national identity and greater internationalism. He sought an equal partnership with the 
US, which involved a more active defence role and a more unequivocal commitment to 
burden sharing, especially in the defence relationship with the US.19
Containing the Soviet Union was the main strategic objective of the alliance and 
in this context, aid was increasingly promoted as a contribution to regional and global 
security. ODA was therefore a way to fulfil the requirements of burden sharing and 
partnership, as well as to accommodate the limits on expanding Japan’s own military 
defence effort. The foreign policy posture of the Nakasone government led to a closer 
identification with US security concerns and created the basis for closer collaboration 
between the US and Japan. In the Pacific island region, Japan’s foreign policy closely 
followed the direction set by the US.20
Under Nakasone’s leadership the concept of strategic aid became more clearly 
defined. The use of the term also began to feature in academic and media writing. The 
essential features of what was termed strategic aid were its identification with Western 
(namely US) security interests; its political function (to support countries/regions 
important to the West); and the implicit rationale (in Japan) that this aid was a form of 
burden sharing (to mitigate trade tensions with the US; and to supplement the lack of a 
military defence effort). Emphasis was on increasing aid levels, not on changing the type 
of aid provided.
US PERCEPTIONS OF SECURITY THREATS IN THE SOUTH PACIFIC
The Nakasone era coincided with a perception of heightened threat on the part of the 
West, especially from the Soviet Union. American thinking about security in the Pacific 
island region was in line with this trend and influenced Japanese perceptions of the
19 See Takashi Inoguchi, ‘Nakasone and his Diplomatic Legacy’ originally published in Japan 
Quarterly, Vol.34, No.4 (October/November 1987), pp.363-70; reprinted in Takashi Inoguchi, Japan’s 
International Relations, Pinter Publishers, London, 1991. Also see Aurelia George, ‘Japan and the 
United States: Dependent Ally or Equal Parmer?’ in J.A.A. Stockwin et al., Dynamic and Immobilist 
Politics in Japan, University of Hawaii Press, Hawaii, 1988, pp.237-96.
20 For example, before a Diet research committee in 1985, a MOFA official described Soviet activities in 
the region as ‘considerably political’ and called for the West to ‘stand guard’ against possible threats. 
Isami Takeda, ‘Japan’s Aid to the South Pacific Region’, in Bruce Koppel and Robert M. Orr, Jr.(eds), 
Japan s Foreign Aid: Power and Policy in a New Era, Westview, Boulder, 1993.
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region. A significant factor was the anti-nuclear policies prevalent in the region in the 
early to mid-1980s, which were viewed as undermining Western strategic interests and 
advancing the interests of the Soviet Union. The main issues of concern to the US were 
the regional South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (SPNFZ) adopted in 1985, the anti­
nuclear constitution in the US Trust Territory of Palau, Vanuatu’s anti-nuclear and non- 
aligned posture, the New Zealand Labour government ban on nuclear armed and 
powered ship visits (effective since 1985 and which led to the abrogation of the ANZUS 
alliance), and an anti-nuclear Labour Party in Fiji (formed in 1985).21
It is perhaps ironic that Japan had played a part in fuelling regional anti-nuclear 
sentiment and the subsequent regional treaty (SPNFZ). This stemmed from its attempt in 
early 1980 to dump low level nuclear waste in the Pacific ocean, north of the Ogasawara 
Islands.22 In 1981 a team of officials from Japan’s Science and Technology Agency 
toured the region in order to gain the understanding and support of the island countries. 
But they were urged at each stop not to proceed with the plan. Their request to visit 
Vanuatu was denied. At the South Pacific Forum meeting in August 1981, Japan’s plan 
to dump nuclear waste brought the issue of a nuclear free zone back onto the Forum 
agenda.23 Tuvalu and Vanuatu both sought a Forum resolution condemning nuclear 
waste dumping and nuclear testing. Vanuatu also mooted the possibility of a nuclear free 
zone. This was strongly opposed by both New Zealand and Australia.24.
Nuclear issues were thus one source of tension between the region and Western 
powers. But the primary source of tension centred on exploitation of the region’s 
fisheries in particular tuna. American policy not to recognise coastal state sovereignty 
over tuna (a highly migratory species) fuelled conflict with the Pacific island states.25 As 
early as 1982 some US policy makers recognised that this issue had the potential to push
21 For a survey of these issues, see Stewart Firth, Nuclear Playground, Allen and Unwin, Sydney, 1987. 
ANZUS was the defence alliance between Australia, New Zealand and the US.
22 For details of Japanese government proposed dumping program, see Low Level Radioactive Wastes: 
Dumping at the Pacific, Radioactive Waste Management Centre, Science and Technology Agency, 
Tokyo, 1980.
23 The South Pacific Forum had not pursued this concept since the mid-1970s when a proposed regional 
nuclear free zone had lapsed (in part due to French government policy ending atmospheric nuclear tests 
and Australian and New Zealand opposition to the proposal).
24 Agreed Record and Communique, 12th South Pacific Forum, Vanuatu, 10-11 August, 1981. The 
changes in government in Australia in 1983 and New Zealand in 1984 shifted opinion in the Forum in 
favour of a nuclear free zone. This led subsequently to the SPNFZ, adopted in 1985 (commonly known 
as the Treaty of Rarotonga).
25 Conflict essentially stemmed from the US tuna industry failure to comply with licensing conditions 
set by island states. This in turn led to the activation of economic embargos by the US on those island 
governments that arrested US vessels caught fishing ‘illegally’. Two significant cases involved PNG in 
1982 and the Solomon Islands in 1984. For details of US policy and its relations with the Pacific island 
states see B. Martin Tsamenyi, ‘The South Pacific States, the USA and Sovereignty over Highly 
Migratory Species’, Marine Policy, January 1986, pp. 29-41.
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the island states into closer relations with the Soviet Union and/or deny access to 
American nuclear vessels.26 A regional treaty formalising access for American vessels to 
the economic zones of the South Pacific was therefore proposed as a way of avoiding 
such confrontation. Dialogue with the US on the issue of a multilateral access 
arrangement tentatively began in 1984. This may not have progressed very far had not 
Kiribati, in October 1985, signed a fishing agreement with the Soviet Union (the first 
such arrangement involving the Soviet Union in the region). In 1986, Vanuatu also 
signed an access arrangement with the USSR, while other Pacific island countries, for 
example Fiji, mooted the possibility of doing the same.27
Against this background, which generated extreme alarm in the US about Soviet 
‘in-roads’, the US government concluded a multilateral access agreement with the Pacific 
island countries in October 1986.28 The main feature of this agreement, which was to run 
for five years, was the US government’s commitment of $10 million a year in cash and 
fisheries aid to the island countries as payment for access. The American tuna industry, in 
turn, was required to pay only $2 million a year. This agreement was thus essentially 
dependent upon the US government’s economic support. The American motivation to 
conclude what was an unprecedented agreement (both for the US and the region) was 
largely based upon security concerns. This agreement was therefore an explicit example 
of American strategic aid to the Pacific island region.29
This was not the first case of strategic aid by the US in the Pacific island region. 
US aid policy to Fiji was an earlier example of this approach. Fiji had agreed in 1983 to 
allow US nuclear armed and powered vessels access to Fiji ports. This policy was 
rewarded in late 1984 when Fiji’s Prime Minister, Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara, became the 
first Pacific island leader to be received at the White House. During this visit, the US 
government pledged bilateral aid to Fiji, which would make that country the exception in 
US aid policy to the region (where countries generally received aid through regional 
programs managed by the USAID office in Fiji).30
26 See statement of Congressman Paul McClosky Jr., quoted in B. Martin Tsamenyi, ‘The South Pacific 
States, the USA and Sovereignty’, p.40.
27 ‘Ratu Mara Plays the Russian Card’, Pacific Islands Monthly, August 1986, pp.20-1.
28 ‘Fish Pact Inked in Tonga; Soviets Exit Kiribati’, The Washington Pacific Report, Vol.5, No.3, 
November 1986, p .l. Chapter 4 gave details of the terms and conditions of this treaty.
29 Media reports of the US-South Pacific negotiations focused heavily on strategic and political 
imperatives shaping American policy. For example, see the series of articles in The Australian (October 
1986) by Bruce Loudon. Both the Pentagon and the CIA were reported to be lobbying the US 
Administration to conclude an agreement, citing a ‘Soviet quest for economic and political influence in 
the South Pacific’ as the motive behind their pursuit of fishing rights. See ‘Reagan Under Pressure to 
Find $20m for Island States’, The Age, 30 August 1986.
30 Details of US aid policy to the region in the 1980s and the distribution of aid are given in United 
States Aid to the South Pacific, Regional Development Office, South Pacific, USAID, November 1987.
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Thus in the 1980s the US made clear its commitment to strategic aid to the South 
Pacific. The US also made clear that it expected Japan to adopt a similar approach. In 
US-Japan consultations in the 1980s, according to media reports, American officials had 
emphasised the need for Japan to offer increased economic aid to the Pacific island 
countries, and to take greater responsibility for countering the ‘Soviet drive’.31 The 
explicit statement of American expectations about Japan’s role in the region was an 
integral part of the Kuranari Doctrine developed by Japan.
It was a major irony, however, that the US decision to enter into a multilateral 
fisheries access agreement with the region had damaging implications for Japan’s own 
fisheries agreements in the region, for example with PNG. The US treaty was also the 
catalyst for mounting regional pressure on Japan to adopt a similar multilateral approach 
to fishing arrangements. Here was a case, then, of US strategic aid policy proving 
counter-productive to the interests of its ally, Japan.32
SOUTH PACIFIC FORUM OVERTURES AND JAPAN’S RESPONSE
The emergence of a new policy towards the island states was also facilitated by overtures 
initiated by the South Pacific Forum. In August 1985, at the South Pacific Forum 
meeting in the Cook Islands, a resolution was adopted calling for closer cooperation 
between the region and Japan. The issue was considered late in the meeting. The 
resolution stated: The Forum, taking into account Prime Minister Nakasone’s visit to 
the region and the current level of Japanese aid to Forum states, requested SPEC to 
explore the establishment of dialogue with Japan with a view to obtaining further 
assistance for the Smaller Island Countries (the Cook Islands, Kiribati, Niue and Tuvalu) 
in particular’.33
The Forum resolution, the first time that Japan was targetted for assistance in an 
explicit way by the regional body, was formulated in the context of policy towards 
assisting the special needs of smaller island countries (SICs). A committee on SICs had
31 See, for example, Nayan Chanda, ‘No More Free Rides: The US Wants Japan to Play a Major 
Political Role’, Far Eastern Economic Review, 2 October 1986, pp.27-8. The report quoted an American 
official as stating that the US expected Japan to play a role ‘not only in economic aid’ but ‘in curbing 
Soviet influence’ in the Pacific island region.
32 As noted in the previous chapter, it was mainly Fisheries Agency officials in Japan who viewed US 
policy in this light. The officials from MOFA, interviewed by the author, did not perceive (or admit to) 
any connection between US policies and their own fisheries interests. Differences between MOFA and 
the Fisheries Agency on this issue reflect more general tensions in Japan’s relations with the US. While 
MOFA was primarily concerned with promoting diplomatic and security aspects of relations with the 
US, the more problematic economic aspects of the relationship were mainly the concern of other 
ministries, for example MITI. MOFA aimed to ameliorate friction with the US arising from economic 
differences through political and aid initiatives.
33 Agreed Record and Communique, 16th South Pacific Forum, Cook Islands, 6 August 1985. The 
South Pacific Bureau for Economic Cooperation (SPEC) is the secretariat of the South Pacific Forum.
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been established after the 1984 Forum meeting. Its focus was to find ways to utilise 
regional cooperation more effectively in the interests of SICs. The resolution on Japan 
thus appeared narrow in scope, especially when compared with the statement at the 1985 
Forum meeting on relations with the Peoples Republic of China. It noted the ‘successful 
visit’ to the region by the General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (in April 
1985), which had ‘emphasised China’s strong interest in playing a helpful and 
constructive role in the region’. The statement also noted ‘Australia’s offer to facilitate 
productive contacts between China and those Forum Island Countries that might wish to 
develop their relations with China’.34
The first step in the dialogue with Japan occurred in April 1986 with a visit to 
Japan by the Director of SPEC. The aim of the visit was to explore Japan’s attitude 
towards providing assistance to the SICs, especially in the sectors of fisheries, transport, 
employment and telecommunications. Discussion focused on the regional 
telecommunications program and regional shipping. According to an assessment of 
SPEC, ‘the discussions revealed a willingness on the part of Japan to develop the overall 
relationship with member countries, including aid relationship, but also revealed a lack of 
information and understanding within the Japanese administrative system of the South 
Pacific, its development needs and regional programs’.35
During the same visit, the question of Japanese observer status at the South 
Pacific Forum was raised by Japanese officials. This may have been an attempt to enable 
Japan to provide aid directly to SPEC, as Japan does not generally provide aid to 
organisations from which it is excluded. The SPEC Director undertook to raise the 
question with the SPEC Committee working on a review of the SPEC agreement. This 
was done in May 1986. A request by the Director for more information from Japan on its 
enquiry did not receive a response by the time of the Forum meeting in August. The 
consideration of the matter was deferred.36
The Forum Communique in 1986 called for a continuation of the dialogue with 
Japan. A second visit to Japan by the SPEC Director took place in November 1986. This 
followed up earlier talks on regional cooperation and specific projects that Japan could 
become involved in. On this occasion discussion of political issues was included, 
specifically decolonisation and the reinscription of the French territory of New Caledonia
34 Agreed Record and Communique, 16th South Pacific Forum. This statement possibly was responding 
to the stronger political commitment to improving relations with the South Pacific voiced by the Chinese 
leader, Hu Yaobang, during his regional tour. During the visit to Fiji he had stressed the importance of 
peace in the region, support for regional cooperation, rejection of any military aspirations in the Pacific 
and opposition to any other countries seeking leadership within the Asia-Pacific region. He also pledged 
greater aid to the island countries. ‘Chinese Seek Stronger Ties with U s’, Fiji Sun, 23 April 1985, p.3.
35 Report on Developments Relating to Japan, China and ASEAN, SPEC, Suva, August 1986.
36 Report on Observer Status of Japan, SPEC, Suva, August 1986.
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on the UN list of territories awaiting decolonisation. The Forum sought the backing of 
the Japanese government on the UN vote on reinscription.
The policy approach of the South Pacific Forum at this time was to work out 
ways in which Japan would be able to support regional programs. The main areas of 
concern were: SICs, telecommunications, transport and tourism. The Forum overtures 
provided information to Japan’s policy makers about the region and helped to enhance its 
profile in Japan at a time when the Japanese government was reappraising its policy 
towards the region. But the extent to which the policy makers in Japan were influenced 
by the SPEC representations on aid to regional projects was limited, as Japan’s policy 
subsequently revealed.37
Hence the antecedents to the Kuranari initiative included a number of factors. 
Pressure from the US on Japan to assume a greater aid presence in the region had been 
building (motivated primarily by the perceived Soviet ‘in-roads’). The opportunity to 
develop a dialogue with the region had also been opened up with the South Pacific 
Forum’s overtures to Japan. Meanwhile under Prime Minister Nakasone, Japan’s aid 
policy had developed an increasingly political/strategic rationale, if not orientation: as an 
instrument of ‘comprehensive security’ and as a contribution to the ever-growing 
American demands for ‘burden sharing’. Nakasone provided the leadership and the 
political will to openly embrace strategic aid as part of a more forthright foreign policy 
posture. Japan’s evolving Pacific Basin diplomacy provided a foreign policy context in 
which to place the region and its importance to Japan. The rhetoric of Pacific 
cooperation was invoked in declarations about Japan’s relations with the region. This 
supported an emphasis on regional peace and stability. MOFA reports on Japan’s aid 
policy to the Pacific island countries reflected this approach; emphasising the need to 
promote stability in the region. Japan’s economic security was not a prominent factor in 
MOFA policy papers or rationales for aid to the region.
FORMULATING THE KURANARI DOCTRINE
The immediate origins of the Kuranari Doctrine lay in the policy planning begun in mid- 
1986 by the head of the Oceania Division in MOFA. This section analyses the 
formulation of the Japan’s aid initiative to the Pacific island countries. Attention focuses 
on the policy actors (their perceptions and motivations) as well the policy making 
process. The impact of bureaucratic structures is also examined.38
37 This is analysed in more detail below. It refers, however, to the decision by Japanese policy makers to 
channel their regional aid through the United Nations Development Program rather than SPEC.
38 The following analysis is based largely on interviews with MOFA officials who were active in this 
area at the time. It also relies on discussions with scholars and other observers in Japan. Press and other 
reports have also been used. Not all of the sources (especially interviews) are cited specifically in the 
notes.
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The actors
The task of formulating policy towards the Pacific islands primarily lay with the Oceania 
Division of MOFA, and in particular with the Director of that Division. The Oceania 
Division is located in the Bureau for European and Oceanic Affairs. This included (as of 
1992) two divisions for West Europe, one for East Europe and one for the Soviet Union. 
The Bureau is primarily concerned with Europe and the Soviet Union, which hold a far 
more important place in Japan’s foreign relations than does Oceania (Australia, New 
Zealand and the Pacific islands). The Director of the Oceania Division tends to enjoy a 
significant degree of autonomy over policy, relative to other division directors. He is 
more free to set his own direction, although the extent to which he exercises his initiative 
depends largely on the individual holding the position.39
In mid-1986 a new director, Nobuaki Tanaka, joined the Oceania Division. He 
previously held the position of Deputy Director, Policy Coordination Division, in the 
Minister’s Secretariat. In the formulation of the Kuranari Doctrine this actor played the 
most central role. Other prominent actors were also from the political side of MOFA (as 
opposed to the aid and economic cooperation sections of the Ministry). They included 
the Director of the Policy Coordination Division (who, among other things, decided the 
schedule of diplomatic visits), the Administrative Vice-Foreign Minister, and the Private 
Secretary to the Foreign Minister. These actors may be defined as primary policy makers, 
central to instigating the initiative.
In policy development, a wider range of policy actors was involved. These 
included the directors of the various divisions of the Economic Cooperation Bureau in 
MOFA; sections of the Budget Bureau of the Ministry of Finance (MOF), in charge of 
allocating resources, the Foreign Minister after whom the policy was named and who 
reportedly had a personal interest in the island countries, and the Cabinet, which 
approved the Minister’s regional visit. These actors were important in shaping the 
outcome of policy and may be called secondary policy makers.
Finally there were important policy actors outside of the government who either 
closely advised government policy makers (for example an academic at the University of 
Tokyo, Seizaburo Sato) or who played a more supportive role. In the latter category 
were groups that helped to put pressure on MOF to increase budget allocations —  such 
as the think-tank, Foundation for Advanced Information and Research (FAIR), under the 
auspices of MOF —  and create an atmosphere supportive of such increases. The media 
was particularly influential in this respect. Some private sector actors also served as 
informal intermediaries.
39 The Oceania Division does not fit easily into any one regional bureau. While being a part of the 
European and Oceanic Affairs Bureau, the director and deputy director of the Oceania Divison also 
attend meetings of the Asian Affairs Bureau, although they are somewhat of an outlier in this setting as 
well. Interviews, Oceania Division, MOFA.
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The policy approach
When the new Director to the Oceania Divison took up his appointment in mid-1986 he 
did so with a preconceived policy agenda. What was described as his ‘main task’ was to 
find ways to ‘counter the Soviet Union in the South Pacific area’.40 According to 
Tanaka, this task had been spelt out to him by his former head, the Director of the Policy 
Coordination Division (a senior diplomat, Yukio Sato). Soon after joining the Division, 
the new Director accompanied the Parliamentary Vice-Foreign Minister, Usuoki Urano, 
on a visit to the region. This included Papua New Guinea, Vanuatu and Fiji.41
This visit reinforced certain perceptions that Tanaka had already formed about 
the situation in the region and Japan’s role there: Japan’s lack of interests and lack of 
influence in the region meant there was little upon which to build policy; the 
preoccupation with the Soviet presence (especially the extent to which Soviet fishing 
vessels could be used for surveillance) combined with a lack of intelligence about the 
Soviet Union’s objectives in the region; and the need to coordinate policy with other 
Western powers (especially the US and Australia). In addition, during the visit island 
representatives (such as the Director of SPEC) expressed the view that Japan should do 
more for the region. On his return, Tanaka began what he called ‘his Pacific campaign’.
The approach taken by the Director was to seek to increase substantially Japan’s 
aid presence in the Pacific region. The general target was to double aid flows. There was 
no specific time frame, just a ‘quickly as possible’ approach. This emphasis on aid was 
based on the view that the island countries ‘needed cash’, which was why the Soviet 
Union had succeeded in signing fishing agreements with some countries. If Japan offered 
more aid, it would fill that need and the island countries would not accept Soviet 
overtures. The view of policy makers was that since the Japanese aid allocation to the 
region was very small, it would not affect overall aid allocations to double the region’s 
share; but it would make a big difference to the region.
There were two components to the policy approach developed by Tanaka. One 
was to build a domestic consensus supporting the need for an initiative to the Pacific 
islands. This meant popularising the view that there were security interests at stake in 
enhancing Japan’s aid presence. The US was seeking and would welcome a greater 
Japanese role in the region. This in turn would give credence to the arguments put to 
MOF and aid divisions of MOFA that more aid was needed. Implicit in this approach 
was the view that an attempt to get more resources allocated to the region would not 
succeed unless there were strong reasons, based on Japan’s national interests, to support 
the increase in aid. The prevailing view within MOF and aid divisions was that Japan was 
already doing enough and that the island countries would not be able to absorb more aid.
40 Interview, Nobuaki Tanaka, Bangkok, April 1993.
41 ‘Parliamentary Vice-Foreign Minister Visits Oceania’, Nihon keizai shimbun, July 10 1986.
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There was also a lack of interest throughout MOFA in South Pacific affairs in general. 
This first approach relied on media coverage, the work of a MOF think-tank (FAIR) and 
informal overtures by influential, private sector actors.
The second component, which complemented the first, was to formulate a 
political initiative that would not only attract a lot of attention internationally but would 
also generate the necessary momentum domestically for achieving the proposed aid 
commitment. This took the form of a ministerial visit to the region and the articulation of 
a foreign policy statement, which was elevated to the status of ‘doctrine’. Since such 
visits are expected to be marked by an announcement of aid or a new diplomatic 
initiative, the purpose of the ministerial visit was to serve as such a policy catalyst. As 
Yasutomo noted, foreign policy initiatives, especially those incorporating aid pledges, are 
generally designed for ‘maximum public relations effect’.42 This may be one reason why 
the Pacific aid initiative was labelled a ‘doctrine’.
Developing the policy: the media, FAIR and private sector
The campaign to popularise concern about the Pacific island countries was based on 
encouraging media coverage of regional developments. Media interest in Japan’s South 
Pacific diplomacy gradually developed in 1986. The general tone of these reports 
borrowed heavily from Western media reporting of political issues in the region and was 
alarmist in the portrayal of the Soviet Union. An article in The Japan Times on 1 August, 
titled ‘Change comes to the American Lake’ was indicative of this approach.43 The 
frequency of these reports increased significantly towards the end of 1986, in the lead-up 
to the Foreign Minister’s visit to the region. Tanaka claimed that he orchestrated this 
coverage, to some extent, by selective feeding of information to the media, often 
exaggerating the extent of Soviet intrusion.44 During and immediately after Foreign 
Minister Kuranari’s visit to the region in January 1987, media interest was at its height, 
fuelled partly by dramatic events such as the military coup in Fiji in May 1987. Through 
1987 and to a less extent in 1988 media interest in strategic and political events in the 
Pacific island region continued.45
42 Dennis Yasutomo, ‘Why Aid? Japan as an “Aid Great Power” ’, p.501.
43 This article included a warning that the era of ‘unchallenged and unquestioned American domination 
of the Pacific’ was over and unless care was taken to allocate resources and attention to the region, ‘the 
hitherto absent Russian bear would be ready to pick up the pieces’. Other articles that concentrated on 
Soviet activities in the Pacific region were published in the Asahi shimbun, 1 July (morning edition) 
1986 and Nihon keizai shimbun, 27 August 1986.
44 The media coverage of the Kuranari trip is covered in more detail below. According to Tanaka, the 
Soviet ‘threat’ was deliberately exaggerated in media briefings in order to highlight the need for a 
Japanese initiative in the region. This approach was questioned at times by the Soviet Union Division in 
MOFA, which was concerned about the possible effect of such reporting on relations with the Soviet 
Union.
181
In addition to media coverage of issues in the region, the work of the FAIR 
Committee for Oceania and the Pacific Islands helped focus on the issue of Japan’s aid to 
the region. FAIR was established in 1985, under the auspices of MOF. It grew out of 
Prime Minister Ohira’s Pacific Basin Cooperation Study Group.46 FAIR is essentially a 
policy think-tank with an international network of affiliate members. It oversees research 
on a wide range of policy areas and issues, promotes the exchange of information and 
interaction of policy makers, business people and academics and sponsors various 
symposia, conferences and study programs.
The main task of the FAIR Committee for Oceania and the Pacific Islands was to 
develop a report on Japan’s aid policy to the Pacific island region. Although not released 
until early 1988, the drafting of what was called the Pacific Aid Initiative paralleled the 
development of Japan’s diplomatic approach to the region (the Kuranari Doctrine). The 
Director of the Oceania Division was one of the Committee members and initially viewed 
the FAIR Committee as a way to bring pressure on MOF to allocate a greater share of 
resources to the region. Five members of the Committee were from MOF while the 
Chairman of FAIR’S Executive Board was an influential former official of MOF — 
Yuichiro Nagatomi. Although not directly involved in the work of the Committee, 
Nagatomi was interested in the preparation of the Pacific Aid Initiative and helped to 
publicise and promote it. The assessment of some members of the Committee, including 
Tanaka, was that the Committee ultimately exercised very little influence on Japan’s aid 
policy, although it did build on the momentum of the Kuranari Doctrine. Its main 
contribution perhaps was to elaborate on aid policy recommendations for the region. In 
this context, it was of more interest to foreign observers, being the first major report in 
English on Japan’s aid policy to the Pacific island countries. As far as generating 
increased resources for the region, it was perceived to be far less significant than the 
Foreign Minister’s v isit47
One member of the FAIR committee was the Honorary Consul for Kiribati and 
Tuvalu, Tokugoro Kuribayashi. As the President of Nanyo Boeki Kaisha (NBK) 
Corporation, Kuribayashi presided over one of the oldest Japanese trading companies in
45 Other events that helped keep attention focused on the Pacific islands included a conference in 
Western Samoa in August 1987, sponsored by the Association for the Promotion of International 
Cooperation (APIC) and MOFA. See for example ‘South Pacific No Longer the Isolated, Peaceful Island 
Paradise’, The Japan Times, August 10,1987. A Pacific islands conference in Tokyo in August 1988 
sponsored by the Sasakawa Peace Foundation also attracted media interest.
46 The name FAIR is regarded by some in Japan as a pun on the call for ‘fair trade’ by the US and 
others, since FAIR was formed at a time of intense trade friction between Japan and the US.
47 See Pacific Aid Initiative: A Proposal for Japanese Assistance to Pacific Island Nations, FAIR, 
Committee for Oceania and Pacific Island Countries, April 1988. Written by academic members of the 
Committee, this report closely resembled the Kuranari Doctrine in its analysis of Japan’s role in the 
region and the principles and ideas that should inform aid policy. It also echoed the popular alarm about 
strategic and political developments in the region.
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the Pacific islands. The NBK Corporation had dominated commerce in Micronesia and 
parts of the Gilbert Islands in the 1930s and 1940s. After the end of the Second World 
War, their operations had ceased but the company was ‘reborn’ in the 1950s and 
resumed operations in the islands. Amongst other things, it secured the contracts for 
projects supplied to the US Trust Territory of Micronesia by the Japanese government, 
under the terms of the 1969 reparations agreement.48 Kuribayashi became the Honorary 
Consul for Kiribati in 1983, and in that capacity he facilitated a number of ODA projects, 
acting as an advisor to both the Kiribati and Japan governments.
Kuribayashi actively supported a greater ODA presence by Japan in the Pacific.
In the period leading up to the Kuranari initiative, he argued (both publicly and in a 
submission to the MOFA) for a greater effort by government and the private sector to 
promote economic development in the region. He warned that ‘the fragile Pacific island 
nations will be compelled to break away from the free world ... unless the Japanese 
Government and private sector join hands to make an all out effort to grapple with the 
problems of development aid’. Kuribayashi sought a ten-fold increase in Japan’s ODA to 
the region together with a greater effort by business in promoting joint ventures and 
infrastructure development. He also articulated a somewhat romantic idea of Japan’s role 
in the Pacific: declaring that he ‘felt strongly that the development of the industries and 
economies of the South Pacific nations is a mission entrusted to Japan’.49
Kuribayashi’s role was twofold: as an advocate in the campaign to increase aid to 
the Pacific islands and, perhaps more importantly, as a promoter of development projects 
that could channel increased Japanese aid as well as private sector investment to the 
region. The development with which he was most closely associated was the proposal to 
transform Christmas Island in the far east of Kiribati into an international space and 
communications centre. Kuribayashi, as the secretary to a Japan-based lobby group, the 
Pacific Space Centre Council, has been trying to attract Japanese support for the 
proposal. It is estimated that the total project, which envisages the development of a 
space shuttle launching base as well as tourism facilities, would require an investment 
(public and private) of $8 billion.50 Although the prospects for proceeding with the 
scheme remain uncertain, at least one component of the proposed development, a 1000
48 Claim —  Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands Agreement between the United States of America and 
Japan, 1969. Details in Grant Goodman and Felix Moos, The United States and Japan in the Western 
Pacific: Micronesia and Papua New Guinea, Westview Replica Edition, Boulder, 1981. Details of NBK 
Corporation’s activities are from Nanyo Boeki Kaisha, ‘History of the Company’, NBK Corporation, 
Tokyo.
49 Tokugoro Kuribayashi, On Issues Relating to the Economic Development of South Pacific Nations, 
Draft Submission, 7 October, 1986.
50 ‘Shuttle Base in the South Pacific’, Nikkei sangyo shimbun, 8 June 1987. The Japan government 
already maintains a satellite tracking station on Christmas Island and has built a hotel on the island to 
house technicians. For further details of Christmas Island development plans, see Kokusai kaihatsu 
janaru, No.453 (3), 1993, pp.54-63.
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ton passenger/cargo vessel, was provided under Japanese ODA to Kiribati in 1991 
(valued at 1.2 billion yen).51
Planning theMinisterial visit
The second, related strand in formulating policy towards the region involved 
preparations for a Ministerial visit to the region and elaboration of Japan’s policies and 
principles in relations with the island countries. The process of deciding to include a visit 
to the region on the Minister’s agenda began with consultations between the Director of 
the Oceania Division, the Director of the Policy Coordination Division in the Minister’s 
Secretariat, Yukio Sato, who was in charge of organising the diplomatic schedule, the 
private secretary of Mr Kuranari, and the Administrative Vice-Foreign Minister. 
According to Tanaka, the main obstacle lay with convincing the Minister’s Secretariat of 
the need to include the Pacific island region in the Minister’s itinerary. In this, support of 
the above actors was crucial. The Minister himself did not play a direct role in the 
decision. But he was interested in the region and was sympathetic to the development 
needs of the islands countries.52
It was decided that the Foreign Minister should travel to Fiji, Vanuatu and Papua 
New Guinea following planned visits to Australia and New Zealand, where the Foreign 
Minister and other Cabinet colleagues were scheduled to hold Ministerial consultations in 
January 1987. This would provide the opportunity for Japan to brief Australia and New 
Zealand of its Pacific island initiative. The visit to Fiji would be marked by the 
declaration of Japan’s commitment to the Pacific islands and a statement of policies 
including pledges of aid. It was up to Tanaka to write the speech for the Foreign 
Minister. Shortly before the Kuranari visit, Tanaka travelled to Washington and briefed 
State Department and Pentagon officials of Japan’s proposed policy to the Pacific 
islands. American officials pledged to support Japan, by such indirect means as urging 
the World Bank to provide more aid to the region. But the US itself would not be able to 
commit more aid funds.53 According to Tanaka, the visit to Washington affirmed the 
existence of two common security concerns shared by the US and Japanese governments
51 This project was not provided explicitly as part of the development of Christmas Island. However, in a 
draft ‘Basic Policy for Development of Christmas Island’, prepared by Kuribayashi, a 1,000 ton 
passenger and cargo vessel was listed as a ‘basic item’ to be sought under the Japanese ODA program.
52 There are mixed opinions about the degree of interest and involvement that Kuranari had in the 
development of this policy. According to his bio-data, Kuranari had a keen interest in the South Pacific 
because of his involvement in remote islands affairs in Japan. See Isami Takeda, ‘Japan’s Aid to the 
South Pacific Region’. While some observers dispute this, suggesting that Kuranari simply ‘read the 
speech’, it does appear that the initiative was helped by the fact that Kuranari was personally interested 
in the region. This was not necessarily for sentimental reasons but, according to Tanaka, ‘because he 
(Kuranari) was anxious to extend new horizons’.
53 The US government had recently pledged almost $60 million over a five-year period under the 
multilateral access agreement between the US and the region. This was in addition to existing aid 
programs administered by the regional USAID office.
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in the South Pacific. These were that Soviet fishing vessels were seeking home ports and 
this could lead to a possible rocket launching base in Kiribati; and that Soviet air routes 
would be strengthened and wide-bodied jets would secure landing facilities in Vanuatu.54
Building a favourable ambiance
In planning the visit to the region one issue that was crucial to how Japan’s initiative 
would be received, was decolonisation. In the mid-1980s, growing violence and 
confrontation in the French territory of New Caledonia between pro-independence 
Kanaks and pro-French settlers had encouraged the South Pacific Forum to seek 
international support to resolve the question of the territory’s future.55 The first stage in 
this process was to seek to re-enlist New Caledonia on the UN list of territories awaiting 
decolonisation. This would require the French government to report to the UN 
Decolonisation Committee on preparations towards eventual independence for the 
territory. The South Pacific Forum had agreed in 1986 to take this step, in the face of 
strong opposition from France. A vote on the issue was expected to be taken at the UN 
General Assembly on 2 December (one month before Kuranari’s visit to the Pacific).
During the SPEC Director’s visit to Tokyo in November the issue had been 
discussed and Japan’s support on the vote had been sought. This may have been 
influential, but Tanaka attributed more significance to the lobbying of Australia and New 
Zealand which both strongly supported the vote. Ultimately the question that carried 
most weight was how the vote would impact on the forthcoming visit to Oceania. A 
negative vote (or abstention) would cast a shadow over Japan’s Pacific initiative. The 
final decision on the issue was made in a ‘roundtable’ session presided over by the 
Administrative Vice-Foreign Minister. Arguing strongly in favour of abstention was 
Japan’s Ambassador to France and the West European Division of MOFA. Arguing in 
favour of support was the Oceania Division and the Japanese Ambassador to Australia 
(who made the case from Australia by phone). The Administrative Vice-Foreign Minister 
was responsible for the decision eventually made to vote in support of reinscription.56
The decision to support the vote at the UN was unprecedented. It was the first 
time Japan had broken ranks with its key Western allies on such an issue. The US, 
Canada and Britain were among countries that abstained in the vote. France was 
reported to be so shocked and affronted that the French President refused to meet with
54 Interviews, Nobuaki Tanaka, Bangkok, April 1993; officials, Oceania Division, MOFA, Tokyo, 
November 1992.
55 For more details on New Caledonia, see Helen Fraser, New Caledonia: Anti-Colonialism in a Pacific 
Territory, Peace Research Centre, Canberra, 1988.
56 This was described by observers as a personal ’contest’ between the Ambassadors to France and 
Australia, who were contemporaries in MOFA and ‘class mates’ at university. The Administrative Vice- 
Foreign Minister was a former Ambassador to Australia and his close relations with Australia may have 
swayed policy in that direction.
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Kuranari during a subsequent visit to Paris in mid-December.57 According to Tanaka the 
spillover effect of this decision was far more positive than expected. It created a ‘very 
favourable ambiance’ during the Foreign Minister’s tour of the Pacific region.
The media coverage
Extensive media coverage preceded Kuranari’s visit to the region. This highlighted a 
number of issues: Japan’s ‘mission’, the security and strategic context, and regional 
allies, support for Japan. The Oceania Division, in the lead-up to the regional tour, 
heavily promoted its initiative in the Japanese media. It labelled the political statement to 
be given in Fiji the ‘Kuranari doctrine’ and this was quickly picked up and used in the 
press reports. One of the first media references to the forthcoming political initiative as 
‘Kuranari doctrine’ appeared in The Japan Times on 13 December, a month before the 
speech was given in Fiji. In this article an unnamed MOFA official predicted that the 
initiative would be ‘truly eye catching’. The article described some of the expected 
outcomes of the visit: a doubling of aid (especially grants), increased high level 
exchanges, and scholarships. The article pointed to an increased Soviet presence as one 
reason why Japan needed to play a greater role in the region, which was ‘strategically 
essential’ to Japan given the maritime transportation routes it included. The declining 
influence of other Western countries in the region made the new initiative more 
imperative.58
Several days later the Foreign Minister met with ambassadors from Pacific island 
countries resident in Japan (Papua New Guinea and Fiji) and from Australia and New 
Zealand. He briefed them about Japanese policy and explained Japan’s aim in the region 
as the promotion of ‘solidarity and economic development’. He promised that Japan 
would extend more aid.59 Cabinet approval for the Minister’s visit was given a short time 
later, although this was essentially a formality.60 A detailed exposition of the contents of 
the Kuranari Doctrine was published in the media on 31 December. This revealed that 
Kuranari would ‘spell out a five point package including support for independence, 
regional cooperation, political stability, economic prosperity and heart to heart 
interchanges’. It added that Kuranari ‘plans to state that Japan is an Asian Pacific power
57 ‘Kuranari’s Oceania Trip Aimed at Boosting Japan’s Presence in Pacific’, The Japan Times, 6 
January 1987. This article suggested that the positive support for the region on the New Caledonia issue 
also foreshadowed the foreign policy principle to be announced by Kuranari on his visit: ‘that Japan will 
never encroach on independence or hamper autonomous initiatives’.
58 ‘Japan Seeks Greater Role in Development of South Pacific Island Nations’, The Japan Times, 13 
December 1986.
59 ‘Envoys from Pacific Countries Meet Kuranari’, Nihon keizai shimbun, 19 December 1986; also 
‘Kuranari to Define South Pacific Policy During January Visit to Region’, The Japan Times, 20 
December 1986.
60 ‘Foreign Minister Kuranari to Visit Oceania’, Nihon Iceizai shimbun, 23 December 1986.
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both historically and geographically [and] Japan will perform its duty as a member of the 
non-communist world’.61
Further reports, at the time of Kuranari’s departure in early January, previewed 
the contents of the Kuranari Doctrine. One report declared that the Foreign Minister 
‘will announce that Japan will boost its development aid to the South Pacific, help the 
mini-states formulate development plans, help protect the stable political environment of 
the region, and invite more junior leaders to Japan’.62
During Ministerial talks in Australia, the first stage of the regional tour, it was 
reported that Kuranari expressed concern about the Soviet Union in the region and 
requested Australian cooperation, arguing that ‘friendly cooperative relationships 
between Japan and Australia would build a favourable foundation for the West in the 
South Pacific region’.63 Media reports also highlighted the positive response of regional 
countries to Japan’s policy initiative. Australia, New Zealand and Fiji were described as 
pleased with the interest that Japan had taken in the region. Only the Soviet Union was 
reported to be critical.64
In general, media reporting of the Kuranari initiative promoted and endorsed the 
idea of strategic aid; that is, aid to promote ‘peace and stability’ and support the Western 
defence effort. To embrace such an overtly political rationale for aid was unusual, but 
symptomatic perhaps of the changing approach to aid in Japan, especially under the 
Nakasone government. It also reflected the perceived need to arouse public or political 
interest in economic assistance to the island countries. The Japanese media appeared to 
accept the premise of MOFA policy makers that Japan had no other compelling national 
interests in the region that would justify an increased aid presence.
In one analysis, it was suggested that ‘Japan’s commitment to increased 
economic assistance to the region can be interpreted as forming an important link in the 
US-initiated strategy to counter the growing Soviet presence’. The same analysis also 
argued that behind Japan’s ‘Pacific policy’ was the perception of policy makers that 
contributing to ‘maintaining peace and security in the region [would] mitigate the 
pressure from the US and other Western allies’ stemming from Japan’s trade surpluses. 
The report did caution, though, against ‘blindly accepting the US view of Soviet strategy 
in Asia’ as a pretext for increasing aid. It suggested that Japan could best contribute to 
stability by assisting the development efforts of island countries and in this context urged 
that Japan ‘help aid recipients sell more to Japan’ (by further opening up its markets).
61 ‘Kuranari to Spell Out Japanese Policy to S. Pacific’, Nihon keizai shimbun, 31 December 1986.
62 ‘Kuranari’s Oceania Trip Aimed at Boosting Japan’s Presence in Pacific’, The Japan Times, 6 
January 1987.
63 ‘Kuranari Voices Concern over Soviet Presence in Oceania’ and ‘Japan Seeks Australia’s Support of 
its Interest in Oceania’, both in Nihon keizai shimbun, 8 January 1987.
64 See reports in Nihon keizai shimbun, 10, 12, 13 and 14 January 1987.
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Significantly, it described the ‘new Pacific policy’ as ‘an extension of the Fukuda 
Doctrine’.65 Like their Japanese counterparts, Western media reports also focused on the 
strategic motivations underlying the Kuranari initiative.66
Public opinion and aid to the Pacific islands
The assumption of policy makers was that Japanese political and public interest in 
foreign policy to the Pacific islands was weak, primarily because there was an absence of 
strong pre-existing ties with the region. This led them to popularise, mainly through the 
media, a perception that there existed a political imperative in providing aid to the 
region.
One of the main sources of information about public opinion on Japan’s 
international affairs is the ‘Survey of Public Opinion on Foreign Affairs’ conducted each 
year by the Public Information Office of the Prime Minister’s Secretariat. These surveys 
regularly included questions about which countries were of greatest interest to the 
respondents and which countries Japan should give economic aid to. In the years 1980 to 
1987, the Pacific island countries were the lowest in terms of interest and priority for aid. 
In 1987, only 1.4 per cent chose the Pacific islands as the countries of most priority in 
future Japanese aid. Not surprisingly, Asia scored the highest (41.4 per cent). It should 
be noted, though, that a significant proportion (27.1 per cent) preferred Japan to 
‘cooperate evenly’ with all countries.67
On the question of countries of greatest interest, the inclusion of Australia and 
New Zealand within the category of Oceania obscured, to some extent, the level of 
interest in the island countries. Nevertheless, in the October 1986 survey it was still the 
area of lowest interest (7.1 per cent). The highest, once again, was Asia (43.4 per cent). 
On the other hand, a signficant proportion believed that relations with countries of 
Oceania were important (in October 1988, 71.8 per cent). The main reasons for 
considering relations with Oceania important were, overwhemingly, economic: trade and 
economic relations (47.4 per cent) and resources (33.1 per cent). Once again, Australia 
and New Zealand obscured these results as far as the Pacific island countries were 
concerned.
65 Editorial, Nihon keizai shimbun, 31 January 1987. The Fukuda Doctrine was the statement of 
principles governing Japan’s relations with ASEAN countries, articulated by Prime Minister Takeo 
Fukuda in 1977. The Fukuda Doctrine was primarily concerned with allaying ASEAN fears that Japan 
aspired to a military role in the region. This did not appear to figure in Japan’s policy towards the 
Pacific island countries.
66 Some examples included Stuart Inder, ‘Japan Poised to Counter the Soviet Thrust’, The Bulletin, 13 
January 1987, p.44; Robert Horiguchi, ‘New Aid Programs Reflect Japan’s Strategic Concern for Sea 
Lines’, Pacific Defence Reporter, April 1987, pp.43-4; and Robert Keith-Reid’s articles in Islands 
Business, January 1987, pp.10-16 and February 1987, pp. 13-21.
67 These were reprinted in Hiroshi Nakajima, ‘Japanese Interest in Oceania, 1979-88’, Journal o f the 
Pacific Society, July 1989, pp.21-5.
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These surveys support the view that, relative to other areas, the Pacific island 
region was not considered a priority in Japan’s foreign relations (and especially in foreign 
aid). But the results are somewhat ambiguous. For example, in the area of cultural 
exchange, in 1988 Oceania was second to Asia as the region which should receive most 
emphasis in cultural exchange programs. Between 1985 and 1988 the number of 
respondents emphasising cultural exchange with Oceania doubled (from 10.1 per cent to 
21.5 per cent).
This emphasis on economic and cultural relations may reflect the fact that 
domestic opinion in Japan is generally averse to Japan playing a strategic role in foreign 
affairs (as this tends to resemble a military posture). This perception extends also to 
foreign aid. The popular support for aid is because of its non-military (if not non­
political) nature.68 There is some difficulty, therefore, reconciling the overt strategic 
rationale promoted by MOFA to publicise its aid initiative to the Pacific island region and 
the public sentiment against such an approach. The conclusion that may be drawn is that 
the publicity campaign surrounding the formulation of the Kuranari Doctrine was aimed 
primarily at influencing bureaucratic elites (in MOFA and MOF) and foreign observers. 
As for the general public, it was sufficient perhaps to raise awareness of the region and 
of Japan’s policy initiative. In addition, it could also be a test-case: as part of a gradual 
process to build Japanese public acceptance for a more political role in world affairs.
The foregoing analysis has suggested that the policy makers instrumental in 
formulating the Kuranari Doctrine heralded from the political sections of MOFA (rather 
than from the Economic Cooperation Bureau other ministries). Policy was developed 
primarily within MOFA and in consultation with MOF. What appeared to preoccupy 
leading policy makers, as well as commentators, was the role of Japan in countering 
perceived Soviet in-roads in the Pacific islands and thereby supporting US foreign policy 
goals. These were themes that were prominent in Japan’s foreign policy statements about 
the Pacific islands in the 1980s. They reflected the overall priority of MOFA policy 
makers to demonstrate Japan’s ability to assume a more politically assertive foreign 
policy. The Pacific island region was a new ‘diplomatic frontier’ and thus provided an 
opportunity for MOFA to further extend its foreign policy in support of Japan’s security 
alliance with the US.
Increasing Japan’s aid presence was rationalised in terms of promoting political 
stability, not on the basis of specific interests such as in the area of fisheries. The 
emphasis was on aid as an instrument for promoting regional security and Western 
strategic interests. The next section explores in more detail the impact of the Kuranari 
initiative on Japan’s aid flows to the region.
68 See, for example, Dennis Yasutomo, ‘Why Aid? Japan as an “Aid Great Power” pp.502-3. Also see 
Takashi Inoguchi, ‘Four Japanese Scenarios for the Future’ in Japan’s International Relations’, Pinter 
Publishers, London, 1992, pp. 155-77.
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THE AID COMPONENT OF THE KURANARI DOCTRINE
The initial commitment
What did the Kuranari statement propose in terms of specific aid pledges and what were 
the reasons for this? It is first important to note that the Kuranari speech was essentially 
a political statement that concerned itself primarily with elaborating on Japan’s ‘basic 
thinking on the development of relations with the Pacific island countries’.69 Five 
principles were advanced in respect of this ‘basic thinking’. These were the promotion of 
bilateral relations and respect for countries’ ‘autonomous initiatives’; support for 
regional cooperation and strengthening of dialogue with the South Pacific Forum; 
preservation of political stability in the region; provision of economic assistance (details 
below); and the building of mutual understanding. In this context Papua New Guinea and 
Fiji were invited to participate in the Youth Friendship Program for the 21st century.70
Despite the media publicity, which had referred to an aid doubling plan for the 
region, this was not actually stated in the speech. The fourth principle of Japan’s ‘basic 
thinking’ on relations with Pacific island countries stated that:
Japan will provide as much assistance as possible to make the region 
economically more prosperous. Japan intends to expand its economic cooperation 
and to review cooperation modalities in order that their effectiveness may be 
enhanced ... I have ordered a study of the ways to expand Japan’s cooperation yet 
further. For this purpose I shall be sending a government survey mission to this 
region within the present fiscal year to formulate new guidelines for future 
bilateral assistance.
The one explicit announcement about aid to the region was that Japan was 
committing $2 million to a special Pacific islands fund to be created within the United 
Nations Development Program (UNDP), subject to Diet approval. The fund would be 
used to support various projects within the region. No actual projects (bilateral or 
regional) were announced. This UNDP fund, described by Tanaka as ‘the big 
breakthrough’ for multilateral aid to the region, was developed through consultation 
primarily between the Oceania Division, the Multilateral Cooperation Division of the 
Economic Cooperation Bureau and MOF’s Budget Bureau. It was chosen as the 
preferred approach to aid at that time largely because it bypassed the complicated and 
time-consuming procedures that dominated bilateral project aid. As a lump sum 
commitment, it did not need to be justified (to MOF) according to specific projects to 
particular countries (where per capita income of the recipient and other factors would be
69 Tadashi Kuranari, ‘Working Towards “The Pacific Future Community” Address presented in Suva 
on 14 January 1987, Press Release, Embassy of Japan, Canberra.
70 This is a cultural exchange program administered by JICA. It was first proposed by Nakasone in 1983 
as a way of promoting ties with the ASEAN countries. Under the program (which began in 1984) youth 
leaders are invited to Japan to experience Japanese society and a range of cultural activities including 
home-stays. For details, see JICA, Annual Report, 1991, Tokyo, pp.51-3.
190
taken into account). Moreover, bilateral, project based aid depended upon the 
identification and request of ‘good projects’ —  something the Oceania Division in 
particular could not count on.71
According to Tanaka, there was resistance on the part of the Economic 
Cooperation Bureau in MOFA, and in particular the then Director of the Grant Aid 
Division, to an increase in bilateral aid to the region. This was because of the perceived 
low aid absorptive capacity of the island countries. ‘He [the Grant Aid Division Director] 
insisted that Grant Aid could not do any more for the region’. MOF’s position was that it 
would be willing to look at more projects, but they would need to be ‘good projects’.72 
The commitment to increase bilateral aid was therefore couched in more general terms 
and left to the forthcoming survey mission to facilitate.
There were two reasons why the UNDP was chosen as the aid conduit instead of 
SPEC. One was that, because Japan was not a member of the South Pacific Forum, it did 
not appear that Japan could give funds directly to the organisation; and the other, more 
controversial reason, was because the Oceania Division was not confident about the 
effectiveness of the South Pacific Forum or convinced of its political significance.73 This 
decision was quickly criticised by regional leaders (in particular the Director of SPEC). It 
led the Director of the Oceania Division to press for a new aid commitment to SPEC.
The follow-up
In late March 1987, the economic survey mission promised in Kuranari’s speech left for a 
tour of four Pacific island countries: Fiji, Vanuatu, Western Samoa and Kiribati. It was 
headed by the Director of the Development Cooperation Division in the Economic 
Cooperation Bureau of MOFA.74 The aim of the mission was to ascertain priority areas
71 This refers to the preferred criteria o f grant aid projects that MOF as well as Grant Aid Division 
adhere to. In general, there is a preference for large-scale capital projects geared towards infrastructure 
development and ‘basic human needs’. Important considerations include ‘self-help’ and economic 
feasibility (ostensibly the ability of the recipient to maintain the project and pay for its operation). The 
number of potential beneficiaries was also a key factor (see Chapter 3).
72 Interviews, Nobuaki Tanaka, Bangkok, April 1993. Although the view of the Grant Aid Division’s 
Director was not confirmed, the position described by Tanaka echoed comments made by Grant Aid 
Division officials. For the Grant Aid Division, the main priorities are identifying and implementing 
projects that MOF will accept and that fit the criteria of ‘good projects’. But it is also sensitive to what 
are the most important foreign policy issues or relations at any one time.
73 These were the reasons given by Tanaka in interviews with the author. Officials from the Oceania 
Division in MOFA suggested that the main problem with the Forum Secretariat/SPEC was that it did 
not adequately represent the interests of its members. Other observers noted that Japan’s policy towards 
the South Pacific Forum was to some extent coloured by the presence of Australia and New Zealand in 
the organisation. Japan did not view the South Pacific Forum as an organisation of developing states and 
thus was reticent about channelling aid through SPEC. Interview Tsutomu Kikuchi (PECC Pacific 
Islands Taskforce), Tokyo, May 1992.
74 ‘Government to Send Assistance Mission to South Pacific’, Nihon keizai shimbun, 16 March 1987.
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for cooperation and ways to increase aid to the region. It was also required to follow up 
mechanisms for disbursing the UNDP special fund for Pacific island countries.
It had been decided that in allocating aid under the UNDP Special Fund, priority 
would be placed on three types of projects: those that benefit the whole region (transport 
and telecommunication), those that benefit smaller island countries, those that could not 
be provided under the bilateral aid framework (which would include the above two 
categories).
Perhaps recognising the constraints on increasing bilateral grant aid, the mission 
argued that Japan would have to be as flexible as possible in its dealings with those 
countries ‘some of which are too small be covered within the existing framework of 
Japan’s aid’. Although it recommended that Japan ‘expand its cooperation more 
flexibly’, the mission proposed that multilateral aid be promoted so as to supplement its 
bilateral cooperation. It also suggested that Japan give ‘greater consideration to the 
importance of SPEC as a regional organisation’ and recommended that there be more 
donor coordination to avoid duplication or waste.75
One of the issues raised by the survey mission was the role multilateral donor 
agencies could play in the region; it mentioned specifically the Asian Development Bank 
(ADB).76 This was followed up by the Director of the Oceania Division in mid-1987. 
Tanaka met with the head of the ADB (Masao Fujioka) and discussed the prospects for 
the bank providing more assistance to the Pacific island countries. He was informed that 
a conference on the ADB in the South Pacific region was already scheduled for August 
that year and that the bank, in principle, was in favour of an increased role in the 
region.77 Tanaka saw the ADB as a way of increasing Japan’s aid contributions to the 
Pacific, albeit indirectly. The role that the ADB could play was to provide loans, 
technical assistance and co-financing to the region, which would supplement bilateral 
ODA flows. The ADB was thus perceived as a vehicle to promote Japan’s foreign policy 
agenda in the region. That MOFA could suggest such a role reflected the close 
association with and influence in the ADB that Japan has enjoyed since its inception.78
75 Details are in Kenji Kanasugi, ‘Japanese Aid Policy in the South Pacific Region’, Pacific Economic 
Bulletin, Vol.3, N o .l, 1988, pp.43-8.
76 This emphasis on multilateral aid may also reflect the emergence of a ‘comprehensive development 
strategy’ in Japanese aid policy that was evident in the late 1980s. This strategy emphasised the role in 
development financing of the private sector and multilateral agencies. In particular, the role of ODA was 
to be a catalyst for private sector flows to the developing countries. This was based on the assumption 
that development problems could not be solved by ODA alone and that Japan’s ODA could not increase 
substantially for an indefinite time. See Dennis Yasutomo, ‘Japan and the Asian Development Bank’, in 
Koppel and Orr, Japan s Foreign Aid, pp.305-40.
77 For details of the ADB’s past and projected assistance to the region, see report of this meeting: The 
Asian Development Bank in the South Pacific; Symposium cum Workshop on Country Development 
Strategies for the South Pacific Developing Member Countries, Auckland, New Zealand, 5-7 August 
1987.
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The decision by MOFA to channel the multilateral aid initiative through the 
UNDP and not SPEC had clouded the Kuranari visit and undermined the diplomatic 
goodwill Japan had expected to build with the region. The need to pay more attention to 
the indigenous regional bodies (such as the South Pacific Forum and SPEC) was noted 
by the Japanese survey team to the region. It was also a matter of concern at the May 
South Forum Pacific meeting in Apia, Western Samoa. Some island leaders viewed 
Japan’s decision as an indication of the lack of recognition that the Forum enjoyed 
internationally. Some also requested that the $2 million to be administered by the UNDP 
be managed by SPEC instead. This was reflected in the communique of the meeting as 
follows:
The Forum welcomed progress in the Dialogue with Japan, including the visit by 
the Foreign Minister to the South Pacific ... and his announcement of a $2 
million fund for the Pacific islands. The Forum also requested Japan to regard 
SPEC as a conduit for regional funds and to adapt its aid procedures to meet the 
special needs of the South Pacific. The Forum also expressed the hope that Japan 
[would] expand its development assistance to the region.79
In August that year the Chairman of the South Pacific Forum (the Prime Minister 
of Western Samoa) and the SPEC Director visited Japan. This was in line with the 
proposal put to the region by Kuranari that immediately prior to or following each 
Forum meeting, Japan would invite the two leading officials of the Forum to Japan. 
During this visit the question of channeling Japanese aid through SPEC was raised. This 
had been mooted when the Survey Mission had visited the region in late March and the 
Oceania Division Director had since been actively pushing for an annual allocation direct 
to SPEC. The decision was subsequently taken to allocate $400,000 to SPEC in 1988, to 
form part of its Work Programme Budget.
How, and on what grounds, was this decision made? As noted earlier, MOFA 
had chosen the UNDP over SPEC because it did not believe that it was feasible to direct 
funds through an organisation of which Japan was not a member. It had also doubted the 
political importance or competence of SPEC. A clear shift in policy occurred 
subsequently. According to Tanaka, he had decided after Kuranari’s visit in January to 
press for an aid allocation to SPEC ‘because the SPEC Director had complained so much 
at the time’. In subsequent negotiations with MOF, ‘we appealed to the political nature 
of the South Pacific Forum and also to the fact that the UNDP fund did not satisfy the 
region’. It appears that this argument was helped by the recommendations of both the 
Survey Mission and the FAIR Committee for Oceania and the Pacific Islands. This aid
78 This is covered in detail in Yasutomo, ‘Japan and the Asian Development Bank’. Yasutomo makes 
the point that this close association is largely due to the special ( ‘intimate’) relationship between the 
Japanese government and the Bank’s President, who is usually an ex-MOF official (p.318).
79 Agreed Record and Communique, 18th South Pacific Forum, Apia, Western Samoa, 30 May 1987.
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was channeled through the Multilateral Cooperation Division of the Economic 
Cooperation Bureau.80
In addition, the policy of funding regional organisations was more flexible than it 
was portrayed initially. A senior MOFA official elaborated on this policy in a 1990 
article:
Direct grant assistance to regional organisations such as the South Pacific Forum 
does not lend itself to the existing scheme of Japan’s grant assistance which is 
based on bilateral government to government requests. Thus it is not possible ... 
to provide a direct grant to the Forum Secretariat [SPEC] for a comprehensive 
coverage of a certain regional project. It is possible, however, to respond to 
bilateral requests from a government participating in a regional project, if the 
project is accorded a high priority by the government and is deemed to be good 
and feasible ... Significant cooperation with regional organisations can [also] be 
effected through donation of funds to regional organisations, the despatching of 
Japanese experts and other means.81
Problems in Japan’s relations with SPEC (re-named the Forum Secretariat in 
1988) continued, particularly with the Director (since 1988 the Secretary General), 
whose blunt and forthright style of diplomacy was a source of some tension. At the 1989 
Forum meeting the Secretary General recommended that the annual visits to Japan by the 
Forum leadership be dropped in favour of the annual post-Forum dialogue being 
introduced that year. One reason given was that the meetings in Japan were generally 
with officials (rather than at the ministerial level) despite the Forum delegation being led 
by a head of government. It was argued that this undermined the ‘dignity’ of the Forum. 
The decision was taken that the post-Forum dialogue become the main approach to 
dealing with Japan. But the Forum also recommended that the Director decide on an ad 
hoc basis whether to continue with the visits to Japan.82
How to measure the effect on bilateral aid
It is widely assumed that the Kuranari initiative was a catalyst for increasing bilateral aid 
levels. Indeed, this was the intended effect of the initiative. Significantly, the assessment 
of Tanaka (then head of the Oceania Division) was that the Kuranari Doctrine only had a 
marginal effect on bilateral aid flows to the region. He believed that after the initial
80 Because this was an initiative of the Oceania Division (and not the Economic Cooperation Bureau), 
direct negotiations between the Oceania Division and Budget Bureau of MOF were necessary. In this 
case, political arguments supporting the aid initiative were more salient, than if the negotiations were 
between the Economic Cooperation Bureau and MOF.
81 Italics added. See Sadaaki Numata, ‘Japan’s Cooperation with the South Pacific Region’, Pacific 
Economic Bulletin, December 1990, p .ll.
82 It was the view of some leaders that the visits were worth pursuing. The problem raised by the 
Secretary General could be overcome if the Chairman (who was a head of government) only participated 
in ministerial and prime ministerial meetings, while the Secretary General conducted meetings at the 
officials level. Agreed Record and Communique, 20th South Pacific Forum, Tarawa, Kiribati, 10-11 July 
1989.
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commitment (evident in the UNDP aid and later SPEC aid), aid sections of MOFA as 
well as MOF paid only ‘lip service’ to the policy of directing more aid to the region. He 
suggested that after the multilateral aid initiative, which seemed to satisfy the immediate 
goal of making a concrete aid commitment, ‘MOF did not consider it necessary to give 
more bilateral aid at an accelerating speed’.
The actual aid figures reveal a somewhat different picture; a short-term though 
significant rise in grant aid that followed the political initiative. Bilateral grant allocations 
in 1989 reached their highest level ever: 9.3 billion yen (compared with 5.3 billion yen in 
1987 and 5.9 billion yen in 1988). This was an increase of more than 55 per cent between
1987 and 1989. This was not the largest jump in grant aid to the region in any single year 
(grant aid had risen by 64 per cent between 1983 and 1984 and 82 per cent between 
1979 and 1980). But the earlier increases had begun from a substantially lower point. By
1988 Japan was donating 5.9 billion yen in grant aid to the region and it had reached a 
previous high of 6.4 billion yen in 1986.83 Some sections of the aid bureaucracy had 
begun to view this as the limit to Japan’s aid effort to the region (apart from the 
occasional yen loans to Papua New Guinea).
The significance of the years 1988 and 1989 is that the impact on bilateral grants 
of the Kuranari initiative in early 1987 would take about two years to become effective. 
The process of deciding on projects and approving their allocation for fiscal year 1989 
would probably have occurred in fiscal year 1988. The actual projects approved had to 
be identified and requested rather earlier (1987 or before). It is notable that the increase 
in aid in 1989 was realised mainly through providing an unusually high number of large- 
scale grant aid projects. Among the large components of Japan’s aid to the region in
1989 were a hospital in Kiribati (921 million yen), a hospital in Papua New Guinea 
(1,923 million yen), a fisheries infrastructure project in the Solomon Islands (1,018 
million yen), an airport terminal in Tonga (784 million yen), an airport terminal in 
Vanuatu (1,115 million yen), the second stage of a port development in Western Samoa 
(913 million yen), and fisheries infrastructure in the Federated States of Micronesia (649 
million yen). All were large infrastructure projects and in some cases unprecedented in 
their scale for the region (for example the PNG hospital grant).84
The other significant increase in aid occurred with technical assistance: between 
1987 and 1988 technical aid rose by 42 per cent (2.2 billion yen to 3.1 billion yen). This 
was the largest increase in a single year in technical aid to the region. It is likely that this
83 Statistics are from Gaimusho, Waga kuni no seifu kaihatsu enjo (various issues), Tokyo. See tables in 
Chapter 1.
84 JICA Basic Design Studies for these projects give some indication of when they were formulated and 
approved (since the dispatch of a team to carry out a Basic Design Study usually signals approval, by 
MOFA at least). The time taken to put this team together may delay the process. For some projects (the 
Solomon Islands, for example) the Basic Design was not carried out until late 1988. Note that only two 
of the large infrastructure projects in 1989 were fisheries grant projects.
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increase coincided with the Kuranari initiative but, given the shorter lead time required 
for allocating and dispatching technical cooperation, the increase was realised faster. 
Technical assistance continued to grow at a steady (though slower) rate and reached a 
peak of 4 billion yen by 1992.
The analysis is not conclusive that there was a political cause underlying the 
pattern of bilateral aid, but it strongly suggests there was one. It is likely that the 
Kuranari initiative helped to accelerate aid flows, but this effect was not sustained at the 
level that policy makers had aimed for (that is, double the volume). The level of grant aid 
in 1990 dropped back to 6.8 billion yen (a decline of 26 per cent). This points to a short­
term impact on aid levels that mirrored what was in fact a short-term political interest in 
the region (as the next section argues). The question remains: how did political 
considerations impact on decisions concerning grant aid to the Pacific island region?
As discussed in Chapter 3, the various sections of the aid bureaucracy, including 
different parts of MOFA, have different aid policy priorities and criteria. Translating 
policy declarations into practice required coordination between the various parts of the 
aid bureaucracy and balancing different interests and perspectives. In the case of the 
Kuranari initiative, MOF and the Grant Aid Division (reluctantly) agreed to Took at 
more projects’ for the region. But this depended on projects being identified and 
requested. To achieve the goal of increased bilateral grant aid to the region, it was 
necessary to secure the cooperation of various ministries and agencies in undertaking 
project identification and development.85
If MOFA policy makers did seek the cooperation of other ministries in the 
development of the Kuranari initiative, this did not appear to include the Ministry of 
Agriculture Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF) or the Fisheries Agency.86 It was also clear 
that the Fisheries Agency did not share MOFA’s view of security issues in the region.
For them, the main threat to Japan’s (economic) interests was posed by the US, not the 
USSR. At the same time, the Fisheries Agency did anticipate that fisheries aid flows to 
the region would increase as a result of the Kuranari initiative and this led to a new form 
of aid, the small-scale fisheries grant But the purpose and use of this aid would be 
restricted to those countries where Japan had close fishing relations.
The evidence suggests that the Oceania Division was able to mobilise MOFA and 
MOF support for the policy of increased aid to the region in the short term. But it did
85 The Ministry of Transport, for example, indicated its intention to research projects that would 
promote infrastructure development in the region. See ‘Japan to Help South Pacific Nations to Promote 
Tourism’, Nihon keizai shimbun, 19 August 1986.
86 Tanaka did not meet with the Special Advisor for Fisheries Matters (Norio Fujinami) nor other 
officials in the Fisheries Agency. According to Tanaka, ‘MAFF had nothing to do with our policy’ (the 
Kuranari Doctrine). He argued that while fisheries ‘are important’ and should be borne in mind, 
‘political initiatives and ODA initiatives do not depend on their [MAFF’s] opinion’. The FAIR 
Committee for Oceania and the Pacific Islands, which drafted the Pacific Aid Initiative, also did not 
include any Fisheries Agency officials. Nor did it refer to fisheries issues.
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not follow this through in the longer term. Table 6.1 gives the pattern of grant aid flows 
to individual countries in the period 1988 to 1993. This reveals the erratic pattern of aid 
flows to countries, which in turn is a reflection of the number and size of projects 
provided. The table shows the increase in total grant aid in 1989, but also the uneven 
flows that subsequently followed. This suggests that ministries were not successful in 
identifying consistent numbers of large grant projects to countries in the region. This may 
be attributed in part to the fact that some countries had difficulty supporting large 
infrastructure projects. But it may also reflect the nature of strategic aid policy, and the 
fact that political interest in the region was not sustained. The nature and objectives of 
strategic aid, as evident in the case of Japan’s Kuranari Doctrine, are analysed in the next 
section.
Table 6.1 Japan’s Grant Aid to Pacific Island Countries, 1988 - 1993 (million yen)
Country 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993
Fiji 245 352 52 1,146 1,043 68
Kiribati 130 1,011 630 1,183 107 -
Marshalls 648 599 337 375 588 148
FSM 515 672 824 749 1,130 1,193
Palau 330 493 414 404 469 691
PNG 2,129 2,126 1,839 1,888 1,739 1,243
Solomons 897 1,018 909 4 122 1,041
Tonga 270 824 613 548 517 671
Tuvalu 107 146 - 396 3 -
Vanuatu - 1,115 352 4 6 6
W .Samoa 690 925 674 854 1,457 1,342
Total 5,961 9,281 6,644 7,551 7,181 6,403
Source: Gaimusho, Waga kuni no seifu kaihatsu enjo, Vol.2, 1994, pp.803-70.
DISSECTING STRATEGIC AID: OBJECTIVES AND AGENDAS 
Rhetoric and reality
The Kuranari Doctrine aimed to be a catalyst for achieving a political goal of significantly 
increasing Japan’s ODA flows to the Pacific island region. It was openly admitted that 
this initiative was aimed at countering the perceived in-roads of the Soviet Union in the 
South Pacific. The rationale (which has come to to be identified with strategic aid) was 
that aid would pre-empt Soviet offers. It would also serve to shore up regional stability. 
But what did this mean? Did Japan intend to play a more active political role in the island
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countries? Was aid to be used to exert influence in the region and thus enable Japan to 
exercise leverage in the interests of political stability?87
A test case for this occurred not long after the visit to the region by Kuranari. In 
May 1987 the democratically elected Coalition government in Fiji was overthrown by a 
military coup, triggering unprecedented instability in that country. The response that was 
taken by Japan was much less critical of events there than the responses of Australia,
New Zealand or other Western countries (including Britain and the US). In particular 
there was no automatic suspension of aid, unlike the US for example, which is compelled 
by law to stop aid in the event of a military coup or similar event88 The initial reaction of 
the Japanese government was to ‘wait and see’. One official was reported as stating that: 
‘Japan will continue to extend economic aid regardless of government changes because 
the construction of hospitals and other assistance are not closely related to politics’.89 
The sentiment of key policy makers and policy advisors, however, was somewhat critical 
of the Western reaction to events in Fiji. Australia and New Zealand in particular were 
viewed as too intrusive, fuelling instability through their hostile and antagonistic 
reponses.90 This was later reflected in the FAIR report (the Pacific Aid Initiative), which 
pointed to a need to support and be sympathetic to the expression of indigenous Pacific 
island political and economic systems.91
Commentary in the Japanese media viewed the foreign policies of the overthrown 
Coalition government as symptomatic of regional instability (the non-aligned and anti­
nuclear elements in particular). It questioned how the Kuranari Doctine fitted into that 
picture and suggested that Japan was not living up to the spirit of Kuranari’s declaration. 
‘Japan has the power and the responsibility to provide South Pacific nations with the 
maximum assistance and to set a positive example in region’.92 But then Director of the 
Oceania Division, Tanaka, suggested that the Fiji coup ‘did not create problems for us as 
the Kuranari Doctrine made no mention of domestic instability. We were not going to 
get involved in domestic problems, [which are] too delicate’.
The Fiji coup indicated that Japan’s concern for stability seemed confined to 
political rhetoric about Soviet intrusion. It did not signal a new approach to aid policy;
87 For a discussion of the ambiguities and problems inherent in strategic aid policy, see Dennis 
Yasutomo, The Manner of Giving, especially ch.6, pp. 117-9. He raises questions such as ‘How exactly 
does economic assistance contribute to national security?’ and ‘Is aid enough?’.
88 Details of the US Foreign Assistance Act are contained in United States Aid in the South Pacific, 
USAID, November 1987. Food aid and disaster relief activities are excluded from the suspension 
provisions.
89 ‘Japan Still Undecided on New Military Government of Fiji’, The Japan Times, 15 May 1987.
90 Interview, Professor Akio Watanabe, University of Tokyo, November 1992.
91 FAIR, Pacific Aid Initiative, pp.12-3.
92 ‘Cracks in the Pacific Basin’, The Japan Times, 23 May 1987.
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that is, using aid to influence politics in recipient states, in the way other Western 
countries did. Another issue (that of New Caledonian independence) was perhaps more 
revealing of Japan’s diplomatic approach and priorities in the region. It also reflected the 
way aid would be directed towards supporting those priorities.
After breaking ranks with France and other Western powers by voting in support 
of New Caledonia’s reinscription at the UN in early December 1986, Japan subsequently 
reversed its position. It abstained in the vote taken in October 1987 on a South Pacific 
Forum-sponsored resolution ‘urging France to follow UN principles on 
decolonisation’.93 Australia and New Zealand were the only Western countries to 
support the resolution. A shift in Japan’s position had been evident during the visit in 
August 1987 to Japan by the Forum Chairman (the Prime Minister of Western Samoa). 
Kuranari reportedly ‘urged the Prime Minister not to take a radical course in supporting 
the independence movement’ in New Caledonia. He advocated instead a moderate 
approach based on dialogue with France ‘in order to gain international credibility’.94
Tanaka attributed the shift in Japan’s policy to the fact that France had lobbied 
very hard to change Japan’s position, including sending Gaston Flosse, the French 
Minister for Pacific Affairs, to Japan. Although Tanaka suggested that Japan’s position 
was reconsidered on the grounds that ‘France played a security role in the region in 
support of our objectives’ (that is, it helped keep the Soviets out), he also admitted that 
the main concern of MOFA was with relations with France and not the issue of 
decolonisation or relations with the South Pacific Forum countries. Once France began 
to put pressure on Japan, the response was to support France. Moreover, one key 
(perhaps unintended) objective had been realised: France could not take Japan’s vote for 
granted. In Tanaka’s assessment, ‘Our vote (in December 1986) was so shocking to 
France ... I believe we should make more diplomacy like that —  so countries like France 
take notice of us and take us seriously as a global power’. Thus the outcome was to 
elevate Japan’s standing in its relations with France. The other, more ostensible, 
objective had also been realised: to create goodwill in the region in the lead-up to the 
Foreign Minister’s visit
Following the set-back at the UN, in a meeting between Pacific island 
representatives in Tokyo and Kuranari, the Japanese Foreign Minister sought to explain 
Japan’s policy. He reportedly told them that ‘Japan knows there are disappointments’ but
93 Washington Pacific Report, Vol.6, No.3, November 1987. The result of the vote was 69 in favour, 46 
abstentions and 17 non votes.
94 ‘Kuranari Urges Samoan Leader to Moderation over New Caledonia Independence’, The Japan 
Times, 25 August 1987. Prime Minister Nakasone also advocated dialogue in his meeting with the 
Samoan leader. See ‘W. Samoan PM Praises Japan’, The Japan Times, 26 August 1987.
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‘pledged future cooperation’.95 The statement was a reference to economic cooperation 
rather than cooperation on political issues. The promise of aid was a way of allaying 
friction; it was also perhaps an attempt to influence regional policy.
This issue illustrates what essentially motivated Japan’s strategic aid policy. The 
declaration of intent in the Kuranari Doctrine and the subsequent aid commitments 
demonstrated Japan’s support for Western security interests and its intention to play a 
more active political role in the Asia Pacific region. In this sense it was a diplomatic 
exercise. The Kuranari Doctrine (as with Japan’s policy on New Caledonia) was 
essentially a quest for recognition on the international stage. In this quest, the ‘target’ of 
Japan’s policy was not the recipient countries so much as the Western powers with 
whom Japan identified and, to a certain extent, aspired to emulate.
In addition, the Kuranari initiative aimed to provide the basis of a political role in 
the region, but one that reflected the personal ambitions of individual policy makers. As 
the Oceania Division head later declared: ‘My whole objective was to establish policy for 
the South Pacific which would be geared to the Soviet in-roads. I also aimed to 
[support] our need for taking diplomatic initiatives on all fronts of foreign policy. The 
South Pacific was virgin territory, so we had an interest to expand our political influence 
in the region’. The way this influence would be exercised was conditioned to some extent 
by the other priority of supporting Western security interests, hence the position on New 
Caledonia.
It is significant, though perhaps not surprising, that with the benefit of hindsight, 
the Soviet Union was perceived by the architects of the Kuranari doctrine as a hollow 
threat. According to Tanaka, he realised ‘later’ that the Soviet Union’s quest for fishing 
access in the Pacific came about not from strategic ambitions but from their need for 
protein: ‘Fishing agreements were essential and good for them. But the Soviets didn’t 
explain this very well at the time; and everyone was afraid of the Soviets then’. It is not 
clear when the threat receded in the minds of the policy makers. Certainly the fact that 
the Soviet Union failed to renegotiate fishing agreements with Kiribati and Vanuatu was 
a significant factor. But the evidence suggests that by 1989, two years after the Kuranari 
initiative, the ‘Soviet threat’ was no longer a salient concern or an effective argument for 
aid, and other political rationales were utilised.
This is demonstrated by the attempt to increase multilateral aid to the region. 
After the decision to allocate an annual contribution to the Forum Secretariat (the first 
donation was in 1988), the Oceania Division attempted to increase subsequent 
allocations. But MOF resisted these requests (and it is possible they were not pressed 
strongly by the Oceania Divison). It was not until 1992 that the decision was taken to 
increase the allocation, but even then it was only raised marginally: from $400,000 to
95 Washington Pacific Report, Vol.6, No.4, 15 November 1987, p.4.
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$500,000. This was announced at the Dialogue between the South Pacific Forum and 
Donors, following the South Pacific Forum meeting in July 1992. According to Oceania 
Division officials, there was difficulty finding ‘persuasive arguments’ to put to MOF (and 
presumably to MOFA in general) as to why the amount should be increased. ‘There was 
nothing as dramatic as the Soviet threat... the only political argument we could mobilise 
was that in the South Pacific Forum communiques, policy in support of or against Japan 
was made’. The controversy over driftnet fishing demonstrated the potential influence 
that the South Pacific Forum exercised in the international arena. After this it was easier 
to justify increased aid to the Forum Secretariat.96 The donation of aid to the Forum 
Secretariat was thus aimed, in part, at allaying criticism of Japan and enhancing Japan’s 
profile (if not influence) in the regional body. This echoes the policy of using aid to build 
support for Japan on environmental issues, as discussed in the previous chapter.
The role of foreign pressure
If Japan’s main interest was to ‘do something’ that would impress its allies and at the 
same time raise its standing internationally, was this an indication of Western (mainly 
American) requests that Japan do more in the region? To what extent was Japan 
prompted by others into announcing an aid and diplomatic initiative for the region? It 
was suggested earlier that American security concerns in the Pacific island region had led 
to expectations and to pressure on Japan to assume a greater aid presence in the region. 
Moreover, US policy had already embraced the need for strategic aid (as evident in the 
multilateral fishing access agreement).
It is clear that MOFA coordinated its Pacific diplomacy to some extent with the 
US State Department (for example, Tanaka’s trip to Washington prior to Kuranari’s 
regional tour). Moreover, by 1986 media reports had made explicit the American 
expectation that Japan should play a security role in the region. This served to encourage 
the view that America supported and indeed had sought a greater aid presence by Japan 
in the Pacific island region. In the process described by Orr, foreign presssure was in part 
solicited by MOFA officials in order to put pressure on the more intransigent elements of 
the decision making system (MOF in particular). The Oceania Division used the US to 
bolster its position and leverage in relation to MOF and other sections of MOFA. Tanaka 
openly admitted to this approach. He suggested that since there were few economic 
interests in the region, the most effective argument for aid to the region was political: ‘If 
we have the Pentagon or State Department on our side, it is easy to wrench the arms of 
the Ministry of Finance. So in this case we stressed US appreciation for our efforts’.97
96 Based on discussion with Oceania Division officials (and former officials). Note that the driftnet issue 
is covered elsewhere.
97 Utilising foreign pressure in this way was described in detail in Robert M. Orr Jr., The Emergence of 
Japan s Foreign Aid Power, Columbia University Press, New York, 1990. Tanaka denied that the 
Kuranari Doctrine was directly influenced by, or was the outcome of, US pressure. He argued that policy 
makers in Japan would rather set their own agenda than respond simply to the policy agendas of other
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Consultations about the Pacific island region also took place with Australia and 
New Zealand. Here the situation was somewhat different to that concerning the US. It 
was not as necessary to attract the attention and encouragement of Australian or New 
Zealand. It was important, however, to ensure their support and also to learn from their 
experience. The forum for these talks with Australia was the Australia-Japan Ministerial 
Committee, which since 1985 included the region on its agenda.98 The Kuranari initiative 
was also preceded by discussions with Australian and New Zealand representatives, both 
in Tokyo and the region. This was interpreted as a way for Japan to brief the two 
Western countries which ‘regard the island nations as being within their sphere of 
influence’.99
But the process of consultation was marred by both mutual suspicion and 
tensions that flowed from underlying problems in the bilateral relationship. At the 
Australia-Japan Ministerial talks in January 1987, the Australian Foreign Minister Bill 
Hayden welcomed Japan’s ‘clear commitment’ to the region, especially its support at the 
UN on the New Caledonia issue. But he suggested that regional stability, which was an 
interest shared by both Japan and Australia, would continue to be undermined unless 
Japan took further action in opening up its markets to Australian imports. In particular, 
he stressed that Australia’s ability to ‘play a political and strategic role in the region’ was 
being damaged by Japanese protectionism.100 Tanaka recalled that Australian policy 
makers ‘often stressed the low absorptive capacity of the islands and that we should not 
overwhelm them’. He interpreted this as indicating some ambivalence on Australia’s part 
towards Japan playing a greater role in the region.
Australia’s position was essentially three-fold: it could not keep Japan out of the 
region; Japan could play a constructive role in the region if it adapted its aid policies and 
practices; and Australia should encourage and assist Japan to do this. But the Australian 
perception was that while Australia gave advice to Japan at the time of the Kuranari 
Doctrine (for example, Australia encouraged the idea of a South Pacific Trade Office in 
Japan), this advice was ignored. This reflected, in part, Japan’s failure to adapt its aid
states. This may be true of the individuals involved, however overall policy cannot be understood 
without consideration o f US preferences and pressures emanating from the broader bilateral relationship.
98 MOFA, Diplomatic Bluebook, 1986, p.64. In the early 1980s it had already been noted that Japan 
needed to cooperate with Australia and New Zealand in maintaining ‘stability and prosperity’ in the 
region. See MOFA reports Hachiju nendai no nichigo Icankei, 1980; Hachiju nendai no waga kuni 
taiyoshu gaiko, 1981.
99 ‘Japan Seeks Greater Role in Development of South Pacific Island Nations’, The Japan Times, 13 
December 1986.
100 Keynote speech by Bill Hayden, 9th Australia-Japan Ministerial Committee, News release, 8 January 
1987. See also report in Pacific Islands Monthly, February 1987, p.26.
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system to accommodate the needs of its recipients. 101 As for the question of rivalry in the 
region, Australia’s Ambassador to Fiji commented: ‘We don’t mind seeing more 
Japanese aid [in the region]. We are not competing with Japan. Our dominant aid 
presence in the region is a fact not an ambition’. 102
Japan’s aid initiative towards the Pacific island region was not simply a reaction 
to pressure from other donors or from recipient countries. But it was a policy initiative 
that was built through consultation and coordination with other countries, and which 
harnessed other countries’ interests. On the one hand, this secured political leverage for 
the Oceania Division and other MOFA actors through promoting American support for 
the initiative. On the other hand, it was perceived as necessary in order to ‘explain’ to 
Japan’s Western allies what its policy interests and objectives were in the region. 103 The 
emphasis on promoting transparency in Japan’s foreign policy was seen to be important 
by the policy makers in MOFA. It reflected a more general reticence, if not a lack of 
confidence, about playing a political role in the international arena.
Strategic aid and the policy process
The way the Oceania Division Director approached the question of aid increases to the 
region (as a group) was conditioned to some extent by the procedures and processes of 
Japan’s policy making system. For example, the decision to make a multilateral aid 
commitment to UNDP, rather than attempt to announce a series of aid pledges and 
projects to individual countries, was a pragmatic move, predicated on the assumption 
that commitments could not be made until projects were requested, processed by aid 
divisions of MOFA in consultation with other ministries and approved by MOF. 
Moreover, this system was constrained by the single year budgeting framework, 
according to which there could be no (formal) undertaking to commit funds in advance 
of the budget allocation being made on an annual basis.
The multilateral pledge, on the other hand, was both regional in scope, thus 
potentially beneficial to the whole region, and (once committed) outside the immediate 
purview of MOF and other bureaucratic rules. It was therefore more ‘eyecatching’ and 
more flexible in meeting the needs of the region. 104 For instance, it could be utilised in
101 The process of building greater coordination between donors in the region, which effectively began 
at the time of the Kuranari Doctrine, is discussed in the next chapter. For an overview of some of the 
issues see ‘Australia, Japan Close to Agreement on Regional Aid Coordination’, Pacific Report, Vol.2, 
No. 17,14 September 1989, p.6.
102 Interview with John Trotter, Australian Ambassador to Fiji, Suva, January 1993.
103 Tanaka also initiated consultations with Britain and France, following the Kuranari tour of the 
region. These focused on aid policy.
104 There are parallels in the regional aid commitment announced in the Kuranari Doctrine and the 
regional aid pledges to ASEAN made by Prime Minister Fukuda in 1977. Both were designed for public
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ways that Japan’s bilateral grant aid could not be, such as supporting regional and small- 
scale projects. 105 The choice of using the UNDP, however, reflected a conservative 
approach: that is, the assumption that Japan’s procedures would not accommodate a 
direct grant to the South Pacific Forum/SPEC, an organisation from which Japan was 
excluded.
But the Kuranari Doctrine also revealed the way bureaucratic procedures may be 
preempted or adapted in response to political pressure. This was a case of what Rix has 
described elsewhere as a ‘special aid relationship’. 106 The Pacific island region was 
elevated (albeit briefly) to a special aid relationship. Two features stand out as a result. 
One, the aid initiative came from Japan and in particular the political sections of MOFA, 
not from recipients, although their expectations helped to facilitate policy. Aid increases 
were supported at the highest levels of MOFA (Foreign Minister, Administrative Vice- 
Foreign Minister, and the head of the Policy Coordination Division of the Minister’s 
Secretariat). This support helped to override, at least initially, objections by aid sections 
in MOFA as well as misgivings by MOF. Moreover, economic feasibility was to some 
extent subordinated to political necessity; in this case priority was put on doubling aid to 
a group of countries that was perceived as ‘difficult’ (as relatively small recipients, with 
low aid absorptive capacity, limited resources and an already high aid per capita level).
The second feature was that aid policy (at least at the declaratory level) was 
directed not simply at the recipients but also at other ‘targets’. While the impact of aid 
on the recipients’ economic conditions and their political relations with Japan was 
important, a more salient consideration was to demonstrate to other donor countries 
(and its Western allies) Japan’s capacity for taking political initiatives. In this way Japan 
hoped to acquire kudos with these countries. By highlighting the political return to Japan 
in these terms, the Oceania Division and other sections of MOFA were able to secure a 
commitment to substantially increase aid to the region and to even intimate an aid 
doubling plan despite the absence of projects upon which to base this quantitative target.
In the longer term, the bureaucratic procedures governing bilateral grant aid were 
not substantially altered or did not give in significantly to political directives. Aid policy 
continued to be influenced by the procedural formalities and guidelines that prevailed
relations effect, both avoided more difficult decisions about increasing bilateral aid, and both failed to 
satisfy the recipient countries.
105 One of the ways that the UNDP Special Fund was utilised was to contribute $700,000 to a Trust 
Fund established by the Tuvalu government, which aimed to create a sustainable flow of funds to the 
government to be used as budgetary support. See Isami Takeda, ‘Japan’s Aid to the South Pacific 
Region’.
106 Alan Rix, Japan s Economic Aid, pp.234-41. The countries identified by Rix as having a special aid 
relationship with Japan include the Middle East, Indonesia, South Korea, Burma and Brazil. They 
constituted ‘an elite group of recipients outside normal classification of less developed countries by per 
capita income’. There were usually extensive capital, information and human resources flows between 
Japan and these countries.
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before. Chief amongst these was the emphasis on large-scale infrastructure projects, 
provided as bilateral aid. But this policy approach was ultimately a constraint on aid 
flows to the region due to difficulties that small island countries experienced in both 
devising and maintaining large projects. 107
CONCLUSION
The analysis of the Kuranari Doctrine has suggested that aid policy was essentially 
motivated by political considerations. It was primarily aimed at gaining recognition for 
Japan in the wider political context (mainly for US and other foreign consumption). It 
was also motivated by the personal agendas and ambitions of key policy makers in 
MOFA. The rhetoric underlying this initiative emphasised the Soviet ‘threat’ and the 
need to pre-empt or counter these in-roads in the Pacific island region. But the policy 
itself appeared to lack coherence and substance.
Subsequent policy (for example on New Caledonia) revealed that there was little 
effort to address directly the concerns and interests of the region; and that the focus and 
priority of MOFA was elsewhere. The Kuranari Doctrine was targetted primarily at other 
Western allies/donors. Most telling perhaps was the failure on the part of MOFA to 
address what was the main point of contention between the region and the Western 
states at this time (that is, fishing arrangements). As one newspaper editorial in Japan 
stated: ‘Would the island countries have signed a fishing agreement with the Soviet 
Union if they felt [Japan] would offer a better one? ’ 108 That policy makers in Japan failed 
to address this issue is significant
The fact that the Kuranari Doctrine was concerned foremost with political 
relations with other donors and Western allies introduced tensions in relations between 
Japan and the region (the very countries the policy was ostensibly aimed at supporting). 
As observed in the previous chapter, the Kuranari Doctrine was interpreted by Pacific 
island officials as providing a basis for negotiating more favourable fisheries 
arrangements, including perhaps a multilateral access agreement. But this was clearly not 
within the scope of the policy. In addition, the failure by MOFA to address regional 
concerns or support regional priorities (support on New Caledonia, aid to the Forum 
Secretariat) led to disappointment; and this perhaps diluted the political goodwill with 
the region that may have Japan built up.
What is striking in the formulation and development of the Kuranari initiative is 
the way Japan’s aid policy was rationalised in political and strategic terms rather than in 
economic terms. Economic rationales had no place in this policy agenda. Nor were
107 Oceania Division officials found it ‘incredible’ that some countries could not manage ‘one request’ a 
year. Interview, Oceania Division, November 1992.
108 ‘Cracks in the Pacific Basin’, The Japan Times, 23 May 1987.
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Fisheries Agency officials included or consulted in the development of the policy. This 
may reflect the fragmented and decentralised decision making processes, which meant 
that separate aid policies could be promoted. But there were also fundamental 
differences in perceived policy interests and priorities. Fisheries Agency officials viewed 
the main ‘threat’ to Japan’s interests in the region to be the US and not the Soviet Union. 
MOFA officials meanwhile did not accept that US strategic aid policy (embodied in the 
multilateral fisheries treaty) had directly harmed Japan’s fishing interests in the region. 
Nor did they appear concerned about the implications of the Kuranari Doctrine for 
Japan’s own regional fisheries interests.109
The Kuranari Doctrine was a demonstration of ‘strategic aid’ policy to the extent 
that it was rationalised in terms of enhancing regional security and Western strategic 
interests. These arguments (especially US concern) were used in justifying aid increases 
to the region and were perceived as instrumental, by MOFA policy makers, to realising 
their objectives. But the Kuranari Doctrine was also formulated according to prevailing 
bureaucratic constraints and shaped by what established aid policy procedures would 
accommodate. Its approach was essentially conservative.
The impact on aid flows to the region was essentially short term and limited; it 
neither achieved its aid doubling target nor maintained aid flows at the 1989 peak. This 
reflects the relatively short-term nature of the political interest; and the fact that policy 
objectives were perceived to be achieved once the initial commitment to increase aid was 
made. In this context, strategic aid policy may be understood as designed mainly to 
produce a public relations effect The pattern of aid flows also reflects Japan’s complex 
aid procedures and difficulties finding large projects in the region, that fit these 
procedures.
What also emerges are the problems of translating declared intentions into 
practice without transforming policy making frameworks and structures. There were 
difficulties realising the goal of doubling aid to the region under the existing policy 
procedures. The nature of domestic policy making structures was covered in Chapter 3. 
How responsive these are to pressures for reform is taken up in the next chapter in the 
context of Japan’s approach towards multilateral aid policy frameworks in the Pacific 
island region. This is a pressing issue in Japan’s aid diplomacy given how the political 
and diplomatic weight of Japan’s ODA is dependent largely upon the ability to address 
the concerns and interests of both donors and recipients.
109 There was thus an inherent conflict between the political objectives of strategic aid (burden-sharing) 
and Japan’s economic interests in the fisheries sector (reflecting a more long-standing ‘economic 
cooperation’ rationale).
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7 Regional and Multilateral Frameworks in 
Japan’s Aid Diplomacy
In order to cope with transnational regional problems, Japan will cooperate 
more closely with international organisations and other frameworks for 
regional cooperation.1
When Foreign Minister Kuranari declared Japan’s commitment to support economic 
development in the Pacific island region, the specifics of this undertaking were not spelt 
out. This was because the actual task required of Japan was more than simply allocating 
larger sums of aid to the region. Problems inherent in increasing aid to the region were 
acknowledged by both the Economic Cooperation Bureau in the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs (MOFA) and the Budget Bureau in the Ministry of Finance (MOF), which 
doubted whether the island countries could absorb more aid from Japan. This raised the 
issue of how to adapt Japan’s existing aid modalities, and make them more suitable to 
conditions in small island countries. Reference to reviewing aid modalities was made in 
the Kuranari Doctrine and was carried further by the survey team that visited the region 
in late March 1987.
The issue of enhancing Japan’s aid to the region reflected a broader challenge 
confronting Japan’s aid program in the late 1980s and 1990s: how to introduce 
procedural and policy reform that satisfied or addressed the criticisms and demands of 
other donors and the needs of recipients. The underlying dilemma for Japan was that the 
leadership role expected of Japan in international development required reforms and 
innovations that challenged the administrative and political foundations upon which 
Japan’s aid program had been built
This chapter examines Japan’s aid policies towards Pacific island regional 
organisations and multilateral frameworks.2 The study explores the way Japan has 
responded to external pressures to reform its aid program, its interest in participating in 
regional donor dialogues and Japan’s approach to policy conditionality. This is 
essentially an analysis of the bureaucratic influences on aid policy and, in particular, the 
influences on Japan’s approach to aid reform. This includes Japan’s approach to global 
development issues, such as the environment
1 MOFA, Japan’s Official Development Assistance Charter, Tokyo, 30 June 1992.
2 The distinction made between regional and multilateral in this chapter is essentially between region- 
specific and more broad based (if not global) institutions and diplomacy. The discussion in this chapter 
refers primarily to the coordination of bilateral aid in multilateral fora and to the provision of aid to 
regional organisations.
PACIFIC ISLAND REGIONAL ORGANISATIONS
Pacific island regional organisations, especially the South Pacific Forum, have been at the 
forefront of initiating dialogue with Japan, as well as with other donors. They have 
actively sought Japan’s engagement in the region, as described in the previous chapter, 
and lobbied Japan to support regional development, including aid to regional 
organisations. How Japan has responded to these overtures is an indication of its 
willingness and/or capacity to adapt its aid program in line with the expectations and 
needs of recipients. This section first examines policy towards the South Pacific Forum 
followed by discussion of policy towards the South Pacific Commission. It analyses 
Japan’s position on regional aid, as well as the response to innovations recommended by 
a Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) study group on aid to the region.
The South Pacific Forum Secretariat and post-Forum Dialogue
The second principle of the Kuranari Doctrine, spelling out Japan’s ‘basic thinking’ 
regarding the Pacific islands, was an endorsement of regional cooperation and 
specifically of the South Pacific Forum. ‘Japan, a country of the Asia Pacific community, 
will support and assist existing arrangements for regional cooperation among the Island 
States’. The one substantive offer that was made in support of this principle was set out 
as follows: ‘Japan fully recognises the political significance that the South Pacific Forum 
bears and ... Japan will invite the Head of State/Govemment of the Chair country and the 
Director of the SPEC to visit Japan either immediately before or after the annual meeting 
of the Forum ’.3
As discussed in the previous chapter, Japanese policy makers in MOFA were 
initially not convinced of the importance of the Forum or of its effectiveness. This was 
one reason for the decision to channel the regional aid initiative through the United 
Nations Development Program (UNDP) instead of the Forum Secretariat. The fact that 
the Kuranari statement highlighted the South Pacific Forum as the key regional 
organisation and sought to cultivate links with the organisation can be seen in part as a 
political gesture in response to the Forum’s overtures. But given that the Kuranari 
statement was described by its architect (the former head of the Oceania Division) as a 
‘standard foreign policy speech’, it may also have reflected a tendency in Japanese 
foreign policy to support ‘indigenous’ regional organisations.4 The reasons for this in the 
context of the South Pacific Forum are examined in more detail below.
3 Tadashi Kuranari, ‘Working Towards “The Pacific Future Community” Address presented in Suva 
on 14 January 1987, Press release, Embassy of Japan, Canberra. SPEC, the South Pacific Bureau for 
Economic Cooperation, was re-named the Forum Secretariat in 1988.
4 ASEAN is the most obvious example but a more recent one is the South Asian Association for 
Regional Cooperation (SAARC). A speech that outlined Japan’s support for SAARC was given by Prime 
Minister Kaifu to the Indian Parliament on 30 April 1990. The comment from the former head of the 
Oceania Division, Nobuaki Tanaka, was made in an interview in Bangkok in April 1993.
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In 1989 Japanese officials attended the first post-Forum Dialogue. This was a 
meeting between South Pacific Forum representatives (usually three heads of 
government) and the representatives from the leading donor countries in the region.
These countries included the UK, the European Community, France, the US, Canada, 
Japan and the People’s Republic of China (PRC).5 The post-Forum Dialogue, held 
immediately after the South Pacific Forum Heads of Government meeting, was 
introduced in part as a way of increasing the Forum’s international standing. It was 
modelled on the ASEAN post-ministerial conference. Discussions were not confined to 
issues of aid but to a broad spectrum of economic, political and security issues.
Japan’s representatives to successive post-Forum Dialogues used the occasion to 
declare their support for the South Pacific Forum and for regional cooperation. At the 
1990 dialogue, the Japanese representative declared that ‘cooperation with the South 
Pacific Forum forms the main pillar of our policy towards the South Pacific’. Moreover, 
‘support for regional cooperation and support for economic prosperity are the two 
wheels of our axle’.6 At the third dialogue in 1991, the Japan representative was elevated 
to the level of Parliamentary Vice-Foreign Minister. In his statement he reaffirmed 
Japan’s policy of support for the Forum. ‘Japan fully recognises the geo-constraints and 
traditional value of the South Pacific region and will work together with the South 
Pacific Forum for regional cooperation based upon mutual trust through constant 
dialogue’.7
At the 1992 Forum Dialogue, also attended by the Parliamentary Vice-Foreign 
Minister, regional cooperation was again singled out as an important feature of Japan’s 
South Pacific diplomacy: ‘Intensifying our support for this Forum is an integral part of 
our policy toward the South Pacific’. The statement also highlighted the importance of 
bilateral aid in Japan’s relations. ‘Development aid is Japan’s main vehicle for supporting 
the efforts of the Island nations of the South Pacific’. The Vice-Minister continued: 
‘Japan also realises that regional cooperation is crucially important in the South Pacific 
area’.8
5 Australia and New Zealand, as full members of the South Pacific Forum, were not part of the post- 
Forum Dialogue. Since 1993, the post-Forum Dialogue has also included Taiwan/Republic of China’, 
although this takes place in a separate consultation and only with those countries that desire to hold a 
consultation. According to the Forum Secretariat, ‘participation by island countries in the [Taiwan] 
consultation was not regarded as representative of the Forum’. Forum News, No.6, September 1992, 
p.l 1. The PRC has strongly criticised the attendance of Taiwan. However, four Pacific island countries 
recognise Taiwan and not the PRC.
6 Address of Takehiro Togo, Ambassador of Japan, at the Japan-SPF Dialogue, Plenary Session, 3 
August 1990, Port Vila.
7 Address by Muneo Suzuki, Parliamentary Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan, at the Japan-SPF 
Dialogue, Plenary session, 1 August 1991, Pohnpei.
8 Address by Koji Kakizawa, Parliamentary Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan, at the Japan- 
SPF Dialogue, Plenary session, July 1992, Honiara.
209
To what extent has the Japanese government provided tangible support to the 
Forum? As the previous statement by Vice-Minister Kakizawa implied, Japanese ODA 
and its policy of support for the regional organisation remained quite separate 
components of Japan’s foreign policy. This is underscored by the limited financial 
assistance that Japan provided to the Forum Secretariat. Since 1988 Japan has provided 
an annual grant of $400,000 to the Forum Secretariat. This is used for regional programs 
(especially energy, trade and investment). In 1992, Japan announced it would increase 
this to $500,000. This contribution amounted to 8 per cent of the Forum Secretariat’s 
extra program budget (see Table 7.1). In addition, Japan has provided the Secretariat 
with small-scale grant assistance. In 1993, Japan presented a grant of $44,000 to the 
Forum Secretariat. According to a statement accompanying the signing of the 
Memorandum of Understanding: ‘Japan appreciated the important role played by the 
Secretariat in the South Pacific and the grant was a token of that appreciation’.9
Table 7.1 Forum Secretariat Budget, 1991-94 (Fiji $‘000 )
1991 1992 1993 1994
Regular 2,298 2,405 2,512 2,788
Extra: 
Normal (a) 8,072 8,565 8,831 9,151
Extra:
Infrastructure 1,350 2,850 2,084 150
Total 11,70 13,80 13,47 12,09
Note: (a) Covers work programs: Economic Development, Legal and Political, Administration,
Energy, Telecommunications, Trade and Investment, Civil Aviation, Maritime and, until 1993, 
the ACP/European Community Unit.
Source: Compiled from Forum News, No.4, March 1992 and N o.l 1, December 1993.
The above choice of words was perhaps more apt than intended. Japan’s 
assistance to the Forum Secretariat has essentially been of a ‘token’ kind. This is 
recognised by the leaders and officials of the South Pacific Forum. From the outset 
Forum member states sought to use the Dialogue as a way of encouraging Japanese 
contributions to regional programs. At the first Dialogue in 1989 the Forum Secretariat 
noted that ‘Japan remains hesitant about channelling significant funds through the 
Secretariat’ while, at the same time, it ‘wants to strengthen its relations with South 
Pacific organisations and seeks to intensify its relationship with the Forum because of its 
political and economic role’. It called on Japan to channel more ODA through the
9 This grant was for the acquisition of 10 computer sets. Forum News, N o.l 1, December 1993, p.9. See 
previous chapter for background to the decision to provide budgetary support to the Forum Secretariat.
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Secretariat ‘which is now better geared to accept this task’.10 This was a reference to the 
recently introduced South Pacific Organisations Coordinating Committee (SPOCC). It 
was anticipated that SPOCC would provide a mechanism for effective coordination 
among regional organisations and eliminate duplication (an issue of concern to Japan, as 
discussed more fully below). The question of Japan giving more aid on a regional basis 
was continually raised by Pacific island leaders in subsequent post-Forum Dialogues with 
Japan, as well as at the visits to Japan by the Chairman and Secretary General of the 
Forum.
One request that has repeatedly been made by the Forum Secretariat is for Japan 
to fund a regional South Pacific trade office in Tokyo, similar to the ASEAN trade 
office. This request was at first refused, mainly on the grounds that such an office would 
not be feasible given the small volume of Japan-South Pacific trade. Officials in Japan 
have also reasoned that such an office was not necessary because trade between the 
region and Japan had increased significantly since the late 1980s.* 11 But the Forum 
Secretariat has maintained that, despite some ‘export successes’, the Pacific island 
countries have found Japan ‘a problem market because of language difficulties, different 
customs, high costs, lack of official marketing support services and market access 
limitations generally’.12 In 1994 MOF agreed to allocate 2 million yen in its 1995 budget 
to fund a feasibility study on the proposed South Pacific Regional Office (also called the 
South Pacific Economic Exchange Centre). This was strongly supported by the Oceania 
Division in MOFA. But Oceania Division officials remained pessimistic about the 
prospects of this centre being established.13
So far, requests by the South Pacific Forum and Secretariat for more financial 
assistance from Japan have not been m et In 1990, for example, the Secretary General of 
the Forum Secretariat, on a visit to Japan, sought $4 million from the Japanese 
government for regional projects to be coordinated by the Secretariat, in the areas of 
telecommunications and shipping.14 Negotiations over provision of this grant eventually 
broke down and the Forum Secretariat (successfully) sought funding from other 
donors.15
10 Forum Secretariat, post-Forum Dialogue Meeting, 14-15 July 1989.
11 According to the Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs, speaking at the post-Forum Dialogue in 1992, the 
region’s exports to Japan had increased by 85 per cent in the previous six years.
12 Forum Secretariat, post-Forum Dialogue meeting, 3 August 1990, Honiara.
13 Interview, Deputy Director, Oceania Division, Canberra, April 1995. The official suggested that MOF 
was unlikely to support the proposal because this would establish a precedent for other regional 
organisations to also request funds for regional offices in Tokyo.
14 ‘Forum Chief off to Japan’, The Fiji Times, 25 June 1990, p.9.
15 According to a former official in the Forum Secretariat, the main cause of disagreement was over 
procedures governing the implementation of the proposed grant. While the Japanese government wanted
211
The Forum Secretariat has continued to seek more financial support from Japan, 
but according to the Secretary General, Ieremia Tabai, ‘Japan has not yet been convinced 
that there is a regional program that needs assistance’.16 Ironically, it has been a private 
businessman from Japan, Ryoichi Jinnai, who has provided the largest ‘Japanese’ 
donations to the Forum Secretariat In 1992 Jinnai, who heads a finance company, the 
Promise Loans Company, donated $1.4 million for the construction of a new conference 
centre at the Forum Secretariat headquarters. In 1990, he donated $1.2 million to fund 
the participation by island member countries of the South Pacific Forum at the 
International Garden and Greenery Exposition in Japan.17
The Japanese government’s policy towards the South Pacific Forum has been 
essentially to maintain a presence at the post-Forum Dialogue and to use the Dialogue as 
a stage from which to expound on Japan’s ‘international contributions’. In fact, most of 
the speeches by the Japan representatives to the Dialogue dwelt on Japan’s policy 
towards global issues such as the environment, ODA and international peacekeeping. 
Another theme that recurred in the statements to the dialogue was the ‘geopolitical 
interdependence’ of the Asia Pacific region. The South Pacific Forum was described as 
playing a ‘central role in fostering political stability and economic development’; this in 
turn was dependent upon ‘the stability and prosperity of the entire Asia Pacific region’.
In this context Japan’s representatives assumed a leadership role. For instance, it was 
claimed that Japan ‘endeavoured to make the viewpoint of the Asia Pacific reflected in 
discussions at the Group of 7 Summit’.18
Perhaps more important than the elaboration of Japan’s ‘international 
contributions’ was Japan’s use of the post-Forum Dialogue to counter or defuse 
criticisms of Japan’s policies. Two highly controversial issues were driftnet fishing in 
1989 and Japan’s proposed shipment of plutonium through the region in 1992.19 In both
to control all aspects of project implementation, the Forum Secretariat sought a more flexible 
arrangement, giving the Secretariat more control over contracting and implementation. Interview, 
Canberra, June 1994.
16 Interview, Yokohama, March 1993. He suggested that the ‘environment program is one area we 
would like Japan’s support [but] they are a bit slow to respond’. The kind of environment related support 
the Forum Secretariat was seeking was spelt out by the Secretary General in his speech ‘Environment 
Problems and Issues in the South Pacific’, Conference on Local Initiative in Asia Pacific Region, 
Yokohama, March 1993.
17 Forum News, No.4, March 1992, p.4. These donations were secured largely through personal contacts 
between the former Secretary General of the Forum Secretariat, Henry Naisali, and Ryoichi Jinnai.
18 From statement to the post-Forum Dialogue, 1992. The reference to Asia Pacific ‘interdependence’ 
echoes earlier statements by Japanese leaders on policy towards the Pacific island region (see previous 
chapter).
19 Driftnet fishing was dealt with in Chapter 4. On plutonium shipments, at the 1992 Forum meeting 
Japan expected strong criticism of its possible shipment o f plutonium through the region. The Japanese 
government did not reveal the actual route in advance of the shipment, which occurred in late 1992. A
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cases the post-Fomm Dialogue was a focus for regional discussion and for the Japanese 
government it was an opportunity to present its side of the story. As a MOFA official 
observed, referring to the driftnet issue: ‘We have learnt from this experience the vital 
importance of mutual communication and understanding’.20
The Japanese government has in fact placed high priority on initiatives aimed at 
countering criticisms of its policies and addressing what it perceives to be unfair or 
biased views. These have been mainly related to fisheries and nuclear issues. For 
example, in October 1994 Japan’s Science and Technology Agency, in collaboration with 
MOFA and the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), organised a seminar 
on nuclear issues and a study tour of nuclear facilities in Japan for Forum member 
countries. The initiative, which cost 40 million yen, was motivated by a perception in 
Japan that the ‘region’s lack of understanding about atomic energy had caused a slanted 
opposition’ to plutonium shipments. This tour was reported to have been less than 
successful in placating the region.21
The importance of the South Pacific Forum and of securing a presence at the 
post-Forum Dialogue also rested on the collective diplomacy that members displayed in 
international fora such as the UN. Policies such as voting for candidates to the UN 
Security Council could be influenced at these meetings. MOFA usually took the 
opportunity of the post-Forum Dialogue to thank Pacific island countries for their 
support.22
Thus, the South Pacific Forum was essentially of diplomatic importance to Japan. 
The budgetary support provided to the Forum Secretariat, together with the relatively 
high level political attendance at post-Forum dialogues, was a token gesture of this 
importance. Japan’s priority was to influence the Forum on issues important to Japan
large contingent of Japanese officials were present at the South Pacific Forum to deal with questions. In 
the event, the Forum simply presented a letter to the Vice-Foreign Minister requesting ‘timely 
information’ from the Japan government on its plans. The strongest critic of Japanese policy on 
plutonium shipments was the President of Nauru, who spoke out against the plan at both the South 
Pacific Forum meeting in July 1992 and at an anti-nuclear forum held in Tokyo in October 1992. See 
Kakuya Ishida, ‘Nauru’s Dowiyogo to Attend Plutonium Safety Forum’, The Daily Yomiuri, 28 
September 1992, p.2.
20 Sadaaki Numata, ‘Japan’s Cooperation with the South Pacific Region’, Pacific Economic Bulletin, 
December 1990, pp.8-14.
21 ‘Participants Critical of Japanese Government Sponsored South Pacific Forum Nuclear Tour’, Asahi 
shimbun, 10 October 1994 (morning edition), p.30. It is significant that while Japan allocated 40 million 
yen to this study tour, it was prepared to allocate only 2 million yen to fund a feasibiity study of the 
South Pacific Economic Exchange Centre, something the region has put a high priority on. Japan has 
also sponsored various regional fisheries meetings in Japan, usually under the auspices of the Overseas 
Fisheries Cooperation Foundation (OFCF).
22 MOFA, especially the Oceania Division, maintains that the political importance of the region (and 
basis for Japan’s aid to the region) is the votes that the island countries have in international fora and 
the fact that they may have influence on policies of importance to Japan. Interviews.
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rather than to address economic development issues. Requests by the Forum Secretariat 
for more substantive economic support from Japan were not met. The reasons for this, 
which are explored in more detail below, included a lack of political and bureaucratic 
support in Japan and resistance to changing grant aid procedures. Japan’s ambivalence 
about support for regional organisations was also evident in policy towards the South 
Pacific Commission.
The South Pacific Commission
Soon after the visit to the region by Foreign Minister Kuranari, MOFA declared its 
interest in joining the South Pacific Commission (SPC). Unlike the South Pacific Forum, 
where membership was restricted to independent and self-governing Pacific island states 
and Australia and New Zealand, the SPC has a more broad based membership. It 
includes all members of the South Pacific Forum, plus non-self-goveming Pacific island 
territories and metropolitan governments.23 Its work programs mainly focused on 
community health and education, rural development (especially agriculture), fisheries 
research and a major statistical service for the region. The SPC is not a forum for 
discussing issues that could be construed as ‘political’.24
The official position put forward by MOFA was that ‘if invited by a consensus of 
the SPC members, Japan may seriously consider joining the organisation’.25 Unofficially, 
the view was taken that it would be better to be in the SPC than not, so as to ‘know the 
region better’. More importantly, membership would enable Japan to contribute more 
assistance to the region, on a multilateral basis.26
The Economic Cooperation Bureau of MOFA took a contrary position. For 
them, the problem was convincing MOF of the merits of financially supporting the SPC. 
To some officials, the SPC and the Forum Secretariat were seen to be engaged in 
essentially the same type of programs. The perceived duplication between the SPC and 
the Forum Secretariat were grounds for not supporting regional organisations and, more 
specifically, for not becoming a member of the SPC .27
23 These are France, the US, the UK and New Zealand. In 1993, the UK announced its intention to 
withdraw from the SPC.
24 For an overview of the SPC (and all other regional bodies in the Pacific island region), see South 
Pacific Organisations Coordinating Committee, Forum Secretariat, Suva, 1991.
25 Sadaaki Numata, ‘Japan’s Cooperation with the South Pacific Region’, p.12. According to the then 
head of the Oceania Division, Nobuaki Tanaka, he had opposed Japan’s request for membership of the 
SPC: ‘I thought it ridiculous that we should request membership. They [France and other members] 
should come to us’. But he was overruled by more senior officials, including the Director General of the 
Bureau for European and Oceanic Affairs. Interview, Bangkok, April 1993.
26 Interview, former Deputy Director of the Oceania Division, MOFA, Tokyo, April 1993. But this 
official also observed that from Japan’s perspective, neither Australia nor New Zealand appeared 
particularly in favour of admitting Japan to the SPC.
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By 1992, the Oceania Division’s interest in membership had also weakened. One 
official in the Oceania Division commented that Japan ‘was not in a hurry to join the 
SPC’. It would use the time that the SPC was taking to decide whether or not to admit 
Japan (which would require amendment of the Canberra Agreement) to decide its 
position.28 Ironically, this change of heart coincided with a new sense of urgency on the 
part of SPC members to include Japan. This resulted from Britain’s pending departure 
from the SPC, announced in 1993. Rather than amending the Canberra Agreement, the 
SPC Conference agreed in 1993 that new members would be admitted by resolution and 
not by amendment of the Canberra Agreement. This would make it easier for new 
members to join the SPC.
In 1994, however, the Japanese government indicated that it may not seek 
membership of the SPC. The official statement made to the SPC by Japan’s 
representative was that Japan ‘will continue to consider the membership question from 
the point of view of whether a consensus emerges among members and whether 
compatibility with Japan’s ODA scheme will be ensured’.29 An Oceania Division official 
explained that MOFA continued to be concerned that there was duplication between the 
SPC and Forum Secretariat; that the future of the SPC was uncertain; and that Japan 
may not be eligible for membership. The underlying factor however remains funding: 
membership would require additional financial allocations and there was not sufficient 
political support in Japan for further contributions.30
It was suggested earlier that Australia was perceived by some officials in MOFA 
to be not in favour of Japanese admission to the SPC. The Australian concern, according 
to the Australian Ambassador to Fiji, was that ‘to amend the Canberra Agreement would 
not just mean letting in Japan, but also the two Chinas, Russia and Chile. This would not 
only politicise the SPC but overwhelm the small island countries for whom the SPC is 
their only forum’.31 At the 1993 SPC Conference, however, the Australian 
representative, Gordon Bilney, declared that ‘Australia would support Japan if it sought 
membership of the SPC in place of Britain’.32
27 Interview, Grant Aid Division, MOFA, Tokyo, December 1992.
28 Interview, Oceania Division, MOFA, Tokyo, June 1992. The document that created the SPC was 
drawn up in Canberra in 1947; hence its title, the ‘Canberra Agreement’.
29 Greg Fry, Report on the Thirty-Fourth South Pacific Conference, Port Vila, 24-25 October 1994, 
mimeo, International Relations Department, Australian National University, Canberra.
30 Interview, Deputy Director, Oceania Division, Canberra, April 1995.
31 Interview, Ambassador John Trotter, Suva, January 1993.
32 ‘Australia Will Support Japan as SPC Member’, FFA News Digest, No.6/93, November-December 
1993, p.22.
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Japan’s policy towards the SPC is not influenced by MOFA alone. The Fisheries 
Agency also has an interest in the issue. Arguably of most importance to Japan is the 
Tuna and Billfish Assessment Program, based at the SPC. This carries out the main 
research on tuna stocks in the region (through a tuna tagging program).33 Since 1992 
Japan’s Fisheries Agency has provided raw data34 on catch levels of Japanese fleets to 
the SPC, mainly on the grounds that a Japanese scientist is now engaged in research in 
the SPC’s Tuna and Billfish Assessment Program.
It does not appear that MOFA policy on SPC membership has been coordinated 
with the Japan Fisheries Agency. Japan’s policies towards the regional fisheries 
organisations and programs are conducted primarily by the Japan Fisheries Agency, not 
by MOFA. While the Fisheries Agency’s support for the SPC has been tempered by its 
more long-standing policy of seeking to establish an international fisheries organisation in 
the region, it is also evident that (from Japan’s viewpoint) membership of the SPC is a 
condition of Japan’s vessels providing more timely and comprehensive catch data to the 
SPC.35 Japan’s fisheries officials maintain that the ‘current structure’ of fisheries research 
and management bodies in the region means than decisions are made without prior 
consultations with fishing nations, and research programs are hindered by budgetary 
constraints. They assert that Japan has a legitimate claim to participating ‘on an equal 
basis’ in regional fisheries management frameworks, given that Japan is also a 
‘custodian’ of the region’s resources.36
A decision to not seek membership of the SPC would probably rule out the 
possibility of Japan providing more substantial amounts of aid to the SPC on a 
multilateral basis. This has implications for Japan’s fisheries cooperation with the SPC. 
Conversely, fisheries interests may ultimately determine the level of Japan’s participation 
in the SPC.
The above analysis of Japan’s policy towards the South Pacific Forum and SPC 
has pointed to an ambivalent attitude towards regional organisations. While supportive of 
regional cooperation in principle (and rhetoric), in practice there has been little tangible, 
financial support for the regional programs under the SPC and Forum Secretariat. The 
following section explores reasons for this, in the context of the response to proposals 
made by a task force on Japan’s aid policy to the Pacific islands set up by JICA.
33 The SPC tuna research program has also been expanded into Southeast Asia through channels 
established under the Pacific Economic Cooperation Conference (PECC) taskforce on fisheries. Japan 
has not been active in funding these activities although it has been engaged in dilaogue with the region 
through various fisheries fora.
34 This means data that includes both in-zone and high seas catch that have not been disaggregated.
35 The Japan Fisheries Agency is reluctant to provide more aid and other assistance to the SPC and 
Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA) as long as it is excluded from these organisations.
36 Multilateral High-Level Conference on South Pacific Tuna Fisheries, Record of Proceedings, 5-9 
December 1994, Honiara.
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The JICA Study Group
In 1991, JICA established a study group to examine problems in aid implementation to 
the Pacific island region and find ways of overcoming these. It submitted its report in 
December 1991. This was part of a process underway since 1987 in JICA and MOFA 
which aimed to establish clearer aid principles for each recipient country, taking into 
account their specific development plans, needs and priorities. The study group was 
composed of academics rather than bureaucrats, although a special task force was 
formed within JICA itself.37
There were three sets of proposals included in the report. The first was titled 
‘Creating the organisational framework for aid to the entire region’. This called for 1) 
creation of a regional aid forum; and 2) increasing funding to regional organisations. The 
first recommendation appeared to envisage an almost permanent body where meetings of 
donors could be held on a regular basis in order to avoid duplication and build 
‘complementary ties drawing on the respective strengths of each donor or recipient 
country’. The second recommendation declared that ‘efforts are needed to expand the 
scope of eligibility under the current principle of bilateral agreements between 
governments for ordinary grant aid cooperation, to include regional organisations and 
thereby address the entire Oceanian region’.38 It suggested circumstances under which 
regional aid should be promoted: when aid could be provided more efficiently and 
effectively to the region as a whole (such as the transportation and communication 
sectors); and when aid would serve to promote ‘regional harmony’ (for example, in the 
education sector, where the aid resources could be shared by all countries, rather than 
centred on one country).
The second set of proposals focused on strengthening project formulation, 
implementation and evaluation processes, through establishing mobile support teams 
stationed in the region and equipped with budgets to undertake field studies. This aimed 
to improve the quality of bilateral grant aid. The proposal envisaged increased budget 
support to JICA officials in the region and greater autonomy for these officials to decide 
how to use funds. It also recommended that JICA assist countries with the recurrent cost 
of projects, which continued to be an on-going problem in the region.39
37 The study group did not have any policy making powers but was essentially to advise government 
ministries (MOFA in particular) in making policies. See Chapter 3 for discussion of the role of these 
groups in aid policy.
38 Regional Study Group for Development Assistance to Oceania, Regional Study for Development 
Assistance to Oceania, JICA, December 1991, p.27 (in English and Japanese). The proposal for a 
‘regional aid forum’ was to some extent pre-empted by the initiation of a donor-recipient dialogue in 
1991, coordinated by the South Pacific Forum Secretariat. This is dealt with later.
39 This problem was also highlighted by the FAIR Committee for Oceania and Pacific Island Countries 
in its report Japanese ODA to Pacific Island Countries: Current Problems and Future Perspectives, 
FAIR, Tokyo, March 1993 (in English and Japanese). There was in fact some overlap in the (academic) 
membership of the two study groups. According to the FAIR report, which carried out follow-up studies
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A third set of proposals called for an expansion of small-scale grant assistance 
(SSGA). The introduction of the SSGA in 1989 was one of the first attempts by the 
Japanese government to respond to the problems of its grant aid (in particular, its large 
scale, and unwieldy, complicated procedures). The SSGA was not proposed specifically 
for the Pacific island countries, but they have been amongst its main beneficiaries. An 
annual budget of $10 million is set aside for the SSGA. Projects that are supported under 
this scheme are between $50,000 and $80,000 (or a maximum of 5 million yen). The 
main advantage of the SSGA is that it not only supports small projects but the Japanese 
embassies have authority to negotiate the grant contract with the implementing agency. 
Japan volunteers, working in the recipient country under the Japanese Overseas 
Cooperation Volunteers (JOCV) program, generally carry out the project identification 
work. These features were intended to simplify and speed up the dispensing of aid.
The proposal to channel more aid through regional organisations, in the interests 
of efficiency and regional harmony, did not meet with a positive reaction in MOFA, 
either with the Oceania Division or the Economic Cooperation Bureau. According to 
MOFA officials, the problem with utilising regional organisations in the Pacific (such as 
the Forum Secretariat) as aid channels is that they were unable to aggregate the interests 
of their members and coordinate the diverse development needs of the Pacific island 
states. In other words, there were ‘too many differences and conflicts inherent in regional 
organisations’. A second reason that was given was that Japan was not adequately 
represented within these organisations and thus did not have any decision making 
influence. Such influence would ensure that there was some oversight by Japanese 
officials of Japan’s financial contributions.40 The only instance where Japan would 
support a regional program or project was when the project had a bilateral base. In other 
words, if the request was from a government participating in a regional project, support 
would be forthcoming if ‘the project is accorded high priority by the government and is 
deemed good and feasible’.41 These arguments justified the limited financial support 
given to the Forum Secretariat and the SPC by Japan.
What does seem to be a major obstacle for Japan providing aid to regional 
organisations is adapting aid policy procedures to accommodate the provision of regional 
grants. The case of providing a large grant to the Forum Secretariat for 
telecommunications and shipping, mentioned earlier, is illuminating. The negotiations
of Japanese aid projects in four Pacific island countries, infrastructure was not utilised effectively and 
equipment installed was not maintained adequately. This resulted from limited financial resources 
available to island governments and lack of technical expertise. The recommendations of the FAIR 
report were similar to those contained in the JICA study.
40 Reference was made to the need to ensure that ‘tax payers’ money was not wasted’. Interviews with 
Oceania Division officials, November 1992 and April 1993. Also interviews with Grant Aid Division, 
December 1992 and Technical Cooperation Division, January 1993.
41 Sadaaki Numata, ‘Japan’s Cooperation with the South Pacific Region’, p . l l .
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broke down over the method of providing funds to the proposed regional projects and 
the degree of control over implementation that Japan wished to retain.
In addition to procedures, principles underpinning Japan’s aid program have also 
been resistant to change. For example, there was strong opposition from policy makers 
to any funding of the recurrent cost of grant aid projects, although in practice it was 
becoming increasingly apparent that some recurrent cost financing was necessary. One 
senior official in the Economic Cooperation Bureau reasoned as follows: ‘We believe in 
the philosophy of self-help, so countries should be encouraged to maintain projects 
themselves and not be too dependent forever on aid’. He also argued that since the 
Japanese aid budget was limited, it was not possible to support the recurrent cost of on­
going projects ‘and com m it... to new projects’.42
Principles and procedures are in turn politically defined. Any change that involves 
shifting power away from one ministry or agency is a direct challenge to that agency. It is 
likely that political considerations influenced the response to the proposal for mobile 
JICA support teams to undertake project evaluation. The proposal was described as ‘too 
complicated’ to be implemented.43 The main problem with this proposal is that it requires 
more financial resources to be allocated to JICA and greater autonomy to be given to 
JICA missions in the field. This would challenge standard aid decision making 
procedures whereby allocations are decided through a process of bargaining and 
consultation between ministries in Tokyo (especially MOFA and MOF). The implication 
of giving greater autonomy to JICA would be a lessening of MOFA’s influence over aid 
decision making. Past experience has shown that such proposals rarely win support, 
given that MOFA’s priority is to preserve its jurisdiction over aid policy.44
The only area that has seen some movement in the direction recommended by the 
JICA study group is with SSGA. This is the least contentious of the proposals since it 
does not require major changes to aid policy or procedures. The number of small-scale 
grant projects to the region grew from 6 in 1989 to 26 in 1993. It is important to note,
42 Interview, Director, Research and Programing Division, Economic Cooperation Bureau, MOFA, 
Tokyo, October 1992. The main exception to this rule appears to be the fisheries aid sector. Some 
recurrent cost financing and maintenance of fisheries projects is undertaken by the Overseas Fisheries 
Cooperation Foundation (OFCF).
43 Interview, Director, Research and Programing Division, Economic Cooperation Bureau, MOFA, 
Tokyo, October 1992.
44 The division of labour between MOFA and JICA was discussed in Chapter 3. Essentially, MOFA acts 
as a policy maker and JICA as the implementing agency (specifically for grant aid and technical 
cooperation). But with greater professional resources at its disposal, JICA is in a position to challenge 
MOFA’s political authority. Recommendations made in 1988 by the Administrative Management 
Bureau of the Management and Coordination Agency in fact called for JICA to be put in change of the 
grant aid budget, as well as project contracting and implementation. But, as Rix observed, ‘the grant aid 
budget is one of MOFA’s largest budget items and shifting it to JICA would remove one of the 
ministry’s main sources of bureaucratic power’. Alan Rix, Japan s Foreign Aid Challenge: Policy 
Reform and Aid Leadership, Routledge, London and New York, 1993, pp.81-4.
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however, that some countries have not received SSGA from Japan, while the bulk of 
Japan’s grant aid to the region continues to be channelled into large-scale infrastructure 
projects.45
The above objections to the proposals of the J1CA study group reflect a 
combination of bureaucratic and procedural conservatism, if not rigidity. The somewhat 
lofty goals articulated by the JICA study group in arguing for changes to Japan’s aid 
policy have clearly not carried much weight. The authors of the JICA report appealed to 
globalist ideals in arguing for these reforms: that Japan could ‘make an extremely 
significant contribution by adopting a long-term and broad view point on international 
interdependence and welfare where its contributions are not just carried out in the 
expectation of achieving short-term benefits’. They argued that this ‘would further help 
to publicize and make known to the rest of the world Japan’s commitment to 
international responsibility’.46
What this outcome also points to is that the Pacific island countries and regional 
organisations have not carried sufficient weight to influence Japan’s policies beyond the 
declaratory level. Bilateral, project-based aid remains the preferred approach for Japan. 
This approach provides opportunities for Japan to exercise influence and leverage more 
directly on individual countries. It also provides benefits to private sector and 
commercial interests in Japan. More generally, the present structure permits other 
ministries some influence over aspects of JICA’s operations.47
The foregoing analysis has suggested that while supportive of regional 
cooperation and of playing a role in regional fora, aid bureaucrats (this includes MOFA 
and MOF) are resistant to moving too far from the traditional bilateral approach to aid.
In the international arena there has occurred in recent years a shift in donor practice 
towards new frameworks for coordinating bilateral aid policy, engaging in dialogue and 
participating in joint aid projects. This trend is reflected in the Pacific island region. It has 
led to increasing pressure on Japan to adapt aid procedures and aid policy. The following 
section examines Japan’s participation in the new multilateral aid fora and its position on
45 For details of projects up to 1993 see MOFA, Japan s Official Development Assistance 1994 Annual 
Report, pp.448-61 or Gaimusho, Waga kuni no seifu kaihatsu enjo, Vol.2, 1994, pp.803-70.
46 Regional Study for Development Assistance to Oceania, pp.13-14. There are also practical reasons for 
supporting Pacific island regional organisations: they provide channels for multilateral aid, which, in 
turn, would help to address the problems of limited aid personnel in Japan, and the lack of flexibility in 
its bilateral aid programs. The UNDP Pacific island fund was initiated by Japan in part to overcome 
these problems.
47 It should be acknowledged, of course, that Japan is not alone in favouring a bilateral approach to aid. 
Many donors in the region place priority on their bilateral programs. In a recent statement on Australian 
aid to the Pacific islands, the Australian Minister for Development Cooperation and Pacific Island 
Affairs declared that ‘The predominant emphasis of Australia’s aid partnership with the South Pacific 
continues to be on a bilateral approach, delivered through country programs’. Hon. Gordon Bilney, ‘The 
Philosophy and Process of Australia’s Aid Partnership with the South Pacific Region’, Centre for South 
Pacific Studies, University of New South Wales, 27 October 1994.
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policy frameworks that are now being promoted by the donor community. It assesses the 
extent to which bureaucratic and procedural factors noted above have influenced Japan’s 
policies in these areas.
JOINT PROGRAMMING, POLICY COORDINATION AND DONOR 
DIALOGUE
MOFA has distinguished between two types of aid coordination: project coordination 
and policy coordination.48 This section first examines project coordination in the context 
of Australia-Japan joint programming.
Australia-Japan aid cooperation
Discussions between Australian and Japanese officials on developments in the region 
(and specifically on Japan’s role in the region) began in 1985 at the Australia-Japan 
Ministerial Committee. The importance to Japan of cooperation with Australia and New 
Zealand in formulating its aid policy towards the region had already been noted in reports 
commissioned by MOFA in 1980 and 1981 (see previous chapter). The immediate 
antecedents of Australia-Japan aid cooperation can be traced to 1988 when Prime 
Minister Takeshita visited Australia. This visit produced a formal agreement on 
cooperation between Australia and Japan for an expanded Japanese aid program.
In mid-1988 Australian officials from AID AB held detailed discussions in Tokyo 
with Japanese aid officials. These consultations raised the possibility of joint aid projects. 
But they mainly focused on ways in which Australian experience in the region could be 
harnessed to assist Japanese planners to identify suitable projects.49 In this context, plans 
for proceeding with ‘parallel aid projects’ already undertaken in Western Samoa were 
developed. In 1989 agreement was reached to continue with parallel projects and for 
Australian technical consultants to ‘have access’ to Japanese aid projects. The decision 
to move ahead with joint aid projects ‘in appropriate cases’ was also taken.50
Parallel aid projects focused mainly on airport construction and development. 
Three major projects were carried out in the region:
Western Samoa, Faleolo International Airport
Japan —  grant (1985, 1986) expansion of the terminal;
Australia —  runway expansion and improvement;
48 MOFA, Japan s Official Development Assistance 1991 Annual Report, pp.156-9.
49 ‘Expanded Aid Program will be Test of Wider Relations’, Pacific Report, N o .8 ,7 July 1988, p.3.
50 ‘Australia, Japan Close to Agreement on Regional Aid Coordination’, Pacific Report, Vol.2, No. 17, 
14 September 1989, p.6. The difference between joint projects and parallel projects is essentially 
determined by the level of coordination between the donors. Joint projects combine the resources and 
efforts of the two donors from beginning to end, including feasibility studies. Parallel projects are 
complementary but carried out separately.
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New Zealand — airport lights and electricity supply system;
Canada — light maintenance vehicles.
Vanuatu, Bauerfield International Airport
Japan —  grant (1989) for new terminal and aviation facilities;
Australia —  runway expansion;
New Zealand, France, the UK and the 
European Community —  miscellaneous assistance.
Tonga, Fua-amotu International Airport
Japan —  grant (1989) for terminal, feeder runways and aprons;
Australia —  runway expansion and landing instruments and equipment;
New Zealand —  control tower and automatic control equipment;
European Community —  communication facilities.51
What was officially termed ‘Australia-Japan joint programming’ was first 
discussed in detail at a high level consultation in Suva in August 1991 with officials from 
Australia, Japan and the government of Fiji. The decision to include Fiji in this approach 
underscored Japan’s interest in promoting aid relations with Fiji, on the grounds that Fiji 
was a regional ‘opinion-leader’ and influential in South Pacific regional fora. But the fact 
that Fiji’s per capita income exceeded the ceiling that was put on grant aid recipients (see 
chapter 3) meant that it was necessary to rationalise continuing aid on the grounds that 
the projects were ‘regional’, thus benefitting other countries as well as Fiji.52
The next step was taken in April 1992 at a second trilateral meeting in Canberra. 
At this meeting it was agreed to proceed with planning for implementation and that the 
initial projects would be drawn from the health sector. A joint Japan-Australia project 
identification mission visited Fiji in September 1992. The mission examined a list of 
possible projects put forward by the Fiji government and settled on two; ‘the further 
development of a health promotion program to serve Fiji with links to the regional 
centres’; and ‘the development of an integrated health care system on the island of 
Taveuni’. One criterion for the proposed projects was that they ‘offer direct or indirect 
benefits to other Pacific nations’.53
The ostensible objective of the joint programming was ‘to enable the two 
countries to undertake development cooperative activities on a scale that might not be
51 Sadaaki Numata, ‘Japan’s Cooperation with the South Pacific Region’, p.12.
52 Despite attempts by MOFA and JICA to persuade Fiji to accept loans from the Overseas Economic 
Cooperation Fund (OECF) and not grants, it appears that Fiji will continue to receive grant aid for 
‘regional’ projects. ‘Japanese Impress Rabuka’, The Fiji Times, 31 October 1994, p.5.
53 Other criteria were that the projects be among priorities listed by the government of Fiji; and that they 
‘take into account the capabilities of the two donors and if possible added advantage should be obtained 
to parties involved through cooperation via a tripartite rather than usual bilateral channels’. Government 
of Fiji, AID AB, JICA, A Report of a Joint Japan/Australia Project Identification Mission in the Health 
Sector of Fiji, September 1992.
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possible for either Australia or Japan as a single donor’.54 But the underlying rationale 
was more political. Joint programming was in line with a recommendation of an 
Australian Parliamentary Committee that argued in 1989 that Australia should ‘actively 
seek to involve Japan in consultations regarding aid to the region’.55 According to 
Australia’s Ambassador to Fiji, the initiative for joint programming came specifically 
from a former head of the Australian International Development Assistance Bureau 
(AIDAB). ‘The aim was to draw the Japanese into the region; to get them so involved 
that they could not get out’.56 This was echoed by Fiji officials. In other words, joint 
programming was intended to be a way of ensuring Japan’s on-going commitment to 
development cooperation in the region. Australian officials also aimed to improve the 
effectiveness of Japan’s ODA by seeking to make it more like Australian aid, following 
similar principles and procedures.57 Ambassador Trotter admitted to misgivings about 
this approach. He suggested that rather than make Japan’s aid more like Australian aid, 
the reverse was actually more likely to happen.58
Japanese officials, meanwhile, were largely pessimistic about the prospects for 
joint programming with Australia. The prevailing attitude towards joint projects was 
summed up by one MOFA official as follows: joint programming ‘sounds good in theory 
but it is not very practical’.59 The reasons why this approach was deemed not very 
practical included language difficulties, different financial years, the fact that for Japan all 
projects must be implemented within one fiscal year, and ‘inefficiency’ in that there were 
‘too many actors involved’.60
Apart from procedural factors that hindered aid coordination, there were also 
tensions that related specifically to relations with Australia. According to an official in
54 Ministry of Finance (Fiji), Brief for Fiji Delegation to the Joint Australia/Japan Programming 
Mission, Sydney, April 1992.
55 Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, Australia s Relations with the South Pacific, 
Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, March 1989, p.193.
56 Interview with Ambassador John Trotter, Suva, January 1993.
57 Generally, the Australian approach is to announce an annual disbursement in advance, which is not 
linked to specific projects. The aid may be used for various programs and projects, and shifted around as 
appropriate. It is thus highly flexible, unlike Japan’s aid.
58 Interview. It had earlier been noted that there were underlying reservations in AID AB about being 
seen ‘too much at Japan’s side on the ground’. ‘Australia, Japan Close to Agreement on Regional Aid 
Coordination’, Pacific Report, Vol.2, No. 17,14 September 1989, p.6.
59 Interview, Director, Research and Programing Division, Economic Cooperation Bureau, MOFA, 
Tokyo, October 1992.
60 Similar problems were observed in the case of US-Japan joint projects, which originated in the early 
1980s and mainly focused on South and Southeast Asia. One Pacific island country was involved —  
Tonga. See Dennis Yasutomo, The Manner of Giving: Strategic Aid and Japan s Foreign Policy, 
Lexington Books, MA, 1986, pp. 104-5.
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the Grant Aid Division: ‘Other donors have more experience and this can complement 
our lack of experience and expertise. But the problem is that we cannot always accept 
aid proposals of other donors —  especially Australia. We feel that Australia views the 
South Pacific in a special way — emphasising certain countries. And sometimes they will 
try to impose their view on the recipient. In this case we must support the recipient’.61
Significantly, at the time that the Australian, Japanese and Fijian governments 
were negotiating implementation of a joint project in Fiji, the official ODA Report 
published by MOFA in 1991 signalled a move away from this approach. It noted that 
there were many difficulties in undertaking joint projects: that they ‘require more effort 
and time than ordinary bilateral projects’. It also noted ‘differences between the aid 
systems of Japan and those of its partners’. Thus a joint project ‘is very difficult to 
implement successfully’. The Report concluded that ‘from now on policy-level 
coordination would be the main form of (Japan’s) aid coordination and the emphasis on 
joint projects would be further reduced’.62
Despite carrying out preliminary feasibility studies of the joint project in Fiji, this 
has not gone ahead. It may be argued that Japan’s position on joint projects was 
essentially the same as that for aid to regional organisations. While at the rhetorical level 
MOFA declared its interest in joint programming, in practice there was an unwillingness 
to adapt aid procedures. The emphasis was on keeping control over the aid process. In 
addition, political tensions emerged in relations with Australia.
Development partners policy dialogue
Policy-level coordination refers to the cooperative process by which donors and 
recipients collectively work out ‘the most effective and efficient ways to provide 
assistance’.63 The need for ‘new consultative aid coordination mechanisms’ had been 
mooted in 1987, in the context of increased aid to the region from new donors (Japan) 
and multilateral agencies. It was suggested that an ‘aid consultative mechanism will 
protect South Pacific nations from administrative and economic waste, as well as serve 
to further strengthen institutions within the region’.64
More specifically, policy coordination aims to address the macro-economic policy 
context within the recipient country, according to prescriptions of structural adjustment
61 Interview, Grant Aid Division, MOFA, Tokyo, December 1992.
62 MOFA, Japan’s Official Development Assistance, 1991 Annual Report, p.159. This view was 
qualified in subsequent ODA reports of MOFA. The difficulties were highlighted, although joint 
programming continued to be described as one form of donor coordination.
63 On the role of aid policy coordination, see Robert Cassen et al., Does Aid Work?, Second Edition, 
Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1994.
64 Peter Drysdale, ‘South Pacific Trade and Development Assistance’, in George Kozmetsky et al. (eds), 
Pacific Cooperation and Development, Praeger, New York, 1988, pp.73-80. (Proceedings of the Global 
Community Forum Conference, Western Samoa, July 1987.)
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set out by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.65 The emphasis on 
policy level coordination has become increasingly pronounced in multilateral aid fora 
since the late 1980s. This had much to do with the combination of economic recession in 
Western donor countries, which led to fiscal austerity measures; the end of the Cold 
War, which removed political imperatives to aid; the apparent economic success of those 
developing countries pursuing market and export oriented development strategies; and 
the deepening cycle of poverty in other developing countries, burdened with debt, 
overpopulation and environmental degradation.
The direct impetus to aid donor coordination in the Pacific island region was 
provided by the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development. In December 1991, DAC held a meeting to 
review development and aid issues in the Pacific island region. It noted that ‘the most 
important overall observation was that economic performance in the region did not meet 
expectations despite the provision of very substantial amounts of development 
assistance’. Meanwhile, ‘similar island economies had achieved much better performance 
over a comparable period’.66
The review came up with two sets of recommendations to improve the economic 
performance of the Pacific island countries —  one pertaining to the policies of regional 
countries and the other to the policies and practices of donor states. For the Pacific 
island countries, the following objectives were identified:
• the improvement of macro-economic policy settings;
• the development of an appropriate policy environment and planning 
framework;
• the fostering of a more balanced economy with a dynamic private sector;
• increased participation by communities and women in particular;
• the development of human resources and potential;
• the provision of basic economic and social infrastructure;
• to devise strategies that are environmentally sustainable;
• the reduction of population growth rates where they are not sustainable. 
For donor countries there were four key challenges:
• improving aid coordination and policy dialogue;
• dealing with unmanageable recurrent cost burdens;
• correcting inappropriate patterns of technical cooperation;
• streamlining burdensome aid modalities.67
65 For background on the World Bank’s policy-based lending, see Paul Mosley, Jane Harrigan and John 
Toye, Aid and Power: The World Bank and Policy-based Lending, V ol.l, Routledge, London and New 
York, 1991.
66 DAC, Development Cooperation, 1992 Report, OECD, Paris, December 1992, pp. 11-12.
67 DAC, Development Cooperation, 1992 Report.
225
These recommendations were in line with the World Bank approach to 
development in the region, and the problems facing both donors and recipients. The 
World Bank focus was on ‘the need to invest in people, to foster a climate for enterprise, 
integrate into the global economy, and to pursue stable macro-economic policies’.68 
Developed countries needed to, amongst other things, increase the quality and quantity 
of financial assistance to developing countries.
Formal consultations between the member states of the South Pacific Forum and 
the major donor countries and organisations to the region (named ‘development 
partners’) were first held at the Forum Secretariat in early 1991. A number of issues 
were discussed. These included private sector development, recurrent cost issues of aid 
delivery, progress in the development of strategic planning and policy formulation 
capacities, human resources development and refinement of aid consultative mechanisms. 
In July 1991, the meeting of the South Pacific Forum endorsed the continuation of ‘high 
level economic discussions between Forum Island Countries and the region’s major 
development partners’.69
The first Pacific Island Countries/Development Partners meeting produced ‘broad 
acceptance of the need to strengthen macro-economic policy formulation and planning 
strategies’.70 Policy recommendations included the need to encourage export oriented 
policies and eliminate distortions in the pricing system, financial deregulation, labour 
reform and taxation reform. These issues dominated the second Pacific Island 
Countries/Development Partners Meeting, held at the Forum Secretariat in Suva in 
March 1992. The meeting attracted participants from international aid agencies, UN 
agencies and regional organisations, as well as donor countries and Pacific island 
countries. It had two basic themes: ‘improved aid delivery through more effective 
planning, policy dialogue and consultation; and strengthening the role of the private 
sector and improving the provision of technical assistance and training’.71 The Forum 
Secretariat also undertook to develop a statement of regional priorities to enable donors 
to address needs in keeping with regional priorities. The aim would be to ‘reduce 
duplication, ensure activities have a regional focus and provide for greater collaboration 
on regional programmes’.72
68 Described as the ‘World Bank’s Market Friendly Approach to Development’. Extracts of the 1991 
World Bank Development Report, reprinted in Australia’s Overseas Aid Program, 1991-92, Budget 
Related Paper No.4, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1991.
69 Communique, 22nd South Pacific Forum, Pohnpei, Federated States of Micronesia, 29-30 July 1991.
70 Forum Secretariat, Report of Pacific Island Countries/Development Partners Meeting, Suva. 9 - 1 2  
March 1992. The Australian Ambassador to Fiji suggested that Pacific island countries were at first 
wary of the dialogue approach, suspecting that it may strengthen donor influence over domestic policies.
71 Forum Secretariat, Report of the Pacific Island Countres/Development Partners Meeting.
72 Forum Secretariat, Report of the Pacific Island Countries/Development Partners Meeting.
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The third Pacific Island Countries/Development Partners meeting, held in April 
1993, considered the second World Bank Regional Economic Report, produced in 
cooperation with the Asian Development Bank. The major theme of this report was the 
so-called ‘Pacific paradox’ —  continued slow growth despite relatively high levels of aid 
and investment and reasonably prudent macro-economic management.73 The meeting 
also continued discussion of established issues: a strategy for regional programs, design 
and appraisal of technical assistance, and measures for improving national level aid 
coordination.
Australia was at the forefront of the regional initiative for donor dialogue and 
policy coordination. One of the main arguments that Australian policy makers used in 
order to underscore the need for donor dialogue and for policy reform on the part of 
both donors and recipients was the ‘changed global circumstances’ and the fact that aid 
flows to the region would be increasingly difficult to attract. In this context, it was 
necessary to make more efficient use of aid flows that were unlikely to increase and may 
in fact decline. Citing the World Bank’s second Regional Economic Report, which had 
reflected on the ‘disappointing’ economic performance of the Pacific island countries in 
the 1980s,74 Australia’s Minister for Pacific Island Affairs asked rhetorically: ‘has there 
not been an observable shifting of attention away from the South Pacific region on the 
part of some of its more traditional partners as they have found themselves having to 
address pressing priorities elsewhere? Does this not make it all the more the urgent that 
we strive to attune ourselves as closely as possible to changed global circumstances?’75
The most obvious demonstration of this shift was the decision by the US Agency 
for International Development (USAID) to terminate its aid program in the South Pacific 
in 1994. The US aid program in the region in 1993 amounted to $7.5 million (excluding 
payments under the fisheries treaty). All programs will be phased out by 1995.76 Donor
73 Australia s Development Co-operation Program, 1993-94, Australian Government Publishing 
Service, Canberra, 1993, pp.21-2.
74 According to the World Bank report, real GNP grew by about 0.1 per cent in the 10 years between 
1982 and 1992. This compared unfavourably to other small island countries, such as those in the 
Caribbean and Indian Ocean.
75 Hon. Gordon Bilney, ‘Australia’s Relations with the South Pacific —  Challenge and Change, Address 
to Foreign Correspondents Association, Sydney, 15 June 1994.
76 ‘US Budget Cuts Lead to Less Aid for Pacific’, Pacific Islands Monthly, May 1994, p.5. This move 
followed a directive from the US government that USAID close 21 missions by the end of fiscal year 
1994. While the official rhetoric spoke in terms of the need to ‘rationalise and reorganise the USAID’, 
the main imperative for the budget cuts was the redistribution of a reduced aid budget towards new ( ‘in 
vogue’) priorities including Eastern Europe and former Soviet republics. Programs to the Pacific that 
will not be cut include those tied to treaty obligations (the multilateral fisheries access agreement) and 
aid to regional organisations (the SPC [$1 million] and the South Pacific Regional Environment 
Program [$90,000]). Interview, US State Department, Washington DC, February 1994.
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reticence about providing additional funding to the region was also apparent at the Small 
Islands Development Conference convened in Barbados in 1994.77
Japan has declared its support for aid policy coordination and has participated in 
the Forum/Development Partners Dialogue. Japan’s role in the donor dialogue has been 
muted, however, and it has not taken any initiatives in this area. This is in contrast to 
Japan’s role in sponsoring donor coordination and dialogue on assistance to Mongolia, 
the Philippines, Cambodia and Africa.78 With respect to the Pacific island region, the 
official position is that ‘consultation with other donor countries is important to avoid 
duplication of efforts or waste of limited resources and to harness the experiences, 
expertise and resources [of other donors]’.79 Other considerations include the benefits of 
information sharing and enhanced policy transparency.
Conversely, there are obvious difficulties for Japan in subscribing to some of the 
prescriptions of the multilateral agencies. Japan’s aid practices in the Pacific context are 
in fact implicated in the criticisms made by DAC. Especially pertinent were DAC 
recommendations that called for ‘dealing with unmanageable recurrent cost burdens’ and 
‘streamlining burdensome aid modalities’.80 The earlier discussion of Japan’s response to 
the JICA study group proposals indicated a lack of political will to adapt policy 
procedures. This raises the question: what is the purpose of Japan’s participation in 
donor coordination and dialogue if it is not serious about reforming its aid ‘modalities’?
It may be argued that by engaging in regional dialogues, which have not required 
any major institutional adjustments on Japan’s part, Japan has taken its place beside other 
donors and played the role of a ‘responsible’ member of the donor community. But to 
what extent has Japan been motivated by an interest in influencing donor and recipient 
policies through applying conditionality to its ODA? This question has implications for 
the broader debate about Japan’s leadership role in international affairs.
POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CONDITIONALITY
In Chapter 2 it was observed that Japan has traditionally not applied policy conditionality 
to its ODA in order to encourage structural adjustment measures or political reforms in
77 Ian Williams, ‘No New Money for Island States’, The Australian, 10 May 1994, p.10.
78 See for example, MOFA, Japan’s Official Development Assistance 1994 Annual Report, p.215. With 
the exception of Africa, the role in sponsoring donor consultations on Mongolia, Cambodia and the 
Philippines is in keeping with the active role Japan has taken on development issues in Asia.
79 Sadaaki Numata, ‘Japan’s Cooperation with the South Pacific Region’, p.12. See also MOFA,
Japan s Official Development Assistance, 1991 Annual Report, pp. 157-8.
80 DAC, Development Cooperation, 1992 Report, p.17. See also DAC, Aid Review 1990/91: Report by 
the Secretariat and Questions for the Review of Japan, OECD, Paris, 1991. This mainly focused on 
Japan’s inadequate management of aid (the need for more staff, especially aid professionals, and for 
further decentralisation of authority to implementing agencies and field missions).
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recipient countries. The long-standing rationale for this approach has been that 
conditionality erodes the sovereignty of recipient countries. It has also been suggested 
that Japan has been averse to policy conditionality such as stipulated by the World Bank 
because this tends to be politically unpopular in recipient countries.81 Hence the only 
time Japan uses its aid as an instrument to encourage ‘reforms’ in recipient countries is 
when its aid is channelled through multilateral fora.
This policy of not applying conditionality to bilateral aid has started to change, 
but not necessarily in line with the development orthodoxy promoted by institutions such 
as the World Bank. For example, MOF officials in Japan have sought to shift the World 
Bank to a position on structural adjustment that more closely resembles Japan’s 
experience.82 This is reflected in the ODA Charter, which argues that cooperation with 
international financial agencies ‘ensures that Japan’s perspective on ODA is adequately 
reflected in the international organisations’.
On political issues, Japan has also promoted an approach to conditionality that is 
distinct from that of other donors. The ODA Charter, adopted in 1992, integrated four 
guidelines for ODA which had been announced by Prime Minister Kaifu in April 1991. 
According to these guidelines, in the implementation of its ODA Japan would ‘pay full 
attention to 1) trends in military expenditures of recipients; 2) trends in the development 
and production of weapons of mass destruction; 3) trends in the export and import of 
arms; and 4) efforts to promote democratisation, the introduction of a market oriented 
economy and basic human rights’.83 Japan would ‘reconsider’ its aid policy if reversals in 
these areas occurred.84
The key feature of the Charter is that it does not ‘lock’ Japan into a fixed 
approach to political conditionality. There are no provisions for automatic aid
81 Barbara Stallings, ‘Development in the 1990s: US and Japanese Paradigms’, in Barbara Stallings et 
al., Common Vision, Different Paths: The United States and Japan in the Developing World, Overseas 
Development Council, Washington DC, 1993. This concern about popularity does not appear to hinder 
equally unpopular policies of linkage (such as with fisheries aid policies).
82 This refers primarily to the question of the role of the state and of industrial policy: the so-called 
‘activist government model of East Asian development’ versus the free market approach, based on 
liberalisation and privatisation. See Juichi Inada, ‘Democratization, Marketization and Japan’s 
Emerging Role as a Foreign Aid Donor’, International Studies Association Conference, Washington 
DC, 30 March 1994. The World Bank publication that reflects Japan’s approach to structural adjustment 
policy is World Bank, The East Asian Miracle: Economic Growth and Public Policy, Oxford University 
Press, New York, 1993.
83 Japan’s Official Development Assistance Charter, 1992. See Chapter 3 for further details of the 
background to the ODA Charter.
84 Orr sets out a rough schedule for implementing these principles: ‘The review process would involve 
three distinct steps: Japan would remind the recipient during annual consultations of the principles 
adopted. If the recipient continued to violate the principles then the second year the aid volume would be 
frozen. A third year of non-compliance would result in initial reduction of commitments’. Robert M. Orr 
Jr., ‘Political Agendas: A New World Order Through Foreign Aid?’, in Barbara Stallings et al.,
Common Visions, Different Paths, p.85.
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suspensions. This is possible since the principles of the Charter do not have any legal 
status but are simply guidelines. In practice, the aid principles have been applied ‘flexibly’ 
and cautiously by MOFA. Although new aid commitments were suspended to some 
countries for reversals in democratisation and human rights violations (Malawi, Kenya, 
Sudan, Nigeria, Gambia, Haiti, Burma), aid has also been resumed to some countries in 
the absence of any improvement in the human rights situation (Burma); while in other 
cases Japan preferred to use ‘quiet diplomacy and demarches' than the aid lever (China, 
Indonesia, Peru and Thailand).85
At the 1991 post-Forum Dialogue, Japan’s representative was questioned about 
the application of the aid principles in policy towards the Pacific islands. The 
Parliamentary Vice-Foreign Minister replied that the principles ‘would only apply to 
countries which were considered politically unstable or had large military spending.
These principles do not therefore apply to Forum island countries’.86 There has been no 
indication since then that this position has changed.
The ODA Charter may be viewed primarily as an attempt at enhancing policy 
transparency for domestic and international consumption, rather than a serious attempt at 
promoting political or economic reform in developing countries. The cautious approach 
to human rights issues is justified on the grounds that Japan has a different interpretation 
of human rights —  one more sensitive to ‘indigenous’ (as opposed to Western) forms of 
political development. In other words, Japan has an ‘Asian view’ of human rights.87 But 
the Charter also reflects underlying conflicts of interest in Japan’s ODA program. In 
particular, there is a conflict between the objectives and expectations of other donors in 
promoting policy conditionality; and Japan’s economic and political relations with 
recipients. It is notable that suspensions of aid have only been effected in countries where 
there are no significant economic interests at stake. This suggests that where there is a 
necessary trade-off between the more abstract goals embodied in the Charter and Japan’s 
interests in preserving a bilateral relationship, the latter will carry more weight
In this context it is important to note that application of the ODA principles 
depends on the agreement of other ministries since it is not MOFA alone which decides 
on aid allocations. Thus other ministries’ opinions (including MITI) will influence
85 See ‘Adherence to ODA Criteria Scrutinised’, The Japan Times, 18 December 1992, p.3; Hisao 
Takagi, ‘Japan Pursues own Diplomacy on International Human Rights’, Nikkei Weekly, Vol.30,
No. 1528, 1 August 1992, pp.1-2. On resumption of aid to Burma (Myanmar), see ‘MOFA Decides to 
Extend 1 billion yen in ODA to Myanmar Government for Food Production’, Mainichi shimbun, 8 
March 1995 (morning edition), p .l.
86 Japan-South Pacific Forum Dialogue, 1 August 1991.
87 This is discussed more fully in Sandra Tarte, ‘Japan Ties New Strings to its Help’, Islands Business 
Pacific, January/February 1993, pp.39-41. In general, MOFA claims that ‘in comparison with other 
industrial nations, [Japan] attaches greater importance to and respects more the circumstances of the 
recipient’. See ‘Interview with Economic Cooperation Bureau Director-General, Hiroshi Hirabayashi’, 
Nihon keizai shimbun, 1 October 1994, p.13.
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decisions about implementing the Charter. This introduces economic, commercial and 
domestic political considerations, as well as diplomatic opinions. Moreover, the case by 
case procedure of aid decision making permits an ad hoc approach to the question of 
policy conditionality.88
Japan’s contributions to global and regional environment conservation
A principle of the ODA Charter is that ‘environmental conservation and development 
should be pursued in tandem’ and that Japan ‘will support efforts by developing 
countries to overcome environmental problems’. Japan’s policy in this area has 
essentially been to declare new aid commitments that establish quantitative targets for aid 
to support environment conservation. At the Earth Summit in 1992, Prime Minister 
Miyazawa announced plans to increase environmental aid to $7 billion between 1992 and 
1997. This compared to the $2.3 billion disbursed between 1989 and 1991.
Environmental aid, described as the ‘most prominent new issue to appear on the 
development agenda in the last decade’,89 clearly illustrates the dilemmas and challenges 
facing Japan’s aid program. Despite the declaration of aid targets, the actual 
implementation of policy is hindered by a number of problems. One writer has suggested 
that there are two main problems for Japan in this area.90 One is a lack of institutional 
adjustment within Japan’s aid program. Several ministries and agencies vie for a share of 
this aid and have established separate programs. For example, JICA and the OECF have 
introduced environmental guidelines, while MITI and MOFA both have established 
separate environmental research facilities. There is thus competition over resources and a 
lack of overall policy coherence. The aid program also continues to emphasise 
infrastructure and equipment supply (which Japan’s private sector may deliver) rather 
than more innovative aid, such as technology transfer or debt-for-nature swaps.91
A second problem is recipient country ambivalence about the importance of the 
environment. Moreover, there remains a lack of clarity about the relationship between 
environment and development. Developing countries are often unwilling to introduce 
environmental conservation measures at the expense of economic growth. MOFA
88 According to a senior MOFA official, policy change is more likely to be in the overt linkage of aid 
and human rights at the rhetorical level than more substantive change. What was previously rationalised 
in non-political terms (such as recall of Japanese aid workers in times of turmoil for their own security) 
will henceforth be articulated in political terms (stopping aid because of human rights reversals). 
Interview, Director of Research and Programing Division, MOFA, October 1992.
89 Barbara Stallings, ‘Development in the 1990s: US and Japanese Paradigms’, p.21.
90 David Potter, ‘Assessing Japan’s Environmental Aid Policy’, Pacific Affairs, Vol.67, No.2, Summer 
1994, pp.200-15.
91 It is important to note that Japan has also channelled environmental aid through multilateral fora, 
especially UN agencies. These include the UN Environmental Program and the International Tropical 
Timber Organisation, which is based in Japan.
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officials have claimed that ‘such projects (for the environment) are not often requested 
by developing countries’.92 This problem is compounded by the fact that Japan’s aid 
system relies on requests from recipients to initiate a project.
To these may be added a third problem (which is in fact linked to the above), a 
conflict between policy goals of ‘economic cooperation’ and of environment 
conservation. In other words, the problem is how to marry the interests of economic 
ministries and the private sector with the global environment agenda. This is evident in 
the areas of resource extraction and industrial development. Promoting ‘development’ in 
these areas may directly contribute to problems of resource depletion and pollution. To 
address this dilemma, one writer has suggested that environmental aid be framed in terms 
of ‘traditional rationales’ of Japanese ODA; for example, expansion of export markets or 
resource security.93 This would encourage allocation of additional resources of aid that 
could attack the ‘root causes’ of environmental problems. But this still leaves the 
difficulty of distinguishing between environmental and development goals.
The Pacific island region, through the South Pacific Regional Environment 
Programme (SPREP),94 has identified a number of areas where Japanese assistance 
would be welcome. These include the research, development and transfer of technologies 
to increase energy efficiency and promote alternative energy sources.95 But a positive 
response from Japan has not been forthcoming. This suggests that, contrary to the view 
expressed above that there was a lack of initiative from developing countries in this area, 
the problem is more one of reconciling recipient needs with Japan’s own policy priorities 
and aid procedures.
One aspect of Japan’s aid to the region that is clearly environment-oriented is in 
the fisheries area, as discussed in Chapter 5. Japan has announced initiatives that aim to 
promote conservation of marine life in coastal states economic zones. It strongly 
supported cooperation with developing states at the United Nations Conference on 
Highly Migratory and Straddling Fish Stocks. But, as was argued in Chapter 5, this aid 
was a reaction to criticisms of Japan’s fishing practices and to measures that threatened 
to foreclose the option of high seas fishing. Its main objectives are to counter criticisms 
of Japan, to build a more positive image of Japan as a fishing nation by taking steps to 
ensure the ‘sustainable’ use of resources, and to secure the continuing operations of 
Japan’s fishing fleets.
92 ‘Humanitarian ODA Policy Viewed by Some as a Tall Order’, The Japan Times, 18 July 1992, p.3.
93 Taizo Yakushiji, ‘The Challenge o f Development with Environmental Protection’, in Barbara 
Stallings et al., Common Vision, Different Paths, p .l 11.
94 Based in Western Samoa, SPREP is now an independent, inter-governmental organisation. It was 
previously attached to the SPC.
95 Ieremia Tabai, Secretary General, Forum Secretariat, ‘Environment Problems and Issues in the 
Pacific’.
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The record of Japan’s aid in the environment area has reflected more general 
characteristics of Japan’s aid program. It has reacted to policy agendas set by others; it 
has been defensive of Japan’s interests and image; it has emphasised quantitative targets 
rather than qualitative change; and it has put priority on bilateral ties and the economic 
and political interests at stake in those relations rather than multilateral frameworks. 
Environmental aid has also followed more general procedures of Japanese aid: 
emphasising bilateral infrastructure development and an ad hoc, case by case, approach 
to policy.
CONCLUSION
A prediction made in 1989 that Japan ‘is set to become the largest aid donor to the 
South Pacific region, with an emphasis more likely on multilateral assistance to the whole 
region rather than its formerly more piecemeal approach of bilateral aid’96 has clearly not 
been borne out. The above analysis has suggested that Japan’s aid diplomacy towards the 
Pacific island countries is not shifting towards a new emphasis on regional fora or new 
regional frameworks for ODA. This is despite rhetoric, particularly from MOFA, that has 
strongly supported regional cooperation and multilateral dialogue on aid and 
development. What the analysis does suggest is that Japan’s aid diplomacy is proceeding 
on several fronts simultaneously.97
Japan is continuing to emphasise its traditional bilateral approach to aid and has 
not provided significant financial assistance to regional programs or regional institutions. 
Despite this bilateral emphasis, Japan has engaged in the post-Forum Dialogue and in the 
Forum-sponored aid donor coordination. This has not required major institutional 
adjustments by Japan, so it has been possible to participate in multilateral fora without 
changing policies or procedures. On project coordination and joint programming with 
Australia, the record was mixed. On the one hand, Japan solicited advice from Australia 
on how to expand its aid program. It was also apparent that MOFA officials were 
sensitive to Australia’s dominant position in the region and sought to consult with 
Australia in advance of its aid initiative. On the other hand, joint programming, which 
was an idea imposed on Japan by Australia, did not prove successful. Both Australia and 
Japan clearly had misgivings about this approach in terms of the implications for their 
own aid policies.
96 Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, Australia’s Relations with the South Pacific, 
p. 193.
97 This paraphrases Susan Pharr’s observation about how Japan’s policy on infrastructure development 
aimed on the one hand to incorporate this traditional emphasis into its ‘aid philosophy’, while seeking at 
the same time to gradually reduce the proportion of aid spent on infrastructure. Susan J. Pharr,
‘Japanese Aid in the New World Order’, in Craig C.Garby and Mary Brown Bullock (eds), Japan, A 
New Kind of Superpower?, Woodrow Wilson Center Press, Washington DC, 1994, p. 171.
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Japan’s approach to policy conditionality, a feature of the donor dialogues, has 
been cautious and concerned primarily with retaining policy flexibility (that is, to apply 
conditions on an ad hoc basis). This has been rationalised, in part, on the grounds that 
Japan has a different view of political and economic development to other Western 
countries and the international finance agencies. Essentially, this position enables Japan 
to promote established policy objectives, while accommodating donor demands that 
Japan’s aid program conform more closely to multilateral frameworks. In the area of 
environmental aid, which is touted as a major component of Japan’s ‘international 
contributions’, the approach has been to emphasise established procedures and 
modalities, and to use aid in order to promote Japan’s foreign policy goals; for example, 
in the fisheries area.
The analysis suggests that the resistance to multilateral frameworks and regional 
aid stems from bureaucratic conservatism, which in turn reflects the need to balance 
political and economic interests underpinning Japan’s aid program. Bilateral aid may be 
more amenable to supporting particular foreign policy goals. It also promotes the role of 
the private sector in delivering aid. Existing procedures enable different ministries and 
agencies to continue to influence aid decisions, in line with the interests of their private 
sector ‘clients’. Bureaucratic resistance to change stems from opposition to losing policy 
making power. For example, in respect to the policy innovations recommended by the 
JICA study group, the only area to be incorporated was the SSGA. Other proposals, 
which required devolving more power to JICA as well as providing aid to regional 
organisations, have not been acted on.
These factors constrain Japan’s ability to play a leadership role in international 
development fora. This includes defining development debates and influencing the 
policies of other states. It may be argued that the goal of playing a leadership role in 
international affairs is subordinated to promoting particular economic, political and 
bureaucratic interests. The analysis also suggests that as long as the ‘economic 
cooperation’ principles continue to shape the policies and procedures of ODA, the 
broader political role of Japan’s aid program will be limited.
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8 Conclusions
The issue fo r Japan is how aid can best be used to achieve Japanese goals while 
enhancing the welfare o f people in developing countries who need itd
The central question in this study is ‘What are Japan’s goals in providing aid to the 
Pacific island region?’ The argument is that ODA goals are neither uniform nor 
immutable. Japanese aid policies have been motivated by a range of different interests 
and objectives. Aid policies have been formulated by different parts of the aid 
bureaucracy, often without close coordination.
ODA to the Pacific island region has, over time, responded to an increasingly 
complex set of problems and pressures. This has reflected the broadening of Japan’s 
ODA program as a whole to encompass economic, political and diplomatic goals.
Japan’s aid policies to the Pacific island countries developed in the 1970s in response to 
challenges in the international Law of the Sea regime, as a way to secure access and 
protect the operations of Japan’s distant water fishing fleets. The task of securing access 
to coastal state economic zones widened in the 1980s and 1990s to include confronting 
regional management initiatives, protecting access to high seas fishing grounds, and 
easing the problems of adjustment facing the Japanese fishing industry. This part of 
Japan’s aid program was primarily shaped by the Fisheries Agency and industry groups.
Economic challenges were joined in the 1980s by strategic-political pressures, 
mainly emanating from the United States. Japan sought to contribute more to Western 
security efforts and to demonstrate its willingness to play a political role in regional 
affairs. This served as a rationale for increased aid flows under the Kuranari Doctrine, a 
policy initiative conceived and developed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA).
More recently, the challenge to Japan has been to adapt aid procedures and 
policies to regional and multilateral frameworks, in order to address development, 
environment and security issues. There have been growing expectations both from other 
donors and recipients in the region that Japan reform its aid policies and procedures, 
cooperate in joint aid programming and contribute to regional organisations. This is part 
of a broader process of using aid to demonstrate international leadership, which Japanese 
leaders have declared is a fundamental component of Japan’s foreign policy.
The changing aid policy context has raised a number of dilemmas. Most 
important are the underlying tensions within Japan’s aid program between its various 
goals and objectives. The extent to which these tensions are resolved depends on the 
administrative structures underpinning ODA and, in particular, the presence of
1 Alan Rix, Japan s Foreign Aid Challenge: Policy Reform and Aid Leadership, Routledge, London 
and New York, 1993, p.3.
coordination or conflict between policy makers. This is a crucial factor shaping Japan’s 
performance as an aid donor.
The study of Japan’s ODA to the Pacific island countries has shown how the 
decentralised aid bureaucracy in Japan has responded to the broadening of ODA goals 
and objectives. This has highlighted on-going coordination of policies between the 
government and private sector according to the principles and objectives of ‘economic 
cooperation’, but increasing conflicts between ministries and agencies within the aid 
administration. Thus, the approach that is developed integrates both the bureaucratic 
politics perspective of aid policy making and the ‘modified strong state’ paradigm.
While the bureaucratic politics model is central to explaining the incremental and 
reactive nature of Japanese policy making, the 'modified strong state’ paradigm is crucial 
to explaining the integration of the private sector into the aid bureaucracy and hence the 
coordination of public and private sector interests in ODA policy. But what the 
foregoing study reveals is the dynamic interplay of political, economic, private sector and 
bureaucratic factors underpinning Japan’s ODA policies. There is conflict between 
Japan’s political/ diplomatic goals on the one hand, and economic agendas on the other. 
This has made it more difficult to promote traditional economic interests through ODA. 
More generally, decision making procedures complicate and constrain the use of ODA as 
a foreign policy tool. This study suggests that while no one model of Japan’s aid system 
may account for the presence of competing aid policies and the problems of adapting the 
aid administration to shifting policy objectives, a more encompassing framework may be 
applicable to case studies of Japan’s ODA.
This study has argued that Japan’s fisheries interests have been the paramount 
influence on allocation of fisheries aid. There are linkages, both in policy rationale and in 
practice, between fisheries aid and the issue of access (including terms and conditions of 
access) to recipient states’ exclusive economic zones (EEZs). The special category of 
grant aid for fisheries was introduced precisely for the purpose of protecting the distant 
water operations of Japan’s fishing fleets. This reflects a long-standing principle of 
Japan’s ODA: economic cooperation with developing countries in order to support 
Japan’s economic interests (in this case, resource security). Key individuals have had a 
decisive impact on aid allocation and applying linkage. But while the institutional 
structures of Japan’s ODA program have facilitated close coordination between 
government and industry, the process of tying aid to access was complicated by aid 
policy procedures and bureaucratic politics. More specifically, procedural rigidity, the 
protracted project cycle, and the different views and interests of bureaucratic actors in 
aid policy have meant that in practice the linkage of aid and access was not always 
straightforward.
This policy area demonstrates the difficulty of achieving ‘Japanese goals while 
enhancing the welfare’ of recipients. The purpose of fisheries aid is to support the 
interests of Japan’s distant water fishing industry, ostensibly by providing assistance to
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coastal states. But in reality fisheries aid has been used as a ‘second best’ attempt to 
meet demands by regional states for improved terms and conditions of access. It has 
served as an indirect subsidy to industry and, at times, a negative sanction in negotiations 
with the region —  that is, as a political tool or an ‘influence attempt’ in the statecraft 
tradition.
While Japan’s fisheries aid may play an important role in assisting Pacific island 
states to develop their fishing industries, the approach to aid has not always put priority 
on the welfare of recipients nor on building goodwill between Japan and the region. 
Japan’s role as aid donor in the fisheries domain is seen to be driven primarily by its 
interests as a fishing nation; its aid has been viewed at times as a way of dividing the 
region and undermining multilateral initiatives. In addition, the quality of aid has been 
criticised for being inflated in cost, not based on adequate consultation with the region, 
and not aimed at addressing development needs of the region. These factors have created 
tensions between Japan and the island states.
Under the Kuranari Doctrine, aid policy was directed not primarily at the interests 
of the recipients or of Japan’s fisheries industry but at elevating Japan’s political status in 
the context of relations with other donors (the US in particular). This was a priority of 
MOFA and reflected a gradual politicisation of Japan’s ODA policies in the 1980s. The 
Kuranari initiative demonstrated how aid policy may develop in new directions without 
close coordination with existing aid agendas. The Kuranari Doctrine also highlighted the 
potential conflicts inherent in Japan’s ODA program —  between supporting political and 
economic goals.
To the policy makers in MOFA, the Pacific island region was a new diplomatic 
frontier. Burden-sharing, or supporting US strategic goals, was the main agenda. For the 
policy makers in the Fisheries Agency, on the other hand, the region was familiar 
territory, with which it had a long history of negotiation, cooperation and, at times, 
acrimony. Japan’s fisheries diplomacy was a special area, run by policy specialists who 
carefully tailored aid policy with fisheries access. They did not appreciate the diplomatic 
‘offensive’, with all the trappings of a foreign policy ‘doctrine’. To make matters worse, 
when the diplomats lost interest in the region and moved on to other issues, they left 
behind a more muddled and unstable relationship.
While MOFA officials talked mostly about ‘political stability’ and the ‘Soviet 
threat’, the Fisheries Agency was more preoccupied with US policy. The multilateral 
access agreement between the region and the US had directly challenged the interests of 
Japan’s fishing fleets. In this context, Japan and the US were rivals. US aid policy was 
being used in a way that undermined the negotiating position and power of Japan’s 
fishing industry and Fisheries Agency. The Kuranari declaration of support for the region 
unintentionally put additional pressure on the Fisheries Agency to address regional 
concerns regarding access agreements. As a result of both the US agreement and the 
Kuranari Doctrine, the Fisheries Agency and industry had to mobilise aid resources in
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order to counter the regional demands for higher access fees and multilateral 
arrangements.
One question that stands out in all of this is why, if MOFA concern had really 
been about the Soviet threat, MOFA officials did not respond in kind —  with an 
approach to fisheries agreements that would have made Soviet access agreements less 
attractive? This, after all, had been the US response. Would not Japan’s aid have been 
more ‘effective’ if utilised in the same way? Several factors were important in shaping 
policy to the region. The Fisheries Agency was opposed to such an approach (and this 
also reflected the influence of the Special Advisor at the time, Norio Fujinami). It wanted 
to keep arrangements bilateral, flexible and on terms that best suited the industry. MOFA 
was opposed to using aid to subsidise the operations of Japan’s fishing industry.2 MOFA 
also, traditionally, did not concern itself with fisheries aid policy. Finally, the multilateral 
approach would have meant a major shift in aid policy procedures, away from project 
based, bilateral grant aid.
This last factor has shaped Japan’s approach to regional and multilateral policy 
frameworks. Although Japan has engaged in multilateral donor dialogue, and declared its 
support for regional cooperation and participated in joint programming, it has maintained 
a long-standing preference for bilateral, project based aid. While Japan is responsive to 
international pressure and concerned about its status and image as a donor, it has not 
demonstrated strong commitment to policy reform. In fact, Japan has avoided measures 
that require major administrative and institutional adjustment. This raises another issue: 
how to play the role of a leading donor, meeting international and regional expectations, 
given the prevailing administrative and political structures underpinning ODA.
The resistance to reforms is largely due to the nature of the bureaucratic and 
economic interests that have supported, and in turn have been supported by, Japan’s 
ODA since its inception. Ministerial jurisdictions are jealously preserved and expanded 
only at the expense of another ministry or agency. The threat to power posed by reforms, 
which call for redistributing control over aid resources, creates resistance to change and 
hence a preference for the status quo. The role of the private sector in delivering ODA is 
also central to Japan’s aid program.
As a result of these structural factors, there is a strong tendency for aid 
allocations to be decided on an ad hoc basis where private sector, political and 
bureaucratic actors share input and shape outcomes. Policy innovation is driven mostly 
by criticism (both domestic and foreign) and by concerns about Japan’s ‘security’, 
broadly defined.3 This is evident in most cases covered in this study, including fisheries
2 It is possible that this reflects a concern by MOFA about appearances —  namely, that it should not 
appear an economically self-interested donor.
3 Robert M. Orr Jr., The Emergence of Japan s Foreign Aid Power, Columbia University Press, New 
York, 1990, p. 101.
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grants, the multilateral aid to the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and to 
the Forum Secretariat; fisheries joint ventures; and the new environmental focus in 
fisheries aid.
Decision making structures facilitate decentralisation and thus diversity of 
interests in ODA. But conversely, fragmentation of decision making structures and 
processes has meant a lack of coherence in aid policy and at times conflict between 
various parts of Japan’s aid program. This is most evident in the area of fisheries aid and 
the Kuranari aid initiative.
Assessing aid as economic statecraft
The concept of aid as economic statecraft suggests several levels at which to analyse the 
goals of Japan’s aid diplomacy; namely 1) in terms of relations with recipients; 2) in 
terms of relations with other developing countries; and 3) in terms of relations with other 
donors and/or allies. Japan’s goals have been broadly divided into those of the fisheries 
industry and Fisheries Agency, and those of MOFA.
In the area of fisheries aid, the main target of policy was the actual recipients. 
Japan aimed to influence the policies of recipients regarding the access fee. Aid was both 
a subsidy to the fishing industry and a lever in negotiations with coastal states. The goal 
of policy makers was to keep access fees to levels the industry could meet. More 
generally, Japan sought to encourage recipient states to support it on regional 
management issues and to guarantee its vessels secure access to their economic zones. 
There have also been attempts to defuse opposition to Japanese policies (such as driftnet 
fishing) and to build diplomatic support for Japan.
Non-fisheries aid has been motivated by the goal of securing diplomatic support 
of recipients in international fora. The declared intention to preempt Soviet offers of aid 
(which underpinned the Kuranari Doctrine policy) did not appear to subsequently feature 
in Japanese aid policy. But the main target of non-fisheries aid was other countries, 
mainly other donors. The goals of Japan’s aid policies have been to attract attention to its 
international efforts, especially with regard to playing a role in promoting regional 
‘political stability’. This policy was encapsulated in the Kuranari Doctrine. The fact that 
so much media attention surrounded this initiative was symptomatic of the public 
relations effect it was designed to achieve. An unstated agenda was to defuse tensions or 
criticisms over broader economic relations, such as trade, by demonstrating political 
commitment to contribute to development in the region. Japan has also adopted 
measures, such as the ODA Charter, in response to criticisms and to pressures that it 
play a more constructive role through ODA in addressing global development and 
security issues.
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What does the foregoing study suggest about the effectiveness of Japan’s aid 
diplomacy in respect of these goals?
In terms of influencing recipient policies, Japan has succeeded in maintaining 
reasonably low access fees in most of the arrangements it has in the region, but it failed 
to re-start an important agreement with Papua New Guinea because of disagreement 
over the fee level (and Japan’s proposed aid and access fee formula). Moreover, while 
bilateral arrangements may have been relatively easy to influence, Japan failed to stem 
the tide of multilateralism in the region. This has been spurred on mainly by the success 
of the US multilateral access agreement, which led to more concerted efforts in 
concluding other regional management and conservation arrangements. These have put 
additional pressures on the fishing industry. There has also been strong opposition to 
Japan on other issues, especially nuclear and environmental ones.
Where there is less contentious debate, island states have generally found it to be 
in their interests to support Japan (such as supporting Japanese candidates in 
international fora) .4 This reflects the importance of Japan’s economic assistance to 
regional countries. But it is likely that Japan would enjoy better relations with the region 
if it took steps to address regional requests, such as the proposed regional economic 
centre in Tokyo. This has been resisted so as not to set what is seen as an unwanted 
precedent with other developing countries.
In terms of relations with other donors and allies, while the Kuranari Doctrine 
achieved the desired effect of establishing the view that Japan’s commitment to the 
region had entered a new, more meaningful phase, the other side of the coin was that this 
introduced new tensions in Japan’s foreign relations. These stemmed in part from 
conflicts in other areas (such as between the US and Japan in the fisheries domain). But 
there were also problems of adapting Japan’s aid program to regional initiatives favoured 
by other donors, notably Australia. In general, Japan’s policy innovations have not 
succeeded in easing tensions with key allies, in part because they do not go very far 
towards addressing donor concerns, and in part because they have the potential to pose a 
political challenge. This is reflected at the global level in US-Japan relations.
There are problems for Japan in using aid as a foreign policy tool. Although aid is 
utilised in ways that aim to address perceived threats and challenges in the international 
domain, this study has shown that Japan’s ODA is not a very flexible or decisive policy 
instrument. In making policy, there is a need to compromise and to consult. This leads to 
delay and to opportunities for conflict between policy makers. This process also 
obstructs innovation and reform. Policy makers may work at cross-purposes, extending 
from individuals to ministries and agencies —  for example, between MOFA and the 
Fisheries Agency; MOFA and the Ministry of Finance; and even MOFA and the Japan
4 Although there is no quantitative evidence on hand to demonstrate Pacific island voting patterns in the 
United Nations, regional officials acknowledged in interviews with the author that they generally voted 
in favour of Japanese candidature in the Security Council or for other international posts.
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International Cooperation Agency (JICA). Aid policy making is marked by 
decentralisation and fragmentation of power, overlapping jurisdictional domains, and 
different views of the purpose of aid in relation to Japan’s national interests.
This finding challenges the view that Japan’s ODA is ‘strategically coordinated’. 
Although this is certainly the intention of policy makers most of the time, the reality is 
more complex. The finding also challenges the view that Japan’s aid diplomacy has been 
‘extremely successful’ and that, in broader terms, Japan has ‘overwhelmingly achieved 
[its] national goals of economic security ... economic superpower status and foreign 
recognition of its achievements’.5 The analysis of Pacific island multilateral diplomacy in 
the fisheries domain revealed how small and extremely vulnerable states may enhance 
their leverage in relations with Japan, and counter pressures and threats from a 
significant aid donor.
Issues of power
The common view of Japan’s role in the Pacific island region is that it is an economic 
giant that is capable of, if it has not already attained, dominance not just in aid but in the 
‘totality of relations’.6 Japan’s economic importance to the region certainly should not 
be underestimated, especially for countries which are highly dependent on ODA and face 
the prospect of declining aid revenues from other sources. This study attests to the 
influence that Japan’s ODA may have. For example, when negotiating access 
agreements, most countries in the region have been unwilling to forego (indefinitely) the 
benefits of fisheries aid and access fee revenue. But what is ‘aid power’?
As suggested in Chapter 1, aid power refers to the ability to influence, using 
resources that have a ‘reasonable semblance of a market price’. This definition does not 
rule out power based on political or military factors, in addition to economic factors. The 
discussion of Japan’s use of aid as a form of statecraft in relations with the Pacific island 
states points to an emphasis on economic influence.
In this study, questions have been raised about the limits of aid power, and about 
how to translate economic influence into political influence. Japan’s ability to project 
power through aid depends on a complex set of factors, not least the convergence of 
political interest in Japan, with policy actors working together, rather than at odds. The 
study points to procedural rigidity, the existence of competing policy agendas, and an 
absence of close coordination within the aid administration. These factors constrain the 
use of aid as a foreign policy tool. In this context, it is necessary to question simplistic 
assertions that Japan’s volume of aid amounts to ‘aid power’.7
5 William Nester, ‘The Third World in Japanese Foreign Policy’, in Kathleen Newland (ed.), The 
International Relations of Japan, Millenium Publishing Group/ MacMillan, London, 1990.
6 Alan Rix, Japan Foreign Aid Challenge, p.176.
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It is also the case that aid is sometimes used as an attempt to compensate for 
weakness in other areas (for example, to ease adjustment in a declining industry). In 
other words, rather than a statement of national strength, it may be that aid is sometimes 
driven by internal weakness. This was apparent in the area of fisheries aid diplomacy. 
Japan’s position as a fishing power was weakened significantly by the Law of the Sea 
Convention, which exacerbated economic problems of the distant water fishing industry. 
Aid resources were mobilised in an effort to counter political challenges posed by the 
new regime. But while the Law of the Sea regime undermined the interests of Japan, it 
strengthened the bargaining power and leverage of the Pacific island countries. Japan’s 
fisheries aid diplomacy was a response to, and an attempt to counter, the multilateral 
initiatives of the Pacific island states.
The study reveals elements of power on the part of the small island states not 
usually considered in analyses of Japan-Pacific island relations. These include regional 
cooperation and collective diplomacy by the island states, based largely on the legal 
framework created by the Law of the Sea Convention. US-Japan rivalry as fishing 
powers, and US policy in support of regional positions, have also strengthened the 
position of the island states in relations with Japan. Cold War politics elevated the 
importance of the region in the foreign policy calculations of both the US and Japan, and 
island states were successful in exploiting Western concerns about the Soviet Union in 
order to attract more aid. These factors have increased the power of the island states vis- 
a-vis Japan. Collective diplomacy has boosted the combined weight of countries in 
international fora; it has also led to multilateral measures such as the US multilateral 
fisheries treaty. In some cases, island states have utilised bureaucratic politics in Japan to 
their advantage, as a bargaining tool. For example, Papua New Guinea responded to aid 
pressure in fisheries negotiations with Japan by questioning the authority of the Fisheries 
Agency, and addressing its concerns to MOFA. This led to contradictory policies being 
articulated.
Another point that is important when considering the question of aid power is the 
kind of dependence that is generated. Japan’s aid flows to the region are often irregular, 
reflecting the problem of adapting processes and procedures to conditions in the region, 
as well as ambivalence about the importance of aid to the region. Aid is usually centred 
on large-scale infrastructure projects. The benefits of infrastructure development may not 
easily be translated throughout society. Large-scale infrastructure projects often create 
untenable cost burdens for island states. In some cases, projects end up as ‘white 
elephants’, especially if there is no back-up support in the form of ‘experts’ for
7 There is a tendency to treat Japan’s aid flows as an indicator of its broader power in global terms. See, 
for example, Gavan McCormack, ‘Pacific Dreamtime and Japan’s New MUlciunanism', Australian 
Outlook, Vol.43, No.2, August 1989, pp.64-73.
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instance.8 Moreover, in the absence of infrastructure projects being identified and 
requested, flows are not continuous from year to year.
The result is an uneven dependence on Japan. There is also uncertainty about the 
nature and reliability of Japan’s aid commitment to the region. Experience of Japan’s aid 
policies have tempered regional expectations of Japan. The hard-line approach of some 
officials in Japan towards Pacific island countries, for example the treatment of Tuvalu, 
also fed the view that Japan is a difficult and not very generous donor.9
The thesis raises a number of questions that may be taken up in further studies. If 
extremely small states have succeeded, to some extent, in balancing Japan’s economic 
weight with political and diplomatic strategies, what implications does this have for 
Japan’s aid relationships where there are less extreme disparities between Japan and 
recipients? How far have aid relations between the Pacific island states and other donors 
reflected similar patterns; are there lessons for the region in terms of its conduct of aid 
diplomacy more generally?
Future directions
Japan’s political commitment to providing aid to the region has long been shaped by the 
salience of specific foreign policy and economic objectives. This commitment has not 
rested on provision of aid as an end in itself.
Japan’s ODA to the Pacific islands has mainly been driven by threats and 
challenges to its interests in the international arena. But, in this context, it is perhaps 
more of a problem for the region that Japan now perceives few compelling interests, 
apart from fisheries, in providing aid to the Pacific island states. This in turn has 
weakened the political will in Japan to address regional concerns. The study suggests 
that policy innovation (for example, fisheries grant aid and multilateral aid to the Forum 
Secretariat) has generally resulted from political and economic pressures. These also 
required a domestic political environment supportive of new aid measures. While 
fisheries interests still command interest in Japan, it also seems that the fate of the distant 
water fishing industry is no longer of sufficient political concern to generate support for
8 This was underscored by the experience of Papua New Guinea. A fisheries training vessel, provided by 
Japan as part of a grant to establish the National Fisheries College in 1977, ceased operations in 1983 
after Japan withdrew its expert. An assessment by Papua New Guinea officials in 1989 found that, 
overall, ‘resources and facilities [were] inadequate to carry out effective training’. Department of 
Fisheries and Marine Resources, ‘Summary of Fisheries Developments in Papua New Guinea’, 
PNG/OFCF Colloquium, Tokyo, November 1989. Evaluations of other Japanese aid projects revealed 
that recurrent cost and maintenance are a principal problem in the region. See FAIR Committee for 
Oceania and Pacific Island Countries, Japanese ODA to Pacific Island Countries: Current Problems 
and Future Perspectives, FAIR, Tokyo, March 1993.
9 Tuvalu is Japan’s smallest recipient in the region and has few national resources. In Chapter 3, it was 
noted how the Economic Cooperation Bureau in MOFA was planning to reduce aid to Tuvalu after it 
was alleged that Tuvalu’s Prime Minister was critical of Japanese ODA. Problems of Japan’s aid were 
highlighted by the fate of a fisheries project (a fishing wharf) provided to Tuvalu by Japan. Soon after 
the completion of the project in 1992, the wharf was destroyed by a storm. It has since not been replaced.
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more direct contributions to the region under a multilateral agreement. Nor, with the end 
of the Cold War, is there more broad based political interest in the region sufficient to 
support the introduction of other policy reforms.
But Japan’s contributions are still vital to the region’s economic development. 
Regional leaders believe that Japanese private sector and government support is crucial 
to the economic future of their countries. For this reason, the Forum Secretariat, as 
regional coordinator and interlocutor, has been at pains to stress that the island states are 
an integral part of the Asia Pacific region and hence their interests should not be 
forgotten.10
It was evident as early as 1988 that the Japanese government did not expect 
ODA to continue indefinitely or even to play the key role in regional development. 
Foreign Minister Kuranari, speaking at the Sasakawa Pacific island leaders conference, 
stated that while the government of Japan had taken the initiative in promoting economic 
cooperation with the Pacific islands, ‘in the long run it is the private sector that would be 
expected to assume primary responsibility in extending cooperation to the region’.* 11 
This statement was directed at ‘private aid’ such as the donations of the Sasakawa Peace 
Foundation.12 It also reflected the broader Japanese view of aid as economic 
cooperation. This view holds that the government is not responsible for the development 
of recipient countries but works to promote and support private sector activity (for 
example, providing national infrastructure development), which ultimately holds the key, 
especially for small-scale industry development. As MOFA policy makes clear: ‘the 
development of vigorous business activity by the private sector is vital to the 
advancement of the developing countries, and it is important to recognise that aid can 
contribute to the creation of environments for such activity through improvement of 
industrial and social infrastructure’.13
Japanese policy on supporting private sector links between Japan and the region 
has been promoted through the Pacific-wide economic fora. In 1988 an initiative was 
taken to establish a Pacific Islands Nations Task Force in the Pacific Economic 
Cooperation Council (PECC).14 Introduced by Dr Saburo Okita at the Osaka PECC 
General Meeting, this initiative aimed to consolidate closer ties between the region and
10 See, for example, Statement by Ieremia Tabai, Secretary General, Forum Secretariat, to Fourth APEC 
Ministerial Meeting, Bangkok, Thailand, 10-11 September 1992.
11 Friendship Across Oceans, Peace Across Borders, The Pacific Islands Nations Conference,
Sasakawa Peace Foundation, August 1988 (Conference proceedings in English and Japanese), p.107.
12 The Sasakawa Foundation established a Pacific islands fund in 1988 with an endowment of 3 billion 
yen. A total of 267.7 million yen was spent on projects in the three years between 1990 and 1992. Data 
provided by Sasakawa Peace Foundation.
13 MOFA, Japan’s Official Development Assistance 1991 Annual Report, p . l l .
14 PECC was formally the Pacific Economic Cooperation Conference.
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PECC. The terms of reference of the task force, drawn up in 1989, included developing 
entrepreneurial skills and small business joint ventures, promoting private sector 
cooperation between PECC countries and the region, and involving the region more 
effectively in PECC.15
But despite being introduced by Japanese officials, there was little tangible 
support for the task force once it was created. Japan opposed measures, recommended 
by other members of the task force (US and Taiwan) that required a substantial financial 
commitment by Japan, including the funding of a proposed ‘information exchange centre’ 
in the region.16 These ideas were seen to be too much a radical departure from the work 
of existing PECC task forces. The response perhaps also demonstrated a lack of 
Japanese political and private sector interest in the region. The limited support for the 
proposal to establish a Pacific regional office in Tokyo in order to facilitate trade, 
investment and tourism links between Japan and the region also indicates a lack of strong 
commitment to the goals of supporting private sector development.
Perhaps more important than the PECC framework in terms of the future 
direction of Japanese aid to the region is the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) 
forum. APEC may primarily be a vehicle for promoting regional trade liberalisation, but 
aid issues are also on its agenda. APEC is viewed in Japan as one way of promoting a 
policy of ‘South South cooperation’.17 Also called ‘APEC version triangular 
cooperation’18, this refers to cooperation between developed and more advanced 
developing countries in providing aid to less developed countries. The emphasis, since 
this approach was mooted, has been on ASEAN cooperation.19 For example, both 
Singapore and Thailand have concluded agreements with Japan to undertake joint 
dispatch of ‘experts’ to third countries as technical cooperation. Another case of 
‘trilateral cooperation’ involves the cooperation of Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia and 
Philippines with Japan in providing ‘experts’ to help resettle refugees in Cambodia. The 
funding for this cooperation is provided by Japan through a United Nations Development 
Program fund.20
15 Pacific Economic Cooperation Conference, Background paper, Forum Secretariat, Suva, 1989; 
‘Activities of the Task Forces’, Pacific Cooperation Newsletter, N o.14, Spring 1990, p.9.
16 Interview, Professor Akio Watanabe, University of Tokyo, February 1993; ‘Standing Committee 
Meetings I and II’, Pacific Cooperation Newsletter, No. 16, Spring 1991, p .l. Professor Watanabe was 
Japan’s leading representative on the PECC Pacific Island Nations Task Force.
17 Interview, Technical Cooperation Division, MOFA, Tokyo, January 1993.
18 This term was introduced by Foreign Minister Yohei Kono in November 1994. See Yomiuri shimbun, 
8 November 1994 (morning edition) p. 2. See also ‘Foreign Minister Kono to Propose Dual Methods of 
Cooperation at APEC Meeting’, Asahi shimbun, 8 November, 1994 (morning edition), p .l.
19 ‘Miyazawa to Propose Aid Plan to ASEAN’, The Daily Yomiuri, 5 January 1993, p .l.
20 MOFA, Japan s Official Development Assistance 1994 Annual Report, pp.216-17.
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The Asia Pacific fora will likely play a more important role in Japan’s future aid 
policy. It is possible that Japan may delegate some responsibility for Pacific island 
regional development to other countries through the APEC forum. But a more urgent 
issue at present is building on the regional dialogue among island states and coordination 
among donor countries.21 It is necessary for both the region and Japan to demonstrate 
commitment to building closer cooperation, not just on aid issues but across the 
economic and political spectrum.
In this context, the region is well placed to build on the experience in the fisheries 
domain, where there are complementary and interlocking ties between Japan and the 
island states. Managing relations with Japan in this area has required regional cohesion 
and collective diplomacy, as well as building alliances with other major powers. The 
result has seen a gradual move towards institutionalised regional arrangements and 
gradual acceptance of these by Japan.
Japan’s future role in the region will depend on its commitment to policies and 
reforms that promote development in island states, in ways that achieve optimal results 
for both donor and recipient. An interesting task for further study would be identifying 
other areas where regional cooperation and Japanese interests can work together in this 
endeavour. The search for common ground in Japan-Pacific island relations has probably 
only just begun.
21 These were described in Chapter 7. See also Savenaca Siwatibau, ‘Policy Discipline from Outside?’, 
Pacific Economic Bulletin, Vol.9, No.2, December 1994, pp.46-50.
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APPENDIX 1
List of Interviewees
Thomas Dirona Abe, Counsellor, Papua New Guinea Embassy, Tokyo, Japan, 26 March,
1993.
Ambassador Kinja Andrike, Embassy of the Republic of Marshall Islands, Tokyo, Japan, 2 
June, 1993.
Dr Masateru Anraku, Chief Fisheries Officer, Overseas Fisheries Cooperation Foundation, 
Suva Office, Fiji, 16 July, 1993.
David Blackstock, Director, Legal and Political Division, Forum Secretariat, Suva, Fiji, 
January 1993.
Akira Chiba, Assistant Director, Grant Aid Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tokyo, 
Japan, 22 May, 1993.
Masaru Ebihara, Director, Project Operations Division, Overseas Fisheries Cooperation 
Foundation, Tokyo, Japan, 12 March, 1993.
John Fritz, First Secretary, Embassy of Federated States of Micronesia, Tokyo, Japan, 3 
June, 1993.
Norio Fujinami, Former Special Advisor to the Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and 
Fisheries, (Fisheries), Tokyo, Japan, 12 May, 1993.
Bill Gibbons-Fly, Fisheries Section, US State Department, Washington DC, 9 February,
1994.
Yasuo Ishimoto, Managing Director, Overseas Agro-Fisheries Consultants Company, 
Tokyo, Japan, 6 July 1993, 9 July 1993.
Sir Peter Kenilorea, Director, Forum Fisheries Agency, Honiara, Solomon Islands, 
November, 1993.
Tokuya Kikuchi, Executive Managing Director, Overseas Fisheries Cooperation 
Foundation, Tokyo, Japan, 28 June, 1993.
Yoshiyuki Kimura, Assistant Director, Oceania Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
Tokyo, Japan, 24 June, 1993.
Professor Izumi Kobayashi, Director, Japan-Micronesia Association, Tokyo, Japan, 9 
December, 1992, 20 March, 1993.
Seiji Kojima, Director, Research and Programming Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
Tokyo, Japan, 29 October, 1992.
Tokugoro Kuribayashi, Honourary Consul-General, Republic of Kiribati, Tuvalu, Tokyo, 
Japan, 16 February, 1993.
Peniasi Kunatuba, Director of Fisheries, Ministry of Primary Industries, Suva, Fiji, January 
1993.
Dan Larson, US Agency for International Development, State Department, Washington 
DC, 9 February, 1994.
Hiroshi Matsuura, Oceania Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tokyo, Japan, May,
1992.
Masaaki Miyamoto, Program Administrator, The Sasakawa Peace Foundation, Tokyo, 
November, 1992.
Hiroshi Nakajima, Executive Director, The Pacific Society, Tokyo, Japan, 23 March, 1993.
Masaaki Nakamura, International Department, Federation of Japan Tuna Fisheries 
Cooperatives Association, Tokyo, Japan, 26 May, 1993.
Yutaka Nakamura, Oceania Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tokyo, Japan, 6 
November, 1992.
Ambassador Satya Nandan, Chairman, United Nations Conference on Straddling Fish 
Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, New York, 27 January, 1994.
Tom Nitta, Planning Department, Japan International Cooperation Agency, Tokyo, Japan, 
21 December, 1992.
Dr Saburo Okita, Chairman, Institute for Domestic and International Policy Studies, Tokyo, 
Japan, May 1992.
Dr Robert M. Orr, Jr., Institute for Pacific Rim Studies, Temple University, Japan, Tokyo, 
Japan, February, 1993.
Shizuo Saito, Former Ambassador to Australia, Tokyo, Japan, November, 1992.
Tatsuo Saito, Special Advisor to the Minister for Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries 
(Fisheries), Tokyo, Japan, 18 May, 1993.
Hiroya Sano, President, Japan Fisheries Association, Tokyo, Japan, 24 June, 1993.
Kuni Sato, Former Deputy Director, Oceania Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs;
Embassy of Japan, Bangkok, Thailand, 28 April, 1993.
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Mitsuko Shino, Technical Cooperation Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tokyo, Japan, 
5 January, 1993.
Ieremia Tabai, Secretary General, Forum Secretariat, (meeting in Yokohama, Japan) 7 
March, 1993.
Yasuho Tadokoro, Director, Fisheries Cooperation Division, Japan International 
Cooperation Agency, Tokyo, Japan, 17 May, 1993.
Futoshi Takahashi, Grant Aid Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tokyo, Japan, 25 
February, 1993.
Takeshi Tanabe, Development Cooperation Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tokyo, 
Japan, 16 March, 1993.
Nobuaki Tanaka, Former Director, Oceania Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs; 
Counsellor, Embassy of Japan, Bangkok, Thailand, 20 April, 1993; 26 April 1993.
Ambassador John Trotter, Embassy of Australia, Suva, Fiji, 27 January, 1993.
Atsushi Ueno, Grant Aid Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tokyo, Japan, 16 December, 
1992.
Kenichi Unno, President, Overseas Fisheries Cooperation Foundation, Tokyo, Japan, 28 
June, 1993.
Professor Akio Watanabe, University of Tokyo, 15 February, 1993.
Hiromoto Watanabe, Fisheries Coordinator, International Affairs Division, Fisheries 
Agency of Japan, Tokyo, Japan, 7 April, 1993; 18 May, 1993; 5 July 1993.
Tsutomo Watanabe, Executive Director, Federation of Japan Tuna Fisheries Cooperatives 
Association, 20 May, 1993.
Andrew Wright, Deputy Director, Forum Fisheries Agency, Honiara, Solomon Islands, 
November, 1993.
Makoto Yamashita, Second Secretary, Embassy of Japan, Suva, Fiji, January, 1993.
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